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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, the work of Serge Moscovici on the human history of nature is 
made relevant to his theory of social representations. This theoretical synthesis breaks 
away both from the realist assumption of a given, immutable and non-socialised 
nature, and from the individualist conceptualisations of man-environment relations 
which still dominate environmental, ecological and social psychology. It is argued that 
social representations are not solely the concern of epistemology; they have 
ontological correlates and are involved in the social construction on nature. The 
empirical study investigates how social representations of nature functioned in 
Shetland - a society which combines traditional and late modern features - in the wake 
of the Braer oil spill in January 1993. The findings are based on the qualitative 
analysis of 17 individual interviews, five small group discussions, 375 articles from 
the newspaper The Shetland Times, the transcript of a public debate on the Cost of the 
Braer for Shetland and, more generally, participant observation. The analysis reveals 
the synchronic existence of three distinct, yet interrelated, social representations of 
nature: organic, mechanistic and cybernetic. Each of them is intrinsically related to 
a particular sense of identity, mode of knowledge, and mode of relations to nature. 
"Real Shetlanders" hold predominantly organic representations, whereby nature 
constitutes a repository of their history, a definer of their identity as a marginal but 
resilient community. It is known through direct engagement and participation in a life 
world. By contrast, "Sooth-Moothers" (outsiders) hold mechanistic and/or cybernetic 
representations which rest upon some universal, abstract knowledge of the systemic 
properties of "the environment". Their relations to nature oscillate between 
domination, mastery and protection. However, the imperatives facing the community, 
together with constant exchanges of information via the media, blur the boundaries 
between representations. 
Key words: Social representations, nature, environment, social constructionism, 
Shetland, identity, transition, crisis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is always difficult to identify the complex motivations and circumstances 
which lead to a thesis; and it is almost impossible to account for the actual process 
of conducting research in a way which respects the true chronology of events. This 
thesis stems from a long-running and deep-seated concern for the ways in which 
human beings represent, experience, create and change their social and material 
world. It attempts to understand how members of a society come to see their world 
as real, objective and natural, and how they produce and sustain a shared 
understanding of this world in the flux of everyday life. 
No empirical object seemed to allow us to discuss such issues better than what 
is referred to, in common sense and science alike, as "nature". The choice of nature 
as an object of investigation is to be explained, partly, by the proliferation of 
scientific and moral discourses around the "natural question" over the last thirty 
years. These discourses are now integral to the common sense of Western societies. 
What was hitherto relatively unproblematic suddenly became the object of intense 
symbolic activity and the site of important power struggles. Once thought of as an 
orderly, stable and finite (if as yet undiscovered) set of matter and forces, "nature" 
now also appears as changing and fragile. Novel social representations of nature are 
forming before our very eyes. Their emergence raises profound practical and 
existential issues. The transformations in people's symbolic and material relations to 
"nature" - or rather, to "the environment" - made it both possible and necessary to 
reflect upon the socially constructed character of "nature" and to explore how 
different social groups create and contest the meanings surrounding this object. 
Partly too, "nature" seemed to constitute a critical case with respect to the 
theory of social representations. This theory is firmly rooted in a social 
constructionist epistemology. It makes a number of claims concerning both the 
epistemological and the ontological status of social representations. First, social 
representations are systems of ideas, beliefs, images and practices which provide 
members of a given society with the resources for understanding their world. Second, 
social representations actually constitute the "environment" in which people live. 
Taken together, these propositions account for the two-fold status of social 
representations as psychological structures and as social realities. The fundamental 
interrogation of this thesis is to investigate whether and how social representations can 
be said to actually create the "natural" world. Do social representations amount to 
nothing more than historically changing conceptions of otherwise identical objects (in 
this case, "nature"), or do they actually create new objects (and subjects)? The 
present study only aims to map out a coherent way of thinking about these issues. 
My theoretical and analytical efforts were prompted by the grounding of the 
tanker Braer in Shetland. On the morning of January 5, 1993, the fully laden tanker 
Braer ran aground in Shetland, releasing its entire cargo of 85,000 tonnes of light 
crude oil on the southern and eastern coasts of the Shetland archipelago. Perversely, 
this crisis seemed to constitute an ideal methodological situation to investigate how 
people represent nature. The very location of the spill was favourable: Shetland is 
isolated by some two hundred miles of water from both the Scottish mainland and 
Norway. It has a distinct culture and dialect where British and Norse influences 
blend. It is a tight-knit community; dialogues and debates - to which the local 
newspapers would undoubtedly contribute - were likely to be intense in the wake of 
the oil spill. This was crucial: nature is so fundamental to the experience of everyday 
life, so taken-for-granted, that it is rarely discussed. A profoundly disruptive event 
of the scale of the Braer incident ensured that Shetlanders would become more aware 
of their feelings and thoughts about nature and would be better able to talk about 
them. This, coupled with the over-night arrival of more than a thousand foreigners -
journalists, scientists, politicians, volunteers, environmentalists, etc. - was bound to 
generate new and contradictory meanings with respect to nature. Furthermore, the 
practical imperatives facing the community called for action, for social representations 
to be expressed in material practices. The sudden character of the oil spill also 
provided a rare opportunity to analyse social representations in the making. 
I arrived in Shetland eight days after the incident with a number of questions 
in mind. How do Shetlanders represent nature? How does the physical environment 
become meaningful for individuals and groups? What are the other, non-indigenous, 
representations of nature circulating in Shetland? How does the local population 
assimilate, or reject, elements of these unfamiliar representations? What happens 
when a whole community is faced by such a profound disruption? What are the 
dynamics of change and stability, of conflict and consensus? Is the crisis simply the 
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stage for a battle between various representations, or do these conflicting 
representations themselves generate the crisis? These are some of the questions which 
appear en filigrane throughout the thesis and which orientate the analysis. 
This study, then, is spatially and historically situated. It attempts to describe 
and explain the social psychological practices of different social actors in Shetland 
with respect to "nature", in the highly effervescent context of a major social and 
ecological crisis. To recognise the situational character of empirical work, however, 
is not to preclude the possibility of transcending, at least partly, the particularity of 
the case. It is, rather, to be committed to the basic principle that concrete human 
events are always rooted in a context and that there exists a mutual determination of 
events and context. It is to seek to preserve the integrity of social psychological 
phenomena. 
What, then, allows us to transcend the immediate situation? Firstly, the 
inescapable consideration that human beings, as producers and users of symbols, do 
have the capacity to transcend their immediate reality and to bring their experience 
to bear in constructing other meanings, across different situations. Secondly, the 
trans-situational character of social representations themselves. Social representations 
are the result of the collective life of groups; they emerge in the course of social 
interaction and communication. In a word, they circulate. Thus, many aspects of 
social representations belong to the broader context of Western social life. Thirdly, 
the theoretical implications of the research findings. Refinement of the theory of 
social representations is bound to result in an increased power to describe and to 
explain a wider range of social psychological phenomena. And fourthly, the reflection 
about the state of the entire discipline of social psychology (and related disciplines) 
which this kind of research makes necessary. In particular, I am thinking about the 
perennial problem of coming to grips with the elusive "social", and that, at the 
epistemological, theoretical and methodological levels. For all these reasons, I believe 
that grounded, situational research can play a crucial role in developing better social 
science. 
* * * * * * * * * 
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The case of the Braer oil spill is central to this thesis. Unusually, and because 
of the sudden and relatively short-lived nature of the events which I sought to analyse 
as they unfolded, the data were collected prior to the full development of the 
theoretical framework. This is not to say that the data were gathered arbitrarily or 
that the analysis is entirely data-driven. It simply means that the theoretical 
framework was elaborated with a constant concern for Shetlanders' representations 
of nature, as I had already begun to apprehend them during the fieldwork. 
The present thesis comprises three sections: three theoretical chapters, two 
concerning methodological issues, and three devoted to the empirical analysis. 
Chapter One critically examines the disciplines of environmental psychology and 
ecological psychology (or behavioural ecology). It follows my search through the 
psychological literature on "man-environment relations" for models to account for the 
data collected in Shetland. This search proved to be of little use, mainly because of 
the epistemological and methodological assumptions of the individualism which 
informs that literature and, as I would find out later, of the particular representations 
of nature which underpin most of the studies conducted by environmental and 
ecological psychologists. Thus, although this first chapter does not directly contribute 
to the analysis, it serves, a contrario, to clarify the perspective opened by the theory 
of social representations, and to highlight the radical character of the theoretical 
synthesis proposed here in the context of traditional psychology. 
Chapter Two introduces the theory of social representations, its history, its 
workings and its aims. It focuses more particularly on two inter-related questions 
which are at the centre of contemporary debates: first, what exactly is the meaning 
of social constructionism in social representations theory?; and second, to what extent 
can the phenomena of social representations be said to be distinctly modern and 
particular to Western societies? I take a strong social constructionist stance and argue 
that the theory ought to favour an anti-generalist view of society and of social 
psychological phenomena. I also argue that the main contribution of this theory rests 
in its potential for overcoming a number of the dualisms which have plagued our 
discipline. 
Chapter Three provides a counterpoint to the environmental and ecological 
psychological perspectives discussed in the first chapter. It proposes a 
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problematisation of nature as a social construct. This is achieved in two ways. First, 
I establish the relevance of the theory of social representations to this endeavour by 
examining social representational studies of objects as diverse as the human body, 
childhood or gender. Second, I draw on two essays by Serge Moscovici - Society  
against Nature (1972/1994) and Essai sur l'Histoire Humaine de la Nature 
(1968/1977) - to develop a theoretical perspective which allows us to apprehend 
nature as the objectifications of symbolic and material practices. These two essays are 
reframed within the perspective of the theory of social representations. They provide 
a tripartite typology with which to analyse the various representations of nature 
uncovered in Shetland in the aftermath of the Braer. 
Methodological issues are addressed in two separate chapters. Chapter Four 
discusses the nature of case studies and their pertinence for the study of social 
representations. In the first part, I argue that in spite of the criticisms often levelled 
at case studies concerning their lack of generalisability, validity and replicability, the 
latter can offer invaluable insights into complex social psychological processes. I 
emphasise the value of a particular type of case - crises - to reveal latent 
representations, to demonstrate how novel realities are made familiar, to foster 
change, and to highlight the structural relations between representational activity and 
social processes. I then present a diary of the Braer incident: the main events, social 
actors, and political, economic and symbolic stakes which provide both the context 
and the object of my empirical investigation. 
In Chapter Five, I turn to the specific methods of data collection and data 
analysis which were triangulated to account for the social representations of nature 
circulating in Shetland. Individual interviews with Shetland residents, discussions in 
"natural" groups, the local newspaper The Shetland Times, and a public debate 
organised by BBC Radio Scotland were all qualitatively content analysed. I also 
engaged in participant observation. This multi-method design enabled me to gain 
access to the multiple versions of reality constructed by different social actors in 
Shetland, to focus simultaneously on discourses and practices, and to grasp social 
representations of nature in their sociogenetic, microgenetic and ontogenetic 
dimensions. For each method, I provide a theoretical and empirical rationale, and 
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describe the specific procedures entailed. I then move on to discuss how the data from 
these diverse sources will be integrated. 
In the remaining three chapters, I present my findings. In a typical 
anthropological fashion, I have selected and presented the data according to themes 
which were either empirically salient or theoretically significant, and I have linked 
the genesis of these various themes to particular social groups (or "natural 
categories"). Whenever possible, I have used data from all of the sources to support 
my interpretative claims. Some themes were theory-driven, others arose more directly 
from the data. The delineation of social groups was conspicuous in the discourses of 
Shetlanders themselves, who drew sharp distinctions between "real Shetlanders" 
(crofters and farmers, fishermen, or people working in fish factories), "born and bred 
Shetlanders" (the indigenous population who do not contribute to sustaining the 
idealised traditional culture, but often wish to modernise Shetland society and to 
integrate it into global structures), and "Sooth-Moothers" (those who are not born in 
Shetland, whether they reside there or not, and who explicitly threaten the local 
ethos). In chapter six, I explore the relationship between being a "real Shetlander" 
and participating in the traditional "way of life". The slow pace of change means that 
the physical world has remained remarkably stable over the centuries and that the 
indigenous population has evolved complex nature-related knowledges and practices 
-organic representations of nature - which are now inscribed in a landscape which
symbolises the traditional way of life and which shapes Shetlanders' identity. I also 
discuss how traditional symbols are progressively being emptied of an reality but are 
nevertheless used to sustain a fiction of social homogeneity. 
In Chapter Seven, I examine the impact of late modernity in Shetland. I show 
that Shetland, nowadays, is immersed in global processes which intertwine with 
traditional ones and deeply modify social relations, modes of knowledge, social and 
self-identity, as well as modes of relating to nature. I begin to explore the 
representations of nature of the Shetland residents who are excluded from the group 
of "real Shetlanders". These are salmon farmers, oil workers, town dwellers, people 
working in the tourist industry, scientists, etc.: Shetlanders and "Sooth-Moothers" 
(outsiders) who do not sustain the traditional "way of life" . Their representations of 
nature stand in sharp contrast to those of "real Shetlanders"; they tend to combine 
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elements of what Moscovici calls the mechanistic and cybernetic states of nature. 
Nature, in this case, is represented as divorced from humankind, as an object of 
appropriation for the latter, as a set of resources to be exploited or protected, of 
forces to be rationally controlled or of systems to be monitored through disembedded 
expert knowledge. Such representations become objectified most ostensibly by the 
creation of protected areas which, quite literally, shape new natures. 
In the final chapter, I turn to the Braer incident per se. The similarities and 
differences between cybernetic, mechanistic and organic representations of nature are 
explored in this critical context. I argue that the social crisis surrounding the oil spill 
must be explained in terms of a conflict between diverse, and often incompatible, 
representations. This claim is supported in a number of ways. I examine "real 
Shetlanders"' reactions to the spill itself. The metaphors of death and rape used by 
"real Shetlanders", and the meanings of such metaphors, are discussed. I then turn 
to Shetlanders' attitudes to the main actors involved during the spill: the local, 
national and international media; the master and the crew of the Braer; the 
environmentalists, Green activists and volunteers, collectively referred to as "the 
birdie people"; and the plethora of experts who came to Shetland in the immediate 
aftermath of the Braer disaster. Here, I analyse Shetlanders' arguments and 
evaluations, their coping strategies, the underlying representations of nature which all 
these reveal, and the functions of these representations. Finally, I examine how such 
representations are put to use to construct the Braer oil spill either as "a disaster" or 
simply as "an accident". 
* * * * * * * * * 
To convey the essence of the experience of others is an impossible task. I have 
often found myself in the position of an alchemist: only this time, I was turning gold 
into lead. The intractable methodological difficulty of exploring other people's ideas, 
feelings and motivations confronted me all along. I have tried to give a voice to the 
subjects in this study, but the interpretation I suggest remains a version, my version: 
research practices cannot escape the mediation of the "I". This version stems from 
a particular epistemological and theoretical orientation. It is also deeply constrained 
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by the short time spent in Shetland and by the fact that there are precious few 
relevant ethnographic studies on Shetland society (with the notable exception of 
Anthony Cohen's excellent work). 
Indeed, in the empirical analysis I try to make explicit the representational 
structures underlying the discourses and silences, the group dynamics and solitary 
struggles, the ideas and images which arose in Shetland in the process of making 
sense of the Braer oil spill. These processes vary from group to group, from person 
to person. Often, one individual is found to be articulating ideas and symbols which 
would correspond to three distinct representations of nature, and yet are strangely 
reconciled. This is the legacy of modernity. Rarely, nowadays, can a single 
representation dominate unproblematically one's mental universe: we have become 
"cognitively polyphasic" . 
The processes of making sense of new realities are also necessarily embedded 
in the history and culture of those affected by novelty. In Shetland, I encountered a 
community whose "way of life" had already been deeply altered by the oil industry. 
Oil breached the remoteness of the islands and projected Shetland into the modern 
era. It called for a renewal of Shetlandic culture and changed the community's 
relationships both to its culture and to its "nature". These societal changes occurred 
years before the oil spill which I witnessed. Their consequences can only be inferred 
from the intensity and particular quality of the psychic and collective efforts to 
establish clearly defined identities, to defend and to revive a moribund "way of life". 
Many of the interpretive claims I make depend upon similar inferences. Having had 
little idea of how the data might to be analysed at the time of the crisis, I sometimes 
failed to pay attention to details which would now be more meaningful. Whatever 
data I did gather have been the object of much selection and re-ordering to build a 
coherent account. Thus the reconstruction of the social representations of nature 
which I suggest circulated in Shetland at the time of the Braer oil spill remains not 
only my version, but also one with gaps and holes, hesitations and uncertainties. 
Sometimes, there was simply no way of knowing. And yet, by some miraculous 
synergy, the analysis maps onto and substantiates recent work in anthropology and 
sociology, two disciplines which have concerned themselves more explicitly than 
social psychology with the social construction of reality. 
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In spite of its numerous short-comings, this thesis - or rather the invisible 
learning process which, like the submerged part of the iceberg, underlies it - has 
helped me to understand how social representations function to create reality. It has 
begun to explore the foundations of many of the current debates about nature. I hope 
that this work can be taken further and serve to emancipate us from the ontological 
dualism between nature and society upon which modern societies are predicated but 
emphatically deny. 
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PART I: THEORY 
1.0. ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY: A CRITIQUE 
This chapter critically reviews past and present psychological theories and 
empirical studies which bear on three interrelated phenomena: perception, cognition 
and behaviour with respect to the physical (built or natural) environment. These 
phenomena have generated considerable interest amongst psychologists associated with 
schools as diverse as behaviourism, Gestalt psychology, and cognitive psychology. 
The theories developed by proponents of each school have, in turn, exerted a 
profound influence on the sub-discipline of environmental psychology. The latter 
emerged in the mid- to late sixties and early seventies as a result of two sets of 
factors: first, the recognition that psychology had failed to take into consideration the 
so-called "non-social" environment, and second, the concomitant realisation that the 
discipline had to deal more explicitly with environmental interaction, in the face of 
pressing ecological problems. 
It is argued here that in spite of their radical divergences in perspective, 
behaviourists, Gestaltists and cognitive psychologists have all equally subscribed to 
both epistemological and methodological individualism. And since environmental 
psychologists have, by and large, rooted their research efforts in the path opened by 
early traditional psychologists, their work is fraught with similar short-comings: it 
often remains a-social, a-cultural and a-historical, albeit in different ways. 
In the second part of the chapter, I consider another sub-discipline which has 
concerned itself with the environment per se, and with behaviour in environmental 
systems: ecological psychology (or behavioural ecology). The strengths and 
weaknesses of the theories and methods advanced by the main proponents of this field 
are discussed in relation to the empirical phenomena which this thesis investigates. 
The chapter comes to a close with a discussion of recent debates within 
environmental and ecological psychology. It is shown that these fields are perhaps not 
as monolithic in their epistemological assumptions as might at first appear. In fact, 
many environmental psychologists are themselves highly critical of the reductionist 
nature of the models which have been indiscriminately borrowed from individual and 
social psychology. Some even advocate a complete separation between traditional 
(individual and social) psychology and environmental psychology. However, it will 
become apparent that the judicious critiques imputed by radical environmental 
psychologists apply only to individualistic forms of psychology, and that their own 
work often falls short of meeting their intended requirements. My overall aim is to 
provide a background against which to pit a more adequate tradition of research in 
order to develop a genuinely social psychology of nature. 
1.1. Theoretical antecedents of environmental psychology 
Environmental psychology did not really emerge as a distinct scientific 
discipline until the decade between 1961 and 1971 (Proshansky, 1990; p. 20). Even 
during the following years work remained sporadic and scattered. It is with the 
publication of specialised journals, introductory textbooks and readers in the seventies 
(Altman & Wohlwill (eds), 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980; Canter & Stringer (eds), 1975; 
Ittelson et al, 1974; Proshansky et al (eds), 1970/1976; Stokols (ed), 1977) that 
environmental psychology began to take shape as an autonomous field of research. 
In this section, I review some formative works of early representatives of various 
schools who, although they did not always consider themselves as environmental 
psychologists, provided the cornerstones upon which the edifice of environmental 
psychology was to be built. 
My choice of authors reflects the disciplinary, rather than the societal, 
antecedents of environmental psychology'. It necessarily leaves out many substantial 
and influential works. It is made on the basis of the following criteria: the importance 
of the studies, or approaches, in terms of the theoretical and empirical interest which 
they generated (as assessed in reviews of the field mainly by Fluckiger & Klaue (eds) 
(1991), Lévy-Leboyer (1980), Stokols (1977) and Proshansky (Proshansky & 
O'Hanlon, 1977; Proshansky, 1987; 1990); their respective relevance for 
environmental psychology; their pertinence, either as counterpoints, rivals or 
complementary theories with respect to the framework of social representations; and 
'Global problems such as overpopulation, urban stress, environmental degradation and the 
depletion of natural resources are not considered in the following section, although they have prompted 
an increased interest in man/environment relationships and significantly oriented research programmes. 
Extensive discussions of the societal antecedents of environmental research can be found in introductory 
textbooks, as well as in Proshansky & O'Hanlon (1977). 
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their relative suitability to account for the empirical phenomena which this thesis aims 
to uncover. 
1.2. Antecedents in traditional psychology 
It is generally acknowledged by environmental psychologists themselves 
(Craik, 1973; Ittelson et al, 1974; Proshansky & O'Hanlon, 1977) that their 
programme of research is defined more by some common methodological assumptions 
and research commitments than by any formal theoretical structure and that, in spite 
of the steady growth of the field over the last three decades, the various contributions 
have not yet reached the stage of a coherent body of research (Giuliani & Feldman, 
1993). Yet, the field did not develop in a theoretical vacuum. It was clearly 
influenced by major - if often contradictory - trends within psychology, all of which 
stressed the interaction of personal and environmental factors in determining 
behaviour. According to Stokols (1977), the advent of behaviourism (Watson, 1913), 
the developments of "field theories" in the areas of perceptual, cognitive and social 
psychology (Lewin, 1936) and the shift of focus in personality research from person-
based (Adorno et al, 1950; Allport, 1937; Freud, 1904/1938) to situation-oriented 
(Mischel, 1968; 1973) explanations of behaviour, all contributed towards defining the 
orientation of the "new" field (Stokols, 1977; p.13). To these, I would add the wider 
contributions of the Gestalt School (Koffka, 1935; Lewin, 1951) and the 
Transactionalist School (Ittelson & Kilpatrick, 1952/1991; Ittelson, 1973) which 
helped to reconceptualise the organism/environment "interface" , as well as those of 
cognitive mapping theory (Lynch, 1960) and of ecological psychology (Barker, 1963; 
1968; Gibson, 1950; 1979/1986). 
Behaviourism, at least in its early formulations, emphasised the environmental 
determinants of behaviour and banished all reference to mental processes or 
consciousness. It advocated a clear separation between the environment, a complex 
set of directly observable stimuli, and the organism responding to it. The limitations 
of this dualistic Watsonian conceptualisation of the "interactions" between man and 
his environment eventually became apparent; it was revised by others (Bandura, 1969; 
Rotter, 1954) to include cognitive mediational processes. The latter, it was argued, 
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determined the functional significance of stimuli for the individual. Rather than 
postulating a simple, unidirectional causal relationship between the environment and 
the individual's behavioural response, psychologists reintroduced subjective 
interpretations of the value of stimuli at the core of the analysis. The inclusion of 
such intervening "subjective interpretations" was meant to explain individual 
differences in behavioural outcomes. There were few, if any, references to the 
content of these mediational processes. Moreover, the emphasis was exclusively on 
the individual in his or her relationship to the environment. Perhaps more 
importantly, behaviourists never problematised the environment in holistic terms: it 
remained strictly the aggregate of discrete stimuli. In other words, regardless of the 
nature or complexity of the environment, it was assumed that the latter could be 
fragmented and described in the simplest terms, namely as stimuli evoking responses. 
The avowed intent of the behaviourists was to bring behaviour under stimulus control. 
The idea of an active construction of the "stimuli" by individual and collective social 
actors was rejected. I shall argue later that the theory of social representations can 
contribute to overcoming such problems. 
In spite of the reductionist character of the behaviourist framework, these 
theoretical roots have influenced many environmental psychologists working in the 
sub-fields of crowding, territorial behaviour and defensible space, and the 
development of conservationist behaviour, to mention only a few. For instance, early 
studies of crowding (Epstein & Baum, 1978) would examine the direct impact of 
different forms of population density - that is social/environmental attributes - on 
psychological functioning and behaviour. Models were eventually elaborated to 
include the interactive effects of physical density, personal characteristics (age, sex, 
etc), and interpersonal qualities (attraction, social support and networks, etc) on 
behavioural outcomes, but with no fundamental revision of the dualist assumptions 
underlying such models. Similarly, research on territorial behaviour and the defense 
of personal space (Brown, 1987; Taylor, 1987) was based on the assumption that 
individual factors, group characteristics and environmental variables all interact to 
produce different degrees of perceived or actual territorial control and the ability to 
protect one's spatial environment. The principles of operant learning theory were also 
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used in order to modify behaviour such as recycling waste, using public 
transportation, or conserving energy (e.g. Cone & Hayes, 1980; Geller et al, 1982). 
Countless studies could be cited here. However, it suffices to say that, 
although the adoption of a behaviourist framework is sometimes considered by 
environmental psychologists (e.g. Stokols, 1977) as some sort of guarantee of the 
genuinely "interactionist" nature of their work, as well as of its "scientific" nature, 
behaviourist approaches are limited. They do not provide a suitable framework for 
understanding the environment as a social construct and the symbolic and material 
practices of people in relation to it. The distinction between "environment" and 
"person" is defined from the perspective of the observer; it is derived from the 
behaviourists' conception of the individual as a biological organism: whatever lies 
outside of the bodily boundaries of the individual is considered as "environment". 
Since behaviour is performed exclusively by individuals, behavioural approaches view 
the whole as an additive outcome of the relations of its parts (Altman & Rogoff, 
1987): they simply cannot handle properly social psychological phenomena. 
According to Jodelet (1982), it is with Kurt Lewin's (1936) concept of the life 
space that the environment was first theorised in psychological terms. Indeed, Lewin 
introduced another version of "interactionism" which focused on the continual 
interplay between inner forces, such as personal needs and attitudes, and outer forces. 
Lewin considered psychological processes as being embedded in physical and social 
situations, forming a "life space" . The concern of his field theory "was not with the 
objective environment per se but rather with the individual's subjective interpretation 
of that environment and the manner in which environmental perception guides 
individual behaviour" (Stokols, 1977; p.14). Behaviour was determined jointly by 
personal factors (motivational forces) and the perceived environment. This 
psychological environment involved only those features of the situation which were 
directly relevant to the present needs and characteristics of the person. This was akin 
to Koffka's (1935) distinction between geographical and behavioural environments. 
Geographical environments correspond to objective descriptions of spaces, whereas 
behavioural environments are defined by the individual's perception of physical space. 
Behavioural environments are unitary wholes (of which the subject is an integral part) 
loaded with subjective meanings that are anterior to, and extend beyond, the specific 
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aspects of each stimulus taken in isolation. The geographical environment itself can 
never be a cause of action, according to Koffka; only the behavioural one can play 
that role. Koffka postulated a continual reciprocal interaction between the two 
environments: not only is behaviour modified by the geographical environment, but 
the latter is also changed as a result of one's action within it 
Both Lewin and Koffka contributed to a redefinition of "environment" by 
moving away from its almost Euclidian conceptualisation as "space", objective and 
immutable. They conceived of environmental behaviour as being rooted in cognitive 
processes, i.e. as resulting from, and having consequences for, the meanings and 
conceptions that emerge from the perception of some physical reality. They also 
stated that different environments - or the same environment at different times - could 
change in meaning and thereby evoke corresponding changes in behaviour. 
The recognition of the importance of the behavioural environment and of the 
life space by Gestaltists seemed to open up whole new avenues of research on 
environmental perception. But these avenues soon became cul-de-sacs because 
members of the School themselves emphasised the personal determinants of 
perception and because they elected to investigate mainly the perception of objects 
and form, rather than of environments per se. There are, however, fundamental 
distinctions between objects and environments. 
The founders of the Transactionalist School, Ittelson and Kilpatrick, must be 
credited for having highlighted some of these differences. They critically reviewed 
the issues at stake in the discussion on perception and concluded that, above and 
beyond a number of theoretical cleavages, researchers had generally neglected the 
importance of the environmental context and focused erroneously on the perception 
of objects. As Ittelson (1973) pointed out, environments, unlike isolated objects, 
surround the perceiving organism, and the latter is an integral part of them. This 
means that environmental experience always takes on the systemic qualities of a 
coherent whole. Environments have to be actively explored, not simply observed. It 
also implies that the very identity of the organism is changed as a result of its being 
in the environment. Equally, environments do not have fixed boundaries, either in 
time or space; perceptual boundaries must be imposed upon them. Moreover, 
environments are multi-modal: they provide information (in fact, more information 
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than can be adequately handled) through all the senses. They also involve peripheral 
elements, i.e. elements of information that are not directly perceived by the organism 
and yet impinge upon it. 
This short list of crucial distinctions illustrates the difficulties that arise when 
one uncritically transposes the theories and methods used to study the perception of 
objects to investigate the perception of the environment. This fact was recognised by 
most environmental psychologists (Altman & Wohlwill (eds), 1976; 1977; 1978; 
1980; Proshansky et al, 1970/1976) from the outset. Ittelson (1973) thus introduced 
the distinction between space and environment, the former being a configuration of 
objects to which the subject reacts, and the latter being a milieu which includes the 
subject as a participant. By operating a series of "transactions" with their milieux, 
subjects confer on their own immersion in a space, and to space itself, stable 
significations (Fluckiger & Klaue (eds), 1991; p.28). The notion of transaction was 
intended to overcome the classic dichotomy between subject and object. This 
dichotomy was exploded when Ittelson and Kilpatrick (1952/1991) demonstrated, by 
means of a detour via optical geometry 2 , that a percept can derive directly neither 
from the properties of a given physical environment, nor from some physiological 
pattern of stimulation. Both are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions to explain the 
formation of percepts. 
The Transactionalists made significant advances. They posited the necessary 
interrelationships between organisms and their environments; they assumed the 
inseparability of contexts, temporal factors, and physical and psychological 
phenomena. They established the dynamic and selective character of environmental 
perception and the active role played by the organism in the process. Their 
perspective was also essentially historical and it recognised the scientific value of 
unique events, considering the latter as their basic units of analysis. However, the 
Transactionalists failed to acknowledge the social nature of the relationship between 
'Ittelson & Kilpatrick (1952/1991) concerned themselves with the problem of "equivalent 
configurations", a classic issue in optical geometry. The fundamental question is to determine whether 
it is possible for different physical attributes to result in identical configurations in the observer and, 
conversely, for identical physical configurations to induce very dissimilar reactions in an organism. The 
answer to the first question was known since the Renaissance, but Ittelson and Kilpatrick's contribution 
was to show that the human organism was able to differentiate between identical environmental 
messages. If discrepant responses cannot be attributed to different stimuli then, they argued, the ability 
to make such distinctions must rest upon sources of information other than those comprised in the 
physical environment itself. 
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human beings and their environments. They defined perceptual processes as a 
dynamic fusion of some stimuli provided by the environment, of hypotheses 
elaborated by subjects on the basis of their past experiences, and of action. But 
questions pertaining to the genesis of such "hypotheses", to their content, structure 
and functions, remained unanswered. For Ittelson and Kilpatrick (1952/1991), each 
man's perceptions are his own, unique and personal. They may become common if 
similar experiences and motivations are shared by many individuals but, again, the 
origins and nature of this sharedness are not theorised. Thus, in spite of their far-
reaching contributions, the transactionalists' work also remained essentially a-social. 
Stokols (1977) takes the shift of focus in personality research to be one of the 
most influential developments towards the emergence of an interactionist perspective. 
The essence of this contribution is to have demonstrated that behaviour is not derived 
exclusively from a set of stable attributes comprising an individual's personality 
(Allport, 1937; Freud, 1904/1938; Adorno et al, 1950), but that it is in fact situation 
specific. The limitations inherent in trait-centred perspectives led Mischel (1968; 
1973), for instance, to emphasise the cross-situational variability of behaviour and to 
develop the notion of behaviour-contingency units (Mischel, 1973). In short, situation-
oriented explanations of behaviour provided a reinforcing argument for the view 
according to which there is a dynamic and necessary interchange between human 
beings and their environments. In my opinion, the impact of this new orientation on 
environmental psychology is not as clear as Stokols makes out, unless it is conceived 
in broad meta-theoretical teims. As far as I can appreciate, hardly any environmental 
psychological studies have been conducted within that framework. 
Probably the most influential attempt at shifting the object of analysis from 
issues of perception to issues of cognition, and the level of analysis from that of the 
individual to that of the group, came from Kevin Lynch. By training, Kevin Lynch 
is an architect and not a psychologist, which makes the inclusion of his contribution 
under the heading "Traditional Psychology" objectionable. However, it seems justified 
by the fact that Lynch is widely recognised, by environmental psychologists at least, 
as one of the founding-fathers of modern cognitive psychology. His research on 
cognitive maps continues to mobilise considerable theoretical and empirical research 
in this area. According to Levy-Leboyer (1980), he is one of the three figures - 
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alongside Hall (1966) and Sommer (1969) who both worked on personal space - who 
really gave the impetus to the emerging discipline of environmental psychology. 
Lynch's seminal work The Image of the City (1960) constitutes the first attempt to 
analyse the collective representations of major American cities. It analyses the 
"imageability" or "legibility" of urban environments in terms of structural elements -
districts, nodes, paths, edges and landmarks - in the lay-out of the city. The images, 
or cognitive maps, which are formed in the heads of observers of that city are, for 
Lynch, the mental reflection of forms which are presupposed to exist in the urban 
fabric. Once the individual has acquired, stored, decoded and recalled the information 
present in his/her everyday environment, he/she can then use it to make spatial 
decisions (Kitchin, 1994) 3 . 
Although Lynch's typology of five spatial elements has been challenged for 
not being theoretically justified and therefore open to revision in the light of changing 
environmental contexts (cf. Canter & Donald, 1987), as well as on methodological 
grounds (Burgess, 1979; Spencer & Dixon, 1983), his work still laid the grounds for 
most of the research on the formation of cognitive maps of physical surroundings (cf. 
Downs & Stea, 1973; 1977; Kaplan, 1973; Moore & Golledge, 1976; Spencer et al, 
1989). It is important to note that Lynch was interested primarily in the visible 
features of the urban environment and in the ways in which the spatial characteristics 
of the city affect people's ability to represent it to themselves in some coherent 
pattern. In other words, his study was based on a conception of the environment as 
an independent variable. It is reasonable to assume, however, that the social values 
which environmental features embody and symbolise are probably more important in 
structuring representations than such physical attributes as clarity, simplicity and 
dominance. The role of affect was eventually recognised by some environmental 
psychologists. For instance, Spencer and his colleagues state: 
3Some social psychologists ostensibly working under the umbrella of the theory of social 
representations in fact conduct research on cognitive maps. Pailhous (1970), for instance, demonstrates 
how a taxi-driver uses features of the urban landscape in strange towns in order to plan journeys. 
Whilst a version of this research appears in Social Representations (Farr & Moscovici, 1984), 
conceptually and methodologically, it belongs to the tradition of environmental psychology, though it 
is also influenced by Russian research on an action theory of memory. This seems like an unfortunate 
narrowing of the scope of the theory of social representations. 
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"Cognitive maps are not isolated and contextless entities: they are 
formed during purposive activity in the everyday world of the child, 
and, in as much as they encode the resources, valued friends, 
memories, and aspirations as well as factual information about the 
geographical layout and routes, they should perhaps better be described 
as cognitive/affective maps". (Spencer et al, 1989; p.108) 
But again, in this perspective, cognitive/affective maps are the product of the 
activity of an individual - a child - who makes sense, privately and uninfluenced by 
his/her society and culture, of the environment. Moore & Golledge (1976) seem to 
offer a much richer conceptualisation. Discussing environmental cognition, they 
define the latter as: 
"the awareness, impressions, information, images, and beliefs that 
people have about environments... It implies not only that individuals 
and groups have information and images about the existence of these 
environments and of their constituent elements, but also that they have 
impressions about their character, function, dynamics, and structural 
interrelatedness, and that they imbue them with meaning, significance, 
and mythical/symbolic properties." (Moore & Golledge, 1976; p.xii) 
The authors even state that because of the influence of society, we can expect 
cognitions about the environment to be shared. However, a careful reading of their 
empirical work makes it obvious that this "influence" is simply postulated, never 
investigated. As Moscovici (1982) argued with respect to social cognition, the 
framework for a genuinely social approach to (environmental) cognition has yet to be 
developed. This is where the theory of social representations can make a significant 
contribution to further advances in environmental psychology. 
Some studies, using a social constructionist approach, have indeed 
demonstrated that the formation of cognitive maps cannot be explained without 
reference to value systems, normative beliefs and ideological standpoints. For 
instance, research conducted by Mummendey and Schlosstein (1978, quoted in 
Jodelet, 1989b), before the fall of the Iron Curtain, compares the cognitive maps 
drawn by West German students of two neighbouring nations: France, which is 
culturally and linguistically distinct, but economically and politically similar; and East 
Germany, with which West Germans share a common culture and language, but 
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which has a radically different political and economic system. The results are striking. 
The number of trips made by West German students to France increases the quality, 
quantity and precision of the elements drawn on the maps, but frequent visits to the 
G.D.R. do not improve their knowledge of this country. Furthermore, amongst 
students having paid an equal number of visits to both countries, subjects who had 
more acquaintances in East Germany drew less detailed and less accurate maps of that 
country than they did of France. Clearly, ideological cleavages mediated the 
appropriation of new information. The latter was stereotyped to reinforce the positive 
identity of G.F.R. students as democrats and capitalists. This research seriously 
undermines the view that the formation of cognitive maps is a value-free process and 
that the maps themselves are simply mental representations of objective environmental 
features. If one accepts that social representations always have two interrelated facets, 
one symbolic and the other iconic, then these findings become less surprising: one 
would expect the significant dimensions of social life to be conjured up in images. 
A final point must be made about Lynch's contribution. One should recall that 
Lynch writes from the pragmatic standpoint of an architect. It is only of marginal 
relevance for him to determine whether collective - that is, shared - images emerge, 
first and foremost, because the physical urban environment directly affords some 
qualities, or because individuals partake in a common culture, or because they share 
an identical physiological nature. What matters is that these images do exist, that they 
are very similar amongst members of a given social group, and that knowledge of 
urban residents' cognitive maps may be drawn upon by architects and town-planners. 
The seemingly ineradicable foundations of psychological theorising described 
above (behaviourism, phenomenology, personality research, cognitivism, etc.) have 
permeated much of the research in environmental psychology. Environmental 
psychologists have, by and large, rooted their research practice in either a positivist 
(naturalist) or a phenomenological epistemology. This preference has the 
consequences that their research is always individualistic, often based on laboratory 
experiments, and consistently a-social, a-cultural and a-historical. From studies on the 
perception and cognition of the environment (Downs & Stea, 1973; Kaplan, 1973) to 
analyses of the effects of crowding (Baum & Davies, 1976; Desor, 1972; Epstein & 
Baum, 1978); from the assessment of landscape and scenery preferences (Craik, 
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1972; Dunn, 1976; Kaplan & Kaplan, 1989) to research on reactions to natural 
hazards (White (ed), 1974) or noise pollution (Kryter, 1970; Smith, 1983), the bulk 
of the work carried out displays these attributes. And if, in the more refined studies, 
it so happens that the individual does think, his thoughts are only "mediational 
processes" rather than primary causes. And all of this thinking takes place 
"spontaneously", in a social and cultural void. It is difficult to see just how any of the 
theoretical orientations discussed in this section can account for the distinctive effects 
that collective social life has on the perception, and indeed the social construction, of 
the environment. 
1.3. Antecedents in ecological psychology 
So far, we have seen that environmental psychology developed mainly as an 
off-shoot of traditional psychology. It has derived its theories and its models from this 
discipline (Altman & Rogoff, 1987; Jodelet, 1982) - although it should be 
acknowledged that environmental psychologists have always collaborated and continue 
to work closely with architects, town-planners, geographers, etc. (Proshansky & 
O'Hanlon, 1977). However, environmental psychologists have also drawn extensively 
from another perspective - if not discipline - on man/environment relations: ecological 
psychology (or behavioural ecology). 
The most significant theoretical contribution made by ecological psychologists 
is to have considered the environment not simply as a "dimension" which must be 
taken into account in empirical studies, but as the specific object of their theories. 
Jodelet (1982) cites other studies which did take the environment as their object. 
These are Hall's (1966) and Sommer's (1969) studies on personal space (or 
proxemics); the research reviewed by Altman & Wohwill (eds) (1976) and Edney 
(1974) on territoriality; and the studies critically assessed by Lecuyer (1975; 1976) 
on socio-spatial behaviours. But in all these studies, the environment is conceived 
either in terms of its relations to the (biophysical) needs of the individual, or in terms 
of its importance for the regulation of social interactions. Thus, these works are not 
directly relevant to this thesis. 
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Two far-reaching and distinctive approaches are subsumed under the heading 
of ecological psychology: those of James J. Gibson and of Roger G. Barker. Both of 
them have been profoundly influenced by biological ecology, although in very 
different ways (Willems, 1977; Stokols, 1977). Gibson (1950; 1979/1986) is certainly 
the author who most consistently attempted to give a content to the concept of space 
or the physical environment (he uses both terms almost interchangeably). Gibson was 
mainly concerned with issues of visual perception. The essential question, for him, 
was to understand how a tri-dimensional physical environment, projected by light onto 
a surface of two-dimensions, could nevertheless be perceived in three dimensions. To 
answer this question, he developed an ecological approach to visual perception: the 
theory of direct perception. 
According to this theory, people are competent beings, able to perceive 
directly all the information available in the environmental lay-out. As a true 
"nativist", Gibson ruled out the need for mediating processes, such as transactions, 
hypotheses, cognitive maps or images, to explain environmental perception: 
everything is out there, ready to be picked-up by a well-adapted organism. The role 
played by past experience and learning is only marginal; it is considered strictly as 
the permanent residues of the changing perspectives of an organism which, having 
observed the world from a diversity of viewpoints, has come to isolate some invariant 
properties of things. If differences in perception cannot be attributed to differences 
between individual perceiving organisms, then the characteristics of the physical 
environment must become the primary source of information. Hence Gibson's attempt 
to describe as exhaustively and minutely as possible the infinitely rich information 
contained in the environment. 
How does the Gibsonian approach handle the issue of meaning? Gibson rejects 
the empiricists' view that human beings perceive a given environment on the basis of 
previous knowledge and experience. Instead, he claims that all the potential uses of 
objects (which he terms "affordances") are directly perceivable. The particular 
affordances of an object which are detected depend upon the perceiver's species and, 
in the case of human beings, upon the individual's psychological state. People do not 
perceive chairs and pencils in terms of their physical characteristics; rather, they see 
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them in functional, utilitarian ways. Depending upon one's mood, an apple can be 
perceived either as an edible thing or as a projectile. 
Clearly, the Gibsonian notion of affordances fails to do justice to the wealth 
of meaning which we perceive in spaces, objects and people. There is a growing 
literature which indicates that perception is not direct; that the significance of space 
for human beings is not strictly derived from the attributes of a given environmental 
lay-out; that functionality alone cannot dictate the potential uses to be made of 
objects. As I have mentioned earlier, perception and cognition are structurally related 
to social representations and collective practices. The considerable differences in 
individual representations challenge "bottom-up" theories of environmental 
perception. It would also be an error to reduce human activities to a set of adaptive 
spatial behaviour. Behaviour in space is still, fundamentally, social behaviour, 
resulting from collective practices themselves elaborated and enacted in conformity 
with prescriptive and constraining social norms and values. The theory of direct 
perception fails to explain culturally shared perceptions; immediate psychological 
states cannot account for collective meanings. Conversely, belonging to a given 
species is an insufficient condition to explain individual perceptual responses. As 
Kaminski writes, Gibson "devotes but very little attention to concrete socio-cultural 
happenings in human everyday life" (Kaminski, 1992; p.96). Since this thesis is about 
how social groups construct different environments and hold different "perceptions" 
and "cognitions" about them - and neither about human beings' perceptual equipment 
nor about the objective characteristics of Nature conceived as an intemporal given - 
Gibson's ecological viewpoint may be put to one side for the purposes of this thesis. 
R.G. Barker (1963, 1968) and his school developed an entirely different brand 
of ecological psychology. Barker was a co-worker and intellectual descendant of Kurt 
Lewin. His approach was essentially an attempt at complementing Lewin's work 
which, according to Barker, only offered a "postperceptual psychology" as far as the 
environment was concerned. Thus, Barker set out to include the "preperceptual 
environment" in a field-theoretical analysis of human behaviour (Willems, 1977). He 
developed models to analyse the transactional character of organism/environment 
systems and made remarkable advances in establishing methods of research to study 
naturally occurring patterns of behaviour in given settings. 
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"Barker's conceptualization of ecological psychology involved an extension of 
ecological principles from the macro or community level of analysis to a 
consideration of microsocial phenomena" (Stokols, 1977; p.10). Barker proceeded by 
breaking down the physical environment of a community into smaller components, 
according to the kinds of behaviour which occur within these units. The fundamental 
"natural entities" (such as a church, a classroom, restaurants, or the market place) he 
identified in this way were termed "behaviour settings". The latter are defined as 
"bounded, self-regulated and ordered systems composed of replaceable human and 
non-human components that interact in a synchronized fashion to carry out an ordered 
sequence of events called the setting program" (Wicker, 1979; p.12). In other words, 
behaviour settings are environment-behavioural units whose structure and properties 
cannot be dissociated from the cyclical patterns of activity which occur within them. 
"Behaviour, places, and temporal dynamics are mutually interlocked such that 
behaviour gains meaning by virtue of its location in a particular spatial and temporal 
context, and the context gains meaning by virtue of the actors and actions that exist 
within it" (Altman & Rogoff, 1987; p.29). 
The significance of Barker's approach is that he included the social, normative 
and temporal properties of a given setting at the very core of his definition. Each 
behaviour setting is bounded in time and space and has a structure which interrelates 
physical, social and cultural properties so that it elicits regularised forms of 
behaviour. This allowed him to overcome the opposition between subjectivism and 
environmental determinism: Barker was not concerned with individual, but with en 
masse behaviour. He hoped to demonstrate how non-psychological environmental 
factors can have consequences for typical behaviours. 
Barker also developed a precise methodology to investigate the individual and 
collective activities being performed in various behaviour settings. In fact, ecological 
psychology's most influential export is probably of a methodological nature. This 
perspective has indeed often been equated with, and unjustifiably reduced to, the 
advocacy of naturalistic inquiry. Willems (1977) has identified the defining 
methodological attributes of ecological psychology. They include: an emphasis on the 
systemic properties of the relationships linking person, behaviour, social environment 
and physical environment; the use of a plurality of methods; the recourse to direct 
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and naturalistic observation of human behaviour (rather than questionnaires, 
interviews and laboratory experiments which all interrupt the natural flow of 
behaviour) as well as longitudinal designs; and the use of natural experiments. This 
last point is of particular relevance for the present thesis. Ecological psychologists, 
like (other) transactionalists, recognise the potential scientific value of events which 
occur in the real world and which are out of the researcher's direct control (such as 
the introduction of insecticides, institutional reforms and, indeed, the advent of 
ecological disasters), and yet have a profound impact on the phenomena which he or 
she is investigating. 
The version of ecological psychology developed by Barker and his associates 
at the University of Kansas has exerted a profound influence on environmental 
psychology (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Forgas & Brown, 1977; Willems, 1977). It goes 
a long way towards overcoming the reductionism inherent in the theories discussed 
in the previous section. It would even appear to be well suited to the empirical 
investigation of the behavioural consequences of the Shetland oil spill, especially as 
regards its methodological insights. However, since an ecological crisis takes place 
simultaneously in countless behaviour settings, it becomes impossible (in practice at 
least) to analyse each of them in accordance with Barker's approach. Its conceptual 
and methodological armoury is limited when it faces empirical realities of the scope 
of environmental disasters (Kaminski, 1992). Equally problematic from our 
perspective is the fact that Barker's model refers only incidentally to people's 
knowledge. It is ill-equipped to address such issues as language, communication, 
representations and symbolic reality in general. Barker's conceptualisation also 
implies that behaviour settings are almost exclusively constituted from the observer's 
perspective. These and other issues related to "ecological psychology's trouble with 
knowledge" have been more fully examined by Kaminski (1989, 1992). Thus, 
although Barker's programme aspired to some "ecological completeness", its neglect 
of knowledge and symbolic reality makes it less than complete. It is inadequate, at 
least as it now stands, for an analysis of people's relationships with their 
environment. 
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1.4. Environmental and social psychology: Separation or cross-fertilisation? 
This review of the theoretical antecedents of environmental psychology 
suggests that environmental psychologists have uncritically borrowed from psychology 
and behavioural ecology models which, because of their focus on individual 
perceptual, cognitive and behavioural processes, are unable to theorise the origins, 
nature and functions of shared beliefs, images and symbolic practices in relation to 
the material world. However, although environmental psychology has undoubtedly 
been deeply influenced by the theoretical frameworks outlined above, it would be a 
mistake to underestimate the efforts of the proponents of these disciplines to create 
a distinct perspective, one which avoids the pitfalls I have just highlighted. Their 
efforts can be best understood by considering the debate which took place in the 
seventies about how the relationships between environmental and social psychology 
should be envisaged. 
Altman (1976), one of the early contributors to the field, was of the view that 
cross-fertilisation between the two disciplines could be fruitful, in spite of traditional 
social psychology's over-emphasis on "experimental laboratories studies" rather than 
naturalistic inquiries. He was critical of the ways in which social psychology, first, 
ignored the relationship between people and settings, and second, adopted an 
atomistic and analytic perspective which ruled out the possibility of studying group 
processes. Nevertheless, Altman believed that much could be gained from social 
psychological research on perception, cognition, beliefs and attitudes, if such concepts 
were critically transposed within environmental psychology. 
Many environmental psychologists (Epstein, 1976; Stokols, 1976) took issue 
with Altman, but the most stimulating reaction came from Proshansky (1976), who 
openly disagreed with him and advocated a clear separation between the two 
disciplines. He stated that 
"the emergence of a problem-oriented, interdisciplinary field of inquiry 
concerned with understanding person/environment relationships in the 
context of real life settings, must necessarily turn its back on... social 
psychology . " (Pro shansky , 1976; p.360) 
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Whatever Altman treated as somewhat superficial shortcomings in social 
psychology, Proshansky considered as evidence of a discipline at odds with its object, 
of a discipline which is resolutely positivist, which is not theoretically prepared to 
investigate "matters of content and substantive issues" (p. 362), of a science "in 
which the phenomena are "laundered", shaped and processed to fit the methodological 
model" (p. 360) and which, consequently, excludes social and cultural processes from 
the scope of its analysis. Clearly, Proshansky was acutely aware of the problems I 
have highlighted above; he thought that environmental psychology could overcome 
them if it rid itself of the "molecular" models inherited from individual and social 
psychology. In an attempt to clarify the approach of environmental psychology, he 
wrote: 
"the problem-orientation of the field and the criterion of maintaining 
the integrity of the real world person/environment events to be studied, 
almost by definition require a theoretical orientation that involves all 
levels of analysis in the behavioural sciences, including the special task 
of establishing the conceptual linkages which will all relate these 
various analytical levels to each other. Psychological structure and 
process, group structure and process, organisational structure and 
process, and community structure and process, are all critically 
significant for the task of establishing the analytic dimensions and 
relationships of these events for the purposes of both understanding 
them and producing change. The concern for the individual and 
individual psychological processes is no less important in 
environmental psychology than it is for social psychology, but only if 
conceptualisations of these processes are theoretically and empirically 
derived from a directed concern with the structural social context 
which defines the content and meaning of what the person sees, feels, 
thinks, desires to do, and so on." (p. 361) 
Let me first say that I concur with Proshansky's unflattering evaluation of the 
state of social psychology as it was in the seventies. As a matter of fact, his critical 
appraisal would unfortunately still be a valid assessment of much contemporary 
research, since social psychology remains plagued by epistemological and 
methodological individualism. But this state of affairs is being relentlessly challenged. 
The criticisms levelled by Proshansky apply mainly to individualistic forms of social 
psychology. I shall show that his account hardly does justice to more sociological and 
social constructionist approaches, such as the theory of social representations. The 
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latter specifically addresses matters of content and substantive issues as they emerge 
in real-life situations, and does so by using methods which are tailored to the 
particular problems under investigation. It is better equipped than any other theory 
formulated within environmental psychology to fulfill the programme envisaged by 
Proshansky for this discipline. Indeed, his optimistic prognosis for environmental 
psychology turned out to be unwarranted. The "global, molar perspective" which was 
to characterise environmental psychology was rarely adopted. Even a rapid glimpse 
at any table of contents or annotated bibliography pertaining to research in 
environmental psychology is enough to convince the reader that this discipline has yet 
to break away from the positivist and individualistic assumptions which it had 
originally set out to challenge. Very few took up the challenge of focusing on the 
person/environment unit and of locating this analytical unit within broader social 
systems. Stokols (1982) did attempt to bridge the dualism between subjectivism and 
physical determinism by proposing the concept of the "socio-physical environment" . 
This concept refers to the material and symbolic construction of the physical 
environment through human action, and to the social dimension of this action which 
is apprehended in terms of significations. Proshansky himself (1978; 1990; 
Proshansky et al, 1983) elaborated the concept of place-identity, which defines people 
by their embeddedness in particular environments, and which was to be the 
cornerstone of environmental psychology. Place-identity is "a sub-structure of the 
self-identity of the person consisting of broadly conceived cognitions about the 
physical world in which the individual lives. These cognitions represent memories, 
ideas, feelings, attitudes, values, preferences, meanings, and conceptions of behaviour 
and experience which relate to the variety and complexity of physical settings that 
define the day-to-day existence of every human being" (Proshansky et al, 1983; 
p.59). Both concepts recognise the symbolic value of the physical world. But neither 
of them can account for the social origins and functions of the always particular 
rapports which human beings entertain with their environment, especially as these 
have developed over time. 
If environmental psychology has not yet achieved its goals, perhaps one is 
justified in looking towards social psychology, but this time towards a sociological 
and social constructionist form of social psychology, in search of the conceptual tools 
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to apprehend the ways in which people, individually and collectively, invest their 
world with meanings 4 . 
1.5. Conclusion 
Craik (1973), in his introduction to the very first review of the field of 
environmental studies, largely ascribed the growth of the latter to "its lively and 
thoroughgoing multidisciplinary character". Yet, he chose to refer to the study of 
people-environment relations as "environmental psychology", a label which he 
qualified as "inclusive" and "theoretically neutral". 
My own critical review was intended to show that, in fact, the choice was 
neither theoretically neutral, nor all encompassing. The framing of people-
environment relations within the discipline of psychology, and thus the privileging of 
some intellectual ancestors over others, significantly oriented the selection of the 
objects of research, the theoretical constructs and the methods used in empirical 
research. It also carried with it a number of problems. Chief amongst those is, 
somewhat understandably, the individualistic nature of the research, whether of a 
behaviourist, Gestaltist/phenomenological, or cognitivist persuasion. The ontological 
subject, with a proper sense of self, was exploded as he/she was reduced to being 
either a "behaver", a perceiver or an information-processor. This, in turn, implied 
that the social, political, ideological and cultural dimensions which structure the 
material world itself, as well as material practices, were neither theorised nor 
investigated. Symbolic realities were also left outside the scope of the analysis. The 
sharedness of perceptions and cognitions, for instance, was attributed solely to the 
aggregation of identical individual experiences, rather than to processes of social 
communication and interaction. 
4It is interesting to note that one of the most influential books in environmental psychology 
in recent years is the one edited by Altman & Low (1992) on place attachment, a notion directly 
derived from Proshansky's concept of place-identity. Ironically for the advocate of complete 
disciplinary separation, Proshansky's concept has generated a wealth of research in social anthropology 
(e.g. Low, 1992; Lawrence, 1992) and humanistic geography (e.g. Brown & Perkins, 1992), as well 
as environmental psychology per se (e.g. Korpela, 1989). These contributions have focused essentially 
on the (collective) meanings which are attached to various sites, thereby partly substantiating 
Proshansky's notion of place-identity. 
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I also reviewed the contributions of Gibson's and Barker's schools of 
ecological psychology. The theory of direct perception was set aside because of its 
inability to account for the symbolic dimensions of the environment which, as I hope 
to demonstrate in the following chapters, are so central to the relations which bind 
people to their physical milieux. Barker's approach provides a useful theoretical and 
methodological framework to analyse the socio-normative factors that are integral to 
people's use of places. However, it is ill-equipped to deal with social knowledge, on 
the one hand, and with large-scale environments, on the other. Moreover, it is 
concerned exclusively with the "built" environment - churches, schools, etc.- and fails 
to recognise that the so-called "natural environment" is also imbued with meanings. 
In the last section, I considered the important debate instigated by 
environmental psychologists about the possible interface between environmental/ 
ecological psychology and social psychology. Although some have argued that these 
disciplines should remain separate, since inputs from social psychology would only 
serve to reduce the scope of environmental psychology, I contend that social 
psychology can indeed make important contributions to the study of man/environment 
relationships. In the following chapters, I shall therefore demonstrate that the theory 
of social representations provides a framework which enables one to understand how 
symbolic and material environments are produced as well as used, which shifts the 
analysis from the individual to the social group, and which is more genuinely 
"multidisciplinary", as it draws from anthropology, and sociology, as well as (social) 
psychology. 
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2.0. THE THEORY OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS 
Since its introduction to the discipline of social psychology more than three 
decades ago, the theory of social representations has received considerable attention. 
It has produced an important body of empirical research and, in recent years, fora for 
discussion have been opened to facilitate exchanges between the growing number of 
social psychologists from around the world who are now attracted to the theory: the 
birth of a specialised journal, Papers on Social Representations and the organisation 
of three International Conferences on Social Representations are indicators of the 
vitality of the field. This state of affairs dispenses me from introducing the theory, 
the concept, and the specific mechanisms of social representations in detail yet again, 
and enables me to focus on those aspects which I believe most need to be clarified. 
Authoritative work is widely available to the Anglo-Saxon world (e.g. Farr, 1987; 
1993; Farr & Moscovici (eds), 1984; Herzlich, 1973; Jodelet, 1989/1991). 
As the theory gains currency, it also runs the risk of becoming so "versatile" 
(Allansdottir et al, 1993) that it loses its specificity. I do not wish to advocate a 
premature closure to the undeniably fruitful dialogue currently under way: theoretical, 
methodological and empirical advances can only be expected if dissident voices are 
allowed to be heard. My intention, in this chapter, is to examine the radical elements 
which originally granted the theory its significance, so that the theory itself does not 
become anchored within the traditional forms of social psychology which it sought 
to challenge. 
Moreover, I would want to argue that the theory of social representations can 
provide the cornerstone of a social constructionist social psychology (which can then 
serve to develop a social psychology of nature; see chapter 3). The theory also has 
the potential to overcome some of the dichotomies which permeate social psychology, 
a discipline still battling with the ghost of Descartes (Harre, 1981; Markova, 1982). 
This potential, no doubt, is not always fully realised. Nevertheless, I believe it can 
serve as a paradigm to guide our effort, to conquer a space within social psychology 
where symbolic phenomena may be apprehended in their full reality. 
2.1. A brief overview 
Unlike many theories in social psychology, the theory of social representations 
is not rooted in the hegemonic positivist epistemology of the natural sciences; its 
antecedents are found in sociology, anthropology and history, as well as in 
psychology. The conceptual integration of works from social scientists as diverse as 
Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Freud, Mead, Lévy-Briihl, Bartlett, Piaget and, later, 
Vygotsky, has led to the formulation of the theory of social representations. It was 
developed by Serge Moscovici (1961/1976) in La Psychanalyse, son image et son 
public. In this seminal work, Moscovici investigates how psychoanalysis diffused in 
France in the 1950s and was differently appropriated by lay people as a function of 
their social conditions, and by the Catholic and Marxist press as a function of their 
ideological commitments and their readership. 
The study's main insights, which were to serve as an impetus for an extremely 
diversified and fruitful field of inquiry, are the following: firstly, social 
representations are symbolic phenomena, rather than the mere cognitions of isolated 
individuals. As such, they have to be sampled in the culture as well as in individual 
minds. Secondly, the structure and processes of social representations cannot be 
studied without reference to their content. There is a strong commitment to treat 
seriously the information circulating in society about the object of study. Thirdly, 
social representations could not exist as such without being collectively realised. They 
are rooted in social life, expressing and structuring the identity and social conditions 
of the actors who create, reproduce and change them. Social representations reveal, 
in their very structure, their conditions of production and circulation, as well as their 
social functions. Processes of communication and of social interaction therefore 
become central to the analysis. And finally, social representations constitute the 
material, social and symbolic worlds in which people live. They are not merely 
epiphenomena which would reflect people's social conditions. 
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2.2. The theory of social representations: A social psychology of knowledge. 
The theory of social representations proposes more than a psychology of 
cognitions about the social world. It provides the basis for a social psychological 
theory of knowledge. In developing this argument, I will explore the commonalities 
between Berger & Luckmann's sociology of knowledge and the theory of social 
representations, and emphasise the distinctive contribution made by the latter. This 
discussion will enable me to clarify two sets of issues which are central both to 
current theoretical debates on social representations and to my own work. The first 
concerns the notion of social constructionism in relation to the theory of social 
representations; the second concerns the dual aspects of the theory, the concept and 
the phenomena of social representations as both universal and particular. (These 
issues will be re-examined with respect to social representations of nature in the 
following chapter.) 
2.2.1. The theory of social representations and the sociology of knowledge: 
Points of convergence 
The following discussion is based on the sociology of knowledge as defined 
by Berger and Luckmann (1967) in their seminal work The Social Construction of 
Reality: A Treatise in the Sociolo •y of Knowledge. 
"A 'sociology of knowledge' will have to deal not only with the 
empirical variety of 'knowledge' in human societies, but also with the 
processes by which any body of 'knowledge' comes to be established 
as 'reality' [...] And in so far as all human 'knowledge' is developed, 
transmitted and maintained in social situations, the sociology of 
knowledge must seek to understand the processes by which this is done 
in such a way that a taken-for-granted 'reality' congeals for the man 
in the street. In other words, we contend that the sociology of 
knowledge is concerned with the analysis of the social construction of 
reality." (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; p. 15; italics in original) 
The task of a sociology of knowledge thus defined is therefore to understand 
how the objectifications of subjective processes come to constitute an intersubjective 
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common-sense world, a world which is shared with others and, precisely for this 
reason, which appears to consciousness as self-evident and taken-for-granted. The 
world of everyday life, according to Berger and Luckmann, "is not only taken for 
granted as reality by the ordinary members of society in the subjectively meaningful 
conduct of their lives. It is a world that originates in their thoughts and actions, and 
is maintained as real by these" (idem, p.30; italics added). From this perspective, 
"knowledge about society is a realization in the double sense of the word, in the sense 
of apprehending the objectivated reality, and in the sense of ongoingly producing this 
reality" (idem; p.84; italics in original). Understanding this dual character of social 
knowledge is precisely the project of the theory of social representations. 
Indeed, the theory of social representations is concerned with the social 
construction of reality and can contribute to a social psychological theory of 
knowledge along the lines of the programme defined by Berger and Luckmann. These 
sociologists drew on two fundamental insights: with Durkheim, they thought that 
"society does indeed possess objective facticity"; and with Weber, they thought that 
"society is indeed built up by activity that expresses subjective meanings" (idem; 
p.30). Moscovici would be in perfect accord. He, too, claims that the theory of social 
representations "focuses as much on the way in which men think or create their 
shared reality as on the content of their thinking" (Moscovici, 1981; p.181). He, too, 
refuses to treat social knowledge as epiphenomenal. He, too, is concerned with the 
processes by which "each representation realizes, literally, a different degree of 
objectification which corresponds to a different level of reality" (idem; p.198). Like 
Berger & Luckmann, he also aims to understand the dialectical relationship whereby 
what belonged to a social representation "is converted into a property of the 
phenomenon and thereby becomes the reference point" of the social representation 
(idem; p.200). Berger and Luckmann stressed that 
"the symmetry between objective and subjective reality cannot be 
complete. The two realities correspond to each other, but they are not 
coextensive. There is always more reality 'available' than what is 
actually internalized in any individual consciousness, simply because 
the contents of socialization are determined by the social distribution 
of knowledge. No individual internalizes the totality of what is 
objectivated as reality in his society L. .1 On the other hand, there are 
always elements of subjective reality that have not originated in 
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socialization [...] Subjective biography is not fully social. The 
individual apprehends himself as being both inside and outside society. 
This implies that the symmetry between objective and subjective reality 
is never a static, once-for-all state of affairs. It must always be 
produced and reproduced in actu." (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; pp. 
153-154) 
Social representations theorists, again, would agree. In fact, they would add, 
it is precisely because there is a decalage between the object and the subject that the 
need for social representations arises (e.g. Jodelet, 1989a; Jovchelovitch, 1995; 
Moscovici, 1981; 1984a). Social representations, in this sense, mediate between the 
world which they ongoingly create, and the subjects who create them. And because 
social representations theorists broadly share the view that "the contents of 
socialization are determined by the social distribution of knowledge", many (e.g. 
Jodelet, 1989/1991; Moscovici, 1961/1976) have chosen to study the distribution of 
social representations and their changes as they circulate from one group to another. 
This is what Moscovici (1990) has termed "Bartlett's way" of conducting social 
representational research (as opposed to "Vygotsky's way", which is concerned with 
transformations in social representations in the course of ontogenesis). 
Social representations theorists can make a significant contribution to a social 
psychology of knowledge because, unlike Berger & Luckmann, they attempt to 
identify the motivations for (making the unfamiliar familiar), and the functions of (the 
creation of a common order to enable the mastery of the social and physical 
environment, the protection of identities, resistance, etc.), the production of social 
representations. They consider how potential content (the total reality which is 
available in society at a given point in time) becomes the actual content of particular 
representations. They also single out some of the processes (anchoring, 
objectification, diffusion, propagation and propaganda) by which social 
representations are created. In this sense, the theory of social representations links 
psychic functioning, social communication, and social reality more explicitly than 
Berger & Luckmann. It also provides a conceptual apparatus which is more directly 
amenable to empirical research than the programmatic treatise offered by the latter 
sociologists. 
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2.2.2. Social representations and social constructionism 
The discussion above can help to clarify two interrelated "misunderstandings". 
The first concerns the nature of social constructionism in social psychology (and other 
social sciences), and the second concerns the version of social constructionism 
endorsed by social representation theorists. From the 1980s onwards, 
"constructionism" has become a metatheoretical notion: everything, it seems, is a 
social construction. What this means, however, remains unclear. The ambiguity 
chiefly concerns whether this notion refers exclusively to epistemological issues or 
whether it also points to ontological ones. In the following discussion, I shall qualify 
the first version, which refers only to epistemology, as "weak", and the second, 
which also makes ontological claims, as "strong" . 
In an influential and paradigmatic paper, Gergen (1985) describes social 
constructionist inquiry as being "principally concerned with explicating the processes 
by which people come to describe, explain, or otherwise account for the world 
(including themselves) in which they live" (Gergen, 1985; p.266). He restricts the 
scope of social constructionism to epistemology or, as he puts it, to elucidating 
different "forms of knowledge" (idem; p.266). This "weak" version of social 
constructionism, it seems to me, is neither particularly insightful, nor particularly 
useful. To state that various individuals, groups and societies hold different 
representations of the world is a truism of little interest. More importantly perhaps, 
such a conceptualisation allows us to treat all representations as relative, equivalent, 
and commensurable. This, in turn, severs the intrinsic connection between knowledge 
and power. These problems stem immediately from the fact that the version of social 
constructionism proposed by Gergen and other discourse analysts (e.g. Best, 1993; 
Sarbin & Kitsuse (eds), 1994; Shotter & Gergen, 1989) does away with ontological 
issues: at once, they proclaim the "death of the subject" (Shotter & Gergen, 1989), 
they de-legitimise any concern with "mental representations" (Gergen, 1985) and they 
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refuse to recognise the ontological correlates of knowledge (Best, 1993) 1 . 
Social representation theorists, on the other hand, ought to favour a "strong" 
version of social constructionism. Unfortunately, there is still considerable debate 
amongst them as to which version they endorse. Markova (1992), for instance, 
explicitly takes the view that the theory of social representations is exclusively 
concerned with epistemology. This perspective is implicitly shared by many (e.g. 
Abric, 1989; Flament, 1987; Guimelli, 1989; Herzlich, 1969/1973). In part, this 
debate has its roots in the definitional confusion surrounding the concept of social 
representations. Social representations have been variously defined as "branches of 
knowledge" or "theories in their own right" (Moscovici, foreword to Herzlich, 1973; 
p.xiii), as "everyday knowledge" (Flick, 1994) or as a "practical form of social 
knowledge" (Jodelet, 1984c; 1989a). Such definitions do not explicitly refer to the 
fact that social representations also create reality. On the basis of these definitions 
alone, it is therefore possible to assume that the theory of social representations is 
solely concerned with epistemological issues, with the cognitive productions of 
historically situated people. In other words, isolated from the entire theoretical body 
to which they relate, these definitions can be interpreted as implying that the theory 
promulgates a "weak" version of social constructionism. We have seen earlier, 
however, that Moscovici means more than just that. In his concluding address at the 
Second International Conference on Social Representations in Rio, he made it clear 
that social representations are constitutive of reality. 
"[Social] representations are capable of creating and stipulating a 
reality by naming and objectifying notions and images, by directing 
material and symbolic practices towards this reality which corresponds 
to them. In short, giving a kind of public reality "out there" and 
ontological status to our representations and to the verbal and iconic 
symbols that represent them and act on our relationships and practices. 
Thereby, we situate ourselves in a world of shared reality. " 
(Moscovici, 1994a; p.7; italics added) 
'More precisely, discourse analysts are opposed to a strong version of social constructionism -
what they refer to as "strict" constructionism - on the grounds that, after all, ordinary members of 
society make claims about "something" (Best, 1993). Now, people may make claims about "something" 
but this "something" is not reality "as such" (Moscovici, 1988; p. 230). It is the historical product of 
prior constructions which have acquired some objective facticity. If discourse analysts adopted a 
diachronic perspective, this problem would probably not arise. 
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The theory of social representations, therefore, makes ontological claims; it 
opts for a "strong" version of social constructionism. This, in turn, prevents it from 
lapsing into a non-dialectical conception of the relationship between what social actors 
do and what they think; between the world in which they live, and the world which 
they represent and change. It prevents the theory from adopting a relativist stance 
towards social life. On the contrary, the adoption of a "strong" version of social 
constructionism allows us to understand why a social group converts its 
representations into reality. 
"This happens in order to reduce commensurability, the arbitrariness 
of representations, and [to] turn them into a norma agendi for its 
members. The mark of power, one cannot help saying it, is to reduce 
the commensurability of representations, to do away with the feeling 
that one is as good as another, and [to] render one constitutive of 
shared reality." (idem; p.'7) 
Construction, in this sense, is a necessary feature of representational activity 
both at the level of the individual and of society. 
2.2.3. The theory and phenomenon of social representations: Universal or 
particular? 
One of the corollaries of the "strong" version of social constructionism 
described above is that social representations are intrinsically related to social 
conditions; their structure owes much to processes of social communication and 
interaction, as well as to the contents which are created and diffused through the 
latter. As such, they change over time. To describe and explain historically and 
socially changing forms of social knowledge is precisely the aim of the theory of 
social representations (and of the project of a sociology of knowledge a la Berger & 
Luckmann). The theory of social representations must therefore account both for 
universal and particular phenomena. 
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"It seems impossible to overstress the following point: the theory of 
social representations is both a general theory and a particular theory. 
It is in the first place a vision of the whole of society. And in this 
vision stamped by the symbolic and the ritualistic, social 
representations are constitutive of bonds and common actions. [...] 
Then the theory is a particular theory of the collective forms of 
thought and belief and of the communications produced under the 
constraints of society. [...] Figuratively speaking, the general aspect 
of the theory can be associated with Durkheim and the particular 
aspect with Levy-Bridhl. " (Moscovici, 1993; p.161) 
With Durkheim, Moscovici saw communalistic ritual as the source of all social 
knowledge; he recognised that representations exist beyond individual cognitions, that 
they are relatively stable (though much less so than Durkheim assumed), prescriptive 
and conventionalising. Perhaps one should add that with Weber, Moscovici 
recognised the importance of representations as vectors of actions and as forms of 
knowledge which are loaded with symbolism and which exist both at an individual 
and a collective level. And with Freud, he drew attention to the social origins of 
knowledge within each individual, to the ways in which collective knowledge is 
internalised and bears the mark of its social origins. These intellectual ancestors 
provided the foundations for the "general" or universal aspects of the theory of social 
representations. 
But Moscovici also drew on Weber, Levy-Brahl and Piaget to develop, at 
once, the "particular" dimension of the theory of social representations. Weber taught 
sociologists why some men are more rational than others; he located the emergence 
of a specifically modern type of rationality in the diffusion of a puritanical Protestant 
ethic. Levy-Briihl showed social anthropologists that singular acts and thoughts cannot 
be explained without a deeper understanding of the system of collective 
representations that prevail in a given society. Every single type of mentality is 
distinct and corresponds to the nature of the society under investigation, to its 
institutions and to its specific practices. Therefore, Moscovici claims, one cannot 
assume that there are some uniform mental operations which would be identical 
across all societies at all times; no single or unitary logical or psychological 
mechanism can ever explain the collective representations existing in different human 
groups. And Piaget invites us to consider the specificity of representations in psychic 
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terms, to uncover the concrete operations involved in representational thought, to 
investigate the complex issues of the genesis and processes of transformation of 
representations. Piaget's work effectively destroyed the presumption of homogeneity 
of thought that was characteristic of Durkheim and Lévy-Briihl, both of whom 
assumed that representations were transmitted unchanged from one generation to the 
next and were uniform within a given society. 
Such insights are all integral to the theory of social representations. They do 
not in themselves help us to solve its "paradox". Indeed, this apparent paradox has 
been at the heart of the theory from its inception, and it continues to generate much 
debate. Perhaps the current confusion is understandable, considering that the concept 
of social representation occupies a "mixed position, at the crossroads of a series of 
sociological concepts and a series of psychological concepts" (Moscovici, 1976; 
p.39). Yet, it is of central theoretical and empirical interest, both for social 
representations theorists in general, and for this thesis, to keep at once its "universal" 
and "particular" aspects in mind when conducting research. Unfortunately, one often 
finds social representations theorists emphasising only one aspect, at the expense of 
the other. Doise (1996), for instance, has recently taken the view - albeit implicitly -
that the theory and the phenomena of social representations are "universal". He 
advocated that the theory be used to analyse past historical forms of social 
knowledge. This invitation, it seems to me, seriously undermines the contribution of 
the theory of social representations to social psychology. From the outset, the 
programme of research on social representations aimed to investigate a new type of 
common sense, one whose structural and functional characteristics, as well as content, 
would be intrinsically linked to, and constitutive of, a new kind of public sphere, to 
novel forms of communications and social interactions, themselves related to a new 
natural division in society, to a greater social division of labour, to the diffusion of 
scientific knowledge through the mass media, to the breakdown of traditional 
morality, to pluralism, etc. The conceptual and methodological apparatus was tailored 
to the needs of an "anthropology of modern culture"; to use it as a universal 
framework to investigate any form of social organisation and knowledge seems highly 
inappropriate. 
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On the other hand, some want to stress that social representations are a 
"specifically modem social phenomenon" (Moscovici, 1984b; pp.952-53), that we 
have entered "the era of social representations" (Moscovici, 1982). It is argued that 
the qualitative difference between social representations and other forms of social 
knowledge (myths, religion, etc.) requires serious appraisal. Such a radical difference 
would stem from the diffusion and penetration of scientific knowledge in everyday 
life. Changes in the production, transformation and distribution of knowledge in 
contemporary western societies, now that science has become a major source of 
individual and social knowledge, would have produced an altogether new type of 
common sense: social representations. 
"One central assumption of this theory is that the popularisation of the 
sciences and their results has become a major source of mundane 
stocks of knowledge and has replaced other, more traditional sources. " 
(Flick, 1994; p.181, italics added) 
The stress is on how social representations have substituted more traditional 
forms of knowledge, or common sense in the classical sense. The strength of the 
argument resides in its explicit concern with the relationships between, on the one 
hand, some structural societal changes, namely the establishment and dominance of 
institutions devoted to the production and diffusion of scientific knowledge and, on 
the other, psychological functioning and the content of thought. The weakness stems 
from this almost exclusive preoccupation with science, which tends to over-emphasise 
one particular dimension of modernity (see Giddens (1991) for a much broader 
discussion of late modernity in relation to psychic phenomena) 
Yet another stance in relation to the paradox of the universal and the particular 
aspects of the theory of social representations is adopted by Billig (1988). Billig, who 
perhaps most clearly exposed the paradox, attempts to resolve it by distinguishing 
between the processes of objectification and anchoring. Objectification is generally 
defined as a process by which objects or ideas acquire a concrete reality. It is a 
process of materialisation of abstract notions whereby information is selectively 
chosen, integrated into a coherent structure, and then attributed the status of an 
objective entity. Anchoring refers to the integration of novelty into pre-existing 
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frameworks. Unfamiliar objects are named and classified so that they lose their 
threatening character and can serve as a basis for action. Knowledge thus becomes 
instrumental, or functional, in that it enables the mastery of the environment. Billig 
(1988) argues that only one of these processes, objectification, can be said to be 
"particular" to modern society, whereas the other, anchoring, seems to exist in every 
form of social organisation, and can thus be said to be "universal". 
Billig clearly posits the terms of the debate and correctly points out that social 
representations theorists have not, to date, systematically analysed the necessary 
conditions for the emergence of social representations. His own solution, however, 
is less satisfactory. First, as Duveen and Lloyd (1990) have argued, objectification 
and anchoring, if they can be distinguished analytically, are nevertheless always inter-
related. 
"[Objectification and anchoring] are interdependent, in the sense that 
a representation can become securely anchored to the extent that it is 
also objectified, and vice versa, that objectification would be 
impossible unless a representation were anchored." (Duveen & Lloyd, 
1990; p.2) 
Thus, it seems incongruous to argue that one of the two processes could exist 
independently of the other, that is, in certain societies and not in others. Second, 
Billig also overlooks the fact that the anthropological literature is replete with 
examples of objectification in traditional as well as in modern societies (e.g. Descola, 
1986/1994; Douglas, 1966/1991; Hastrup, 1992; Latour, 1991/1993; Levi-Strauss, 
1955/1961), which makes it difficult to claim that objectification would be a 
"particularistic" concept. The real challenge is to account for the universal 
sociological dependence of cognition in a fundamental and detailed manner, and to 
relate particular forms of knowledge to the historical societies which shape them, in 
which they express themselves, and which they contribute to create and change. 
My proposal, which derives in part from existing social representational 
studies and from the empirical analysis which follows, is to restore the hypothesis of 
"cognitive polyphasia" (Moscovici, 1961/1976). This hypothesis suggests that 
different cognitive styles (some of which survive from earlier times, others of which 
emerge in today's societies) would co-exist, nowadays, to apprehend complex and 
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multi-faceted realities, and to create ambiguous realities as well. As early as 1961, 
Moscovici speculated that "the dynamic coexistence... of distinct modalities of 
knowledge, corresponding to defined relationships between human beings and their 
surroundings, [would] engender a state of cognitive polyphasia" (Moscovici, 
1961/1976; p.186; italics in original, personal translation). Having to face and to 
resolve ever more complex social and natural problems, those living in modern 
societies would not only have to learn new "languages" but also to develop varied 
mental apparatuses. In his own research on psychoanalysis, Moscovici noted that a 
particular mode of reasoning was more apt to meet the demands of propaganda, 
another those of making economic decisions, a third those of science, and so on. 
Thus, there would be no unique cognitive process because different modes of 
reasoning serve different purposes and because some are better adapted to particular 
contexts than others. 
A number of empirical studies support this hypothesis. Jodelet (1989/1991) 
found that, intrinsically related to modern medical knowledge, there survived magical 
beliefs about the contagious nature of mental illness. The social representations of 
madness she reconstructs articulate these different modes and contents of thought 
which enable the inhabitants of a village who have to live with the mad to deal with 
this threatening situation. Jovchelovitch (1995) describes how Brazilians' belief in the 
impurity of their own "corrupt" blood serves to explain and justify the corruption of 
the public sphere in general, and of political life in particular. The co-existence of 
scientific and magical knowledge and beliefs about even such modern phenomena as 
HIV/AIDS cannot but surprise those who would rather believe in our monolithic 
rationality. The notion of a "gay plague", theories of divine punishment, and 
conspiracy theories about viruses having been developed by the FBI with the express 
aim of eliminating unwanted populations continue to flourish in order to explain the 
genesis and consequences of the disease, in parallel with medical knowledge (Joffe, 
1995). Thus, traditional forms of knowledge have not been completely eroded and 
replaced by science: religious metaphors, archaic moral prescriptions and 
proscriptions, superstitions and rituals of purification, for instance, do survive in 
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contemporary societies. Mary Douglas' work has taught us not to draw an over-sharp 
distinction between "primitive" and "modern" societies. 
Endorsing the hypothesis of cognitive polyphasia entails the necessity of 
identifying the particular constraints which operate in order to produce a content 
which has some attributes and not others. The fruitfulness of this hypothesis is that 
it opens a path for "the analysis of the transformation - equilibrium and evolution -
of these modalities of thought, of the relationships which are established between 
them, and of their adaptation" (Moscovici, 1961/1976; p.187; personal translation). 
More precisely, it allows social psychologists to bear in mind, simultaneously, the 
general and the particular aspects of the theory of social representations, which are 
crucial to account both for the necessary and universal dependency of ideation upon 
social conditions, and for the specificity of particular modes of knowledge. 
2.3. Of some unfortunate dichotomies 
In many ways, the strength of the theory of social representations resides in 
the fact that it can overcome many of the dualisms which plague traditional social 
psychology. It is this constant struggle to reconcile what is often thought of in 
antithetical terms which guides the epistemological gaze of the theory. I believe it is 
now more crucial than ever, as the theory diffuses ever more widely and becomes 
appropriated - dare I say anchored? - by mainstream social psychologists, to insist on 
just what makes it such an important and radical contribution to this discipline. In 
particular, I would like to discuss how the theory aims to reconcile the false 
dichotomies between 1) individual and collective representations, 2) social and 
cognitive processes, 3) intentional and non-conscious processes, and 4) symbolic and 
material practices. 
2.3.1. Individual and collective representations 
Paradoxically, the theory of social representations has been criticised on the 
grounds of both sociological and psychological (individualistic) reductionism. 
McKinlay & Potter (1987), for instance, argue that the insistence on the "prescriptive 
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and conventional" nature of social representations, as well as on their "autonomous" 
character, denies the possibility of individual participation and rules out the very 
conditions of change in the social universe. In a different vein, but making a similar 
point, Billig (1987; 1993) argues that the theory of social representations rests upon 
an "unthinking image of the thinker" according to which individuals passively 
integrate novelty in terms of familiar schemata. This view of the "thinker" also 
renders negotiation, debate, and, ultimately, social change, impossible. It is precisely 
this conceptual flaw which, Billig claims, leads to an over-emphasis on consensus. 
I have discussed elsewhere (Rose et al, 1995) Billig's (mis)conception of consensus. 
But it is important to state that both he and McKinlay & Potter formulate convergent 
criticisms: the theory of social representations has yet to break away from 
Durkheim's conceptualisation of collective representations. Interestingly, proponents 
of the theory of social representations are also accused of committing the opposite 
"sin". Harre (1984a; 1984b), for instance, takes the view that the theory continues 
to promulgate a version of individualism by qualifying as "social" what are in fact 
merely distributed or aggregated individual representations. 
This debate is not to be dismissed hastily. It points to real ambiguities within 
the theory itself, and these must be addressed. Although the theory of social 
representations is not homogeneous and, as such, is open to the criticisms briefly 
summarised above, it nevertheless constitutes one of the most fruitful and far-reaching 
attempts to conceptualise the relationships between individuals and society. A short 
review of Moscovici's rationale for abandoning the Durkheimian dichotomy between 
"representations individuelles" and "representations collectives" should contribute to 
a clarification of the theoretical status of social representations. 
The substitution of the adjective "social" for the classic notion of "collective" 
representations indicates more than a terminological fancy. It lies at the core of 
Moscovici's ambition to develop a model of social ideation which can, at once, 
account for the diversity found in modern societies, emphasise the constant and 
necessary dialogue between society and its members, and locate the genesis of 
representational activity in communicative practices rather than in the minds of 
isolated individuals or in the productions of a collective, homogeneous and reified 
"single intelligence" (Durkheim, 1912/1995). 
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For Durkheim (1898, 1901/1958, 1912/1995), individual representations 
comprised the realm of the ephemeral. They were a set of fleeting and unstable 
perceptions and images. In opposition, collective representations were like "social 
facts": stable, often fixed in institutional customs and rituals, external to individuals 
and existing before or even independently of them, and they had a coercive and 
constraining power over individual thought and action. Durkheim conceived of 
collective representations as being elaborated by a sort of group mind, a universal, 
homogeneous and autonomous entity. Durkheim insisted on keeping the two types of 
representations apart because, he argued, these representations had a different 
"substratum" (the brain, the human group) and were operating in different realms 
(individual consciousness, collective consciousness). Durkheim's distinction - not least 
because it parallels Wundt's - continues to find echoes in contemporary psychology 
as well as in sociology. 
The theory of social representations can overcome these distinctions. One of 
its most productive aspects is that it locates psychological activities in social life, in 
the relationships which bind, and separate, individuals. It locates the ontogenesis of 
the human subject, of the self, in the simultaneous processes of individuation and 
socialisation. Such a perspective is not entirely novel. It draws extensively on Mead's 
(1934) and Vygotsky's (1978) conceptualisations of the origins of mind in social 
interaction and communication. Mead, it will be recalled, conceived of thinking as 
an internal conversation in which significant symbols have the same meanings for the 
individual as they do for the group. Thus, Mead implied that "mind" does not exist 
solely in the heads of individuals but also in the social and cultural (particularly 
linguistic) contexts in which the activity of mind originates and expresses itself. And 
because human society is characterised by its capacity to produce cultural artifacts 
which together constitute a symbolically significant environment, Vygotsky added, the 
emergence of mind itself depends upon the socially constructed environment. Thus, 
psychological processes are the products of social processes and of cultural 
phenomena. But, conversely, individuals and social groups are also the producers of 
cultural phenomena, since the latter are created and sustained through their material 
and symbolic activity. 
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Thus, the theory of social representations attempts to conceptualise at once the 
power of social reality and the agency of social subjects. It allows us to understand 
both the ways in which socio-epistemic structures impinge on the subject to shape her 
ideas, beliefs, opinions, attitudes and practices, and the ways in which individuals and 
groups, in turn, participate in the creation of the "thinking society" . It shows how 
representations are always and necessarily social products because society is at the 
very core of human subjectivity. Clearly, one "cannot conceive of 'individual' 
processes that are not at the same time bound up with social processes" (Moscovici, 
1987; p.520). 
Individual subjects do not simply respond to stimuli. They perceive social 
realities through the filter of already-existing representations and, thus, construct them 
into social objects. They invest their representations with their accumulated 
experience, with emotional and affective needs and desires, as well as with the images 
and words circulating in their material and social environments about these objects. 
Of course, to state that social representations are produced by individuals need not 
mean that they exist only in individual cognition. Chombart de Lauwe's (1971, 1979) 
work on the social representations of childhood illustrates how movies, novels, parks, 
ads, etc. equally constitute powerful vehicles for the transmission of these 
representations. Such a perspective de-emphasises the focus on individuals in order 
to understand how thought is rooted in a social and cultural world, which has its own 
requirements and which determines modes of knowing as well as the content of 
thought. It allows one to "study collective phenomena, that is phenomena resulting 
from a large number of interactions and revealing common features that no single 
individual can have" (Moscovici, 1987; p.516), whilst at the same time recognising 
the creative role of individuals. Social interaction and communication are the dynamic 
processes within which social representations originate, but also through which social 
representations are sustained and eventually acquire their prescriptive and 
conventional character. 
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2.3.2. Social and cognitive processes 
Perhaps more particularly, the theory of social representations stresses how 
we need the social in order to know. In this sense, it also reconciles the social and 
cognitive functions of representational activity. These two sets of functions are often 
treated separately by psychologists, on the one hand, - who tend to conceptualise 
categorisation, assimilation or the formation of concepts in terms of individualistic 
cognitive functioning - and by sociologists, on the other, - who focus almost 
exclusively on the interplay of external forces (such as relations of production, power 
relations or ideologies) which determine both the form and the content of thought. 
Social representations theorists, however, disregard this unfortunate dichotomy and 
insist on the fact that cognitive elaboration is itself dependent upon the conceptions, 
norms and values which prevail within a given social group at a given time. Indeed, 
this is exactly what the generative mechanisms of anchoring and objectification are 
about: the selection and transformation, via integration into pre-existing frameworks, 
of aspects of the world in a manner that makes this information available and useful 
to social subjects. Thus, the cognitive functions of social representations - to render 
the abstract concrete, to select information, to assimilate novelty, to "take the place 
of", to make available to consciousness, etc - are intrinsically linked to their social 
functions - to organise and interpret the life-world, to orientate action, to serve as a 
guide for communication, to explicate, to legitimise or to undermine social relations, 
etc. For social representations theorists, "there are no content-free mechanisms and 
cognitions that can be arbitrarily dissociated from their mental context and social 
setting" (Moscovici, 1984b; p.950) 
Theoretical and empirical works emphasise the necessary interdependence 
between the cognitive and social functions of social representations. Discussing the 
genesis of social representations from a developmental perspective, Duveen (Duveen 
& De Rosa, 1992) identifies an important paradox: "values cannot be organised in 
terms of a logical sequence which would provide the framework for a developmental 
study" (Duveen & DeRosa, 1992; p.98). Thus, developmental/cognitive approaches 
which rest upon a strict separation between the form and the content of knowledge -
with progressively more mature logical structures providing the form through which 
58 
the content is organised - are unable to account for the evaluative dimensions inherent 
in representational activity. These evaluative dimensions can be deduced neither from 
the intrinsic qualities of the object of knowledge, nor from the canons of logic. They 
arise from social life, from the "social discourse of values" in which the child grows 
up. Culture, in this sense, does not simply "accelerate or retard the rate of 
development" without intervening "in the actual structures which develop" (Duveen 
& De Rosa, 1992; p.99) as Piaget would suggest; on the contrary, it is at the very 
core of social representations. 
Grize (1989) makes a similar argument with respect to the relationship 
between social representations and "natural logic". The very concept of natural logic 
may be open to criticism, but it is useful in the present context. Grize's argument is 
simple. It is illustrated by the following examples: 
a) If elephants are pink (p) then, if 3+3=6 (q), elephants are pink (p); 
b) If he loves her (p) then, if he is honest (q), he will marry her (m). 
The first proposition (a) is, in logic, perfectly valid; it has the form of a 
tautology. The second proposition (b), however, is only convincing from the moment 
one accepts the validity of the complex social representations of love, honesty and 
marriage which it implies. The causal link is precarious and, therefore, the validity 
of its conclusion is "undecidable". 
"By asserting something which does not claim to be true, something 
which lies outside of the logic of non-contradiction, individuals 
immediately locate themselves in the social realm: it becomes a joint 
endeavour, for the speaker and the listener, to decide on the value, 
adequacy and relevance of the proposition." (Moscovici, 1989b; p.17. 
Preface to Jodelet; personal translation) 
Everyday cognitive processes depend upon shared cultural forms (which 
encompass purely, linguistic forms, such as the implicit meanings of words, and 
meanings which arise in conversational contexts) and the objectives of 
communication. They are intimately tied to the sensus communis of specific groups. 
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2.3.3. Intentional and non-conscious processes 
As a sociological form of social psychology (Farr, 1987), the theory of social 
representations must confront problems similar to those with which both sociologists 
and psychologists have wrestled ever since the birth of their respective disciplines. 
One such problem concerns the relationship between intentional and "non-conscious" 
processes. The ways in which one conceptualises the relationships between these has 
important theoretical, methodological and analytical implications. 
It is now a common place in sociology and psychology that not all ideas are 
accessible to the awareness of social subjects. The founding fathers of sociology all 
advocated different versions of the "principle of non-consciousness". Marx, for 
instance, argued that in the production of their life, men enter into determinate 
relations that are necessary and independent of their will. Similarly, for Weber, 
interpretive sociology was based upon the refusal to equate the cultural meaning of 
action with the subjective intentions of actors. And Durkheim suggested that one 
should study collective representations as social facts by "adopting the principle that 
one is ignorant of what they are, that their characteristic properties, like the unknown 
cause upon which they depend, cannot be discovered by even the most careful form 
of introspection." (Durkheim, 1901/1958; p. xii). 
Sociologists, in keeping with the "principle of non-consciousness", generally 
outlaw from the scope of their investigation the representations that subjects form of 
their own experience. Rather, they search for the underlying, objective, material and 
social causes which are not fully apprehended by social subjects but which 
nevertheless explain social relations. This position is conceived as the sine qua non 
of a truly scientific sociological practice. To look for the "reasons", "opinions", 
"justifications" and "rationalisations" provided by subjects to explain their own 
conditions, it is argued, can only "stand in the way of the search for the social 
functions that the 'reasons' disguise..." (Bourdieu et al, 1968/1991, p.17). 
Many psychologists also reject the conceptions elaborated by social subjects 
as viable explanations for human behaviour. Perhaps the two most radical forms 
which this principle assumes in psychology are behaviourism and psychoanalysis. The 
former negates altogether any reference to mental processes, and the latter dismisses 
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the rationalisations of the ego as valid explanations of the subject's representations 
and actions. There is a whole unconscious world, fraught with contradictions, within 
the human self. 
However rich they may be, these positions need to be revised from the 
perspective of the theory of social representations. In their different ways, they 
amount to a radical dismissal of intentionality, of the phenomenological experiences 
which, no doubt, must be constitutive of social life. It is these experiences which 
subjects intend to communicate, and these experiences often become shared realities. 
It is important to restore a sense of intentionality and to take seriously the meanings 
which social subjects give to their own experience. The theory of social 
representations must, and does, focus not only on the structural factors which exist 
"outside" of the experience of social subjects, but on the ways in which lay people 
make sense of, and construct, their world. It is necessary to consider social 
representations as a distinct and legitimate object for social psychology. 
Moreover, it is crucial that "non-conscious" realities be structurally related to 
social conditions as well as psychic drives without being reduced to either. The 
problem is to define and explain non-conscious regularities in ideas and practices 
without reference either to intra-psychic mechanisms, or to the power of ideologies 
or to relations of production'. One of the tasks facing social representations theorists 
is to account for the interplay between the intentional and non-conscious processes 
involved in the creation, maintenance and transformation of meanings. This has 
seldom been achieved, but Jodelet (1989/1991) provides a paradigmatic study. Social 
representations do not just result from, nor simply express, conscious, volitional or 
intentional acts. Clearly, the cultural meanings of actions may differ significantly 
from the intentions of the social subjects, just as each action may have a number of 
unintended consequences in addition to, and perhaps at odds with, those consciously 
2Durkheim explicitly spelled out the difference between the methodological affirmation that 
there are non-conscious regularities in behaviours, and the affirmation of an "unconscious" endowed 
with specific psychic characteristics. He wrote: "All that we wish to say is that certain phenomena 
occur in us which are of a psychic order and which are nevertheless not known by our conscious 
selves. Whether they are known to some other unknown "self" or whether they are outside the realm 
of all apprehension is not for us a matter of primary importance. All we wish to be granted is that 
representational life extends beyond our present consciousness." (Durkheim, 1898; p. 299; personal 
translation) 
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sought and foreseen by individuals. Yet, they do express and shape intentions, and 
this subjectivity must be acknowledged. 
This entails the necessity of breaking away from the assumption of the 
transparency and universality of meanings, in order to locate significant practices in 
the specific contexts which give them their very significance and within which their 
objective consequences can be assessed. "The meaning of the most personal and 
"transparent" actions does not belong to the subject who performs them but to the 
complete system of relations in which and through which they are enacted" (Bourdieu 
et al, 1968/1991; p.17). Thus, although representational life is not entirely opaque 
to its participants, there are nevertheless taken-for-granted assumptions which extend 
beyond the consciousness of individuals. These can be realised in language, images 
and ritualistic practices, and must be retrieved through analytical procedures. Social 
representations theorists must work with this paradox in mind. 
2.3.4. Material and symbolic realities 
And finally, the theory of social representations effectively destroys the false 
dichotomy between the realm of the material and that of the symbolic which 
underpins research predicated upon a realist epistemology. Ideation, both individual 
and collective, is at the root of our practices and, conversely, our material world 
cannot be understood without reference to the representations which are constitutive 
of it and upon which our knowledge is based. Rather than causing each other, the 
"conceptual" and the "material" parts of reality are co-determining our experience of 
the world (Godelier, 1984). To presume that social realities exist independently of the 
activity of social subjects would simply eliminate the need to consider the efficacy of 
social ideation since the latter would be defined a priori as "false knowledge" or 
illusion and, in any case, as simple epiphenomenon. This conception is no longer 
acceptable. In the seventies, Althusser had already enriched Marxian analyses by 
considering what he called the "specific efficacy of super-structures" and the 
"material character of ideological practices" . In spite of its limitations, this 
theorisation gave an enormous impetus to the study of symbolic realities in general, 
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and of ideology in particular. But it was Godelier (1984) who most explicitly stated 
the rapport between the "conceptual" and the "material". 
"Any social relationship includes a conceptual component, an element 
of thought, of representations. These representations are not only the 
form which social relationships assume in our consciousness; they are 
an integral part of social relationships. One ought not to mistake the 
"conceptual" ("Wel") for the "ideal" or the "imaginary": 
representations do not appear "after the event" , as it were, to make 
available to consciousness social realities which would have begun to 
exist before them, outside of them, or even without them. Far from 
being separate from social relationships, far from being their mere 
reflections, representations are a part of social relationships as soon as 
these begin to take shape and they are one of the very conditions of 
their formation." (Godelier, 1984; p.171-172; personal translation) 
Symbols are constitutive of our material environments. Events and realities are 
registered and defined not only by reference to their inherent characteristics but by 
their significance in terms of the social systems where they occur and which they 
shape. This perspective, of course, is not entirely new, but it does recover and further 
develop elements of social scientific thought which had become marginalised as social 
psychology became individualised (Farr, 1996). It derives directly from a social 
constructionist epistemology (and ontology). This will be further discussed in the 
following chapter with respect to "nature". 
2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter was intended as a broad discussion of some of the central tenets 
of the theory of social representations, with three aims in mind. Firstly, I wanted to 
introduce the theory and to clarify its specific contribution to social psychology, 
especially by focusing on its (often unrealised) potential to overcome a series of 
dichotomies which still cut across the entire discipline. Secondly, I proposed to 
examine its epistemological foundations, via the link with the sociology of knowledge. 
This, in turn, led me to affirm that the theory needs to promote a "strong" version 
of social constructionism and that it ought to address, simultaneously, the "general" 
and "particular" aspects of social ideation. And finally, I aimed to develop a 
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framework for the empirical analysis of the social representations of nature circulating 
in Shetland. Rather than opting for a simple presentation of the theory - which would 
have been infinitely more comforting both for myself and for the reader - I have 
chosen to emphasize precisely those aspects which are currently the object of vigorous 
academic debate. I had to resolve such issues in order to proceed to develop a social 
psychology of nature which would begin with a radical doubt about taken-for-granted 
social representations of Nature, and would then propose to reconstruct various 
representations, each being intrinsically related to particular social conditions, borne 
by specific individuals and social groups according to their positionings in society, 
and serving certain functions. 
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3.0. SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF NATURE, SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS IN NATURE 
Building upon the previous two chapters, one may begin to develop a 
genuinely social psychology of nature. In what follows, I set out to lay down some 
of the foundations of such a programme. At its heart is the idea that "nature has a 
human history" (Moscovici, 1968/1977) and, therefore, that nature cannot be 
understood beyond the bounds of the particular social representations which both 
make it available to consciousness and construct it. A social psychology of nature will 
only succeed in constituting itself as a science if it ceases to endorse a naturalistic 
view, that is if it views nature as being constituted symbolically rather than merely 
given. Unless it is able to problematise "nature" as being itself the product of material 
and symbolic practices inextricably tied to specific cultures and historical times, this 
science - like environmental and ecological psychology - will only reproduce and 
validate the existing realist and dualist cosmology of modern societies. 
The theory of social representations can play a central role in defining the 
scope and object of a social psychology of nature. It affords the conceptual tools to 
explore the structural relationships between the genesis of social representations in 
different socio-historical conditions, their content, and their transformation. 
Moreover, it is concerned with the mechanisms through which systems of ideas, 
values and images which exist at a collective level become subjectively real and 
efficacious for individuals in the course of ontogenesis, and through communication 
and social interaction. In its strong constructionist version, the theory also enables us 
to investigate how social representations of nature become objectified in nature, and 
vice versa. In fact, as we shall see below, social representation theorists have often 
chosen just those objects which, because they appear as given, would seem to fall 
outside of the symbolic activity of human groups. Together, their work can constitute 
a powerful challenge to the naturalism which still underpins most of social psychology 
and perpetuates the dichotomy between the realm of nature and that of culture or 
society. 
But this general perspective does not suffice. One must also consider the 
specificity of nature as a particular object. To do so, I shall draw extensively on two 
essays by Serge Moscovici on the relations between human societies and the material 
world. The aim is to theorise the intrinsic connection between social life, nature and 
knowledge. In essence, it will be argued that the history of the social constructions 
of nature is a continuation of the history of nature, that the development of new 
knowledge, skills and abilities is integral to the simultaneous evolution of social and 
natural life and of the human species itself. Moscovici also presents a three-fold 
typology of states of nature which will be described and, subsequently, used to 
analyse the data collected in Shetland. 
3.1. Social representational studies of "natural" objects 
Three decades of research on social representations have produced a body of 
empirical studies which, though not about nature per se, implicitly challenge the 
dichotomy between "nature" and "society". Indeed, social representation theorists 
have investigated a range of so-called "natural" objects, such as the human body itself 
or its various attributes (sex, race, health, illness, etc.), inanimate objects and the 
physical world (houses, cities, parks, space). My review of these works is intended 
to show that the theory can reconcile these allegedly antithetical terms, but also to 
demonstrate that social representation theorists are not always agreed on the version 
of social constructionism they favour. 
Jodelet (1984b) analysed social representations of the human body. She found 
that, over an interval of fifteen years, significant changes had taken place in the 
manners in which men and women represent and talk about their own bodies. As the 
feminist movement gained currency, it changed the relationships between the sexes 
and, concomitantly, the relation of each sex to its own body. Men became more 
aware of, and knowledgeable about, their bodily experiences, and women began to 
challenge hegemonic definitions of their status and the images of femininity which 
circulate in the mass media. Jodelet also noticed that, over this period, the ways of 
talking about the body - both privately and in the media - had changed considerably: 
the present discourse was characterised by more freedom, less hypocrisy, fewer 
taboos, greater diversity and flexibility. The study convincingly demonstrates that 
people's perceptions and conceptions of their body are not direct and unmediated. The 
questioning of ideological representations of the body by minority groups, and the 
decline of moral prohibitions on sexuality, together with the more widespread 
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diffusion of knowledge of biology via the educational system, popular science and the 
mass media of communication, generated important modifications in men and 
women's relations to their own body. Jodelet thus concluded that social 
representations, as social products, bear the mark of their genesis in social relations 
and have "a profound influence on the relationship which an individual maintains with 
his own body at the level of lived experience and of conduct" (Jodelet, 1984b; p.237). 
In an early study, Herzlich (1969/1973) also showed that health and illness -
two apparently neutral, medical, assessments of the state of the body - are neither 
clearly defined nor unambiguously recognised entities. Her work reveals the notions, 
the categories and the kind of language through which health and illness are socially 
constructed. It indicates that judgements about good or bad health are not simple 
assessments of one's physiological state; they are the result of evaluations of complex 
relations between individuals, society, and nature. Herzlich's interviewees state that 
good health stems from a harmonious relation between self and nature, whereas 
illness results from the "unnaturalness" of city life: air pollution, noise, the rhythm 
of life, and the poor quality of the food all contribute to causing ill health. Illness 
therefore is something which happens in the course of one's life and which must be 
explained. Good health, in comparison, does not seem to require any explanation: it 
is given. People are born with a good constitution. These results should not be 
interpreted as implying that good health is indeed a natural category: the fact that it 
is represented as such must not obnubilate the fact that this category is itself the 
product of representational activity, the outcome of an effort to make sense of what 
is perceived as a natural state. 
Duveen and his colleague (Duveen & Lloyd (eds), 1990; Lloyd & Duveen, 
1990; Duveen, 1993), adopting a strict constructionist perspective, analysed the 
processes through which children come to think, act, and feel in terms of already 
structured social representations of gender. In one study, Lloyd & Duveen (1990) 
videotaped women interacting with babies of between four and a half and eight 
months of age. Four different babies (two boys and two girls) participated in the 
study. Independently of the biological sex of the infants, their gender was manipulated 
by calling them either John or Jane and by dressing them either with a frilled dress 
or a blue terry "baby gro" . Despite the imposition of gender-marked names and dress, 
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no differences were observed in the behaviour of the infants. "At this age children are 
not yet active in the semiotic field of gender" (Lloyd & Duveen, 1990; p.33). The 
women also had access to six different toys - two signifying femaleness, two 
signifying maleness, and two deemed neutral (as assessed in a pilot study conducted 
with the general public). The researchers observed no difference in the interest in 
gender-marked toys on the part of the infants themselves. Yet, regardless of the actual 
sex of the babies, the women were more likely to present the ones they thought to be 
girls with a doll, and the ones assumed to be boys with a rattle or a hammer. The 
women's response to the motor activity of the infants was also shaped by what they 
considered appropriate patterns of activity for babies of a given sex. "When dress and 
names signified maleness women offered verbal encouragement to the infant's gross 
motor activity and responded themselves with further motor stimulation. Yet the gross 
motor activity of the same infant whose dress and name signified femaleness elicited 
soothing and calming" (idem, p.34.). 
This study indicates that in the process of development, the child enters into 
a world which is already highly structured in terms of the social representations of 
gender shared by adults in a given community. Insofar as social representations of 
gender become objectified, that is, insofar as they are projected into the world, they 
are constitutive of the reality into which the child is born and grows up. The material 
culture (e.g. toys), as well as the social environment, are pre-constructed on the basis 
of representations of gender. Although toddlers are not themselves actors in the 
semiotic field of gender, they function as signifiers for others. Adults interact with 
them as boys or girls, and thus provide them with the symbolic resources to develop, 
initially through practical activity and later through intellectual understanding, a 
gender identity. Sex, through its inevitable coupling with gender identities, is 
therefore no more a "natural" category than the human body or health and illness. 
What, then, would constitute a truly "nonsocial" object? Could inanimate 
objects, such as buildings, parks, monuments, or the physical environment in general, 
qualify as such? Milgram's (1984) analysis of "cities as social representations" 
disqualifies the built environment as a nonsocial object. He argues that cities are 
social objects par excellence since they represent "the product of intensive and 
prolonged social activity, containing the embodiments not only of one's 
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contemporaries, but of the accumulated labours, decisions, and values of earlier 
generations" (Milgram, 1984; p.293). His work with Jodelet (Milgram & Jodelet, 
1976) on the image of Paris reveals that the evaluation of "arrondissements" - in 
terms of the expressed desire to live there, of the knowledge of their architectural 
characteristics, of their resident population and of the main types of social and 
economic activities found in each of them - is organised around a geographical and 
symbolic knot which corresponds to the historical heart of the city. Parisians today 
experience their city through socially shared representations which articulate and reify 
the past and present economic, political, and social struggles which have marked the 
development of the capital. The boundaries between known and unknown sectors of 
the city partly follow the route of the last wall of Paris, "les fermiers generaux", 
which was abolished in 1859. The working class areas and those occupied mainly by 
ethnic groups are equally less known and often stigmatised. Contemporaries' 
representations seem to reflect and express prejudices about the residents of various 
"arrondissements". 
Chombart de Lauwe's (1971, 1979) analysis of the social representations of 
childhood also teaches us something about the ways in which the built environment 
is imbued with collective meanings which exert a coercive power over individuals. 
Her vast study on the evolution of the representations of childhood, which takes the 
second half of the 19' century as its starting point, uncovers these changing 
representations in a variety of media: novels, autobiographies, movies, etc. She also 
conducted a series of interviews with architects and town-planners in order to retrieve 
their conceptions of children. Cutting across the different social discourses she 
gathers, there appears a coherent and somewhat mythified representation of the child. 
The latter is consistently contrasted with the adult: in a series of binary oppositions, 
the child is associated with nature, spontaneity, authenticity, direct communication, 
and freedom, whereas the adult is coupled with society, normative conditioning, lack 
of authenticity, interested relationships and constraints. For the purpose of the 
argument, what matters is that there often exists a significant discrepancy between the 
real experiences of children and the social representations which adults hold about 
them. And yet, children do live in physical worlds which objectify the social 
representations of childhood held by adults. They go to playgrounds, kindergartens 
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and parks whose design crystallises how architects and town planners represent 
childhood. And so, children live and are socialised, indeed, in a "world apart". 
Again, Jodelet's (1989/1991) work is relevant here. In her monograph on 
social representations of madness, she shows how the organisation of social spaces 
in Ainay-le-Château functions to circumscribe contacts with bredins - "loonies". 
Jodelet demonstrates how rules of spatial segregation are passed on and become more 
rigid from one generation to the next, and how they serve to instigate a social order 
which protects the inhabitants' identity. This study is instructive; the organisation of 
space, of the physical and social environment, does not emerge spontaneously, nor 
without consequences for social life. It is structured by ideology, cultural models of 
usage and normative beliefs. It also serves social and affective functions, notably the 
protection of identities. 
As these examples show, the built environment, the world of inanimate 
objects, the organisation of space, cannot be said to be nonsocial. They are already 
constructed and structured in terms of social representations which give them meaning 
and which have direct consequences for human activity. 
3.1.1. Two versions of social constructionism in social representations theory 
The studies reviewed above expose the fallacy of a dichotomy between the 
realm of the "social" and that of the "natural". So-called natural objects inevitably 
become social from the moment they begin to exist for human beings, that is from 
the moment they begin to signify something. An object is an object for someone - that 
is a Hegelian, rather than Cartesian, perspective. The ideas, beliefs and images which 
are held about these objects arise in social contexts; they originate in social 
communication and interaction. They are shared by members of a group and 
characterise this group. They also serve social functions. On these defining attributes, 
social representation theorists are in agreement. The rub of the matter concerns the 
extent to which social representations actually constitute reality itself. Different 
versions of social constructionism seem to be involved. 
Some studies favour a "weak" version of social constructionism. Jodelet's 
(1984b) analysis of the social representations of body, Milgram and Jodelet's (1976) 
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investigation of the representations of Paris, and Herzlich's (1969/1973) research on 
health and illness belong to this group. The three studies are essentially concerned 
with changing ideas, images and evaluations about otherwise unchanging objects. 
This, I would argue, does not stem so much from the concept of social representation 
itself as from the methodological procedures used to investigate it empirically. 
Practices are not given due attention. One is therefore left having to infer the 
consequences of changing social representations. 
For instance, in Jodelet's (1984b) work, men and women talk about and 
attempt to change the dominant images of the body which make up their symbolic 
environment. But what about non discursive practices? Do people try to shape their 
bodies? Young girls and, more recently, teenage boys suffer from anorexia nervosa 
and bulimia - both of which are spreading at an alarming rate. Diets, meditation, 
physical exercise as an activity in and for itself, or the practice of "safer sex" are all 
manifestations of the coercive exhortations to control one's body which permeate 
western societies. There may indeed be greater flexibility and diversity in the 
discourses around the body, but these novel representations are as prescriptive as ever 
(Foucault, 1979). It is reasonable to assume that a greater emphasis on practices 
would have yielded somewhat different results. It would certainly have shown that 
changing social representations of the body, in a very real sense, create different 
bodies. A similar critique could be made about Milgram's (1984) and Herzlich's 
(1969/1973) analyses. 
Both Lloyd and Duveen (1990) and Chombart-de-Lauwe (1971; 1979), on the 
contrary, afford us a "strong" version of social constructionism. For them, social 
representations do not simply arise in social contexts and through social interaction; 
they also create reality. In their analysis of the development of identities in relation 
to social representations of gender, Lloyd and Duveen demonstrate how objectified 
representations are projected onto babies who, though not yet able to manipulate 
gender-related symbols themselves, nevertheless come to behave according to the 
expectations of their care-takers. By adopting a developmental perspective, they show 
how significations which circulate in society as a whole become subjectively real for 
individuals. 
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Chombart-de-Lauwe's analysis of childhood is also firmly rooted in a social 
constructionist epistemology. For her, representations of childhood are almost 
Durkheimian social facts. They have, at once, a subjective meaning for novelists, 
architects and town planners, and an objective existence in books, parks and 
nurseries. Objectified subjective processes - themselves related to prior social 
representations of childhood shared by adults - make up the world in which children 
grow up. Children are represented as being fundamentally different from adults, and 
a separate world is created around them which institutes and sanctions the difference. 
If the theory of social representations is to propose a version of social 
constructionism which transcends phenomenology, then an explicit focus on practices 
and on objectification is necessary. There also ought to be a greater emphasis on 
change: developmental approaches and longitudinal research designs can make 
important contributions to the theory of social representations. In particular, more 
studies are needed on the circumstances under which social representations become 
"de-objectified", that is, when the taken-for-granted character of social representations 
disappears as new meanings challenge previous ones, as marginal social groups 
confront dominant ones, as new social psychological practices shake the foundations 
of those upon which the very objectivity of the world rests. 
Two seminal studies, one by Levi-Strauss (1955/1961), the other by Bourdieu 
(1970), exemplify how the physical environment objectifies meanings about the 
group, and how it is read as a representation by members of that group. The analysis 
of the Bororo village of Kejara proposed by Levi-Strauss in Tristes Tropiques  
(1955/1961) is exemplary. The anthropologist describes the circular distribution of 
huts around a central house and the relation of this structure to the four cardinal 
points and the river nearby, on the one hand, and to the social structure and 
metaphysical system of the Bororo people, on the other hand. Without going into a 
detailed account of Levi-Strauss's analysis, it suffices to say that the physical 
organisation of the village objectifies the social structure and the symbolic order of 
the Bororo: rules of filiation, myths of origins, relationships between the living and 
the dead, between man and the universe are all inscribed in the physical environment. 
The village itself represents an extraordinarily complex cosmology. Through the 
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process of objectification, space is read as a representation, refers to representations 
and is explained by representations. 
Bourdieu (1970), in a tribute to Levi-Strauss, analysed the structure of the 
Berber house and its function in the production and reproduction of social relations. 
The Berber - kabyle - house embodies and expresses a series of oppositions. Indeed, 
the house at once unites and separates the private and intimate world of women, and 
the public and open space of men; the life of the senses and the feelings, and the life 
of dialogue and exchange; the cooked and the raw; fire and water; darkness and light; 
night and day; high and low; culture and nature. "The relationships of opposition are 
expressed through a whole series of convergent signs which establish the relationships 
at the same time as receiving their meaning from them" (Bourdieu, 1970; p.153). 
Bourdieu's analysis makes it clear that the meanings attached to the house can only 
be understood in terms of some common principles which structure both space and 
social practices. The use of space - both inside and outside the house - is explained 
by reference to some underlying representation which also organises social relations. 
The theoretical unity between the physical environment, social relations, and symbolic 
practices is asserted. 
3.2. Social representations and nature 
However insightful these studies may be, they are not concerned specifically 
with "nature" . In fact, there is no literature on the social representations of nature per 
se (except, tangentially, and from a rather more cognitivist perspective, the work of 
Guimelli (1989) on hunting). This void is particularly remarkable in view of two 
considerations. First, no human society can exist without modifying the natural order, 
without some representation of their rapport to nature, and without some language to 
express and construct such representations. Second, the predominance of the "natural 
question" in contemporary societies would seem to make representations of nature a 
prime object of analysis. Indeed, our century has seen the developments of quantum 
physics, of the theory of relativity, of cybernetics, of molecular biology and "genetic 
engineering"; it has witnessed the explosion of nuclear bombs as well as ecological 
and geomorphological changes on an unprecedented scale. The sheer scale of the 
73 
transformations engendered by human beings, as well as the qualitatively different 
modes of intervention whereby we can effectively annihilate or preserve a species or 
a forest, create new synthetic matter, modify the atomic structure of existing 
elements, and even alter the DNA structure of our species, have brought about a 
fundamental shift of the traditional boundaries between "nature" and "culture"; they 
have brought to the fore the necessity of locating humankind amongst the forces of 
the material world. Such transformations are not issues for natural scientists alone. 
The general public is now weary of bio-technologies and finds it increasingly difficult 
to draw the line between "nature" and "culture". Important social movements were 
also born out of a growing disenchantment with the ideology of progress, itself based 
on a particular socio-historical relationship between man and nature. Environmental 
groups, thanks to the media, ensured that, by the 1980s, "ozone holes" and the 
"greenhouse effect" would be part of the layman's vocabulary. A complex 
conjunction of scientific developments, technological advances and ideological 
changes, together with the consequences of the economic boom, have transformed 
our social representations of nature. It is now necessary to propose a coherent theory 
of the genesis of different representations of nature, to map the origins of today's 
novel representations and to explore how they coexist with older ones. 
3.3. Nature has a human history 
Moscovici takes us a long way towards the development of a general theory 
of the creation, maintenance and transformation of social representations of nature'. 
In two complementary essays (Moscovici, 1968/1977; 1972/1994), he addresses 
himself to the issue of the relationships between nature and society. Although neither 
La Societe Contre Nature (1972/1994) nor Essai sur l'Histoire Humaine de la Nature 
(1968/1977) are written explicitly from a social representational perspective, both are 
'In February 1997, I was asked to write a book review of the English translation of Eder's The 
Social Construction of Nature: A sociology of ecological enlightment  (1988/1996). I found out that 
my own work, developed some years before and presented in this chapter, contains remarkable parallels 
with Eder's. We both drew on Moscovici, and I would of course concur with Eder that "the starting 
point in Moscovici (1968) makes possible a more suitable conceptualization of the relationship between 
nature and culture than is possible with older and more recent sociological theoretical approaches" 
(Eder, 1996; p.9ff). A more detailed discussion of Eder's book and, implicitly, of the similarities and 
differences between his research and mine can be found in the British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 48 
(4) to be published in December 1997. 
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germane to the present project. Moscovici's essential argument is that both the 
assumed non-historicity of nature and the separation of the latter from the sphere of 
human activities are simply (in)convenient fictions. Nothing warrants a strict 
dichotomy between some reified "Nature" untouched by human practice, and a 
"Culture" which would be divorced from its material substratum. The historicity of 
collective endeavours, in as much as it rests upon constantly renewed exchanges with 
material forces, suggests that natural orders must also have their history; a decidedly 
human history (Moscovici, 1968/1977). 
Moscovici's thesis can be summarised in the following way'. Human beings 
have not remained the same throughout their history. Similarly, Nature as an 
immutable given is forever inaccessible; instead, what we find is a succession of 
natures. From the moment human beings begin to act upon material forces, 
Moscovici argues, they also create themselves, that is their historically and spatially 
located states of nature. A state of nature corresponds to a particular material 
configuration, itself brought about by the development of a given type of labour 
which, in turn, both reveals and fosters certain human skills and forms of knowledge. 
It is thus impossible to isolate what would constitute a "primary" or "original" human 
nature; one only encounters secondary natures, as it were, never reaching a primitive 
state out of which humankind would have been born. Particular natural configurations 
include humankind as an internal, creative, organising factor. They cannot be 
deduced from some autonomous natural processes. We must therefore relinquish 
conceptualisations of "nature" and "society" which reify these two terms as either 
unrelated or antithetical spheres of reality. From this perspective, sciences, 
techniques, arts, philosophies - in short that which is usually considered as 
quintessentially social or cultural - are but modalities of interaction with material 
forces, means through which we create and reveal our nature. Any human practice, 
by virtue of being human, belongs to the realm of nature. By the same token, any 
2This account of Moscovici's thesis is incomplete. Chief amongst the omissions is the scholarly 
analysis of artistic, philosophical and scientific treatises wherein Moscovici traces the transition from 
one natural state to the next. This thorough documentary analysis allows him to isolate the genesis of 
each state of nature at different historical times. I have also left out the social, political and scientific 
programme which Moscovici takes to be a necessary corollary of his conceptualisation of the social 
construction of nature. Despite these important omissions, and despite the fact that discussing 
Moscovici's empirical analysis clearly lies beyond my competence, I believe the presentation outlined 
below provides sufficient grounds to discuss the general thesis. 
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natural configuration is, in part, a human creation. The creation of states of nature 
must therefore be understood in terms of the concrete practices of specific social 
groups, or natural categories, which act as bearers of change. Natural categories are 
social groups who create new forms of labour. 
Discussing the processes through which humanity jointly and simultaneously 
creates itself and its states of nature, Moscovici distinguishes between the production 
of objects and the creation of labour. It is the latter, defined as practices that 
engender new faculties, new skills, new "savoir-faire" - in contrast to the application 
of already existing knowledge and abilities to the production of goods - which, for 
Moscovici, constitutes the basis upon which the human species asserts itself as a 
subject both of, and in, nature. Two natural processes, in turn, are jointly involved 
in the creation of labour: invention and reproduction. Invention refers to "the methods 
by which man adds new abilities, knowledge, reflexes to already existing ones, 
thereby forcing phenomena in the material world to interact amongst themselves and 
with the human organism" (Moscovici, 1977; p.55) in novel ways. Invention in this 
sense does not create some artificial anti-nature: on the contrary, it is the 
accomplishment of our very nature. Reproduction, on the other hand, refers to the 
repetition of productive acts. It consolidates the relationships established by human 
beings among themselves, with other species and with their surroundings, thus linking 
their "biological" and "social" being to the physical environment. The reproduction 
of abilities and knowledge ensures the stability, permanence and expansion of our 
natural states. Since invention and reproduction generate new properties in the total 
universe of material, biological and social forces, they are essentially natural 
processes (Moscovici, 1972/1994). In short, the human history of nature is the history 
of the social construction of states of nature through the activities of members of 
natural categories who, by their labour, effect changes both in matter and in 
themselves. 
Before I discuss the strengths and short-comings of this thesis, let me describe 
briefly the states of nature - organic, mechanistic and cybernetic - identified by 
Moscovici as having emerged from the natural division of society. These ideal-types 
will be used to analyse the data collected during the field work in Shetland. 
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3.3.1. Organic nature 
According to Moscovici, the organic state of nature begins to appear towards 
the end of the neolithic period, reaches its quintessence in Greek art and philosophy, 
and disappears with the advent of the Renaissance. The main characteristics of this 
state of nature are that 1) labour has an essentially artistic quality, and 2) the material 
world is treated exclusively as a source of raw material (Moscovici, 1977; p.87). 
Whereas the farmer takes care that society reproduces itself, the craftsman - the new 
and key figure in the organic state of nature - transforms nature into something 
different, a second nature as it were, by producing pottery and metal objects. His 
labour is defined as much by his knowledge or potential creations as by his actual 
work. Corresponding to this craft activity is a partial differentiation of inventive 
knowledge. This knowledge, however, defies objectification in books, treatises or 
theories: bodily movements best express it. There is a relation of identity, as it were, 
between human beings and their abilities. In organic nature, Man is at the centre of 
the world, being at once its privileged subject and the most accomplished of its 
objects. 
Human skills are directed towards material resources - wood, iron, stone - but 
these appear only as raw material, as given, as something which will be transformed 
by artistic labour. Of course, artistic labour does not imply an unmediated 
relationship to material resources; the creation of tools is a central feature of the 
organic state of nature. These tools, however, are essentially extensions of human 
organs, allowing individuals to intervene in areas where they could not easily have 
done so (the invention of tongs to handle red-hot iron), to develop better motor co-
ordination (the potter's wheel), to amplify raw muscular strength (the lever, the 
pulley) and, in general, to increase efficiency. "There is therefore no radical 
discontinuity between man and the substances to which he gives shape, affixing on 
them the seal of his knowledge." (idem; p.90). The tools created and reproduced 
through and for artistic labour serve not only to produce goods: their primary 
creation, somewhat paradoxically, is human beings themselves; men and women with 
more sophisticated and better adapted organs, with new skills and abilities. Thus, in 
the organic natural order, human beings produce themselves as they reproduce what 
77 
has already been created. And they use material resources as substances, considering 
solely those qualities which can be used by the craftsman. Raw materials may assume 
different forms but their structure remains intact. 
3.3.2. Mechanistic nature 
With the Renaissance, things change dramatically. The organic solidarity 
which previously linked the biological substratum of the species to its manual and 
intellectual skills begins to dissolve, as both terms become more independent of one 
another. Instrumental labour and matter as force are the new elements of this natural 
state (Moscovici, 1977; p.93). The mechanisation of the world means that labour 
becomes an attribute of any material force, organic or not; each of these forces is 
envisaged in terms of its potential for producing work. The relative independence of 
instrumental labour from the worker manifests itself in a number of ways. First, it 
appears in the growing concern for effects rather than for causal agents: human 
beings, animals and water-falls become interchangeable as sources of energy insofar 
as they can generate similar effects. Second, the organic, qualitative link between 
skills and the labour force erodes as work takes on a purely quantitative character. 
Labour becomes measurable in terms of the expenditure of energy and time necessary 
for the creation of a given product. It is now endowed with general characteristics 
which permit one to separate it from the working subject: labour is transformed into 
an object which can be manipulated. 
The instrumental quality of labour is also derived from its end which is, 
literally, the invention of instruments: the clock, the water pump, the astronomical 
telescope. Such inventions modify human biological qualities, sharpening some senses 
(sense of measure, of time, quantitative and abstract judgement) whilst rendering 
others subordinate (intuition, tactile sensitivity, qualitative judgement). Moreover, the 
important role attributed to invention creates a need for new means of acquiring and 
diffusing knowledge. Although most engineers - the key protagonists of this state of 
nature - still train in workshops, formal instruction supplements the traditional forms 
of education. And with the establishment of institutions devoted specifically to the 
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production and dissemination of knowledge, the process of invention now occupies 
a more central place: it is both permanent and widespread. 
In this context, the quality of matter as a substance or raw material subsides 
and it appears primarily as a force, a source of energy. Its structure is that of a set 
of homogeneous bodies which can be set in motion and which produce movement. 
Attributes such as mass, volume or kinetic energy become more immediately relevant 
at the expense of the material qualities of shape, texture and colour which dominated 
in the organic natural order. Whether directly or indirectly, the principles of 
instrumental labour dictate how laws concerning the physical elements are formulated; 
these laws, in turn, inform practices. Reduced to being an organised set of forces, 
nature seems to be regulated by a set of precise and eventually uncoverable laws. 
These appear measurable, objective, independent of human action since man has 
become equivalent to any other material force. 
"If, in the organic state of nature, man produces himself as he 
reproduces primarily what has already been created, in mechanistic 
nature it is presumed that the totality will be accessible and rendered 
transparent, as it were, at the end of man's incessant and 
predetermined inventive activity. In the first case, man recognises as 
real only what is deemed to be possible; in the other, he acknowledges 
as possible only what is already real." (idem; p. 98) 
In the mechanistic order, Moscovici claims, nature itself appears limited and 
the discovery of its limits seems well within our reach. Once the laws of force and 
of movement are discovered, the universal machine will be doomed to endless 
repetition and reproduction. 
3.3.3. Cybernetic nature 
The transition from the organic to the mechanistic state of nature has seen a 
profound transformation in the nature, processes and function of labour from being 
artistic to being instrumental. Concomitantly, nature itself has changed from being a 
repository of raw material or substantive forms to being a set of forces and a source 
of energy. In the process, some human skills and faculties have disappeared whilst 
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others have developed. With the advent of the cybernetic state of nature at the end 
of the 19 th century, more fundamental qualitative changes were to take place. For the 
first time and on a grand scale, human beings are not content with shaping, 
fashioning, reproducing and understanding existing material forces; they now 
endeavour to generate new ones. The revolution is striking: matter does not simply 
appear as given; rather it is its potentialities that are sought. In other words, the final 
rather than the primary qualities of matter become central (Moscovici, 1977; p.98). 
Indeed, the development of chemistry has provided the means of producing ever-new 
materials either by changing the internal structure of a given material system or by 
altering the interactions between two or more such systems. Thus, even if substance 
and force are still important, the central qualities of matter in the cybernetic order are 
their structural and systemic properties'. This is without doubt a decisive turning 
point in the human history of nature. We can no longer identify, quantify and foresee 
the evolution of matter since new, original products are continuously being created. 
The human relation to materiality has changed forever. What is available to our 
senses is but one of the multiple states which matter may assume. The cybernetic 
natural order is hierarchically structured, with different laws and determinisms 
governing each level. 
The emergence of the cybernetic state of nature is, of course, intimately tied 
to a new form of labour. The discovery of electricity and of electronic components 
has provided machines with a much greater degree of autonomy. Men and women no 
longer have to stand by machines to fix them in case of a mechanical breakdown: 
their role is to establish norms and programmes to regulate their functioning. Once 
the systems have been activated, human intervention is limited to the supervision, 
monitoring, control and interpretation of signals indicating the relative degree of 
3The matters produced through chemical reactions are generally referred to as "artificial" since 
they do not exist in Nature. However, their very existence being a product of human intervention, of 
novel interactions with the physical world, such materials clearly belong to our nature. 
4The inherent relativity and historicity of material forces could not be more powerfully 
expressed than in the idea of a changing curvature of space as a function of time, of a geometry 
intrinsically linked to a chronological cycle. Time itself has lost the immutable character of a general 
external category which it still assumed in the mechanistic state of nature to become, instead, an 
internal dimension. These notions may not be definitive but they seem highly plausible. Moreover, it 
is now commonly accepted that matter (a star, for instance) has its own evolution, analogous to that 
of a biological species. 
80 
adequation of the system's operations to the norms fixed beforehand. Labour 
therefore becomes essentially regulatory. The phenomenal speed at which material 
forces are invented calls for a more systematic approach to invention and to the 
creation of labour. Scientists, in this context, become the main protagonists of the 
cybernetic order, devoting their efforts to the methodical creation of labour. 
The table below graphically summarises Moscovici's typology of states of 
nature. The types of labour performed by given natural categories rest upon different 
uses of matter which, in turn, result in the creation of different states of nature. 
Table 3.1. 	Typology of states of nature, according to Moscovici (1977) 
State of 
nature 
Matter Type of 
labour 
Natural 
category 
Organic 
End of 
neolithic to 
Renaissance 
Raw 
material, 
substance 
Artistic Craftsman 
Mechanistic 
Renaissance 
to end of 
19 th century 
Force and 
energy 
Instrumental Engineer 
Cybernetic 
End of 19 th 
 century to 
now 
Potential 
systems 
Regulatory Scientist 
3.3.4. States of nature and social representations of nature: Towards a social 
constructionist social psychology of nature 
How relevant are Moscovici's essays to the case study presented in this thesis, 
to the theory of social representations, and to the programme of a social psychology 
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of nature? What are the relationships between states of nature and social representations 
of nature? Can the tripartite typology - organic, mechanistic and cybernetic natures -
be used to account for contemporary representations of nature? These are the issues to 
which I now turn. 
3.3.4.1. 	Nature problematised 
There are a number of productive ideas in Moscovici's essays. First and 
foremost, we find a problematisation of nature through the notion of a human history 
of nature. Moscovici does not postulate a stable and unitary physical world which 
would operate in accordance with some immutable and objective laws, and in front of 
which humankind would stand as a passive observer. Rather, he seeks to find the roots 
of changing states of nature in the practices of various groups. His work is inherently 
social and historical; it focuses on the knowledges and skills carried by particular 
groups, on collective meanings and material practices. This is precisely what attracted 
me to the thesiss . Such a conceptualisation is undeniably a modern one, rendered 
possible by recent epistemological, scientific and ecological revolutions; these force 
upon us the recognition of the social nature of natural events. Whatever its sources, 
however, it shows that the boundaries between man and nature, as well as the content 
encompassed by both terms, do not correspond to some fixed reality but are social 
products; as such, they change over time. Where and why such boundaries are created 
becomes a matter of empirical investigation. The analysis of social representations of 
nature during the Braer crisis in Shetland will shed light on such issues. 
51 should perhaps open a parenthesis on the research process here. The ecological crisis which 
prompted the research happened early on, in January 1993, and so the data were collected with little 
clear view as to how they might be subsequently analysed, except for a strong commitment to study 
the social representations of nature/the environment which would emerge in this context. During the 
following year, I searched through the literature in social, environmental and ecological psychology 
to see if there existed a theoretical framework which shed light on the data. It was this (immediately) 
unfruitful quest which led to the critique of environmental and ecological psychology formulated in the 
first chapter. In parallel, I was conducting some preliminary data analysis and became convinced that 
the actors involved in the oil spill, whether the local residents or the outsiders who came to help, were 
not talking about the same nature. For some, the oil spill was an existential crisis, for others, a 
technical and scientific problem, and for others still, an economic disaster. Different social 
representations seemed to be involved. Moscovici's thesis provided an approach to conceptualising and 
investigating such divergent representations and to locating their genesis in the wider context of 
European thought. Thus, although the presentation of Essai  sur l'Histoire Humaine de la Nature 
precedes the data analysis in the thesis itself, it was chosen for its potential in accounting for the early 
empirical findings as well as to further the analysis. 
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The radical character of Moscovici's theory becomes apparent if one also recalls 
how environmental and ecological psychologists conceptualised the "environment". 
They had little to say about the environment as an object which came into being as a 
result of the diffusion of scientific knowledge, which is constituted symbolically 
through communicative and material practices, and which is the focus of intense 
political, economic and ideological debate. Yet, an explicit concern for the conditions 
of emergence and for the content of this new object is crucial. Although both 
environmental and ecological psychology have been profoundly influenced by the so-
called ecological crisis, the main protagonists of the disciplines continue to conceive 
of "the environment" in naturalistic terms. Underlying these otherwise radically 
different approaches, there remains a conception of the environment as a simple given 
(save for the Transactionalist School). 
Moscovici, in contrast, does not adjudicate beforehand as to what constitutes 
the "nature" . His thesis also successfully resolves the problem of the dichotomy 
between the "pre-perceptual" and the "post-perceptual" environments which so puzzled 
both Lewin and. Barker; he does away with it altogether by positing humankind as their 
common denominator, as an internal, regulatory factor in the creation of nature. The 
Transactionalists did attempt to problematise the environment by focusing on the 
transactions between the latter and subjects. But they confined their analysis to the level 
of individual subjects, as though the accumulated past experience of a single person 
sufficed to explain his/her "hypotheses" about the environment. As the subjects entered 
the laboratory, they left their society, culture and history at the door. One is tempted 
to say that environmental and ecological psychologists themselves live in a finite and 
objective mechanistic state of nature, detached from human experience. Their theories 
are based on but one of the possible forms which the relationships between nature and 
society may assume; a form which sanctions the separation between humankind and 
nature. 
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3.3.4.2. 	Natural categories: Linking practices and knowledge in relation to 
nature 
I should also emphasise the value of the concept of natural category. Its 
relevance to the empirical situation found in Shetland will be further discussed at a later 
stage (see chapter 6), but the elements which are directly related to the programme of 
a social psychology of nature can be assessed now. The strength of the concept lies in 
its potential for articulating the ideas and practices of specific groups about nature itself 
in a coherent fashion. Insofar as one is interested in the genesis, structure and content 
of social representations of nature (including material practices), it is essential to isolate 
the natural categories or social groups who participate in the construction of different 
representations. This approach implicitly rejects other commonly used sociological 
means of delineating social groups 6 . If one aims to understand the evolution of the 
symbiotic relations between human beings and material forces, an explicit concern with 
the changes in what is considered, used or represented as nature becomes necessary. 
Furthermore, it is essential to address the inalienable skills and knowledges possessed 
by members of natural categories and to accord them a constitutive, rather than 
epiphenomenal, status'. 
This theoretical and methodological approach also contributes to the theory of 
social representations by explicitly binding practices to discourses, ideas and images. 
Most studies on social representations have privileged the analysis of verbal material 
at the expense of meaningful actions. Yet, practices can only be rendered intelligible 
6One such means would be to consider the positionings of social actors in terms of social 
classes. However, this would be inadequate. Since the fragmentation of societies into social classes 
concerns the objective laws according to which wealth is differentially appropriated by various social 
groups in the relations of production, such an analytical device refers mainly to social, economic and 
political processes. 
'This approach may be taken as a critique of McKinlay and Potter's (1987) critique of social 
representations theory on the grounds of some circularity whereby social groups and representations 
are co-extensive. They have argued that one of the theory's major conceptual flaws is that "what makes 
a group a group is exactly the shared representations of its members" (McKinlay & Potter, 1987; 
p.474). Therefore, they tell us, social representation theorists are bound to find the representations they 
are looking for since they search for them in the very groups which are assumed to possess them. This 
criticism stems from a particular conception of science and, more specifically, from a positivist notion 
of causality. Social representation theorists, as social constructionists, do not endorse this conception: 
social representations are not caused by sociological determinants operating from the outside. They are 
structurally bound up with the social conditions of their production and use; their genesis, content and 
structure reveals and reflects such conditions. This is so because social representations exist both as 
psychological structures and as social realities. Identifying groups on the basis of their particular rapport 
to materiality is simply better suited to the object of analysis. 
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when they are conceived as part of a network of meanings. Conversely, these practices 
also participate in the elaboration of the ideas and images which constitute the total 
system of the representation. Jodelet's (1989/1991) study of the social representations 
of madness attests to the value of an explicit concern with practices as an expression 
of underlying representations, rather than as an outcome of the latter. Moscovici 
undertakes a similar project when he locates the genesis of different representations of 
nature in the meaningful actions of craftsmen, engineers and scientists. Although these 
practices are mainly accessed through written accounts (often by contemporary 
commentators), they have also resulted in the production of artifacts, of machines and 
buildings, of new chemical elements, all of which constitute the data used by 
Moscovici for the construction of his typology of the states of nature. These historical 
figures are central to his thesis because the social groups which they comprise are 
united by a common rapport to materiality. 
3.3.4.3. 	From states of nature to social representations of nature 
Moscovici discusses states, not social representations, of nature. Given that he 
is best known amongst British social psychologists for having introduced the theory of 
social representations, this choice may seem surprising. In any case, it cannot be 
dismissed lightly. I believe the rationale for this implicit rejection of the theory of 
social representations to be two-fold. First, Moscovici is concerned with establishing 
a general theory of society/nature which would be valid at all times and - although his 
tripartite typology is firmly rooted in European history - valid across all cultures. This 
classical endeavour appears incompatible with the theory of social representations. The 
latter aims to account for the genesis and nature of a new form of social knowledge 
which would characterise "the world of today" (Moscovici, 1988; p. 213). Social 
representations, then, would be associated with, and restricted to, the contemporary era 
(Moscovici, 1982; 1984a). Moscovici insists on distinguishing this form of knowledge 
from both primitive thought and science. However, since the organic state of nature 
is, at least partly, related to the former, and since both the mechanistic and cybernetic 
states are, to a large extent, outcomes of the latter, it seems logically necessary to treat 
the genesis of these natural states as unrelated to social representations (except in the 
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case of cybernetic nature), at least insofar as the latter are defined as modern, common 
sense knowledge. 
Second, Moscovici's reluctance to frame his essays in terms of the genesis and 
diffusion of social representations of nature stems, apparently, from the explicit 
emphasis which he wishes to grant to practices, as opposed to ideas and values. In a 
discussion of Crombie's (1948) reflections on the history of scientific conceptions of 
nature wherein the historian identifies three main concepts of nature which, Moscovici 
concedes, perfectly map onto his own typology, Moscovici criticises the fact that 
Crombie restricts his analysis to the sphere of ideas, thereby precluding the attribution 
of "a concrete existence to abstractions" (Moscovici, 1968/1977; p. 109). Since I 
intend to use Moscovici's typology to investigate contemporary social representations 
of nature, it is important to address these two points - the specificity of social 
representations as modern phenomena, and the relation between ideas and practices. 
Both raise important epistemological and theoretical questions. 
Are social representations exclusively modern phenomena? We are faced again 
with the paradox, discussed at length in the previous chapter, concerning the general 
and the particular aspects of the theory. As before, I believe it is necessary to favour 
an anti-generalist view and to consider social representations as structurally related to 
social conditions and, therefore, as particular forms of knowledge characteristic of 
modern societies. This seems coherent with Moscovici's determination not to use the 
concept of social representations in order to refer to sets of practices and modes of 
knowledge corresponding to past forms of social/natural organisation. The problem, 
then, is to describe and to explain how modes of knowledge and specific contents 
associated with past states of nature can survive in contemporary societies as social 
representations of nature or, more precisely, as elements in a heterogeneous 
representational field with respect to nature. I would argue that the very fact that these 
elements have survived in modern society is sufficient for them to qualify as social 
representations. This, in turn, would imply that social representations are not a simple, 
monolithic, form of knowledge, but that they themselves encompass various modalities 
of thought. This would correspond to what Moscovici (1961/1976) called "cognitive 
polyphasia". It would also support Jodelet's (1989/1991) findings that, in spite (or 
perhaps because) of scientific medical knowledge, there survived an "immense magical 
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conclave" in Ainay-le-Château. Generally, representations which have lain dormant for 
centuries often reappear and lend shape to new realities. The Renaissance epitomises 
this process of rediscovery and re-actualisation. Moscovici may be describing by-gone 
states of nature, but the collective representations generated in the past are still part of 
the stock of common sense knowledge today. Societies remember (Connerton, 1989; 
Halbwachs, 1950). 
Concerning the relationships between ideas and practices, it is surprising that 
Moscovici should choose to refer to "states" of nature in order to link concepts about 
nature to exchanges with the material world. His critique of Crombie is entirely 
justified since Moscovici is not concerned with a succession of different "concepts" of 
an otherwise identical nature, but with very real transformations in both the physical 
world and human beings as a result of changing cognitive, symbolic and material 
practices. What is unclear, however, is why the concept of social representations is not 
used to this end. If social representations are indeed constitutive of the realities 
represented; if, as social constructionism suggests, the object and the subject of 
knowledge are no longer treated as separate and independent entities; if social 
representations are defined as "systems of values, ideas and practices" (Moscovici, 
1973; p.xiii), then there is no theoretical reason to substitute the notion of state for 
social - or perhaps collective - representations. This only undermines the radical 
significance of the theory of social representations which was introduced in social 
psychology as "a critique of approaches which rested on a separation between cognitive 
and behavioural elements" (Duveen, 1994; p.208). Representations structure practices 
as much as they inform ideas and values, and meaningful actions transform the material 
world as well as social actors. This has always been an assumption of the theory. 
Once it becomes possible to think of contemporary social representations of/in 
nature as "traces" of previous states of nature preserved in the human body, in rituals, 
artifacts, collective memory, and in "nature" itself in its current configuration, then the 
possibility of a critique of any social state of nature is opened up because there is 
nothing necessary about it. This paves the way, for instance, for a "symmetrical 
anthropology" (Latour, 1991/1993). The theory of social representations constitutes a 
privileged tool with which to analyse the social construction of the multiple 
representations of nature which circulate nowadays and create the highly complex states 
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of nature characteristic of modem societies. Few would dispute that we live in a nature 
which is not exclusively cybernetic. The latter should be the case if Moscovici's last 
state of nature were indeed the only characteristic state of the contemporary period. 
Organic and mechanistic representations circulate and interact with cybernetic ones, 
modifying all of them in the process. We must therefore be able to handle the complex 
interweaving of different systems of beliefs about, and practices in relation to, nature. 
The theory of social representations provides a space where heterogeneity is 
acknowledged (see Rose et al, 1995). 
"In a society like ours, an assumption of uniformity would lead one to 
underestimate the profound diversity among groups and the meaning of 
this diversity". (Moscovici, 1984b; p.959; emphasis added) 
"Meanings that are contradictory can coexist [within a representation] 
without cancelling each other out." (Moscovici, 1988; p.236) 
The theory of social representations allows us to understand both permanence 
and change, uniformity and diversity, in today's thoughts and practices related to 
"nature" . Perhaps more importantly, it enables us to understand the existential 
meaning, for social subjects, of particular representations of nature. In a world 
characterised by diversity and reflexivity, living by a given representation of nature 
involves selective appropriation. The programme of a social psychology of nature 
would therefore investigate 1) the content of the social representations of nature which 
circulate nowadays; 2) how such representations have emerged in specific contexts and 
how they combine; 3) how, in the face of a fragmented representational field, social 
subjects position themselves in relation to nature; 4) what the ideological, normative, 
affective and practical determinants are of such positionings; and 5) under what 
circumstances a change of representation can take place. Moscovici provides a brilliant 
analysis of the sociogenesis of representations of nature. He is silent, however, about 
the social psychological and existential consequences of living by a given representation 
of nature, and of living in a world structured by diverse representations. 
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3.3.4.4. 	The sociogenesis of contemporary representations of nature 
Essai sur l'Histoire Humaine de la Nature proposes a general theory of 
man/nature relations. But it also provides the lineaments of a framework to study the 
genesis and content of contemporary social representations of nature. Indeed, 
Moscovici's typology of organic, mechanistic and cybernetic states of nature is a useful 
starting point provided that, as I said, we can telescope each "state" into the modern 
era and consider them as constitutive of today's representational field, rather than as 
erstwhile states. It locates the sociogenesis of today's representations in the wider 
context of European history. 
There is, however, a major limitation in Moscovici's work; it has to do with 
the issue of content. The theory of social representations, together with other 
constructionist approaches, is equally interested in the content of representations as it 
is in their genesis, structure and functions, since it is this very content which, through 
the mechanisms of anchoring and of objectification, becomes constitutive of the worlds 
in which we live. Yet, in his essay, Moscovici can only provide a general analysis of 
the content of each state/representation of nature, one which, of necessity, is unrelated 
to particular social contexts. Perhaps this is not so problematic for the mechanistic 
state, since it is inherent to the representations which emerged in this context that 
nature itself should be conceived, experienced and acted upon as though it were finite, 
universal and objective, that is independent from the knowledges and practices of 
human beings. In other words, the mechanistic representation of nature seems to imply 
a unique, global perspective on nature, one which is indifferent to place and context, 
and whose content can therefore be defined a priori, once and for all, as it were. Even 
so, it must be important to understand why some social actors (individuals and groups) 
favour such a representation when at least two others are also part of their thinking 
environment. 
But the content of both organic and cybernetic representations, by definition, 
is expected to change according to different socio-historical contexts and interests. If 
the organic state of nature indeed emerges from the intrinsic solidarity which links 
human beings to their always particular material worlds, if Man is indeed at the centre 
of all things in this state of nature, then "the number of possible local perspectives is 
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potentially infinite" (Ingold, 1993; p.41), and the specific contents of organic 
representations must be described and explained. Similarly, the content of cybernetic 
representations of nature is not stable and unrelated to the particular interests of the 
people and institutions which diffuse them. The creation of our cybernetic nature 
crucially raises the old question of final causes, of the specific properties of material 
systems which are to be emphasised, and of the uses to which the latter are put. Since 
in cybernetic nature the creative manipulation of matter by humans is explicitly 
recognised and actively sought, the interests which shape the content of cybernetic 
representations of nature must be analysed in context. The contents and workings of 
both organic and cybernetic representations must therefore be investigated empirically. 
It is to such a detailed examination that the current thesis is devoted. The 
empirical analysis will emphasise the content of the plural, complex, and 
interdependent representations of nature which were circulating in Shetland in the 
aftermath of the oil spill. It will also make implicit the functions served by each 
representation, as well as the social psychological and existential reality of living by 
any one of them. 
3.4. Conclusion 
The object of this chapter was to provide a problematisation of nature as a 
social psychological object. I have begun by reviewing social representations studies 
which challenge the dichotomy between nature and society. This review had two aims: 
first, to examine how "natural" objects can be conceived as social constructs; and 
second, to discuss ambiguities within the theory of social representations concerning 
social constructionism and, by extension, the ontological status of social 
representations. I have argued that social representations theorists should adopt a strong 
version of social constructionism, that is one according to which social representations 
do not only pertain to changing ideas and images about unchanging objects, but where 
they actually construct the world in which we live, as well as our understanding of the 
latter. 
I then introduced two essays by Moscovici on the relationships between nature 
and society. La Societe contre Nature and Essai sur l'Histoire Humaine de la Nature 
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were chosen for a number of reasons. First, they propose an explicit problematisation 
of nature as the product of objectified human praxis. In this sense, they are genuinely 
social constructionist. Second, they offer a content-based typology of states of nature. 
The typology of organic, mechanistic and cybernetic states of nature provides some of 
the elements necessary for understanding the sociogenesis of contemporary 
representations of nature; it maps onto some preliminary analysis of the data collected 
in Shetland and will be substantiated by the analysis. Third, the concept of natural 
category is a key theoretical and methodological construct to relate the ideas and 
practices of particular social groups about nature per se. And fourth, Moscovici's 
essays have allowed us to reconsider the traditions of environmental and ecological 
psychology discussed earlier. Indeed, I have argued that these traditions are often 
themselves based upon a mechanistic representation of nature. Because scientists 
themselves implicitly sanction this representation - and fail to envisage other possible 
ways of relating to nature - they also sanction the split between humankind and nature 
which this representation implies. Consequently, they are also left unable to account 
for the ways in which the environment and, a fortiori, nature, are socially constructed. 
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PART II: METHODOLOGY 
4.0. THE BRAER INCIDENT: A CASE STUDY 
This chapter is devoted to providing a rationale, both theoretical and 
empirical, for the selection of the particular case upon which the analysis rests, and 
to introducing the case itself. It does not deal with the various methods of data 
collection (semi-structured interviews, group discussions, the media coverage of the 
event constituting the case, and participant observation) which are embedded in the 
research design. These issues will be discussed in the next chapter. 
The first section addresses the nature of case studies in general and the 
justifications for their use. I then examine the relevance of case studies for the 
empirical investigation of social representations and consider a particular type of case, 
"crises", in relation to the latter. Finally, I present a diary of the events which 
provide the context and the content of this case study. 
4.1. On the nature of single case studies 
Case studies have had such wavering support from social scientists that their 
use calls for some prior justification. Case studies are detailed examinations of 
phenomena which are believed to exhibit the operation of some identified general 
theoretical principle (Mitchell, 1983). They are a way of organising social data so as 
to preserve the unitary character of the object studied. Case studies investigate 
contemporary phenomena within their real-life context, when the boundaries between 
phenomena and context are not clearly evident. They also make use of multiple 
sources of evidence (Yin, 1989). These attributes differentiate case studies from 
laboratory experiments (which rule out extraneous factors or contextual conditions), 
from histories (which typically deal with complex, interrelated but non-contemporary 
events), and from surveys (which attempt to relate the phenomena to their wider 
context but, in doing so, exclude a number of significant "variables") (Yin, 1989). 
The case itself may be of several types: a singular event or process, an 
organisation, an institution, or a whole community. For the present project, the case 
is a unique event - the grounding of the tanker Braer in Shetland and the crisis that 
ensued. This event was selected for its potential in revealing the structure, dynamics 
and functioning of social representations of nature in relation to the particular socio-
historical context of Shetland society. 
Despite their relevance to, and significance for, the development of social 
psychological ideas (Dukes, 1965), case studies have often been criticised for lacking 
generalisability, validity and replicability. Boring (1954), for instance, argued that 
such studies are of almost no scientific value due to the absence of control in the 
design. Miles (1979) considered them to be "essentially intuitive, primitive and 
unmanageable" (1979; p.597), and unlikely to "transcend story-telling" (1979; p.600). 
Campbell (1961) and Campbell and Stanley (1966) also warned against some of their 
inherent dangers, such as the impossibility of comparing data obtained from a single 
case or the uninterpretability of comparisons between two instances, the total lack of 
degrees of freedom, the likelihood of various common-sensical rationalisations and 
over-interpretations going unchecked, the tendency to capitalise on chance, etc. These 
criticisms, however, seem to be based on a "caricature" of case studies, as Campbell 
(1975) himself acknowledged'. Before I discuss why and how I used a case study to 
investigate social representations of nature, let me first address the "problems" usually 
associated with case studies. 
4.1.1. External validity 
Criticisms concerning the lack of external validity (or generalisability) of case 
studies seem to rest upon a misconception of the basis upon which an analyst may 
justifiably extrapolate from a singular case to more general social processes. The first 
issue here is that of the typicality or representativeness of the case. The degree of 
typicality is not inherent in the case ex nihilo; it depends on the level of abstraction 
at which the case is considered and on the choice of the "relevant" characteristics to 
be compared and generalised across cases of the same type. Moreover, as Gergen 
In fact, Campbell and his colleagues (e.g. Campbell, 1975; Campbell & Stanley, 1966; Cook 
& Campbell, 1976) were not entirely opposed to using case studies. They argued that there were 
"countervailing relationships" between internal and external validity. "Since some trade-offs are 
inevitable, we think it unrealistic to expect that a single piece of research will effectively answer all 
the validity questions surrounding even the simplest causal relationship." (Cook & Campbell, 1976; 
p.245). Their work on quasi-experimental designs can be seen as an attempt to redress the balance 
between internal and external validity in favour of the latter. They aimed at increasing the ecological 
validity of research designs. Nevertheless, these methodologists still conceived of case studies as the 
weakest form of quasi-experimental designs. 
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(1973) argued, not all social psychological phenomena are equally stable: some are 
more highly susceptible to historical influence than others. Thus, the level of 
typicality is a function of the extent to which the analyst can establish that the case 
selected is likely to reveal the operation of some underlying general theoretical 
principle (Mitchell, 1983). The selection of a given case should be justified by its 
theoretical relevance or explanatory power rather than by its "typicality". 
What kinds of inferences are warranted? A good deal of confusion has arisen 
because of a failure to appreciate the fundamental differences between the procedures 
appropriate to making inferences from statistical data and those appropriate to the 
study of a single case. 
"In case studies, statistical inference is not invoked at all. Instead the 
inferential process turns exclusively on the theoretically necessary 
linkages among the features in the case study. The validity of the 
extrapolation depends not [primarily] on the typicality or 
representativeness of the case but upon the cogency of the theoretical 
reasoning." (Mitchell, 1983, p.207) 
The criterion of external validity, as it has been defined in the context of 
randomisation, does not apply to case studies. The latter rely on analytical 
generalisation, in a way analogous to that of the experimental scientist who 
generalises the results of a laboratory experiment to the theory rather than to some 
general population. Analytical generalisation may involve a kind of "pattern-
matching" between some implications derived from the theory (concepts, propositions 
and empirical generalisations) and the observations made in the local setting 
(Campbell, 1975). It may also entail the systematic confrontation of rival 
explanations. This strategy offers useful probes for the theory. The scientific value 
of case studies in this respect was also emphasised by Becker (Becker, 1970) who 
noticed that social scientists using this research strategy almost invariably found out 
that their initial theories, beliefs and tentative explanations were proven to be 
untenable. This most certainly describes my own experience. 
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4.1.2. Internal validity 
Internal validity can be defined as the extent to which variations in an outcome 
(a dependent variable) can be attributed to controlled variation in an independent 
variable (Cook & Campbell; 1976). The task incumbent on the analyst is to control 
the factors which may bring about variations in outcomes or to randomise those 
factors, thus avoiding various "threats" (Campbell & Stanley, 1966) to the internal 
validity of the study. The ultimate test of internal validity is that of the fit 
(isomorphism) between the findings of an inquiry and the "real world". However, the 
determination of such an isomorphism is "impossible in principle" (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985): it is beyond the logic of statistical sampling because it necessarily implies that 
one knows a priori the nature of that reality. 
"To score naturalistic inquiry as non-trustworthy on the grounds that 
controls and/or randomisation were not effected is to miss the point 
that, at bottom, these techniques are appropriate only insofar as one 
can buy into the assumption of naive realism. ... When naïve realism 
is replaced by the assumption of multiple constructed realities, there 
is no ultimate benchmark to which one can turn for justification... " 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985; p.2.95, italics in original) 
Thus, most of the threats (history, maturation, testing, instrumentation, 
differential selection, selection-maturation interaction, etc.) to the internal validity of 
a study identified by Campbell & Stanley (1966) cease to be considered as such; 
rather, they become part of the object of analysis and integral to the process of 
investigating. 
4.1.3. Replicability 
Replicability, like validity, only becomes a methodological issue when one 
assumes social phenomena to be stable, unaffected by, and existing outside of, history 
and culture. To criticise case studies for not being replicable seems misguided since 
such studies are used precisely to investigate critical, unique or extreme cases (Yin, 
1989): "unique" and complex cases by definition cannot occur in the same fashion 
many times The particular set of events that constitute the case take place in society, 
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because of the activity of social beings, and they have consequences for their life in 
common. The very fact that these events happen changes the conditions of society. 
History does not repeat itself. Thus, not only is replication impossible, but it is not 
even desirable since it would imply ruling out precisely the phenomena which one sets 
out to analyse: the historically and culturally situated construction of reality. 
4.2. The use of case studies to investigate social representations 
Three interrelated considerations have led me to use a case study to study 
social representations of nature: first, the choice of a "theory-confirming" approach; 
second, the adoption of an "event-oriented" case study, where special attention is paid 
to crises; and third, the use of an embedded design. 
4.2.1. A theory-confirming approach 
Case studies are highly relevant strategies for generating hypotheses or for 
confirming (if not proving) and developing existing theories (Lijphart, 1971). I 
believe that I have provided ample external justification for adopting a theory-
confirming strategy. Indeed, my review of environmental and ecological psychology 
was intended to show the inadequacies and shortcomings of a range of approaches 
which have attempted to apprehend the relationships between individuals and the 
material world. As against these approaches, I set out to demonstrate how the theory 
of social representations could provide a more adequate framework for the analysis 
of such relationships. This case study now serves to exemplify the workings of the 
theory. I shall reiterate some of the reasons invoked earlier and make explicit how 
a case study using a combination of ethnographic and participant observational 
methods, together with more traditional social psychological methods, can contribute 
to the development of a truly social psychology of the environment. 
Jodelet (1986, 1989/1991) has insisted on the necessity of studying social 
representations in the real life contexts of their production, functioning and 
transformation. Since social representations circulate in a number of social settings 
and draw upon the resources of the (reconstructed) past, it is methodologically 
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important to find a context which is relatively specific and circumscribed. The "case" 
defines just such boundaries. Of course, many illuminating social representational 
studies have been conducted using different strategies. Social representations of the 
body (Jodelet, 1984b), of health and illness (Herzlich, 1969/1973), of madness (De 
Rosa, 1987), of cities (Milgram, 1984), and of the economy (Verges, 1989) have all 
been analysed without reference to any specific context other than contemporary 
social life. However, case studies should be used more widely: they define the 
temporal and spatial scope of the analysis and allow one to isolate social practices, 
institutional frameworks, cultural models, and collective psychological phenomena 
(cognitions, affects, emotions) which relate to social representations (Jodelet, 1986; 
p.172). 
Many invaluable studies have been conducted in very specific environments 
which, it could be argued, limit the validity of their findings. Jodelet's (1989/1991) 
study of madness, for instance, takes place in a small family colony, Ainay-le-
Château, where local inhabitants act as foster parents for some 1,000 psychiatric 
patients. This "natural" situation is undeniably unusual; but this is precisely why it 
constitutes a unique opportunity to investigate the types of representations and related 
practices which emerge when a community lives in close proximity with the mentally 
ill. Goffman's (1953) analysis of linguistic and non-verbal communicative practices 
in Shetland (which provided the basis for his doctoral thesis as well as his book The 
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life  (1959) and his social psychological study of 
Asylums (1961/1968), is a powerful example of the potential of single case studies. 
Even Festinger, a most rigorous experimentalist, believed it was possible to test a 
theory by means of a case study. His investigation of what happens when a small sect 
expects the end of the world, and is forced to admit that the apocalypse did not 
actually take place, is a cogent illustration of the workings of cognitive dissonance in 
real-life settings (Festinger et al, 1956). These works are all based on single case 
studies. It would be difficult however to criticise them for lacking generalisability 
and, consequently, for being of little scientific value. 
Thus, for this project, the case study approach is used to "confiiiii" a theory 
which stipulates that people's symbolic and material practices in relation to the 
material world do not emerge in isolation but are the outcome of the social life of 
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groups; they engage emotions which are shared and cannot be understood outside of 
the particular historical and cultural context found today in Shetland; they draw on 
modes of communication, interactions and relations to nature which, in turn, 
participate in the construction of ever-changing "natures". 
4.2.2. An event-oriented case study 
The appropriateness of case studies depends upon the choice of the case itself. 
One has to find a real situation (i.e. not one artificially imposed by the researcher) 
in which the object of analysis is problematised and generates significant symbolic 
activity. This situation was found in the immediate aftermath of the oil spill which hit 
the Shetland Islands. 
4.2.2.1. "Crises" as significant complexes of events 
Crises are particularly informative social events. As Morin explains in La 
Rumeur d'Orleans (1969), where he develops his programme of research for a 
sociologie du present, the value of crises is under-estimated amongst mainstream 
social scientists. The latters' predominant focus is on repetition, regularity, stability 
and structure, a perspective whose implicit aim is to discover the general laws 
governing social life. This a priori excludes events and crises as marginal, contingent, 
and therefore unworthy of scientific interest. In his own research, Morin sets out to 
investigate the development of rumours concerning the alleged abduction of local 
white women by Jews in Orleans in the late 1960s. The rumours spread, gain in 
importance and lead to general panic in the town. Together with a team of social 
scientists, Morin is parachuted into Orleans, to study the crisis "in the making". 
Drawing upon the heuristic postulates of Marx and Freud, he notes that crises are 
extremely informative because they uncover latent representations, make visible 
underlying social structures, and highlight the vital role of dialectical processes in the 
social universe. Perhaps more importantly, crises generate a social problematisation 
of what previously was taken-for-granted Empirically, they offer the advantage of 
being relatively circumscribed phenomena. 
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Moscovici, like most French intellectuals in his generation, was profoundly 
influenced by Morin's unconventional research programme. He too recognises the 
importance of crises in uncovering representations. 
"...the character of social representations is revealed especially in 
times of crisis and upheaval, when a group or its image are undergoing 
a change. People are then more willing to talk, images and expressions 
are livelier, collective memories are stirred and behaviour becomes 
more spontaneous. Individuals are motivated by their desire to 
understand an increasingly unfamiliar and perturbed world. Social 
reconstructions appear unadorned, since the divisions and barriers 
between private and public worlds have become blurred. But the worst 
crisis occurs when tensions between reified and consensual universes 
create a rift between the language of concepts and that of 
representations, between scientific and ordinary knowledge." 
(Moscovici, 1984a; p.54.) 
The crisis in Shetland affords an interesting case with respect to the theory of 
social representations. It is an ideal methodological situation in which to analyse 
people's attempt to render familiar a new experience whose own logic requires the 
temporary suspension of customary modes of interaction, but also calls for the 
mobilisation of collective resources, knowledge and traditions. The crisis brings 
together forms of representations (scientific and social) which are rarely found in the 
same context. The affective load associated with the "disaster" also favours intense 
symbolic activity. The Braer oil spill is an effervescent context which brings into 
sharp focus practices which are guided by social representations and practices which 
determine some aspects of these representations as rationalisation, legitimation, 
justification, etc. In a nutshell, this dramatic case renders possible a contextualised 
study of the structure, content and functions of social representations of nature. 
The very location of the ecological crisis is equally interesting. Islands are, 
by definition, separate entities. As such, they have often been selected to research 
specific processes, both in the natural sciences - Darwin's work on the Galapagos 
islands immediately springs to mind - and in the social sciences. For instance, 
Goffman's (1953) Ph.D. thesis on language and communicative practices was 
conducted in Shetland, and based on the assumption that particular linguistic and non-
verbal communicative strategies would have evolved amongst Shetlanders as a result 
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of their geographical isolation. For a social representational study of nature, the 
peripheral geographical position and the marginal political situation of the islands, the 
distinct culture (where Viking, Scottish and English traditions merge) and dialect 
found in Shetland's close-knit communities, the importance of natural resources (oil, 
fish, land, etc.) for the local economy, the stability of the population over the past 
centuries and the sudden influx of immigrants followed by a period of rapid social 
change with the oil boom of the seventies, the ruggedness of the land and the 
uncompromising force of the elements, together with the ecological crisis itself, all 
concur to make Shetland an ideal place. 
4.2.3. An embedded design 
Complex aggregates of social events of the scale of an ecological "disaster" 
cannot be directly apprehended. Yet, the individual events of appropriating 
information, of discussing it with others, and of deciding how to handle the crisis are 
amenable to observation provided the researcher adopts an embedded design (Becker 
& Geer, 1958; Yin, 1989). Embedded designs involve the use of sub-units of analysis 
within the larger context of the case; they are case study designs in which data 
sources (and often methods of analysis) are triangulated. The data sources and 
methods which are triangulated in this study have been chosen for their respective and 
complementary potential in accounting for the interplay of symbolic and material, 
individual and collective practices of Shetlanders as they are faced with the crisis. 
These practices are present both at the interactional and collective levels; they emerge 
as a direct consequence of the oil spill but draw upon a considerable knowledge base 
shared by Shetlanders. They are historically situated (January 1993) but can only be 
understood in a diachronic perspective. The disaster is geographically located (Garths 
Ness) but it penetrates innumerable settings and is linked to the globalising tendencies 
of late modernity. The crisis also triggers very diverse types of cognitive, emotional 
and behavioural processes that are induced by the first-hand experience of the oil spill 
(seeing the black tides, breathing the fumes, etc.), by the dissemination of media 
messages, and by knowledge acquired through social interaction (with family 
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members, crew members, foreign and local journalists, friends, etc.). Thus, an 
embedded design is necessary to analyse such a complex set of events and processes. 
4.3. Diary of the Braer Incident 
On the morning of Tuesday, 5 January 1993, one of Shetlanders' worst 
nightmares became a reality. A Liberian registered tanker, the Braer, en route from 
Norway to Canada, ran aground. She went onto the rocks at Garths Ness, in the south 
of Mainland, the biggest and most densely peopled island of the Shetland archipelago. 
The tanker was fully laden with 84,700 tonnes of crude oil, which is twice as much 
as the cargo of the Exxon Valdez. In addition, it carried some 1,600 tonnes of heavy 
fuel oil bunkers. Immediately upon impact, oil began to escape in large quantities 
until, eventually, the vessel's total cargo was spilled. By its sheer size, its 
suddenness, the potential ecological, economic, political and social consequences, the 
spill quickly assumed the proportions of a major crisis. 
The information provided in this section is derived mainly from three official 
sources', from my own observations during the fieldwork and, in rare instances, 
from the local newspapers' coverage of the incident. The latter were used with 
circumspection, when issues were not contentious. One of the three official documents 
used, that produced by the Marine Pollution Control Unit (MPCU), differs 
considerably from the others. The authors of the report spent many weeks on the 
islands and were closely involved with the local authorities in the co-ordination of the 
2These sources are: 1) a document published by the Department of Transport (1994b) entitled 
Safer Ships, Cleaner Seas: Report of Lord Donaldson's Inquiry into the Prevention of Pollution from 
Merchant Shipping which investigates the technical aspects of the Braer incident and addresses broad 
issues such as the role of key players (flag states, coastal states, port states, shipowners, charterers, 
cargo owners, shipbrokers, various maritime assistance organisations, etc); ship design, construction, 
maintenance, equipment and reliability; ship operation and crewing; the sources and effects of pollution 
on the local economy, the wildlife, and public health; international and national laws and agreements; 
navigation and guidance to mariners; routeing; identification and reporting; insurance; the cleaning up 
of oil spills; the cost of pollution prevention, etc; 2) a report written by the Marine Pollution Control 
Unit (MPCU) and published by the Department of Transport (1994c) entitled The Braer Incident:  
Shetland Islands, January 1993. The MPCU is a body responsible for dealing with spillages of oil, 
chemicals and hazardous substances from ships at sea which threaten UK interests. This report deals 
more exclusively with the Braer incident itself, the local response by the authorities on site, and the 
repercussions of the oil spill on the islands' economy; and 3) the Report of the Chief Inspector of 
Marine Accidents into the Engine Failure and Subsequent Grounding of the Motor Tanker Braer at 
Garths Ness, Shetland on 5 January 1993 (1994a). This report inquires into the circumstances which 
led to the wreck of the Braer and concludes that the immediate cause was a failure of the vessel's 
engines. These sources provide important information but, in the analytical chapters, they are 
themselves used as data sources to construct both the mechanistic and cybernetic representations of 
nature. 
102 
response to the grounding of the Braer. MPCU members were sitting on committees 
attended by Shetlanders. As a result, their views reflect the input of the local 
population. One example will suffice to illustrate this: the MPCU's report includes 
six paragraphs on the disruptive attitudes of media representatives and visitors, a 
concern widely shared amongst the Shetland Islanders. Reporters are described as 
"enormously intrusive", "heavily demanding", having "no scruples", "wasting 
people's time", etc. The difference in accounts between the MPCU's report and the 
other two sources is also largely explained by the fact that the former is reporting on 
its own operational response to the incident, whereas the latter are investigating other 
people's actions. They are produced by outside observers who did not stay in 
Shetland for any length of time, and who were interested in broad technical issues. 
With this cautionary note in mind, let us now turn to the events surrounding the Braer 
oil spill, as these unfolded over the three weeks immediately following the grounding. 
On Tuesday 5, January 1993, at about 5.00 am, the master of the tanker Braer 
notified the Shetland Coastguard that his vessel had lost all engine power. Her 
estimated position was 10 miles south of Sumburgh Head and she was drifting in 
predominantly southwesterly winds force 10 to 11. It looked as though she could pass 
clear of the coast. In these circumstances, the Coastguard initially handled the request 
for help as a rescue operation rather than as a response to a potential ecological 
disaster. They suggested to the tanker's master that all non-essential personnel should 
be lifted ashore by helicopters. Sixteen of the 34 member crew were evacuated in this 
way. As the operation progressed, however, it became increasingly likely that the 
grounding could not be avoided. The master decided to abandon ship. 
In the meantime, an anchor handling vessel based in Lerwick was making her 
way through ferocious tides, waves and winds, to reach the site in order to install a 
tow line which might prevent the disaster. The operation was risky; it required 
putting back on board two of the Braer crew members, an officer of the Marine 
Department of the Shetland Islands Council (SIC) and a helicopter winchman. But the 
long drawn-out efforts to attach a line to a heaving vessel proved ineffectual. Men 
were taken back to safety ashore and at 11.19 am, after a helpless westerly drift south 
of Horse Island and past Lady's Holm, the Braer finally hit the ground at Garths 
Ness, releasing oil instantly. The crisis had begun. Both on land and at sea, 
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Shetlanders were riveted to their "wireless", anxiously following the makings of the 
oil spill. Phone calls were being exchanged across the islands to inform family, 
friends and neighbours. Around Quendale Bay, cars were lining the roads as people 
gathered to watch the grounding. From the cliffs above Garths Ness, people could 
see, smell and taste the oil in the sea-spray thrown up by the mountainous waves 
pounding the wreck. The local, national and international press were on their way to 
report on the Braer "disaster" and, by 10.30 am, the Sumburgh Hotel was turning 
away bookings from media representatives. 
The local authorities spent the first day organising logistical procedures and 
trying to come to terms with this dreadful new reality. They informed the relevant 
bodies (e.g. the London-based Director of Marine Emergencies Operation (DMEO), 
the Marine Pollution Control Unit (MPCU), various Ministers) and set up the Joint 
Response Centre (JRC) - a group of technicians, managers, environmentalists and 
local councillors - to co-ordinate and lead the response to what was already officially 
construed as a "disaster". Contingency plans were promptly established: the area 
around Quendale Bay was sealed off as there were fears of an explosion; the Housing 
Department was considering evacuating residents of the South Mainland if air-borne 
pollution reached dangerous levels; the DMEO was ordering remote sensing 
surveillance aircraft to monitor the spread of the oil around Shetland, and dispersant 
spraying aircraft to dissipate it. Indeed, local authorities - with the authorisation of 
the DMEO, the Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH) and the Scottish Office Agriculture 
and Fisheries Department (SOAFD) - had decided to spray chemical dispersants to 
hasten both the "natural" dispersal of oil in the water column, where the crude oil 
would affect fish, and on the surface of the sea, where it would harm birds and sea 
mammals. Alternative counter-pollution methods, such as the burning of the oil or its 
mechanical recovery, had all been ruled out because they were thought to be either 
too dangerous, or ineffective in the prevailing weather conditions. What little data 
were available on the characteristics of the oil also seemed to indicate that it would 
be amenable to treatment by chemical dispersant. 
Day two of the disaster dawned with news that the oil was spreading. To 
counter this expansion, aircraft began full scale spraying in the vicinity of the wreck 
(see Annexe 1 for an account of the state of the pollution over the first week). Some 
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100 tonnes of dispersants' were sprinkled over the sea and carried by the sea-spray 
over land on that day. The first twenty-four hours also saw a growing realisation of 
what had happened and, with it, despair, frustration, anger, and apprehension about 
the consequences of the spill. In every pub, in every house, on every street, people 
were discussing the "disaster", its causes and potential effects. There were claims and 
counter-claims as to how the tragedy could have been avoided, about who was 
responsible, about the speed of the Coastguard's response, about the necessity of 
banning merchant shipping altogether from the strait between Fair Isle and Sumburgh 
Head, etc. It was also on the Wednesday that the Greenpeace research ship Solo 
arrived in Shetland. She was equipped with facilities to cure oiled birds and sea 
mammals. 
On the third day, some people in Lerwick, 25 miles away from the scene of 
the wreck, reported having smelled fumes. Early morning aerial surveillance indicated 
that the oil was spreading still further away from Garths Ness; it was reaching the 
southern tip of the Burra Isles on the west coast, and was contaminating the southern 
part of the east coast. The SIC decided to co-ordinate the building of a rock and 
rubble barrier at the narrowest point between East and West Burra. The aim was to 
try to halt the progress of the sheen and to prevent it reaching salmon farms. Brown 
crude oil and heavy fuel were surrounding the wreck and streaky brown oil was 
migrating towards Sumburgh. Spraying resumed in spite of growing public concern 
over the effects of the dispersants on human health, crops, water supply, and on 
salmon farmers' fish stocks. However, the operations were curtailed by strengthening 
'Three types of dispersants were sprayed during the Braer incident: Slickgone LTSW (95 
tonnes), Dispolene 34S (15 tonnes), and Enersperse 1583 (10 tonnes). These are all approved by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) for "use at sea from shipborne or airborne 
equipment designed to apply undiluted dispersants", and for use "on beaches from suitably designed 
spraying equipment, in advance of the rising tide, when the oil is less than 6mm thick, using an 
appropriate equipment which has been tested and found satisfactory for the purpose by Warren Spring 
Laboratory." (The Braer Incident. Shetland Islands, January 1993  (Department of Transport, 1994c; 
p.24). People in the south of Mainland expressed great concern about the chemical composition of 
dispersants (which manufacturers refused to make public); about spraying procedures (which were 
indeed faulty: spray was deposited on a strip of land in Quendale and, because of the height of the 
aircraft, had been carried inland by the wind. It may have reached local houses as far away as 1 km); 
about their suitability for the shoreline around Garths Ness (are rocky shorelines similar enough to 
beaches?); and about their effects on human health. According to the MPCU's official report, 
dispersants are not hazardous to health but they do cause irritation to eyes, skin, nose and throat if 
exposure is prolonged, and may lead to light-headedness if inhaled in significant concentrations. Since 
the Braer incident, MAFF have announced a review of their testing and approval procedures for 
dispersants. They will also reconsider the criteria to determine when dispersants are the most effective 
way to protect the marine environment from oil spilled at sea, and address the problem of the 
availability of information on dispersants, including their composition, to people affected by a spill in 
which they are used. 
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winds after an hour. Dead sea-birds, covered in oil, were lying on the beaches and 
some seals and otters seemed to be in difficulty. Shoreline clean-up operations began 
at Quendale Bay. They were limited in scale and consisted of both mechanical and 
manual operations. 
On Friday, 8 January, the weather deteriorated still further, with westerly 
winds gusting to force 11. Beach cleaning continued but it was impossible to spray 
under such circumstances, even though reports showed that the sheens of oil were 
extending to the important town of Scalloway and to West Burra, on the west coast, 
and as far as No Ness on the east side. There, the sheen had thinned considerably 
since the previous day but the spread of the oil was still causing much concern. Bad 
sea and wind conditions continued to impair the attempts of the Braer' s appointed 
salvors to recover any crude still left in the tanker. It was believed that she was 
breaking into two but there was still hope that oil could be recovered. A "voluntary" 
fishing ban was announced by Shetland fishermen's organisations shortly after the 
Scottish Office declared that it would introduce a compulsory no fishing zone. 
Reports from aerial surveillance on Saturday morning showed that important 
quantities of fresh crude oil had been released from the wreck overnight, and that 
sheens had spread northwards on both the east and west coasts. This was to be the 
maximum extent of the oil pollution. St. Ninian's Isle (an area of outstanding beauty 
and a SNH-designated Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSCI)), and the Burra Isles 
(important salmon farming grounds) were surrounded by heavy sheens. Some fish 
farmers tried to protect their cages with absorbent booms. These emergency measures 
proved to be ineffective and, in fact, worsened the situation as booms trapped inside 
the oil that had already penetrated the perimeter of the cages. Near the wreck, 20 
more tonnes of dispersants were sprayed in the course of an operation intended to 
satisfy the local authorities that spraying was conducted safely. The observers 
declared themselves content with the procedures but the weather remained too severe 
to permit spraying. And in the community concern was such that the SIC preferred 
to stop using dispersants altogether. 
Many residents of the south Mainland were beginning to complain of health 
problems: skin irritation, sore throats, itchy eyes, headaches. Yet, the SIC and the 
Director of Public Health kept reiterating that the dispersants were innocuous. 
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Another crisis, social this time, was in the making: distrust in the local authorities 
and suspicion about their "real" interests were creeping in. Environmental groups 
charged the already tense atmosphere, alleging that some of the dispersants were 
toxic, that they were used only to convince Shetlanders that the oil had disappeared 
whereas in fact it was only "invisible", and that the local authorities had a political 
and economic interest in using dispersants despite the threat they posed to human 
health. Greenpeace issued a press release, said to be based on a report from a British 
toxicologist, which summarised the effects of chemical dispersants on oil spills as 
follows: dispersants make an oil slick spread more quickly, reduce the evaporation 
of the most dangerous components of the oil, increase the toxicity of the oil, slow 
down the degradation, make oil available for marine organisms that might not 
otherwise have been affected, and increase the amount of oil and the number of oil 
components which are carried ashore. The press release also stated that the three 
dispersants used during the spraying procedures were inadequate: Dispolene 34S had 
not been relicensed for use in the UK since 1985, and Dasic Slickgone LTSW and 
Enersperse 1037 were not cleared for use on rocky shorelines. More uncertainty, 
more tension. 
Horrendous weather conditions also interrupted the clean-up operation, 
although some workers did continue to pick up debris on the St. Ninian's Tombolo 
(an isthmus linking St. Ninian's Island to the east coast of Mainland). Fresh leakage 
from the wreck was observed as oil tank lids sprang open. It became clear that some 
15 square miles around the wreck had been affected by oil spray, three square miles 
severely so. The evacuation of sheep from their feeding grounds on the cliffs 
overlooking Garths Ness had begun on the first day of the incident, but with news of 
the spread of the spray, further widescale operations had to be conducted. Water 
supplies were still given a clean bill of health but crops visibly contaminated were 
declared unfit for human or animal consumption. Many V.I.P.s also arrived on the 
islands over the week-end to assess the damage caused by the spill. 
The first direct economic consequences of the oil spill for the fishing and fish 
farming industries were suffered on the Saturday. Rumours and speculations 
concerning the cancellations of orders of fish produce were confirmed. Supermarket 
chains (Marks & Spencer and Tesco) temporarily suspended buying Shetland salmon, 
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awaiting reassurance about the safety of the merchandise. Other companies demanded 
tighter quality controls. The pillars of the islands' economy were crumbling. Salmon 
farming has an annual harvest value of approximately £35 million; the fishing 
industry generates some £20 million; and fish processing revenues are estimated at 
about £25 million. Shetlanders could not afford to let the Braer incident - and its 
media coverage in the national and international press - destroy the reputation of their 
produce. Maintaining an image of purity and cleanliness was also vital for the £22 
million tourist industry. Every effort had to be made not to deter the 50,000 visitors 
attracted to Shetland's wildlife and scenery every year. The stakes were high. In this 
context, local authorities and various organisations representing fish farmers and 
fishermen had to play the incident down. There would be no more reference to the 
oil spill as a "disaster" . 
With Sunday, 10 January, came the first encouraging reports from aerial 
surveillance. Apart from the area around the Braer and a long, but narrow, stretch 
on the west coast, only light sheens were evident. A considerable quantity of oil 
seemed to have dispersed naturally, caught in gale-force winds and 60 feet-high 
waves. Clean-up operations had to be suspended because of the rough weather but the 
collection of seabirds and marine mammals for rehabilitation, and the recording and 
storage of casualties for scientific analysis, were still under way. Oiled birds were 
taken to the Wildlife Response Centre (WRC) at Boddam, and oiled otters and seals 
were brought to the Hillswick Animal Sanctuary, in the north of Mainland. The field 
teams conducting beach surveys consisted primarily of volunteers, both from Shetland 
and abroad, supplemented by staff from specialist organisations (e.g. SNH, RSPB, 
SSPCA). The SIC also announced that they were negotiating with the Braer owners' 
insurers for an immediate pay-out of £200,000 to assist with short-term economic 
difficulties. And the Director of Public Health declared that blood and urine tests 
would be made on 600 people in the south to check for liver or kidney problems. 
By Monday, oil spray was thought to have affected up to 20 square miles of 
land and some 200 crofters had to move and confine their sheep, and to provide them 
with supplementary feed. Eleven fish farms in the exclusion zone were unable to 
harvest fish. A CESSNA flew over the wreck to ascertain which tanks still contained 
oil. The survey showed that there was still a considerable quantity of oil in the tanks 
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but salvors could not recover it in the prevailing winds, gusting to force 13 and 14. 
The cargo section of the vessel was in one piece, but perceptible movements were 
registered in some sections of the ship relative to the cargo area. During the 
afternoon, there was a massive release of oil. The tanks were now open to the sea and 
as the heavy swell broke over the wreck, oil was displaced by seawater. The pressure 
of the water was causing jets of oil to spurt from the tanker. However, because of the 
tremendous wave energy and the subsequent dispersion of the oil, the extent of the 
pollution remained relatively stable throughout the day. In London, the disaster was 
discussed in the House of Commons. The Secretary of State for Transport announced 
a full investigation by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB). A bridging 
fund to help farmers, fishermen and fish farmers affected by short term cash flow 
problems was also set up. 
A week had now elapsed since the grounding of the Braer. On Tuesday 
morning, 12 January, hopes that unspilled oil could eventually be retrieved, provided 
there was a lull in the weather, were dashed. Severe gales had broken the ship into 
three parts and it was unlikely that there was much oil left in the tanks. The only 
reassuring thought was that no more oil would come out. The peak of the ecological 
tragedy was now past. From Tuesday onwards, observers would continue to be 
surprised at the speed with which the oil was breaking up. The spread of oil also 
appeared to have halted. 
That was the situation when I landed on Mainland, on Wednesday, 13 January. 
I was not the only newcomer: The Prince of Wales, the Duke of Edinburgh and the 
Labour Party's Transport Secretary also arrived on that day to pay their official visits. 
Weather conditions had temporarily eased, allowing closer inspection of the state of 
the wreck. Morning aerial surveillance indicated that the extent of the pollution 
remained unchanged. However, a significant reduction of sheens and of brown foam 
on the crest of waves was observed; there would be no further need for the spraying 
of dispersants, and so the spraying aircraft returned to their respective home bases. 
Only one CESSNA was kept at Sumburgh airport to continue monitoring the extent 
of the oil pollution until, by Friday 22 January, even these measures seemed no 
longer necessary. In fact, in just three weeks the visible signs of pollution had 
practically disappeared. On Monday 25, no oil was detected. Most of the contingency 
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plans were dismantled and the official response groups stopped their operations. 
According to the scientists monitoring the spill, the astonishing rate at which 
the oil naturally dispersed into the water column, and the relatively small 
environmental impact of the oil spill, were due to a conjunction of factors: the 
characteristics of the oil and the severe weather conditions which prevailed in the 
weeks following the grounding. The Braer was laden with Gullfacks oil, a relatively 
volatile light crude which tends to disperse rapidly. The prolonged spell of rough 
weather also resulted in high waves which contributed to the quick dispersal of the 
oil. Moreover, the tendency of the Gullfacks crude to disperse seems to have 
contributed to the breaking-up of the 1,600 tonnes of heavy fuel oil: as fuel escaped 
from the tanks, it mixed with the light crude and formed a compound which was 
more easily dispersed. Thus few beaches were severely contaminated. Nine of the 39 
sites considered at risk by the MPCU did need cleaning, and a further 11 sites were 
reported to be oiled with either foam or sheen but not to require clean-up operations. 
The immediate circumstances appeared quite favourable. But the nature of the 
coastline in Shetland (which encompasses a diversity of geological structures and 
natural habitats, ranging from cliffs and exposed rocky shores through sandy and 
muddy beaches to sheltered bays) makes it difficult to foresee the long-term, overall 
consequences of the pollution. Oil could become trapped in wetlands and lochs, or 
buried in beach sediments, and could leach for up to a decade. 
During the three weeks following the spill, speculation had been running high 
about the possible damages to wildlife. An officer of the RSPB had put forward some 
distressing figures: as many as 10,000 birds could die. Other experts claimed that 
massive quantities of fish and sand eels would be washed ashore and that seals and 
otters would inevitably be amongst the casualties. In the event, the consequences far 
less catastrophic than had been anticipated: the MPCU's official report states that, up 
to Sunday 24 January, 1,549 birds of 28 different species were collected. Twenty-two 
seals and three otters were also brought to the Hillswick Animal Sanctuary. The 
diagnosis established that 14 seals were ill as a direct consequence of the spill, whilst 
in five cases oil was said to be worsening a pre-existing condition. The WRC also 
dealt with six dead otters, but none of the deaths were attributed to the spill. These 
figures necessarily under-estimate the actual number of deaths (since they represent 
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only the birds and sea mammals that were collected), but they do give some 
indication of the scale of the damage to wildlife. Countless more animals died as a 
result of storms and chronic pollution. 
So, it did look as though the situation would soon be under control again. 
However, the Braer incident was not solely an environmental crisis. Even the most 
encouraging reports could not counterbalance the growing social and psychological 
disquiet. The crisis of confidence faced by the SIC and the Director of Public Health 
over the use of dispersants had assumed massive proportions in the south of 
Mainland. Local residents even formed ad hoc associations to investigate matters for 
themselves. They broke into a warehouse at Sumburgh airport at night and discovered 
barrels of dispersants which, they had been told by Greenpeace, were not approved 
for use on rocky shores. Nobody seemed to provide trustworthy information, not even 
Shetlanders. Environmental groups were either regarded with suspicion or vehemently 
criticised for capitalising on the crisis and failing to take account of Shetland's 
economic reality. "Experts" had little to offer: their knowledge of Shetland, its geo-
morphology, wildlife and resources, hardly compared with that of the locals, and the 
weather severely hampered their efforts anyway. Recommendations and advice were 
often dismissed as being ill-informed and poorly co-ordinated. Shetlanders generally 
assumed that "experts" , especially the ones participating in the clean-up operations, 
had come to the islands hoping to make fast money by selling their untested latest 
technology. 
Exasperation was also fuelled by a strong and generalised feeling of having 
been invaded by foreigners. The SIC estimated at about 1,400 the number of 
journalists, experts, environmentalists and politicians to have come to the islands in 
the wake of the oil spill. For two weeks, there was not a room available in the hotels 
of Lerwick and most of the "Bed and Breakfasts" had their "no vacancy" signs 
posted. The small car fleet at the rental shop was besieged by the temporary visitors. 
Shetlanders were particularly upset by the intrusive attitudes of media representatives 
- according to the MPCU, 500 of them were accredited to the press centre set up at 
Sumburgh airport - and the Dress coverage of the spill outside Shetland. Phone calls 
and letters of commiseration and of moral support by people who had visited the 
islands were coming in from Scotland, England and the rest of the world. Far from 
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achieving their intended purpose, however, they often served to infuriate Shetlanders, 
making them ever more fearful of the shattering consequences that media reports 
could have on the islands' economy. Save for The Shetland Times, no media could 
be relied upon. 
The immensely complex crisis can be superficially described in the following 
way. On the one hand, there is a discourse, skilfully prepared by the SIC, the 
Shetland Fishermen's Association and the Shetland Salmon Farmers' Association, 
which is aimed at outsiders. It is essentially for "external consumption", fed to media 
representatives during official press conferences, and motivated by economic and 
political considerations. For economic reasons, this discourse aims to minimise the 
impact of the oil spill in order to maintain the commendable reputation of the local 
produce abroad, as well as to preserve intact the tourist industry. Thus, the effects 
of the pollution are played down. Simultaneously, however, another aim must be 
pursued. This one requires emphasising the negative consequences of the spill in 
order to mobilise the political will of Westminster and, in turn, to modify 
unsatisfactory national and international policies and practices surrounding merchant 
shipping. 
On the other hand, there is a different, more complex, discourse running in 
parallel: this one is essentially for "internal consumption" and is motivated by 
economic and political considerations, but also by social ones. For economic reasons, 
workers directly or indirectly involved in the fishing and salmon farming industries 
cannot simply understate the incident: their livelihood depends upon the compensation 
they can obtain from the polluter's insurers. There is an obvious interest in 
maximising the effects of the "disaster" and the important financial losses which have 
ensued. The greater the losses attributable to the spill, the more substantial the 
compensation. In terms of local, or internal, politics, it is however crucial that the 
SIC establish their competence and credibility in handling the crisis. And so, about 
ten days after the grounding of the Braer, in an effort to reassure the local population, 
the SIC officially declared that "the crisis was over", that there was no health hazard, 
that Shetlanders "had been lucky" - a reference to the bad weather conditions which 
contributed to disperse the oil - and that "we should all get on with our lives". These 
statements angered many residents in the south of Mainland and, in particular, people 
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whose interests were not represented by any association or organisation (such as part-
time fishermen), for whom the crisis lived on, and who feared that they would not 
be compensated individually. What about cancer or toxic poisoning? What about the 
long-term effects on the wildlife? What if the oil or the dispersants have entered the 
food chain? How does one assess the loss of amenity in financial terms? These and 
many other questions remained unanswered. The obvious disparity between the 
discourses, one downgrading the crisis, another emphasising its disastrous effects, 
made Shetlanders both weary and wary of their local representatives. 
The individual and collective responses to the Braer incident cannot be 
explained exclusively in terms of the ecological, economic or political circumstances 
facing the community The picture broadly sketched above is simply intended to 
provide the context within which Shetlanders' social representations of nature were 
analysed and which the latter, in turn, helped to shape. 
4.4. Conclusion 
I have discussed the nature of single case studies and their relevance to the 
analysis of social representations. I have argued that the criticisms commonly levelled 
at case studies concerning their lack of generalisability, validity and replicability are, 
from the perspective of the theory of social representations, misguided: they either 
rest upon a naive realist ontology, presuppose a positivist epistemology, or involve 
a failure to appreciate the differences between statistical and analytical inferences. 
I also introduced the case of the Braer oil spill, which is the context within 
which the empirical analysis was conducted. I have emphasised the status of a 
particular type of case, crises, as valuable methodological situations for the study of 
social representations. Crises such as the one triggered by the grounding of the tanker 
Braer are particularly informative because they reveal latent representations, confront 
social actors with a novelty which requires appraisal, call upon collective resources, 
highlight social conflicts and, generally, force a problematisation of what was 
previously taken-for-granted. I then provided a narrative of the grounding of the 
tanker Braer. 
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It is necessary to reflect upon the reconstruction of the sequence of events 
which I have described under the heading "Diary of the Braer" . These events 
happened, to be sure. But the account is that of an outsider - myself - and it is largely 
based on the accounts of other outsiders. Thus, I have offered a version which, as the 
analysis will reveal, already presupposes a given representation of nature, one in 
which neither I nor my "official informants" figure as integral parts. This was 
perhaps inevitable but it is nevertheless significant. Moreover, the diary presented 
here draws upon a wealth of information which no single actor had access to at the 
time of the crisis. The situation in which the reader is mentally transported as she 
reads these pages is, therefore, not the one which was experienced by Shetlanders. 
I should also explicate the theoretical status of my version in relation to the social 
representations of nature held by Shetlanders. Does the situation reconstructed here 
provide the objective framework within which to make sense of the representations 
I am about to uncover? No. Is the crisis itself already the outcome of a conflict 
between various social representations? Yes, to a large extent. Was the oil spill 
rendered possible by a particular representation of nature? Clearly so, since the very 
possibility of an oil spill occurring depends upon the existence, at a societal and 
institutional level, of particular representations of nature (which are associated with 
specific modes of intervention and practices in relation to nature). The answer to such 
questions, however, should circumvent the logic of causality altogether: social 
representations of nature shaped the collective and private reactions to the oil spill, 
but they were also transformed in this effervescent context through communication 
and social interaction. 
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5.0. METHODOLOGY: THE MONITORING OF MONITORING 
Below, I explicate the theoretical considerations and methodological principles 
and strategies which guided my fieldwork in Shetland. I expound the rationale behind 
the combination of methods - content analysis of the coverage by the local newspapers 
of the oil spill and related issues, semi-structured individual interviews, small-group 
discussions, participant observation and a "public debate" - used in the collection of 
the data. The procedures followed for the analysis of each data set are described, 
together with the ways in which they will be integrated. 
5.1. Triangulation: Combining methods to reach a deeper understanding 
As a methodological principle, triangulation has been imported into the social 
sciences in the context of the debate about the validity of qualitative methods and, 
more specifically, about unobtrusive measurement (Flick, 1992a). Originally, it 
involved the use of a plurality of methods, or data sources, in the study of a single 
phenomenon, in order to judge whether hypotheses formulated with regard to that 
phenomenon could withstand the test of complementary methods of investigation 
(Denzin, 1970/1978; Webb et al, 1966). Methodological triangulation involved a 
"process of playing off each method against the other so as to maximise the validity 
of field efforts" (Denzin, 1978; p.304), mainly by minimising the reactivity inherent 
in each method. Triangulation strategies were therefore conceived of as a source of 
validation of empirical procedures and results (Flick, 1992a). This conception of 
triangulation has been criticised (Garfinkel, 1967; Silverman, 1985) primarily because 
of its underlying positivist assumption of a 
"master reality in terms of which all accounts and actions are to be 
judged. This casts great doubt on the argument that multiple research 
methods should be employed in a variety of settings in order to gain 
a "total" picture of some phenomenon [.. .1 Putting the picture 
together is more problematic than some proponents of triangulation 
would imply. What goes on in one setting is not a simple corrective to 
what happens elsewhere - each must be understood in its own terms" 
(Silverman; 1985, p.21) 
5.1.1. Triangulation and social representations: Sociogenesis, ontogenesis, 
microgenesis and methods 
The theory of social representations suggests the use of a plurality of methods 
for coming to grips with different versions of reality. This is so because social 
representations are always at once representations of something and representations 
of someone or of some collectivity. Because different social groups and individuals are 
expected to hold and to construct different social representations according to their 
particular position in the wider society at a given historical junction, to their own life 
experience, to their immediate needs and concerns, etc. , one must develop a 
methodological apparatus to apprehend how social representations emerge and 
function in different milieux. 
Drawing upon Vygotsky, Duveen and Lloyd (1990) present a useful typology 
of the processes - sociogenesis, ontogenesis and microgenesis - involved in the 
constitution of social representations. These analytical distinctions offer the advantage 
of focusing one's attention on three separate, though interrelated, moments and 
functions in the life of a social representation, and of pointing to the individual, 
interactional (groupal) and societal lieux of its production. The methods of data 
collection and analysis which are triangulated should highlight these three genetic 
processes and their respective functions. 
Sociogenesis refers to the socio-historical origins of a given form of 
knowledge, to the "construction and transformation of social representations of social 
groups about specific objects" (Duveen & Lloyd, 1990; p.6). It concerns the 
conditions which enable, at the collective level, the creation of a common reality. 
"Sociogenesis takes place in time, so that even when social representations are 
investigated at a particular moment in time, the resulting description needs to be 
viewed in a diachronic perspective" (idem; p.6). This preoccupation with the social 
contexts which permit changes to occur in pre-existing representations, or allow for 
the emergence of radically new objects of collective thought, highlights the 
interdependencies between the internal characteristics of a given corpus of knowledge 
and their external, sociological, determinants. 
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The second set of processes, ontogenesis, "concerns the development of 
individuals in relation to social representations" (idem; p.6). Here, the focus is on 
socialisation within a particular society or social group. By interacting and 
communicating with others, each and every individual becomes familiar with the 
languages of his/her relevant social worlds, re-constructs the representations 
circulating in his/her environment and, in doing so, develops a social identity. 
Ontogenesis is a complex process of creative appropriation of novelty by individuals 
in a world already structured by conventional and prescriptive representations 
(Moscovici, 1984a). 
Finally, microgenesis can be construed as the actualisation of one's 
representations in an interactive context. In such a context, social representations are 
evoked "in the ways in which individuals construct an understanding of the situation 
and locate themselves and their interlocutors as social objects" (Duveen & Lloyd, 
1990; p.8). In every interaction, there are social representations being exchanged, 
renewed, negotiated, constructed. Goffman (1959/1971) also showed that there are 
"selves" being constructed during encounters. This three-fold typology enables one 
to break away from dominant view in social psychology whereby social cognition is 
conceived as the activity of an individual mind reacting to an external, albeit social, 
reality. It provides a useful identification of the various spaces and moments where 
the genesis of representations occurs. I bore this in mind throughout my field work. 
Considering the complexity of the concept of social representations, it is 
hardly surprising that, from the outset, triangulation should have been a distinctive 
feature of empirical work in this field. For instance, Moscovici (1961/1976) combined 
a content analysis of the press with questionnaires, an opinion poll, and open-ended 
interviews in six populations; Abric and Kahan (1982), in their studies on the effects 
of representations and behaviours in experimental games, used problem solving and 
creativity tasks in addition to questionnaires; Jodelet (1989/1991), in her seminal 
work on madness, combined a historical analysis (i.e. archival research) of the 
psychiatric institution in Ainay-le-Château, questionnaires for the staff, open-ended 
interviews with the foster families of the patients, and participant observation; and De 
Rosa (1987) analysed the social representations of mental illness in children and 
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adults using questionnaires, semantic differentials, drawings and social distance 
scales. 
These examples show that a combination of methods may be fruitful provided 
it rests on some theoretical and methodological foundations. It should be clear, within 
the framework of social representations, that triangulation is not used in order to 
validate results or to obtain an "objective" description of an unproblematic reality 
existing "out there" . On the contrary, different methods are used to gain access to the 
multiple versions of reality that are constructed. Inconsistencies in lay knowledge and 
contradictory statements are not to be dismissed or ruled out as "biases", but rather 
to be highlighted since they are the phenomenon. The role of the social scientist is not 
to adjudicate between competing versions of reality but to understand their origins and 
functions in the particular contexts within which they are constructed and put to work. 
Triangulation, thus, relates methods in a complementary fashion so as to add depth 
and breadth to our understanding of the multiple dimensions of the social construction 
of reality. 
5.2. Methods of data collection and analysis 
The selection of methods is dictated by the interplay of the following factors: 
the theoretical considerations informing the research process and the practical 
circumstances structuring its execution, the characteristics of the empirical problem, 
and the kinds of data and potential analyses associated with each particular method. 
In this section, content analysis of the local media, semi-structured interviews with 
individuals, group discussions, and participant observation, as well as a "public 
debate", will be considered with respect to the object of study of the present thesis. 
5.2.1. Analysis of the local newspapers: Description and justification 
The content analysis of the newspapers gives us access to social 
representations of nature existing at a collective level (sociogenesis). Newspapers are 
especially important because of their role in determining the kinds of arguments, the 
logical and symbolic connections, and the various significant assertions related to the 
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"disaster", as well as their relation to broader ideological stances. Unlike individual 
interviews and group discussions, content analyses of newspapers do not generate data 
per se. They make use of an existing data-source, produced for an entirely different 
purpose, and reinterpret the data through qualitative or quantitative analysis. The non-
reactive nature of these data helps to ensure that the social representations which 
emerge from the analysis do not change by virtue of being investigated (Farr, 1993; 
Webb et al, 1966). 
Analyses of the written media have been a standard feature of social 
representational studies since the publication of La Psychanalyse, son image et son 
public (Moscovici, 1961/1976). Moscovici's rationale for content analysing the press 
was that it was crucial to break away from the traditional, mainly Anglo-Saxon, 
conceptualisations of cognition which unduly individualised the phenomenon. He 
wanted to re-cast thought in the genuinely social context that participates in its very 
construction. Moscovici wanted to show that social representations of psychoanalysis 
were present in the culture - as reflected in the media - where they ought to be 
sampled and analysed, as well as in individual cognitions (Farr, 1992). This, at the 
time, was a profound and innovative idea. However, Moscovici somewhat 
oversimplified the relationship between the press and its public. He assumed that 
social representations were present in the press "prior to" being part of any 
individual's representations. The depiction of psychoanalysis in the press was 
conceived as providing the content upon which lay people would dwell as it becomes 
progressively detached from the original theory and enters the realm of everyday 
social communication. The theoretical ambition - to reintroduce culture as an integral 
part of social cognition - was impoverished by the adoption of a diffusionist or 
"agenda-setting" model of the role of the media. This approach is consistent with 
"Bartlett's way" of studying social representations (Moscovici, 1990), since it 
proposes to analyse the construction and transformation of the symbolic forms as they 
pass from one social group to another. However, the privileging of a diffusionist 
model undermined Moscovici's own appreciation of the processes of social 
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communication and interaction'. 
It is now necessary to problematise the role of the media more richly. This can 
be achieved by transposing within social representational studies some of the insights 
offered by contemporary media analysts (e.g. Corner et al, 1990; Gamson & 
Modigliani, 1989; Hansen, 1991). They all concur that the processes of creating 
news, and of making sense of them, are not linear and do not follow a simple 
diffusionist logic. Gamson & Modigliani's (1989) concept of "parallel systems of 
meaning production" seems particularly relevant. It allows us to appreciate that, while 
social representations may emerge in one particular forum, their development and 
inflection take place through complex interaction, involving influence and feedback 
processes, between a number of key fora and social groups. No single social actor is 
responsible for the creation and elaboration of (meanings about) social realities. The 
perception of the "environmental disaster" in Garths Ness cannot be understood solely 
as the passive reflection in the heads of individual newsreaders of the local and 
national press coverage of the problem. In this sense, media representations have no 
primacy over representations circulating elsewhere in society: both feed on one 
another. 
Hansen also criticises "media-centric" studies; he advocates the recognition of 
the "importance of cultural resonances in the privileging of some issues over others" 
(Hansen, 1991; p.444). Indeed, the media do not operate in isolation from the wider 
social context: they draw on cultural forms to construct messages. Hansen's approach 
permits us to focus on the representations that people hold about a given object before 
(or at the same time as) it is re-presented in the press, and which render possible the 
subjects' and groups' active appropriation of the media content. What appears in the 
papers is largely determined by what people want or are ready to read, and it is 
society as a whole which gives newspapers their credibility and importance, even if 
the power of the media obviously resides in their own capacity to impose opinions, 
values and concerns upon society's attention. 
'By separately analysing the Catholic and the Communist press, Moscovici recognised the 
existence of different fora. But he did not consider the active role played by the lay public (readership) 
in constructing social representations that were then appropriated by the press. In large-scale societies, 
this two-way process may not be of primary interest. But in smaller communities, it does require 
appraisal. 
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In Shetland, it is particularly important to have a model of the media which 
explicitly acknowledges the role of the public in shaping the local press coverage. 
Firstly, most journalists are personally known to fellow Shetlanders. Heads of local 
associations and reporters may very well be next door neighbours. Journalists have 
family involved in fishing, crofting, salmon farming, local politics, the oil industry, 
the tourist industry, etc. They are constantly reminded by the public of the issues at 
stake in the wake of the oil spill. It is, after all, an island community. Secondly, 
many Shetlanders had direct experience of the oil spill and became actively involved 
in obtaining information which was then appropriated by the media. In this sense, 
newspapers are really the medium of public life: they provide the link between 
individuals' private lives and the public realm, but perhaps in a more complex way 
than the one envisaged by Moscovici. The media coverage must be understood in 
relation to the nature of the social fabric in Shetland. The importance of "cultural 
resonances" will be highlighted throughout the analysis. (These "cultural resonances" 
cannot be uncovered solely by a content analysis. The latter must be coupled with 
participant observation for such symbolic correspondence to come to the fore). 
Finally, newspaper production is a process which cannot be understood and 
defined on the basis of a single issue or even through the sporadic sampling of 
articles. It is a process of complex and endless feedback, with the content of a given 
issue provoking a response which will become news in the next. In this respect, the 
Braer oil spill is an interesting object of study from a social representational point of 
view: its coverage was extensive, done on a weekly basis, and yet was sufficiently 
limited in time for the research still to be empirically manageable'. 
5.2.1.1. 	Procedure 
Content analysis (in conjunction with participant observation) is used to make 
sense of all the linguistic data (verbal and written) collected during the field work. 
The procedure rests upon three basic assumptions: "that valid inferences can be made 
'Media coverage also defines how nature can literally be viewed, since the object lends itself 
easily to iconic representations. However, the figurative dimension of social representation will not be 
analysed specifically in this study. 
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between content and intended effect, that the study of manifest content is meaningful 
to communication, audience and analyst, and that the frequency of occurrence of 
various content characteristics is in and of itself meaningful" (Ferguson, 1983; 
p.212). Although I share these presuppositions, they deserve further elaboration and 
qualification. 
Firstly, if inferences can be made from the relationship between content and 
intended effect, content analysis can also be used to retrieve the complex internal 
organisation of social representations, and hence to shed light on how conscious 
verbal productions can reveal "out of awareness" representational structures. In other 
words, the analysis does not end with the exposition of the "intended effect" but it 
also seeks to make explicit the efficacy of the symbolic forms which generate, and 
are expressed in, a given content. 
Secondly, the study of manifest content is most certainly meaningful. 
However, social representations are not created, revealed and expressed only through 
language, but also through images, rituals and everyday practices. Hence, with 
respect to the study of social representations, content analysis does not suffice on its 
own. The data it produces should be analysed in relation to the qualitative data 
yielded by other methods and interpreted according to a theoretical framework which 
defines the possibilities and limits of the analysis. 
And thirdly, the frequency of occurrence of various content characteristics is 
necessarily considered significant. Nevertheless, attention must be paid to infrequent 
mentions, to single instances and even to the complete absence of items which are 
thought to be of theoretical significance. The absence of some issues from the agenda 
may point to a number of different social processes: for instance, the topics may 
simply be irrelevant, or they may be "beyond discussion" , which, in turn, may be 
explained by the fact that they are now taken-for-granted or too sensitive to be openly 
debated. Such ambiguity cannot be resolved but the use of multiple data sources can 
help to identify which issues are (not) discussed in which context and to provide some 
clues as to their interpretation. 
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	5.2.1.2. 	Selection of newspapers 
During the field work I subscribed to two local newspapers, The Shetland 
Times (for six months) and The Shetland Fishing News (for two months), and one 
magazine, Shetland Life (for six months). The Shetland Fishing News is a specialised 
monthly paper produced by the Shetland Fishermen's Association. It addresses 
economic and political issues related to the deep-sea fishing industry, provides reports 
on fishing activities and equipment, and offers technical and practical guidelines to 
fishermen. This newspaper will only be referred to sporadically. It will not be 
systematically analysed here because of its very small readership. The monthly 
magazine Shetland Life covers social and cultural issues. In spite of its relevance to 
the present thesis, this magazine will not be systematically content analysed either, 
again due to its small circulation. Both publications are nevertheless used as valuable 
sources of background information. Thus, the only local newspaper systematically 
analysed is The Shetland Times. With approximately 11,000 copies being sold weekly, 
it reaches just about every household in Shetland. The Shetland Times was established 
in 1872 and, today, it truly constitutes the voice of the community. 
5.2.1.3. 	Method of analysis of The Shetland Times 
Two sections of The Shetland Times are the object of this analysis: 1) the front 
page and editorial articles which are related to the oil spill; and 2) "The Tanker Braer 
Disaster". In the week immediately following the grounding of the Braer, the editorial 
board of The Shetland Times decided to devote a whole section of the newspaper to 
issues surrounding the spill. Under the heading "The Tanker Braer Disaster", readers 
could find detailed reports on the series of events leading up to the disaster, on local 
and national reactions to the spill (as perceived by Shetlanders), as well as 
information about its potential and actual consequences. 
A coarse examination first looks at the number of articles, editorials and 
photographs devoted to the Braer. It charts the changing proportion of The Shetland 
Times occupied by the section entitled "The tanker Braer disaster" until it disappears 
altogether, in May 1993. In three issues, this section is either replaced by, or 
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supplemented with, articles bearing on issues related to the oil spill. These are: 
"Managing the Marine Environment: Conference Reports" (issues 13 and 14); and 
"The Donaldson Inquiry" (issue 20). The reports grouped under these headings were 
considered as if they were part of the section "The tanker Braer disaster". Annexe 2 
provides both a qualitative and a quantitative synopsis of The Shetland Times based 
on the titles of the articles printed in the newspapers. This seems the most economical 
way of presenting the data since headlines are designed to capture the essence of the 
articles to which they refer. The tables comprising Annexe 2 are the following: 
Table 1: 
Table 2: 
Table 2.1: 
Table 2.2: 
Table 3: 
Headlines of front page and editorials 
Headlines of "The tanker Braer disaster" 
Headlines of Special section: "Managing the Marine 
Environment: Conference Reports" 
Headlines of Special section: "The Donaldson Inquiry" 
Quantitative Synopsis of The Shetland Times: Number of 
articles and photos per section. 
Each article was coded separately according to: 1) the main themes being 
addressed, and 2) the social actors involved. For this finer-grained coding, the unit 
of analysis was the unit of meaning (a word, a sentence, a paragraph, etc.). The 
themes were mainly theory-driven and captured either the content of social 
representations or the dynamics of their production. For instance, "nature as system", 
"nature as forces", "quantification", "natural resources", "nature as self", "nature and 
social identity", "environment" or "monitoring" would be categories of meaning 
related to the content of social representations. The dynamics would be assessed 
through evaluative statements, logical and symbolic connections, stylistic devices, 
abstentions, images and photographs, etc. Contents and dynamics of production are 
structurally related. The "social actors" were classified into two broad categories: 
those whose views the articles reflect (often the editorial board of The Shetland 
Times, but sometimes also pressure groups, politicians, scientists, local residents, 
etc.), and those who are otherwise referred to in articles. The protagonists were 
grouped according to whether or not they were Shetlanders, and in terms of their 
occupation (which tended to overlap with "natural categories"). 
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A third data set found in the newspapers, but not qualifying as news strictly 
speaking, is the section comprising letters to the editor: "Our Readers' Views". This 
single-page section provides information on lay people's reactions to statements made 
in previous issues, on their concerns about aspects of the "disaster" which have been 
overstated, overlooked, misrepresented, etc. It is also the institutionalised space of 
the public in the newspaper where journalists are explicitly held accountable to their 
readers. "Our Readers' Views" provides a forum for debate amongst different factions 
of Shetland society. However, it was not content analysed systematically. These data 
are, again, used as background information only. 
This longitudinal analysis of the local newspaper coverage permits to assess 
the changes in the salience of issues, in social representations of nature, and in social 
life. The fact that the analysis of the newspapers produces time series data sets it 
apart from other methods of data collection and analysis which only offer discrete 
information. 
5.2.2. Individual interviews: Description and justification 
In-depth, semi-structured individual interviews are a standard method of data 
collection for the study of social representations. Herzlich (1969/1973) went so far 
as to describe this form of interviewing as the only adequate technique of data 
collection for the study of social representations. Such interviews are advocated to 
circumvent some of the problems associated with more highly-structured methods of 
data collection. This stems from the necessity of not imposing the researcher's own 
views on those of the population whose representations she sets out to investigate 
(Farr, 1993). Since discourse itself is one of the lieux where the object is constructed, 
since subjects use language to create and communicate social representations, our 
methods must provide them with a great deal of freedom of expression. The openness 
and flexibility inherent in semi-structured interviews allow the interviewee to expand 
on the short list of broad themes singled out beforehand by the researcher, but also 
to make associations, pursue new ideas, explore personal feelings, report on other 
people's views, etc. 
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Individual interviews, like any other technique used to gather discursive 
material (such as questionnaires, life histories, etc.), raise a number of issues which 
relate to the construction of the object of analysis. Bourdieu, Passeron and 
Chamboredon (1968/1991), in their classic The Craft of Sociology, have highlighted 
some of these issues: firstly, the meanings that subjects confer on their material and 
symbolic worlds are analysed without reference to the specific social context within 
which they are produced and used; secondly, the very object of the research, as well 
as the researcher's own preconceptions and categories, are imposed upon the 
population under study; thirdly, there is an underlying assumption of transparency 
according to which words have stable meanings, independently of either the situation 
or the speaker; fourthly, responses are affected by demand characteristics and social 
desirability, etc. From the perspective of the theory of social representations, these 
issues are both "problems" and "data"; methodological rigour alone cannot 
circumvent all of them. The task of the analyst is to be aware of the ways in which 
the social situation of the interview constructs the object in a particular way and to 
recognise that interview data do not provide "facts" about the world, but socially 
constructed versions of reality. Depending upon the object of analysis, it might be 
necessary to supplement individual interviews (and group discussions, as we shall see) 
with other methodological approaches which provide information on the structural 
dimensions of the phenomenon studied and which are less reactive. 
Di Giacomo (1980) has expressed doubt about the possibility of postulating the 
social nature of representations that are sampled exclusively in the discourse of 
individuals. This criticism, in my opinion, stems from a misguided theoretical 
dichotomisation between the cognitive functions (to assimilate novelty, to take the 
place of, to make available to consciousness, etc.) of social representations, and their 
social functions (to guide action and communication, to organise and interpret 
experience, to legitimise, prescribe and constrain, etc.), on the one hand, and between 
processes and content, on the other. If these opposition were reconciled, there could 
be no doubt that representations, even when they are analysed at the level of the 
individual, are social, because knowledge is always and necessarily social and 
historical knowledge. 
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5.2.2.1. 	Selection of interviewees 
"Unlike the procedures in many other types of research, sampling in [case 
studies] is not necessarily designed and executed in advance of data collection but is 
continually carried on throughout the study. [...] As a consequence, [field workers] 
can seldom prescribe their samples in advance but can only describe and justify them 
after the fact." (McCall & Simmons, 1969, p.64). In social representational studies, 
samples are not expected to be either representative or random. With respect to social 
representations, all subjects are not equal. In this study, differences amongst subjects 
were hypothesised to vary according to gender, age, occupation and place of 
residence, and origins. 
Indeed, a rigid sexual division of labour still prevails in Shetland. By virtue 
of their occupations, women are expected to experience nature very differently from 
men. Men often work on fish farms or are members of fishing crews and spend days 
on end at sea. In contrast, women's involvement in the fishing industry is limited to 
the filleting and packaging of fish. Women contribute to crofting intensively during 
lambing time and the harvesting season. Few of them work in the oil industry. 
Women are generally involved in services, working in restaurants and shops, running 
Bed & Breakfast establishments, knitting at home, etc. Consequently, their social life 
also contrasts sharply with that of men. They are notably absent from the public 
sphere. One seldom sees women in pubs or other social places, apart from the 
Commercial Street where they are busy doing their shopping, and very few of them 
hold a key position in the council or other local associations. Their contacts with the 
rest of the community seem to be channelled mainly through the reports of their 
menfolk as they return home, the media and the frequent visits of neighbours who 
"drop in for a cup of tea". Thus, both the first-hand experience of nature and the 
modes of communication and interaction differ as between men and women. But for 
the reasons expressed above - the relative absence of women from the public domain - 
I conducted only five interviews with women compared to twelve with men (see 
Annexe 3, Table 4). 
In Shetland, almost 70% of the total population of 22,000 live in rural areas. 
The remaining eight thousand or so are divided between two localities: Lerwick, the 
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capital, which has the greatest share by far with about 7,200 residents; and 
Scalloway, an important fish landing site and market place, which counts roughly 900 
inhabitants. Both these towns are located in the centre of Shetland, on the East and 
West coasts respectively, and an imaginary line drawn between the two is used by the 
locals to provide a psychological demarcation between North and South Mainland. 
Beyond the rural/urban dichotomy, I also interviewed people whose livelihood was 
directly affected by the oil spill, whose crops had been destroyed, whose fishing had 
to be indefinitely interrupted, whose health was potentially jeopardised, whose 
landscape had changed, etc. This meant that I had to "over-represent" people living 
either in the southern area of the island (the districts of Quendale, Sumburgh and 
Dunrossness) or on the west coast where the bulk of the oil was driven (Bigton, Burra 
Isles, Trondra). Nine people from these regions were interviewed individually. The 
remainder came from Lerwick and its surroundings, and one person from the North 
of Mainland agreed to take part. 
The choice of people coming from various regions of Shetland is also justified 
for three other reasons. First, the greater erosion of local traditions in urban centres 
compared to villages. Second, the fact that many sites are either statutory protected 
areas (officially designated as National Nature Reserves or SSSI's), or non-statutory 
protected areas but under the supervision of the Royal Society for the Protection of 
Birds or the Scottish Wildlife Trust. The designation of nature conservation areas in 
Shetland might imply a different appreciation of, and sensitivity to, nature among the 
resident population of such regions. And third, the strong correlation between the 
place of residence and predominant economic activities. For instance, the most fertile 
area, where the vast majority of farmers and crofters live and work, is South 
Mainland. Unfortunately, it was also the theatre of the "disaster". In contrast, 
Lerwick is the administrative centre and the main harbour of the islands. Most of the 
oil workers, civil servants and people working in the service industry are concentrated 
there. Many fishermen also live in town. This important overlap between the place 
of residence and the economic structure is likely to be related to social 
representations. I selected potential interviewees from the following economic sectors: 
the service industry (tourism and public administration), the oil industry, fishing and 
salmon farming, farming and crofting. Some officially unemployed people were also 
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interviewed. I contacted both native Shetlanders and non-Shetlanders, but all the 
participants were permanent residents of the islands. 
The combination of these variables provided the criteria for the "purposive" 
or "theoretical" sampling of respondents (Patton, 1980). Various means were used to 
contact interviewees. To approach fishermen, for instance, I used a list produced by 
the Shetland's Fishermen's Association, which identifies boats by name and 
registration number and provides the name, address and telephone number of their 
respective skippers. In this case, I used the place of residence to choose respondents. 
A similar strategy was adopted to contact salmon farmers, farmers and crofters; these 
groups are all represented by local associations. Other respondents were recruited 
through "snowballing" (with each interviewee being asked to provide the names of 
two acquaintances). Yet other interviews were arranged at the end of the public 
meeting in Lerwick (see section 5.2.5.). The resulting sample meets the criteria of 
diversity and typicality required for social representational studies. I should add that 
roughly one person in three contacted refused to collaborate, and that some of the 
people who did consent to be interviewed had been advised by SIC personnel not to 
do so. 
5.2.2.2. 	Conducting interviews 
Most interviews took place in the respondents' homes (three were held in their 
offices and three at the Clickemin community centre in Lerwick). They were 
conducted according to the following sequence: during the preliminary phase, I 
introduced myself (which entailed dissociating myself from media representatives and 
"experts"), the main topic of the interview ("your personal views and feelings about 
the Braer incident and nature in Shetland"), and the context of my research (a 
doctoral dissertation). 
The second phase began with the subjects introducing themselves - which 
generally involved providing their "genealogical history" - but mainly comprised their 
narration of the complex set of events which led to, and followed from, the grounding 
of the Braer. My role then was strictly to listen, take notes and ask questions on the 
themes discussed by the respondents themselves in the course of their narration. The 
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third phase was devoted to a further exploration of the themes already covered, but 
the scope was broadened by asking questions about related issues, such as "nature", 
"life in Shetland", "coping with uncertainty", etc. Although the interviews were 
"officially" terminated when the tape-recorder was switched off, casual conversations 
almost inevitably took place. This informative small talk, summarised in note form 
after each interview, is used for the interpretation of the content of the formal 
interview. 
In many interviews, I had to deviate from this sequence. It seemed less 
productive to ask "neutral" questions than to assume the riskier attitude of a "quasi-
Shetlander" by raising the arguments which were circulating in the community and 
against which the interviewees' thoughts could bounce. It soon became apparent that 
I had to appear to be involved in Shetlanders' critical situation in order to win their 
trust. Otherwise, the interviewees were not disposed to go beyond the official 
discourse skilfully prepared for consumption by outsiders (especially media 
representatives), and more or less willingly accepted by the locals in their interaction 
with foreigners. This approach yielded considerable benefits in terms of the richness 
of the verbal data but also in Willis of access to social gatherings and events in the 
company of Shetlanders. At the end of the first week, I was nicknamed, and 
introduced as, "The Angel". This affectionate name given by Shetlanders - and hence 
bestowing trustworthiness - contributed to the overcoming of many a barrier during 
the research. The defensive manners encountered at first eventually melted, in most 
cases at least, and I was granted the "benefit of the doubt". 
5.2.2.3. 	Data analysis 
The analysis is based upon the assumption that "interview data display cultural 
realities which are neither biased nor accurate, but simply "real". Interview data... 
reproduce and rearticulate cultural particulars grounded in given patterns of social 
organisation. "(Silverman, 1985; p.157) Thus, the dynamics of the interviews briefly 
alluded to above - the flexibility of the interview protocol and the resulting difficulty 
in comparing interviews, the divergence between "official" and "personal" discourse, 
the disclaimers used prior to expressing one's views, etc. - are all subjected to the 
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analysis since they are both "symptomatic" and "constitutive" of the respondents' 
social representations and identities. The conversational strategies used in interview, 
and the information provided therein, need not be contrasted with some other 
"objective reality" - what interviewees actually do, how serious the ecological crisis 
really is, etc.; they can be related to other fora of meaning construction, but each 
must be understood in its own terms. The soundness of analytic induction (Mitchell, 
1983) is the criterion of validity. The analysis is primarily based on an interpretative 
reading (itself informed by the theory of social representations and a social 
constructionist conceptualisation of nature based on Moscovici's work) of the 
verbatim transcripts of the interviews. At a later stage, the preliminary results derived 
from the analysis of this data set were related to, and integrated with, data from other 
sources. 
5.2.3. Group discussions: Description and justification 
I also conducted small-group discussions3 . This method aims at assessing 
more specifically the social interactional processes that come into play when people 
debate novel and unfamiliar ideas or react to unexpected events. It makes use of 
group interactions to generate data and insights which would otherwise have been less 
accessible. Group interviewing provides data on group interaction, on realities as 
defined in a group context, and on interpretations of events that reflect this dynamic 
input (Morgan, 1988; 1993). It also shows how social representations structure 
interaction and social communication. 
3 "Small-group discussions" and "group interviews" are used interchangeably here. I prefer 
to avoid the term "focus groups" since this technique of qualitative data collection is rooted in a 
radically different research tradition - market research - whose objectives are not compatible with mine. 
In contrast to small-group discussions, focus groups function as an ad hoc collection of individuals. 
The participants typically meet for an hour or two and, in a constrained setting, they have to establish 
rapport between themselves and the moderator. It is incumbent on the moderator to provide the themes 
and to lead the discussions, either by asking direct questions to the participants or by introducing a 
variety of stimulus materials. The use of directed leadership and the heavy reliance on stimuli, together 
with the "once-only" nature of the gathering, have been criticised by Burgess et al (1991) for yielding 
superficial impressions and stereotypical responses. In a nutshell, focus groups can be criticised for 
having a focus, whilst not being real groups. All in all, it seems that the use of focus groups is 
motivated by pragmatic reasons - they are less costly and time-consuming to run than individual 
interviews - rather than epistemological considerations. In that context, I will continue to use the 
somewhat vaguer but more adequate terms "small-group discussions" and "group interviews". 
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Group discussions are simply a technique for collecting qualitative data, but 
one which is very much in line with Campbell & Stanley's (1966) and Webb et al's 
(1966) plea for ecologically valid research strategies. Its very aim is to replicate, in 
so far as this is possible through a research design, the social settings in which people 
live and the conditions under which they would normally interact. Small groups 
enable individuals to share in a discussion within a social setting which in many ways 
mirrors real-life social conditions. This technique seems particularly suited to the 
elicitation of a wide array of views and opinions'. 
Harre (1984a) wrote that social representations are "social" because they are 
rooted in the life of groups. Since social representations could not exist as such 
without the material and symbolic activity of groups, it seems appropriate to 
investigate them in the everyday context of their production and use. One can think 
of small-group discussions as attempts to reproduce what goes on in "the streets, in 
cafés, at places of work, in hospitals, laboratories, etc., [where people] are always 
making critical remarks, commenting, concocting spontaneous, non-official 
"philosophies" which have a decisive influence on their relations, their choices, their 
way of educating their children, making plans and so forth" (Moscovici, 1981; 
p.183). In other words, group interviews are small-scale empirical instances of the 
"thinking society". 
Because they are grounded in people's daily lives (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), 
group discussions answer some of the problems usually associated with surveys and 
individual interviews, namely the fact that these methods of data collection do not 
take account of the specific social context in which the data are produced, and 
therefore lead to impoverished analyses. The method of small-group discussions 
There is surprisingly little written on the relative merits of individual interviews and group 
discussions. How do the data collected in one setting compare with those generated in the other? Are 
respondents more inhibited when met individually by an outsider, or when interviewed as members of 
a group thus imposing a different set of constraints? To my knowledge, no systematic comparative 
analyses have been conducted. I can only hypothesise that interviewees are more likely to disclose 
intimate feelings, to explore ideas, to build a narrative, and to be critical when they do not have to take 
account of the views put forward by others immediately present in the social situation. However, the 
range or variety of opinions, ideas, images and emotions expressed in individual interviews is probably 
more limited than in group discussions. It seems reasonable to assume that the two techniques can be 
contrasted in terms of depth and breath: individual interviews being especially relevant to probe 
thoroughly into individual feelings, ideas, etc., and group discussions proving more valuable to draw 
out a wider array of issues, themes, arguments circulating in people's social networks, but which are 
less deep-seated. The benefits associated with each method may also depend on the topic and on the 
relationships existing between the members (e.g. prior knowledge of the participants). 
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"recognizes the significance of the context in any interpretation of discourse; it argues 
that the content of conversations within a group is inseparable from the social 
structures and the processes of communication within which it is spoken" (Burgess et 
al, 1988b; pp.457-458, italics in original). The participants provoke each other into 
responding and they must take account of other people's views in devising their own 
responses. By focusing on the processes of interaction amongst group members, one 
can begin to explore the ways in which people pool information gleaned from various 
sources, incorporate and transform it in the process of making sense of unfamiliar 
ideas or events. One can explore how people utilise collective resources to help 
structure accounts, develop arguments, attribute causes, negotiate value conflicts and 
justify actions in the course of interaction. 
For this research, the use of group discussions was pertinent in yet another 
way. Not only do respondents spontaneously get together to talk about the disaster 
and their relationships to nature, but their first-hand experience of the latter usually 
occurs in groups. Fishermen, fishfarmers and crofters work in teams. Adults often 
go in small groups on leisure fishing trips, on walks, on bird watching expeditions, 
etc. "Physical world socialisation of the self" (Proshansky et al, 1983) is almost 
always carried out in the presence of family members, friends, teachers or 
schoolmates. Shetlanders' social representations of nature emerge in the context of 
groups and because of the company of others. 
Do "once-only" groups really qualify as social groups? Burgess and her 
colleagues (Burgess et al, 1988a; 1988b; 1991) express some concerns about the 
value of "once-only" groups. They argue that one ought to distinguish between groups 
which meet only once, where the interactions between the participants are secondary 
to the discussion of the stimulus material, and in-depth longitudinal small groups, 
where the content of the conversation is interpreted with explicit reference to the 
structure of the group and the nature of the relations between its members. 
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"The once-only group... is not the most appropriate method for 
exploring environmental values which are deeply held and which 
clearly reflect a complex interpenetration of individual experiences and 
collective beliefs about nature, landscape, and society. The social 
context of the group, in which people may discuss their values and 
activities with one another, is crucial but we believe that the group 
needs much more time in which the members can develop and 
establish sufficient trust so as to be able to explore feelings in ways 
which are not continually being directed and manipulated by the 
researcher" (Burgess et al, 1988a; p.311-312). 
The rationale behind this critique is that once-only groups do not, strictly 
speaking, constitute groups in a social psychological sense; they are merely ad hoc 
gatherings of individuals. Such one-off meetings are not characterised by stable 
patterns of relationships between group members, patterns which would then provide 
an internal structure to the group and mediate the processes of verbal and nonverbal 
communication within it 
5.2.3.1. Using natural groups 
My research design circumvents the problems associated with "once-only" 
groups. Although the participants met only once in the context of my research, they 
were not selected at random. The participants had a previous history as group 
members, shared a unique culture, had their own concerns, conversational strategies, 
humour; they did not function dynamically as "collections of individuals". In this 
sense, the groups were "natural". They consisted of already existing social units: a 
family, salmon farmers working on the same farm, two groups of concerned citizens 
who had assembled after the oil spill to seek reparation and act on behalf of their 
local community, and a fishing crew (see Annexe 3; Table 5). 
This choice, again, reflects concerns about typicality and diversity. Two of the 
groups were based in Lerwick and the remainder were in the areas directly affected 
by the oil spill. The group discussions were held in natural contexts: either at home 
or at the place of work (salmon farm). The participants were contacted in the same 
way as the subjects for the interviews (lists of associations, snowballing, direct 
approach after the public meeting). The number of participants in each group ranges 
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from three to four. This is attributable to the nature of the group and/or to the 
availability of the subjects. 
5.2.3.2. Conducting group discussions 
In this case, there was a match between my research interest and the 
participants' topics of ordinary conversation: they didn't need my intervention to start 
discussing the "disaster" or their relation to "nature". The topics were topical! Thus, 
the participants were prompted in the same way as for the semi-structured individual 
interviews, but the ensuing discussions did not follow a particular sequence. This is 
justified by my theoretical preoccupations: to see how people decide on the relevance 
of certain issues, negotiate meanings, compete and argue, support or oppose each 
other, reach consensus, etc. I only acted as a moderator when it was strictly 
necessary. There was no attempt at encouraging reticent people to talk, or at limiting 
the intervention of the more talkative participants, since it was assumed that 
conversational strategies had already developed between the group members and 
were, in themselves, significant. Throughout the group discussions, which were tape-
recorded and lasted approximately for 90 to 120 minutes, I took notes on the 
interactions occurring between the participants (type of leadership, use of humour, 
reluctance to speak, etc). These interactional strategies are included in the analysis, 
which otherwise is similar to the that of semi-structured individual interviews'. 
5.2.4. Participant observation: Description and justification 
Participant observation has not enjoyed much recognition as a relevant method 
for social psychological research. Traditionally, participant observation has been used 
to obtain analytic descriptions of complex social organisations and thus has remained 
confined mainly to sociological and anthropological studies. Two notable exceptions 
'This does not amount to treating the group as a simple aggregate of individual attitudes and 
opinions which would have been equally accessible through the more time consuming technique of 
individual interviews. The context of the group, the dialogical nature of the arguments (Billig, 1987; 
1993), the communicative strategies involved as people debate, the management of impressions amongst 
group members (Goffman, 1959), and so forth, are all taken into account in conjunction with a 
thematic analysis. 
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are Festinger et al's classic study When Prophecy Fails (Festinger, Riecken & 
Schachter, 1956) and Jodelet's now seminal research Madness and Social  
Representations (Jodelet, 1989/1991). In spite of its fate, participant observation 
seems well suited to social representational studies. The latter aim at analysing the 
structure and content of people's ideas, attitudes and images as these relate to their 
conditions of emergence, to the specific communicative practices in which they are 
embedded and from which they spring, and to the functions which they serve in 
orienting one's actions and in mastering the material, social and symbolic 
environments. These aims can be best attained by using a generic method which 
allows the researcher to link discourse and practices by observing, and participating 
in, people's everyday activities in a real life context. Participant observation also 
retains, within the one method, perspectives that otherwise would be incompatible 
with each other, i.e. that of the actor and of the observer. In a sense, participant 
observation is the methodological equivalent to Mead's (1934) notion of "assuming 
the role of the other": researchers assume the role of the "generalised other" and 
incorporate the perspectives of all their informants without their own view being 
identical to any one of them. 
"In my eyes, observation retains a privileged position in the study of 
thinking and communication. Through it the big break-throughs that 
allow us to understand the life of the mind were made, from Levy-
Bruhl to Piaget, from Freud to Vygotsky, from Lewin to Marc Bloch 
[...] Observation has a prominent role in the study of social 
representations. It frees us from premature qualification and 
experimentation, which chop up facts into tiny pieces and lead to 
meaningless findings [...] This approach may occupy a place in social 
psychology (Von Cranach, 1980) comparable to the position secured 
by the ethological approach in biology, and very much for the same 
reasons [...] For many years to come observation stimulated by theory 
and armed with subtle analytical methods will still give us the means 
of understanding the genesis and structure of social representations in 
situ." (Moscovici, 1988; pp. 240-241) 
Participant observation has been defined more or less inclusively by its main 
proponents (e.g. Agar, 1980; Burgess, 1984; Jorgensen, 1989; Lofland, 1971/1984; 
McCall & Simmons, 1969). The research techniques subsumed under this label vary 
greatly: some emphasise covert observation, others advocate overt participation; some 
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favour systematic counting, others prefer more direct involvement with the subjects 
of the study. Choosing between these options should be based on the specific 
requirements of the situation and the characteristics of the object of investigation. But 
whatever distinctions are being made, participant observation is always characterised 
by an unusual quality of open-endedness in the study design, and an unusual degree 
of receptiveness to the subjects' conceptions (McCall & Simmons, 1969; p.19). Both 
are required for social representational inquiries. 
In this thesis, participant observation is not defined as a single method, but 
rather as a characteristic blend of methods and techniques which involves some 
genuinely social interaction in the field with the subjects of the study, some direct 
observation of relevant events, a great deal of informal interviewing, and the 
collection of documents and artifacts (McCall & Simmons; 1969) 6 . 
Becker and Geer (1957) consider participant observation "the most complete 
fowl of sociological datum, [...] a yardstick against which to measure the 
completeness of data gathered in other ways, a model which can serve to let us know 
what orders of information escape us when we use other methods." (p.28). Caution 
is required here in the interpretation of the word "yardstick" as it connotes positivist 
notions of objectivity and validity. Nevertheless, participant observation does enable 
the researcher to relate discourse to cultural models of behaviour and to material and 
symbolic practices. It maximises the inquirer's ability to grasp motives, beliefs, 
concerns, interests, customs and the like and, by positing her/him in a natural, 
ongoing situation, it permits the observer to build on tacit knowledge, to use 
her/himself as a data source. (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). This is not to say that "putting 
oneself in the shoes" of the people studied automatically allows one to recreate the 
mental organisation of the group; clearly, the intuitionist approach has the same 
disadvantages as introspection in general. But it means that immersion and the 
stimulations of participation can yield great benefits if one controls their products. 
Moreover, I would argue that participant observation is virtually indispensable 
within the framework of social representations if these are not simply conceived as 
'Formal interviewing, either on a one-to-one basis or in groups, and the systematic collection 
of newspapers for content analytic purposes are not considered as parts of participant observation, 
although they do comprise the everyday activities of field research. 
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descriptions of behaviours, but in fact define, justify and otherwise refer to the latter. 
If Moscovici (1973) is correct when he describes social representations as "systems 
of values, ideas and practices" (p.xiii), then it must be necessary to consider practices 
as elements which signify or express representations, just as linguistic forms do. 
There are many aspects of people's representations, actions and relationships of which 
the main protagonists themselves are simply unaware. More generally, people may 
only vaguely perceive them and lack the cognitive or linguistic tools to communicate 
them. If perceived clearly, people might still be reluctant to disclose these aspects of 
their lives to outsiders. In all such cases, participant observation is useful. It also 
explicitly acknowledges that social representations should be studied in their natural 
context of production and use. 
Considering the object of my research, the use of participant observation 
(informal interviewing, genuine social interaction, observation, the collection of 
artifacts, etc.) seems particularly relevant. How would it be possible to understand 
Shetlanders' social representations of their nature without having experienced, seen, 
explored, and smelled it for myself? How else could I have gained some insights into 
their ways of relating to the wave of incomers who came in the wake of the oil spill? 
This does not imply that I can now relate to "nature" in the way native Shetlanders 
do, but it may very well be that it is precisely in the distance between my experience 
of nature as a non-Shetlander and theirs that the space of social representations is to 
be found. 
5.2.4.1. Procedure 
I arrived in Shetland eight days after the tanker Braer had run aground and 
begun to spill oil'. Eight days which proved exhausting for a community having to 
'A note is necessary before I describe the procedures followed throughout the fieldwork. The 
preparation for the latter was minimal due to the sudden character of the event and the concomitant 
lack of time. Nevertheless, it involved, firstly, becoming somewhat familiar with the issues surrounding 
the spill by reading its coverage in all the London newspapers, by recording and watching the evening 
television news pertaining to the "Braer disaster" during the week between the 5th and 13th January 
1993, and by contacting various organisations (Greenpeace, the Scottish Natural Heritage, The Royal 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA)) to obtain more information about the 
situation. Secondly, it entailed acquiring some basic knowledge about Shetland, its population, 
geography, economic structure, political and social history and culture, through censuses, 
encyclopedias, books and articles. Thirdly, it meant addressing urgent methodological issues, such as 
the establishment of rough criteria for the sampling of respondents (for both individual and group 
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come to terms with the biggest crisis ever to face Shetland. Eight days during which, 
according to the SIC, some 1,400 "experts", environmentalists, politicians and 
journalists, flew in from all over the world. Eight days during which contradictory 
information, unco-ordinated advice and general uncertainty about almost every aspect 
of the crisis made the tension reach unprecedented peaks. Eight days in the course of 
which the vast majority of tired Shetlanders became more and more reticent about 
engaging in any type of interaction with outsiders. 
In that context, gaining entrée into people's homes was often difficult and 
meeting officials almost impossible. My mere presence was loaded with pejorative 
attributes. The first step, therefore, was to observe how people discussed amongst 
themselves in pubs, at street corners, in small shops, and to get recent issues of The 
Shetland Times in order to gain a general understanding of the situation. I set out to 
"learn the ways" of Shetlanders so that I could eventually participate in the 
conversations whilst minimising the animosity and the inhibitory effects inevitably 
associated with the presence of yet another stranger. 
In all of the public places I attended, the bulk of the conversations, not 
surprisingly, revolved around questions related to the "disaster". But of all the topics 
taken up, that of the attitudes of the journalists and "so-called" experts never failed 
to trigger new anecdotes, provoke hilarity, prompt exasperated comments and spark 
off heated debates. I had to differentiate myself from these people. Because of this 
extremely tense context, most of my observations during the 16 days spent in 
Shetland were conducted mainly in natural and public social settings: in pubs and 
shops, in the market, at the winter festival of Up-Helly-Aa, on the polluted cliffs of 
Garths Ness, where I walked with local inhabitants whilst listening to their 
impressions and stories about the place, at a public meeting held on the causes and 
consequences of the "disaster", etc. I kept a logbook recording my activities, 
significant events and some preliminary interpretations of these events. My 
observations, to some extent, oriented the selection of potential interviewees and 
interviews), the devising of interview schedules, the reviewing of the principles which guide participant 
observation and the conduct of group discussions. And finally, it meant organising the practical aspects 
of the fieldwork: securing transportation to and on the islands, booking accommodation, ensuring the 
financial support of the department, preparing the technical equipment (recording machine, 
microphones, tapes, portable computer, dictating machine, batteries, etc.). 
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suggested new research questions. All these activities generated data in their own 
right; they are used as background knowledge, crucial for the interpretation of the 
data collected through more formal methods. 
5.2.5. A public debate: At the interface of group discussions, media analysis and 
participant observation 
A public debate entitled "The Cost of the Braer for Shetland" constitutes 
another important source of data. The meeting was organised and broadcast by BBC 
Radio Scotland as part of a series entitled "Speaking Out with Leslie Riddoch". In 
essence, this debate was a radio audience discussion programme. Like their more 
widely analysed television counterparts (Livingstone & Lunt, 1992; Livingstone, 
1996), radio audience discussion programmes are one of the fora in which social 
representations are formed and expressed. Livingstone & Lunt (1992) argue that 
audience discussion programmes stand in a metonymic relation to the real-life world 
outside the studio. The topics raised in such programmes reflect the discussions which 
spontaneously take place in other social gatherings. 
The defining attributes of the genre (Livingstone & Lunt, 1992; Livingstone, 
1996) are that such programmes are usually held at times of crisis, focus on issues 
of public concern, typically have a mixed studio audience of "ordinary" people and 
"experts" or "elite" participants, combine individuals and group representatives, and 
involve participation, access and active interpretation from the audience, both at home 
and in the studio. Unlike most media programmes, they integrate lay people's 
opinions and personal experiences with the perspectives of "experts". Thus they bring 
together forms of representations which are traditionally kept apart, whilst clearly 
privileging the voices and experiences of lay people and marginalised groups over 
those of experts. Audience discussion programmes explicitly favour exploratory 
speech. It is incumbent on the host to foster the expression of personal views, to 
protect the right to speak, and to maintain the quality of the discussion as an open-
text. The debate is therefore not entirely under her/his control. 
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5.2.5.1. 	"Speaking out with Leslie Riddoch: The Cost of the Braer for 
Shetland" 
"The Cost of the Braer for Shetland" consisted in a one-hour debate during 
which some eighty Shetlanders and expert or elite participants questioned and 
criticised a panel of three key protagonists in Shetland society under the supervision 
of a host, Leslie Riddoch. The panel comprised the Director of Public Health, the 
Chief Executive of the Shetland Islands Council (SIC), and the Convenor of the SIC 
(who also recently created the Marine Environment Foundation in Shetland). The 
debate was held on January 19, 1993, at the Garrisson Theatre in Lerwick. It was 
recorded for future transmission. I attended and got involved in the meeting, obtained 
a cassette of the programme and transcribed it verbatim. This "happening" deserves 
some attention because it exemplifies the nature of fieldwork, the often ambiguous 
types of data which are collected and the necessarily interpretative character of the 
analysis. How can this public meeting be defined? On the one hand, "The Cost of the 
Braer for Shetland" is clearly a product of the media. It is set up and transmitted by 
the BBC and, as I have argued earlier, it follows, to a large extent, the conventions 
of the genre of audience discussion programmes (even if the visual dimension and all 
the constraints associated with managing one's physical appearance are notably absent 
from radio programmes). Yet, it would be inadequate to analyse the data produced 
in the course of the programme with the coding frame developed for the content 
analysis of the local newspapers. Indeed, the qualitative data generated by this public 
debate are more akin to the ones obtained via group discussions since the content of 
the interventions can only be understood in the light of social dynamics: each 
intervention is prompted by an earlier comment. Like smaller group discussions, the 
public debate provides an excellent opportunity to tap into the stock of arguments 
existing in Shetland in the wake of the oil spill: opinions, "facts", ideas and beliefs 
are expressed simultaneously about the immediate and long-term consequences of the 
oil on the land, in the sea and for animals, etc. The role of the press, that of the 
"experts", the attitude of the SIC, the possibility of claiming compensation, the threat 
to the reputation of Shetland produce abroad, the "scandal" of flags of convenience, 
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people's concerns about their health and that of their children, the loss of amenity, 
etc. are all discussed in an emotionally-charged atmosphere. 
The nature of the relations between members of the audience sets this public 
debate apart from most television audience discussion programmes, as well as from 
the small group interviews conducted during the fieldwork. Unlike the members 
gathered for television audience public debate, most of the participants in "The Cost 
of the Braer for Shetland" were not complete strangers. Their mutual knowledge, 
combined with the fact that the participants must go on living with each other when 
the debate is over, impose a number of constraints on their intervention. And unlike 
the participants in small group discussions, the studio audience was not homogenous, 
but comprised experts and lay people, Shetlanders and outsiders. The members of the 
audience did not have a prior history as a group - in this sense, "The Cost of the 
Braer for Shetland" qualifies as a "once-only" group - but the audience also 
constitutes a "natural group" in that the members were acquainted, sometimes 
intimately, with most of the other participants. 
Finally, my own presence and involvement in the debate change the type of 
analysis which can be made of the data. For instance, the visual dimension of the 
interactions (shaking of heads, expressions of encouragement or disapproval, the 
spatial location of the participants, etc.), which is lost in the radio transmission as 
well as in the verbatim transcription, can be retained through the observations I jotted 
down as the meeting progressed. It is interesting to note that the "beginning" of the 
debate differs in the broadcast version from the actual public discussion: a pre-
recorded introduction provides a context for the debate on the radio, but one which 
has little to do with the concerns expressed by Shetlanders themselves in the 
studio/theatre. This type of information would have been lost had I not attended the 
meeting. 
5.2.5.2. Analysis 
The material generated during this public meeting typifies the kind of data that 
would normally be excluded from more rigid research designs because it does not 
lend itself to any easy classification. The verbatim transcription of the cassette of the 
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programme provides the basis for a content analysis. The unit of analysis is the 
utterance, that is a conversational turn (or segments of conversational turn) in which 
an argument is put forward. Each utterance is coded according to who makes it 
(Shetlander vs non-Shetlander, expert vs lay person, member of the panel vs audience 
participant or host), what is being argued (themes) and how the topics are discussed 
(abstract vs concrete, scientific vs personal, generalised/global vs particular/local). 
This reading is then supplemented with a more interpretative analysis which integrates 
interactional processes with content, which brings in observational data and allows me 
to comment on the more subtle mechanisms used, for instance, to legitimise or 
disqualify a claim. A quantitative synopsis of the public debate which relates the 
number of utterances (and the pourcentage of the total debate which these represent) 
to the main protagonists can be found in Annexe 4. 
5.3. Triangulation and integration 
The principle of triangulation introduced in the first part of this chapter 
deserves further qualification. Three types of triangulation are possible: triangulation 
of data, triangulation of methods of data collection, and triangulation of methods of 
analysis. The integration of such different types of data and methods of data collection 
and analysis is the central task facing the researcher using a multi-source and multi-
method design. Yin (1981) indeed suggests that 
"accounts should be organized around the substantive topics of the case 
study. Each narrative portion should integrate evidence from different 
data elements [...] The narrative must be organized around specific 
propositions, questions or activities, with flexibility provided for 
modifying these topics as analysis progresses [...] As for integrating 
evidence, quantitative and qualitative data that address the same topic 
should be assembled together; similarly, interview segments from 
different respondents but on the same topic should be integrated." 
(Yin, 1981; p.60) 
In this sense, the integration of the data completely disregards the artificial 
dichotomy between qualitative and quantitative methods. The methods used in this 
thesis will provide the means of linking the collective construction of nature 
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(sociogenesis) to the ways in which such representations relate to Shetlanders' social 
and cultural identities (ontogenesis), as well as to the ways in which representations 
are put to use in, and structure, everyday social interaction (microgenesis). The 
analysis should also reveal the "embeddedness" of immediate reactions to the oil spill 
within long-established social representations of nature. It explicitly interrelates 
stability and change, structure and processes. The integration of the methods of 
analysis should maintain the specificity of each type of data but it should equally 
permit us highlighting the discrepancies between them. The incorporation of different 
types of data will serve to contextualise the extracts of verbal or written material and 
to support the analysis. 
5.4. Conclusion 
The suddenness of the events which constitute the present case study meant 
that most of the methodological choices had to be made on the spot, often in difficult 
circumstances. There was little time to plan and to reflect. If the entire research 
project is marked by the early stages of the research process and by the short length 
of my stay, and if, consequently, the analysis is somewhat restricted, I still believe 
that it was necessary to grasp the unique opportunity provided by the Braer oil spill. 
My strong commitment to the theory of social representations, together with an 
awareness of the epistemological positions which underlie particular research 
methods, directed my research efforts. The choice of individual interviews, of small 
group discussions, of media analysis, and of participant observation, reflects 
theoretical concerns. The addition of a fifth data source, the public debate, was more 
directly the result of the reality of the field work. Throughout my stay in Shetland, 
I have tried to remain open to the possibilities which emerged in an ever-changing 
context. 
To summarise: societal discourses on nature were reconstructed using a 
content analysis of 375 articles from the local newspaper, The Shetland Times; these 
reflected the concerns of the community and shaped their understanding. The 
processes of appropriation and transformation of collective meanings by individuals, 
as well as personal experiences and feelings about nature, were accessed through 17 
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in-depth interviews with Shetland residents. The actualisation of social representations 
in interactive, dialogical contexts was investigated in two different ways: firstly, I 
analysed the linguistic material produced in small-group discussions with five 
"natural" groups; and secondly, I analysed the transcript of a public debate organised 
by BBC Radio Scotland on the consequences of the Braer. This debate was 
particularly rich because it brought together various social actors, and laid bare the 
profound disparities existing between their respective versions. Finally, throughout 
my time on Shetland, I acted as a participant observer in order to examine the 
collective and private practices through which Shetlanders construct and reveal their 
representations of nature. A plethora of complementary, ad hoc sources were also 
used. The juxtaposition of the five data sources was not intended as a strategy for 
validation, but a means of understanding the multiple social representations of nature 
which co-existed in Shetland after the oil spill. I looked for the themes which cut 
across the entire corpus, and sought to retrieve the structure, content and functions 
of the social representations which were beginning to emerge. 
The sheer quantity of data, the fact that identical coding frames could not be 
developed for all data sets, the difficulties of handling systematically participant 
observational data, and the realisation that preliminary coding frames were over-
simplifying the complexity and the subtleties of the discourses, images, artifacts and 
practices encountered in Shetland, led me to adopt an interpretive analytical strategy. 
Although this strategy is more common in anthropology and ethnography than it is 
in social psychological research, I contend that it is particularly suited to social 
representational analyses. If social representations are not simply located in the heads 
of individuals, or in institutions, but also in the spaces of mediation between them, 
as well as in matter, then an analytical approach which links these various 
constructions is necessary. 
This approach raises important analytical questions. How many themes should 
there be? How should one convey a sense of interactional dynamics and 
communicative practices whilst focusing on themes? Can the crisis be understood in 
terms of regular social functioning? The reader will be the judge of the extent to 
which these questions have been successfully answered. I have attempted to support 
each interpretive claim by quotes or illustrations which derived from different data 
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sources and, when a theme was conspicuously absent from one aspect of social life, 
to indicate and to explain why this might be the case. 
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PART III: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
6.0. LIVING OFF NATURE, LIVING WITH NATURE: ORGANIC REPRESENTATIONS 
AMONG "REAL SHETLANDERS" 
Social representations do not appear to those who hold them as representations 
at all. They are coercive precisely because they are taken-for-granted and because 
each representation seems to engulf the whole of the "real", instead of being 
recognised as but one version of reality amongst a potentially infinite array of 
alternative ones. To reconstruct how organic social representations of nature - with 
their corresponding values, mode of knowledge, practices and ontology - emerged, 
and now function, in Shetland, is the object of the present chapter. This endeavour 
takes us to the heart of Shetlandic life, since it is in everyday life that past practices, 
traditions and collective memories are renewed and actualised. 
To uncover from within, as it were, the roots, content and functions of 
Shetlanders' organic representations of nature, I begin by discussing how social 
identities are intrinsically tied to particular relations to "nature". In part, these social 
identities emerged and are sustained through simple processes of categorisation: 
arbitrating over who may or who may not be considered Shetlander is an important 
part of social life, especially since the immigration of oil-related settlers to Shetland. 
However, these identities also have deep existential meanings and resonances because 
they are intimately bound up with a specific mode of knowledge, a particular 
representation of nature, and a somewhat mythical "way of life". The predominance 
of this "way of life" over the centuries means that it now constitutes the paradigm for 
contemporary social life. But this stable "way of life" has also favoured the 
acquisition and refinement of certain skills, abilities and knowledges, and created, in 
a very real sense, a particular nature in Shetland. 
6.1. Islands and insularity 
Shetland is an archipelago. It is isolated by almost two hundred miles of 
ferocious waters from both the Norwegian coast and the Scottish mainland. These 
simple geographical facts have complex cultural repercussions. Reaching or leaving 
the islands, even today, is expensive and time-consuming. Ferries carrying 
passengers, cars and goods leave Aberdeen, Bergen and Torshavn regularly. Some 
stop in Orkney on their way to Shetland, in which case the journey takes two days, 
whilst others go directly, thereby sparing the traveller a day on rough seas. Air travel 
is frequent and more convenient, with planes coming into Sumburgh airport from 
Aberdeen, London and Bergen everyday, but flying is three times more expensive 
than travelling by ferry and, just like the latter, is liable to cancellations because of 
extreme weather conditions. Not surprisingly, Shetlanders seldom venture away from 
their islands. 
And for the incomer, the sense of isolation and remoteness is no less 
important. On a clear day, from the plane, the islands appear like the pieces of a 
giant puzzle, set between the North Sea and the Atlantic, sea-torn, treeless, 
peat-patterned, with grassy platforms shaved by sheep, and lonely houses dotted on 
the rocky headlands. And so, when the bus which links the airport to the capital 
releases its passengers in front of Lerwick's popular pub Thule, one cannot help 
thinking that it is an appropriate name indeed: this must be "the island at the edge of 
the world". Yet, Shetland's boundaries are symbolic more than physical. Here, I 
explore the meanings which Shetlanders themselves impute to these boundaries. 
Moving away from simple physical determinism, I consider the islands as symbols, 
as "things which stand for other things", as resources used to condense complex 
ideas, images and sentiments. 
The islands themselves symbolise and are used to explain a number of aspects 
of social life in Shetland. Their objective physical isolation, for instance, becomes the 
point of articulation of complex dialectics between self-reliance - where the islands 
are at the centre of everything - and dependency - where the islands are not only 
distant from the British mainland, but also peripheral in relation to this powerful 
centre. Thus, Shetland folk declare with great pride: "We have everything up here. 
There are a lot of folk who don't even know where Shetland is but, as you can see 
yourself, there is everything you need" (I-09) 1 . Some Shetlanders have never 
ventured away from the islands because, they say, "there is no need to" (I-06), 
because "we never wanted for anything we couldn't get here" (I-02). But these same 
'The codes in parentheses refer to the particular individual interviews (I) or group discussions 
(G) from which the excerpts are selected. The subjects or groups to which the numbers refer can be 
found in Annexe 3, Table 4 (for individual interviews) and Table 5 (for discussion groups). 
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people would also proclaim, and decry, that they are, and always have been, at the 
mercy of politicians, bureaucrats or oil companies which exploit their islands and 
completely disregard the local population. 
As we were walking across the windswept hills overlooking Garths Ness, a 
crofter from Hillwell described the circumstances of the cession of Shetland to the 
Scottish Crown as the single event which best captured the foreign perspective on 
Shetland2 . This act of birth of a Scottish Shetland was going to mark the entire 
history of the islands: a story of abandonment and contempt which, this informant 
said, epitomises the outside world's attitude towards Shetland. She added that nobody 
was interested in Shetland because the islands were just "too far". However, one 
could argue that the perceived lack of interest expressed by Scots for Shetland 
significantly contributed to the recurrent and emphatic expression of difference from 
Scotland which is so alive nowadays and which, historically, has probably been one 
of the main shapers of the distinct local culture 3 . At any rate, there is no doubt that, 
some five hundred years after the abrogation of their freehold rights, Shetlanders still 
recall this humiliating episode of their history and the subsequent centuries of 
exploitation by the Scots. To this day, they try to preserve a distinct cultural identity 
which links them to their Norwegian roots. Shetlanders feel misrepresented and 
marginalised by both Scotland and England, and such feelings are at the core of their 
consciousness. 
At another level, isolation, remoteness and a marginal status in the eyes of 
foreigners have induced in the population a sense that they should be relatively 
2Until the middle of the 15' century, the Shetland islands belonged to the Danish Crown. 
Shetland was a colony of freemen or udallers, independent free-holder farmers and fishermen, mainly 
descendants of earlier generations of Norse settlers. However, in 1469, the islands were pledged to 
Scotland for the sum of 8,000 florins by the ruler of the kingdom of Norway, Denmark and Sweden, 
King Christian I. Ridden by debts, the monarch mortgaged the islands to provide a dowry for his 
daughter. He pawned some of his royal estates as well as the right to collect taxes from the udallers. 
From the king, Shetlanders received a letter admonishing them to be dutiful and to pay their skatt (tax) 
to the kings of Scotland until the time might come when the islands could be redeemed. They never 
were, and the rule that ensued under the Scottish lairds often proved cruel. 
3Peterson (1959), in an article entitled "The Shetlands - Do they exist?" published in The New 
Shetlander, argued that a careful analysis of Shetland's dialects and historical demography reveals 
intense and multi-stranded Scottish influences on the local culture. In a perverse fashion, it would be 
precisely the similarities between Shetlandic and Scottish cultures (themselves explained by the 
substantial Scottish immigration following the handover of the islands) which would have prompted the 
need perceived by Shetlanders to dissociate themselves from Scotland and to draw upon, and over-
stress, their Norse origins in constituting their distinctive culture and identity. Interestingly, the article 
implies that, were the Shetlands to lose their Norse or Viking identity, they would cease to exist. 
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autarkic. The historical subsistence economy has long ago vanished and Shetland 
today is integrated in a much wider economic framework (Byron, 1986; Wills, 
1991). But Shetlanders still think of themselves as self-sufficient (Cohen, 1980; 1986) 
and aim to rely predominantly upon the resources immediately available to them: the 
land and the sea4 . Today, Shetlanders use people's engagement in traditional 
economic/natural practices as a means of allocating identity (Cohen, 1978). To be a 
"real Shetlander" is to be a crofter or a fisherman. The imagined traditional "way of 
life" of crofters and fishermen becomes the ethos of contemporary Shetland life in 
general. 
"Shetland people tend to be fairly good at volunteering I would have thought. 
Someone needs something done, a lot of people in the community will rally together 
and do it. [...] It's always been like that. It's like that when you live on an island." 
(I-17) 
"[When you live on an island] you have to be, in a way you have to be very 
independent and yet you have to be willing to help at the same time. Although you 
are independent in one way, you have to be able to help and accept help as well. You 
are independent as a group. We are independent as islanders, not maybe as 
individuals but as islanders." (I- 13) 
This is how simple geographical facts are transformed into social realities: 
they are used to explain Shetlanders' consciously preserved culture and identity, 
where autonomy and solidarity, resilience and vulnerability, the requirements of 
collective life and the needs of individuals are closely intertwined. 
Moreover, the islands come to signify Shetland society in general, in a 
metonymic fashion, and with all the ambivalence which this entails. At times, the 
physical boundaries of the islands are perceived as a hindrance to the community's 
integration into wider economic, political and legal frameworks. Representatives of 
the progressive segments of Shetland society who want to modernise an "out-dated" 
social and economic system by capitalising on the oil industry have to deny the very 
4The traditional economy was based on fisheries and agriculture and the further exploitation 
of their products through fish-processing and knitting. The islands lie close to prolific fishing grounds 
and so, for centuries, fishing in the Haaf (the Norn word for ocean) and fish-processing have been the 
mainstays of the economy. Agriculture is also important but the main activity is, and always has been, 
the rearing of sheep and cattle. Most of the land comprises rough grassland, heather moorland and 
peatland, none of which is really suitable for cultivation (there are only 11,000 hectares of good 
grassland and little arable soil in Shetland). This means that crofting could never provide adequate 
standards of living on its own. Historically, it could only be combined with other activities such as 
fishing and knitting. 
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reality of the islands themselves in order to escape the insular mentality which is 
associated with them. As this well-travelled marine engineer and city councillor puts 
it: 
"We're not an island! You can't just be a Shetlander. You have to have the broader 
perspective of the rest of Europe derived from the country to work together... 
I: You're not an island? 
I was going to say we're not an island. I mean it was one of the stupidest things I've 
ever felt to say, we're not an island! But it's right, we are not insular. We shouldn't 
be insular. We may be an island and we may be an island race but we should not be 
insular. We should not lock ourselves away from the rest of Europe or the rest of 
Scotland. [...] We can't exist on our own. I'm a Shetlander first but I think that we 
can't be insular in that we have to look at the broader perspective of the whole of 
Europe, the whole of the world." (I-10) 
Even this man cannot escape the intrinsic connection, so conspicuous in 
Shetland society, between the geography of the islands and their distinct culture. (He 
is also careful to reassert his local identity and to emphasise that he is "a Shetlander 
first", in spite of his modernist stance). These elements are again brought together in 
a statement which links natural features and social dynamics - 
"You can influence events in Shetland. Anyone can if you make the effort: it's small 
enough and it has a very tightly defined boundary. If you go over the boundary, you 
drown!" (I-10) 
"Tightly defined boundary" clearly refers both to social norms - what is 
permissible - and to the physical demarcation between land and sea. The figure of 
speech captures the prescriptive character of social life in a close-knit community and 
hints at the fatal consequences - "you drown!" - of trespassing local conventions. The 
sense of agency which may be found in small communities is constrained by coercive 
social norms. 
Ambivalence towards the islands as symbols of social life sometimes assumes 
another form: that between strength and fragility, resilience and vulnerability. Indeed, 
on the one hand, the seas seem to offer a guarantee of cultural distinctiveness, some 
sort of natural protection against assimilation and the dissolution of the traditional way 
of life. In this case, the islands stand as an emblem of solidity, stability and 
permanence, as the name by which they are referred to locally - "The Old Rock" - 
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suggests'. On the other hand, however, it is sometimes a sense of fragility which 
prevails. 
"We're just a bunch of rocks in the middle of the Atlantic and the North Sea!" (I-07) 
"Sometimes I think a good gale could just wipe us out. No more Shetland." (I-09) 
Again, these antithetical terms are inter-dependent: isolation, fragility, 
peripherality and marginality are at once deeply resented and actively used to 
construct and legitimise a distinct culture, to open up a space of resistance based on 
a secure location in the world. These dialectics are perfectly conjured up and 
illustrated by an artifact produced by the Shetland Tourist Information Office. It is 
worth describing. Conventional maps of Britain, such as the ones used for the weather 
reports on British television, seldom show Shetland in its true geographical position. 
For convenience, Shetland is usually contained in a little inset in the Moray Firth, 
thereby ignoring the 200 miles of sea which separate it from Aberdeen. The weather 
reports are interpreted by the locals as daily reminders of Shetland's peripherality and 
insignificance in the eyes of the South folk. With embittered and forceful humour, the 
Tourist Information Office riposted by producing its own revised version of British 
geography: a reversed map of Britain, printed on tea towels, with Shetland featuring 
at the very centre of the map, "larger than life", and the rest of the British Isles being 
squeezed together into a small box posited somewhere north-east of Unst. If the 
theory of social representations is correct in claiming that representations always 
combine a symbolic and an iconic dimension, that they reproduce complex and 
sometimes imprecise concepts as images, then it is scarcely surprising that 
Shetlanders should produce such artifacts. Interestingly, the tea towels, which were 
initially intended for consumption by tourists, are now found in Shetlanders' homes. 
I saw them twice in people's kitchens. They seem to encapsulate both Shetlanders' 
frustration vis-a-vis the outside world, and their efforts to resist marginalisation. 
To sum up, the islands symbolise social life. The use of a natural metaphor 
for social life serves essentially conservative purposes. First, by naturalising, quite 
'It is no accident that the editorial page of The Shetland Times should also be entitled "The 
Old Rock": social commentaries are framed by this natural analogy to confer a sense of permanence 
and invulnerability on the local way of life. 
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literally, what are in fact political, economic, social and cultural realities, the 
possibilities of change are considerably reduced and the weight of tradition is 
reasserted. Second, this strategic naturalisation allows social life to go on without 
opening up debates which would be deleterious in such a close-knit community . 
 "nature" justifies making important decisions concerning social life without ever being 
seen to have deliberately chosen a course of action, because it was natural and 
therefore necessary. Third, a whole ethos is also elaborated which emphasises 
collaboration, solidarity, resilience amongst Shetland folk, and resistance to outside 
influences; it is legitimated because it is intimately tied to a particular way of life 
which is itself deemed natural. The flexibility of the islands as symbols means that 
they can sustain diverse meanings and endow a broad range of experiences with moral 
justification. All this, in turn, suggests that nature is not to be tampered with: its 
stability guarantees that of social life (see below). Of course, only "real Shetlanders" 
truly know how to manipulate this symbol so that it can serve their multiple aims. 
6.2. The "real Shetlander" 
Who are these "real Shetlanders"? Why do Shetlanders insist on distinguishing 
between the local population in general, and "real Shetlanders" 6? What does this 
social category mean? At the most fundamental level, being a "real Shetlander" 
implies a connection to the archipelago through both place of birth and upbringing. 
Although this criterion is a sine qua non, being accepted as a "real Shetlander" 
implies very much more than that. It also requires that one should participate in the 
Shetland "way of life". And this, in turn, implies that the "born and bred Shetlander" 
should belong to specific frameworks of social organisation, be a member of specific 
"natural categories", and be involved in the traditional economic activities upon which 
the much exalted "way of life" is based. It also implies the sharing and the 
°Although Peterson (1959) has analysed Shetlanders' relations to Scotland and shown how they 
involved processes of differentiation and distanciation, I have found no literature on the genesis of the 
social category of the "real Shetlander" per se. Its historical origins have not been traced. It is 
reasonable to assume that it emerged as a result of contacts with outsiders; otherwise, there simply 
would be no need to distinguish between Shetlanders, as everyone would belong equally. One can also 
hypothesise that the number of Shetlanders encompassed by this category would have tended to 
decrease over time, with the progressive erosion of the traditional "way of life". It is also likely that 
the context in which I conducted the research - a context which brought very many non-Shetlanders 
to the islands - exacerbated the need to differentiate between the locals and Others. 
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observance of moral codes. I shall consider these factors, bearing in mind how social 
change - especially due to the oil industry - has accentuated the need to define ever 
more clearly the very social categories it threatened. 
6.2.1. The "born and bred Shetlander" 
Throughout the interviews, group discussions and during conversations 
overheard amongst Shetlanders, one theme continuously recurred: that of the 
difference between "the born and bred Shetlander" and more recent settlers or 
foreigners. This effort to distinguish the "real Shetlander" from outsiders may always 
have been part of Shetland life; however, the intensity with which Shetlanders now 
debate this issue, as well as the resources they summon to support their claims, make 
it plain that the oil industry has fundamentally threatened and changed Shetland 
society, and revived the need to defend the local identity. 
"You must realise that the biggest oil boom-town in Europe is here. It must be 
understood that this is devastating for a small community. I would think we have 
come through reasonably well, but very much has been taken over. [...] About 
twenty years ago, we had the construction phase for ten years and while the 
construction phase was here, we had this tremendous opportunity to study human 
character. And with all the people that were in Shetland - they really were from all 
over the world, Black and White and Yellow included - the Englishman always came 
through. If the chips are down, always look after number one! My conclusion is that 
the Englishman is... an Englishman's philosophy is to take all and give nothing. And 
that's the dead opposite of the Shetlander's philosophy. It is a very dangerous 
philosophy, you see? So that's what happened in Shetland. We have very much been 
taken over in the name of oil and money." (I-03) 
Whatever differences indeed existed between Shetlanders and outsiders, they 
were magnified to eventually become "the dead opposite of the Shetlander's 
philosophy". Asserting the radical difference was all the more necessary considering 
the growing appeal of the "Englishman's philosophy" to the youth of Shetland. 
Openly acknowledging the reality of social change - Shetlanders usually prefer to 
stress the continuity of community life - the same man declares: 
"A young person in Shetland today realises that, in order to survive, he has to 
become more like the White man It's a dog eat dog society we live in. They'll 
even knock the next guy down to take his position and that's what they do! 
I: You think that's the situation in Shetland today? 
Absolutely! It's the only way to survive. I am not going to knock it because it is the 
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only way to survive. There are some young Shetlanders doing well, a bloody good 
job! They are. But we've lost this beautiful old way of life which is wonderful to live 
in. [...] I think that is undoubtedly going to consume the indigenous population of 
Shetland." (I-03). 
In a group discussion, one "real Shetlander" and her acculturated husband also 
talked about the consequences of the penetration of "Sooth" values into their society. 
"T: There was more of a community Now we don't have that. 
I: You think you have lost this sense of community? 
T: Yes. 
S: Yeah, we've spoilt it. It's been spoilt, definitely, with the Sooth folk coming in 
[...] It's not the same. I know it's not the same. When we were young, everybody 
was working together. There was a lot of crofters together, they would all be 
working together and helping each other. You would go to one person one week and 
somebody else the next day or whatever. Not just your little problems. Now... I can't 
really put it into words. It's like, it's far more sort of you're in your own little 
family, in your own little boxes, I would say. And if you try to stick your nose out 
to help anybody, they think you're crazy. To be kind hearted and to be helpful now 
is looked down on by a lot of the community. 
T: There's inbred kind of greed now, and jealousy, and envy which wasn't there 
before. People don't like to see someone get on ahead of them. They don't like to 
see them get more money or a better house or a better car. This sort of thing, you 
know?" (G-04) 
The external menace now threatens to dissolve the community from within. 
The need to restore a distinct and superior local identity is pressing; Shetlanders must 
distinguish themselves from outsiders. The difference is instituted, first and foremost, 
by the place of birth: unless one is born and bred in Shetland, one will never be 
considered a real Shetlander. As the following family discussion reveals, even Rose, 
a woman who has arrived on the islands at the age of four months, is not fully 
considered by the locals as a Shetlander. 
"I: So what does it take to become a Shetlander? 
R: Well I don't suppose they [foreigners]'ll ever become a Shetlander. 
M: You'd have to be born here. 
R: Hum, hum. You would have to be born and brought up here to be a Shetlander, 
a true Shetlander, a real Shetlander. You see I don't think it would matter how long 
you stayed, you still would never be a Shetlander. 
W: Like, like... Rose she was born in Aberdeen and she would be an Aberdonian really. 
R: Hum, hum. 
M: No, but everybody says she's a Shetlander because she was here when she was 
aboot what? four months old. [...] She's a Shetlander to me anyway, really. I mean 
you would class her as being a Shetlander. [silence] 
I: So Walter, what are you? Are you a Shetlander? 
R+M+W: No. 
M: He's no a Shetlander. 
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W: Really, I'm an Orcadian [from Orkney] born of Shetland parents. I would be of 
Shetland blood but... 
I: But would you be considered by the locals as being a Shetlander? 
R+M+W: No, no, no. 
W: I'm still an Orcadian. 
R: You would have to be born and bred in Shetland, you see?"(G-02) 
When Maria, the daughter, said she would class Rose as a Shetlander, her 
parents exchanged disapproving looks: they were not convinced that being raised in 
Shetland was a sufficient condition to become a real Shetlander. The father, still an 
outsider himself despite being of "Shetland blood", seemed particularly reluctant to 
accept Rose into the community. And the mother, without openly disagreeing, 
promptly reasserted the rules. Whether or not Rose and Walter can ultimately be 
considered real Shetlanders is, for the locals, a central issue. It is an object of 
negotiation which involves the entire community: "everybody says" something about 
Rose. When the two criteria of being both born and bred in Shetland are equivocal, 
it is imperative that Shetlanders resolve the uncertainty by assigning the person to a 
class. This crucial judgement concerns the integrity of the community. To what extent 
can we, as a collectivity, relax the rules which preserve our identity? How flexible 
may our boundaries be? These are the questions underpinning the dialogue. 
Since being born and raised in Shetland are such determinant factors of one's 
social identity and, as we shall see, a guarantee of acceptability and credibility, one 
understands why the locals always insist on providing their interlocutor with their 
genealogical and residential credentials, as it were. When I asked people if they were 
Shetlanders, the answer always came in the fowl of a lengthy presentation of one's 
family history and area of settlement. 
"I think that if I was completely honest, then I would have to say there is not a lot 
of Norse blood in me. And my name is not Norse. My first name is, Magnus, but 
[my family name] is not. So, I am probably a real outsider if you go back a few 
hundred years. But I would like to think I am a Shetlander now." (I-03) 
"I: Have you lived here all your life? 
Yes, and my parents too. And grandparents, yes. My great-grandfather is, as far 
back as I know." (I-04) 
"I: Are you a Shetlander? 
Yes, well... My mother's from Shetland, my father's from Orkney. So, I'm a half 
Shetlander. But my mother [has been a Shetlander] fae ever I ken. Grandad, granny, 
great-grandad, great-granny. They're all Shetlanders." (I-09) 
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"I am a Shetlander, born and bred. [My family line can be traced] as far as the 
registers would go back I would think. Yes, I would think so. From both my father 
and my mother's sides. [...] The occasion has never arisen to think about going 
anywhere else. We just were born here and I did stay in Lerwick for my secondary 
education but I came back when I got married and stayed here again. I was born in 
this house..." (I-13) 
"I have lived here all my life. I have never been away except, the longest I have 
been away is probably for ten days at one time. [And my parents] were here as well. 
My mother came from the neighbouring village which is just down the road there and 
my father, as far as I know, was born here. He was born [on this croft]. [...] I know 
that there have been at least four generations here, of my family, in this house, but 
the end where you sat, in the kitchen, that's the original house. [...] And when my 
father was born in there, there were three families living there at that time. Three 
cradles, three babies in this house and they were all rocking them in the cradles and 
that was in 1882." (I-06) 
"I am a born and bred Shetlander. I'll be the fifth generation to farm here. 
I: You mean on this land? 
Yes, in this place. And my son will be the sixth one, he is working here now. "(I-02) 
The sheer frequency of statements about one's family history points to the 
significance of being born and bred in Shetland. The previous quotations also indicate 
that geographic mobility is love. If Shetlanders have to leave home to join the navy 
or to pursue further education, they still tend to come back to their original 
community, often to the very house where they were born. And even when they 
resettle permanently somewhere else on the islands, the place of birth forever remains 
where one "belongs" . 
"I just love hill walking and I go back to where I belong to, out in Bexter, and 
another hobby of mine is fishing. [...] And where I belong to, where I lived, there 
was just at each end of my house there was what we call lochs, small lakes." (I-01) 
Therein lies the significance of being born and bred in Shetland: it makes 
belonging possible. And belonging means that one participates in the rarely defined, 
but constantly invoked, "way of life" . Before we address the specific content of this 
This phenomenon characterises the whole of Shetland but it may be particularly pronounced 
in the smaller islands which surround Mainland. Generally, there is "a profound identification of 
groups of kin with area and, especially, with particular townships. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest 
that the association of some families with particular townships and tracts of croft land goes back over 
two centuries. The extent of such continuity is extremely difficult to establish with any precision, partly 
because the documentation is insufficient, partly because family names have changed substantially 
through affinal absorption and through the erratic transformation of patronyms to surnames. It can be 
stated with some certainty, however, that the present location of most families in crofting townships 
dates back over at least two or three generations to the early years of this century..." (Cohen, 1982a; 
p.30). 
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way of life and its relations to Shetlanders' identity, let me clarify further the 
relationships between place, identity and belonging. 
We have just seen that, when introducing themselves, Shetlanders often refer 
to the croft, the neighbourhood, the village where they were born. Identity is 
instituted by reference to a place which becomes the material support for the 
distinction between wir folk (us) and yon folk (them). This close identity with a place 
may be rapidly disappearing with the increase in geographical mobility brought about 
by the development of the oil industry (sudden immigration, a more extensive road 
network, migration towards the capital), but it has always been a feature of Shetlandic 
life. Even The Shetland Times generally specify a person's place of residence when 
they refer to local inhabitants, as the following excerpts from the text accompanying 
photographs show: 
"Banished from the fields. Farmer John Mainland, Noss, with a recent arrival." (The 
Shetland Times, 04/30/93, (17), p.1) 
"...members of the Save our Shetland Team, Sheila Barclay, Mid Yell; Billy 
Middleton, Lerwick, and Ian Gunn, Boddam." (The Shetland Times, 01/22/93, (3), 
p.12) 
"Crofter James Sinclair, Clavel, Bigton, on his way to feed his sheep after moving 
them away from the worst affected areas of grazing." (The Shetland Times, 01/15/93, 
(2), p.18) 
"Crofter John Sinclair, Rerwick, Bigton, takes his sheep which had to be moved 
away from the pollution." (The Shetland Times, 01/15/93, (2), p.19) 
"A petition was launched on Saturday afternoon with the aim of persuading the Prime 
Minister to take action to prevent another tanker disaster. Organisers Isobel Mitchell, 
Whiteness (left), and Paul Wood, Skeld (centre), have placed copies of the petition 
throughout Shetland and already signatures are pouring in. Among those who visited 
the Freefield Centre to sign the petition are Blair Bruce (back left) and Annabel 
Russell (right), both Scalloway." (The Shetland Times, 01/22/93, (3), p.9) 
"...From left are the Lord Lieutenant Magnus Shearer, Bressay; convener of SIC 
Edward Thomason, Lerwick; chief executive of the Shetland Salmon Farmers' 
Association James Moncrieff, Sandsound; and chairman of the Salmon Farmers' 
Association Chris Young, Walls." (The Shetland Times, 01/15/93, (2), p.5) 
For centuries, the Norse patronymic system, which involves adding "son" for men, and 
"dotter" for women to one's father's name, was used on the islands. This system, simple and 
convenient in small communities, proved unmanageable with an increase in population. Further 
specification was needed and so a place-name was added. This remained the custom until the second 
half of the 19th Century, when names became crystallised in official registries and ceased to indicate 
an association between individuals and places. Yet, to this day, the practice survives and one often 
hears of Magnus in Fetlar, Olaf in Murrister, or Thomas in Egilsay. 
159 
This association of people with places is highly normative. And it is skilfully, 
if not always intentionally, used as such by the press as well as in everyday 
conversations. This can be observed in relation to who is being connected to a place. 
Most of the people referred to in the quotations above are ordinary Shetland folk who 
either endured, with some degree of fortitude, the consequences of the oil spill (the 
two crofters and the farmer), or who were actively involved in organisations 
defending and promoting Shetlanders' livelihoods (the petition co-ordinators and the 
members of the Save our Shetland team). Their actions exemplify the "resilience" or 
"doggedness" of Shetlanders in the face of adversity. Rarely will members of the 
local council and other associations, professionals, or oil workers, for instance, be 
identified in this particular fashion. The last quote is unusual in this respect. 
However, the context in which it is presented may explain what, at first, appears to 
be an exception to the rule. Indeed, the representatives of the local associations were 
photographed during a successful media-inspired operation aimed at convincing "south 
buyers" that Shetland produce was beyond reproach. The article to which the 
photograph refers reads: 
"On Tuesday night, just to prove there was absolutely no problem with the fish, the 
SFA held a reception in the fisheries college for the Press with a seafood buffet made 
from fish landed on Tuesday morning." (The Shetland Times, 01/15/93, (2), p.5) 
The commendable effort and the good fortune of the reception, whose outcome 
was so crucial to the economy of the islands (and which was to be repeated the 
following day for the benefit of Prince Charles), deserved some recognition: it came 
in the form of the attribution of a place to the meritorious organisers, the symbol par 
excellence that one is accepted as a "real Shetlander". Thus, far from being an 
exception, the unusual allocation of a place-name reinforces the rule. But let us not 
anticipate further on what pertains directly to the Braer and return to what it means 
to be a "real Shetlander". We have seen that it presupposes being born and bred on 
the islands. It also entails participating in the traditional "way of life". 
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6.2.2. The Shetland "way of life" 
Shetlanders endlessly talk about their "way of life". According to Anthony 
Cohen, an anthropologist who spent fifteen years studying community life on the 
island of Whalsay, there is no help to be gained from falling back on some such 
clichés as the "way of life" (Cohen, 1987; p.100) to make sense of Shetlanders' 
practices. Of course, references to the way of life do not in themselves constitute an 
explanation. To some extent, it is precisely because the way of life is invoked as an 
explanation that it absolves Shetlanders from having to reflect upon, and to 
disentangle, everything which is taken-for-granted. The ready-made formula of the 
"way of life" seems to defy description. Everything happens as though its power 
depends upon it not being articulated and defined. If it were, the profound internal 
social divisions which characterise Shetland society today could be open to debate, 
and this would severely threaten the integrity of the group. In this sense, the "way 
of life" is not so much a descriptive formula as a normative, prescriptive assertion 
about what ought to be. It is activated to construct homogeneity in the face of internal 
difference. 
And yet, this functionalist perspective does not exhaust the real significance 
of the way of life. There is a whole phenomenological and ontological dimension 
which must be taken seriously, rather than simply explained away as false 
consciousness. Indeed, for some Shetlanders, this way of life is constitutive of who 
they are, of their culture and identity. It remains an unquestioned given, 
psychologically active in part because it is not an object over which they actively 
reflect. 
"I just like Shetland. It is quiet and peaceful and beautiful and it is just where I have 
always lived and just our way of life and... I would not like to live elsewhere.(I-01) 
"L: Well, it is something that... You never really think much about it because it is 
something that you have been brought up with and it is just a way of life and you 
don't know, I mean you probably don't know much different anyway so... But if you 
moved away for a while, if you went to Mainland and you worked in the Mainland 
for a while you would probably see the difference there, but here it is just the way 
it is. 
I: And what do you like about it? 
L: Well, it is just a close community and you ken everybody just about. There is a 
lot of people coming back and forth from the Sooth but you do ken most of the 
people so it is sort of a close environment." (G-01) 
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"It is just a way of life, isn't it? We go out [fishing] for ten, eleven days at a time, 
we work a week-end at sea and then a week-end off. So it is two weeks before I 
spend a week-end at home. [...] It is just a way of life. I don't know what it is I like 
about it. I don't know. I wouldn't like to stay in cities and towns. Some places I 
could stay but Shetland is for me." (I-04) 
"It's a better way of life because I mean you know what it's all about. You know, you 
don't have to explain and everybody understands." (G-03) 
There is very little elaboration upon the content of what would constitute this 
way of life: it is just a way of life which everybody understands. For real Shetlanders, 
there is indeed no need for explanation since sharing in this way of life means 
precisely that one is an integral part of the complex social fabric of the community; 
an active participant in, and recipient of, its distinctive and consciously preserved 
culture; an expert in its idioms. Acquiring this expertise, however, is a long and 
admittedly difficult process. As this crofter puts it: 
"... when I was a youngster, we were told actually: "Respect your elders, always". 
To be seen and not heard was the way you were brought up and by the time you start 
speaking, you should know what you are speaking about. Some of us probably failed 
pretty bad specifically on that! But this is the way. You listened to the old people. 
The old people, there were no TVs then and shit like that, and the old folks tell 
stories, and that is heritage, you see? Passed on heritage. And as you get older, you 
remember all that stuff and it was important because that is how you should conduct 
yourself in the future, and how you should apply it yourself to your children when 
they are brought up, when it is your time again to try and pass on these values. [...] 
My greatest hardship was trying to live up to how I was brought up." (I-03) 
Sustaining traditional values in a modernising world is hard. There are TVs 
and national newspapers in Shetland today. There is money in abundance, and goods, 
and the desire to purchase them. There are Shetlanders who have relished the 
hustle-bustle of great capitals, and who have come back to tell their tale. All this 
erodes the Shetland way of life. 
Having scanned, during the fieldwork, the two local magazines which 
specifically address cultural and social issues, I found only one article which 
explicitly tried to define the almost mythical Shetland way of life. Significantly, this 
account was written in 1974, during the construction phase of the oil terminal at 
Sullom Voe. The article reads: 
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When I tried to crystallise what I think is meant by the Shetland way of life, at first 
I came up with the usual things. Shetland doggedness, that often gets the improbable, 
not to say the impossible, done. Faith, patience, humour. During the recent miserable 
winter, a crofter neighbour of my folks' said, typically: "If you hae your health - an 
your oilskin - you're aa richt!" 
I thought of Shetland honesty. Trust among neighbours. Doors that don't need to be 
locked. Help freely given. The family feeling towards friend folk as well as your 
own. The creative element of thrift, despised by the foolish and the careless. I 
thought of the low crime incidence; the absence of cruelty to children; the help given 
to prevent cruelty to animals. The wholly civilised attitudes of the ordinary 
Shetlander, leaving the exceptions that prove the rule. 
But there is far more to it than that. A way of life evolves continually. Fifty years 
ago, the Shetland woman was little regarded. Now, she is recognised as the equal 
that she has always been in fact. Fifty years ago, that a Shetland man should knit 
would have been unthinkable. Not now. 
A way of life stems at its source from actual human thoughts, opinions, and 
principles. Personal values and behaviour shape the unspoken and unwritten rules by 
which a community lives, wittingly or not. Through the centuries, each of the many 
selves that went to our making left us something of the Shetland they knew and their 
attitudes to it. And the wells of our thinking are still fed, consciously or not, from 
their distilled experience. A man can teach his son to handle a boat or a tushkar, as 
his own father or grandfather taught him. In subtler ways, thoughts and concepts as 
native as our rock are handed down from mind to mind. 
There is, of course, the discord to that harmony, the dark occasional contrast that at 
times saddens and disgusts. But an instinctive sense of what is right and just; a 
respect for life and human dignity; an intolerance of real evil; the preponderance of 
these qualities, I am certain, make our Shetland way of life truly unique, and a 
worthy pattern for any community large or small. 
And there is something else. There is a factor which cannot be expressed or 
explained but of which we are intimately aware: that something in us and for us, 
which makes Shetland the place where we wish to remain." (New Shetlander, Spring, 
1974) 
This is indeed how Shetlanders think of their way of life: an idealised version 
of a reconstructed, harmonious past; a time of honesty, of collaboration between 
neighbours, and of hard work. The rhetoric of tradition, of centuries-old practices, 
of experience handed down from one generation to the next, of "thoughts and 
concepts as native as our rock" provides the resources to construct the community's 
solidarity against threats of disintegration. But, again, the community's perception of 
its way of life cannot be dismissed as pure ideology. It also stems from a genuine 
questioning of what it meant to be a Shetlander, of the specificity of the local culture, 
at a time when the potential consequences of a sudden and intense exposure to other 
ways seemed devastating. In general, "real Shetlanders" construe the effects of the 
oil industry on the local population as overwhelmingly negative. 
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"But we have lost a great deal, we've lost our culture, we've lost our way of life, 
we've lost the community spirit, we've lost our language, and if you take all that 
away from a community, there isn't much left. It doesn't have a recognition, it 
doesn't know itself. So the oil has taken far more away than it has ever given." 
(I-06) 
Wills (1991) warns against taking such accounts at face-value. In his view, 
most Shetlanders fail to acknowledge the positive contribution made by the oil 
industry. He argues that oil-related settlers were often quite appreciative of Shetland's 
distinct culture and in fact contributed to a cultural renaissance. He maintains that the 
perceived threat felt by Shetlanders reawakened their interest in their own dialect, 
poetry, literature and music; that the oil cash enabled the SIC to inject massive funds 
into artistic activities; and that the general increase in prosperity meant that the local 
public could now buy the books, tapes and paintings which flooded into the market 
(Wills, 1991). One cannot doubt that a cultural renaissance followed the oil boom. 
However, the culture thus revived is simply not identical to the one which existed 
previously. Once a community has become conscious of its culture, its relationship 
to it changes, a fact which leaves neither the culture, nor the community, untouched. 
Thus, the awareness of the need to reawaken their interest in their culture, which 
Wills takes to be beneficial, gives greater credence to the pessimistic accounts of the 
old folk. Culture now appears as an external object, a set of artistic pursuits 
abstracted from everyday life, rather than an embedded set of practices, ideas, 
beliefs, myths, skills and artifacts effortlessly arising from life in common and of 
which the arts would be but one form. Moreover, the cultural revival necessarily 
happens from the perspective of the present; contemporary stakes and debates preside 
over the selection of what is to be remembered. It is not accidental, in an age of 
dependency upon massive oil companies, that the model of the exploitative Scottish 
lairds should prevail. 
We therefore find that the constantly invoked "way of life" conceals two 
different, if inter-related, realities; that it reveals different relationships between 
realities, symbolic forms and subjectivity; and that it serves different functions. On 
the one hand, the "way of life" is a normative prescription which proposes an 
idealised version of the past and posits the latter as the model for contemporary social 
behaviour. The use of the "way of life" in this fashion is intended to hide the 
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deepening fragmentation of Shetland society, to counter the very processes of 
de-traditionalisation and modernisation which, in fact, make this way of life 
impossible, and to dissuade those who would be tempted to emigrate (the perennial 
threat of emigration runs deep in Shetlanders' consciousness). In many ways, the 
efficacy of the idiom depends upon it not being defined with any precision. If its 
content were to be articulated, it would soon become apparent that there is less and 
less "reality out there" to which the expression actually corresponds. How symbols 
can be emptied of their original content, and nevertheless subsist, is a problem which 
social psychologists have yet to address. 
On the other hand, there are still some Shetlanders, "real Shetlanders", who 
do live by a particular, predominantly traditional way of life whose content has yet 
to be elaborated. Like the mythical "way of life" to which most Shetlanders refer, the 
content of the latter is not clearly defined either. But this time, it is mainly because 
it is truly embedded in everyday life that this content defies verbalisation. To a large 
extent, the way of life is carried and passed on through practices, skills, postures of 
the body and of the mind, rather than through theories and discourses. In the 
following sections, I shall try to show that this way of life is linked to membership 
in a given "natural category", to a particular sense of identity, to a particular mode 
of knowledge, and to a particular social representation of nature. 
6.2.3. Some are more equal than others: The "way of life" and natural categories 
The previous section instructs us not only on the dual reality and function of 
the "way of life" but also, indirectly, on the natural categories which sustain them. 
First, the vast majority of the quotations are taken from individual interviews and 
group discussions with crofters and farmers; and second, the only natural category 
implicitly referred to is the one comprising crofters, farmers and fishermen. For 
instance, in the magazine article, it is said that a father can teach his son how to 
handle a boat or a tushkar (an indigenous tool used for casting, raising and turning 
peat) - that is, how to be a competent fisherman or crofter - but, and these omissions 
are important, not how to behave on an oil rig, keep proper accounts for the local 
council, or serve customers efficiently in the village pub. In this respect, all are not 
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equal in Shetland society: some natives of the islands are "real Shetlanders", others 
simply are not. Those who belong to the first group do so because they participate 
in the traditional "way of life" which, in turn, implies that they belong to clearly 
identified natural categories. A crofter from Quendale sums up the traditional local 
view: 
"The indigenous population here is crofters, farmers, fishermen; they run fish 
factories, processing factories." (I-03) 
When I later remarked that he had not included oil workers (I had failed to 
notice that he had also excluded fish farmers) in his account, he answered: 
"The oil industry [pause]... There is a lot of Shetlanders involved in the oil industry. 
Don't get me wrong. But this is very much run by incomers; it has always been 
controlled by incomers. Like the Shetland Islands Council, it is run by incomers." 
(I-03) 
Clearly, members of the local Council or oil workers are excluded from the 
consensual definition of being a "real Shetlander", despite being born and bred in 
Shetland. They are categorised together with incomers. They belong to none of the 
frameworks identified by Cohen (1982a, 1987) as fundamental to the community's 
social organisation and sense of cultural distinctiveness, such as crofting 
neighbourhoods and fishing crews. It is arguably because they cannot be regarded as 
composites of - and almost reducible to - any such frameworks that oil workers and 
members of the Council are referred to as incomers in the first place, even though 
both the oil industry and the SIC now comprise a majority of native Shetlanders. 
9In Chapter 3, we considered the concept of natural categories in relation to the human history 
of nature and to social representations of nature. Now, we shall see how the concept maps onto the 
empirical reality in Shetland. Throughout the analysis, I hope to demonstrate the essential affinity 
between natural categories and the various social representations of nature associated with them, not 
only as a theoretical construct but also as a significant structuring factor for Shetlanders themselves. 
Indeed, Shetlanders intuitively distinguish between their fellowmen on the basis of what seems to 
amount to their rapport to nature, mode of knowledge and identity. One group of people comprises 
"real Shetlanders" or the "indigenous population", whereas other inhabitants of the islands can be 
grouped either simply as "born and bred Shetlanders" (which reveals little about their belonging to a 
particular natural category, save through differentiation from the "real Shetlanders") or as 
"Sooth-Moothers" (who will be described extensively in the next chapter). We shall see that it is first 
and foremost a common position in the "natural division of society" (Moscovici, 1968/1977), and 
therefore a particular mode of knowledge in relation to nature, which unites members of natural 
categories. However, social categories also build upon, and are superimposed onto, natural categories. 
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But I wish to suggest that there is another important dimension upon which 
these groups can be distinguished: "real Shetlanders" contrast sharply with outsiders 
in how they relate to "nature". These groups, I argue, hold very different social 
representations of nature. Being a real Shetlander would therefore entail being born 
and bred in Shetland, participating in the traditional way of life, and through the 
latter, acquiring and renewing a particular representation of nature. 
6.3. Real Shetlanders, the way of life, and organic representations of nature 
The particular rapport to materiality which unites "real Shetlanders" - crofters, 
farmers, fishermen - corresponds closely to the "artistic labour" which Moscovici 
(1968/1977) associated with the organic state (representation) of nature. Their way 
of life is intimately linked to a representation of nature as one in which they partake, 
whose cycles determine their everyday activities, to which all their senses are attuned 
and over which they will not claim mastery. Deep-sea fishermen, inshore fishermen 
and crofters all claim that their lives are largely structured by Nature. This dimension 
of organic representations is a product of long-established traditions; it is rooted in 
a different, earlier, social, economic, political and technological era, when fishing and 
crofting were indeed a "way of life" which tied in with natural conditions. 
6.3.1. Haaf fishermen 
Nowadays, skippers are exposed to forces more unfathomable than the seas 
and which no amount of ingenuity and resourcefulness can counter. "The fishing 
grounds are the ever more complicated battleground in which the enemy is not so 
much the fish, nor even the weather. It is provided by other, less predictable 
adversaries: international politics, regulations, unfair foreign competition, the inanities 
of government policy, the fisheries protection officer, fluctuating interest rates, and 
human fallibility" (Cohen, 1986; p.48). Yet, the idea that Nature itself dictates the 
way of life still constructs today's reality. Fishermen claim that they "follow the 
fish", "work with the weather" , and "respect the seas" as though natural elements in 
themselves sufficed to explain and organise their way of life. 
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"J:It's just the weather, elements of the weather. We accept that as fishermen. Some 
weeks we might not go off for a month for bad weather. 
S: Yeah, you just accept that. You allow for that. You're accepting that in a year so 
many weeks in the year you are not going to be able to go for risk of losing your 
life." (G-05) 10 
"K: There is the government trying to tell them when to go to sea, when they should 
go to sea and when they shouldn't. That won't work. That never worked with 
fishermen in fishing boats. 
I: Why? 
K: Because they have to go when it's the weather to start with. They have to watch 
the weather and go when the weather is, go where the tides are." (G -05) 
"We just work until the wind comes, we just fish away until the wind comes and 
when it gets too bad, we just put the boat head in the wind and what we call 
"dodge". D.O.D.G.E., dodging. Until the weather falls away again and it is ready 
to work again. And then we work away, [...] as far as a hundred and fifty miles 
sometimes. Yes, that is west, when we go west. As far as a hundred and fifty, that 
is the most far we have been. Mostly forty, fifty, sixty miles, most of the time, up 
to eighty, a hundred, depending where the fish are. [...] We follow the fish. It 
depends on the seasons." (I-04) 
"J: Only a fool wouldn't [respect the sea] because you don't know the capabilities of 
the sea. It can smash you into smithereens. It's a powerful thing. Any man who has 
been to sea knows what the sea can do." (G-05) . 
The winds, the waves, the tides and the fish determine when, where and how 
to go fishing. Fishing quotas which interfere with "natural cycles" and modify fishing 
practices are deeply resented. Although deep-sea fishing is a multi-million pound 
10The uneven status of crew members is conspicuous in these interactional and conversational 
dynamics. The reader will notice that in the quotations from this group discussion (G-05) where 
turn-taking is reproduced, it is systematically "J" (51 years-old), a skipper who has been at sea for 
thirty-seven years, who introduces new themes and expands upon them. "S" (25 years-old), his 
nephew, is the mate, that is the second in command on the boat in which he has had a share for seven 
years. Nevertheless, he never once disagreed with the skipper, rarely voiced his own opinion, and 
limited his interventions to skilful reformulations of what "J" had already said. "W" (29 years-old) is 
not linked by kinship to the other members of the fishing crew; he has no formal role on the boat and 
is noticeably absent from the discussion (5 utterances in total). Finally "K", the skipper's aunt, acts 
as the bearer of tradition. She provides information about the family's history, the qualities required 
of a good fisherman, the role of women in fishing and crofting communities, the attributes of 
"Sooth-Moothers", etc. 
These interactional and conversational strategies cannot be adequately explained in terms of 
institutional functions and roles. Cohen (1978; 1982; 1982a; 1982b; 1982c; 1986; 1987) has provided 
very fine analyses of interactional dynamics among Whalsaymen. His work shows that the 
"individuality" of crew members is publicly constructed by the allocation of attributes to individuals. 
These attributions have to do more with the person's structural connections to the community than with 
his actual personality; they serve to link him ideologically and culturally to his fishing crew, kinship 
and neighbourhood, and to mitigate conflict. The contriving of responses evident in this group 
discussion may be described as stage-management strategies (Goffman, 1959/1971) but they must be 
related to Shetland's social structure. In this sense, this group (G-05) truly constitutes a microcosm of 
the wider society. 
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industry, this resentment is not only an economic matter. It also has to do with a 
mode of knowledge which is being devalued as TV charts, radar scans, and the whole 
paraphernalia of modern fishing, together with pre-defined fishing territories and 
imposed net sizes, undermine the status of these experienced fishermen. Cohen 
(1982a; 1982b; 1987) has reported extensively on these issues among the fishing 
communities of Whalsay. 
What is this traditional knowledge? Even under the best of circumstances, it 
is hard to uncover this type of knowledge in a short time and mainly through 
discursive material. But in this case, the difficulty was compounded by the crisis 
itself, as well as by the fact that Shetland's Haaf fishermen are both reluctant and 
virtually unable to talk about their expertise. Their reluctance seems to stem from the 
fact that it is inadmissible in Shetland to talk about the particular skills required to be 
a good skipper. In fact, it is common to deny that successful fishing in fact demands 
any skill at all. "Luck" is invoked to explain differences in catch sizes, income and, 
thus, in prestige and economic status. 
"J: It's just a way of life that we like. 
K: It's a kind of hard life mind you. It's rough but it's an honest life, it's very honest 
i• • 
J: What we catch we get paid for. 
K: Yes, that's right! 
J: What we don't catch we get nothing. 
K: You get nothing. It's a very honest, an honest life. [...] It's a hard life but honest 
life, I think. It can be pretty hard. 
I: What does it take to be a good fisherman? 
J+S+W: A lot of luck." (G-05) 
The answer comes immediately and in chorus. Appealing to luck, rather than 
competence, to explain differences in catch between fishermen is a sound strategy in 
small fishing communities where open competition and the acknowledgement of 
unequal individual aptitudes and merits would threaten the stability of the group". 
Luck hardly constitutes a sufficient explanation, though. The astonishing level of 
11 Cohen (1986) locates the origins of Shetlanders' remarkably non-competitive approach to fishing 
in their "shared subjection to the tyrannies, first of the lairds, and later of the fishing companies" 
(Cohen, 1986; p. 55). But he also concludes that, whatever the historical roots of this attitude may be, 
"it is significant that it should have survived into the modern circumstances of cut-throat fishing 
economics" (idem, p. 55). 
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expertise displayed by deep-sea fishermen - their knowledge of the fish, the tides, the 
currents, the water depths - and the long years of apprenticeship indicate that 
successful and safe fishing depends on something more than just luck. And yet, 
whenever expertise is claimed or paid tribute to, it is not an individual's competence 
and skills which are praised, but collective knowledge which is held only by 
Shetlanders, and almost by virtue of being a Shetlander. It is therefore very difficult 
to tap into the specialist knowledge which fishermen undoubtedly possess. 
"J: When you've been in a fishing family and you've been brought up with the 
fishing and the boat, you see, this is what me fadder would say: "You needn't leave 
the pier if you are no going to come back". So this is the thing, you see? [...] They 
need to know the Shetland waters. It's only Shetlanders dat ken. 
K: The tides and the water and the rocks and everything. It's very difficult. It's only 
Shetlanders that ken." (G-05) 
Disasters which occurred when fishermen followed "foolish" orders and put 
to sea under dangerous circumstances are recalled in yarns as well as in newspapers. 
This skipper remembers the death of his brother which, implicitly, he attributes to the 
decision of a reckless skipper who paid no heed to the weather forecast. 
"It was on the fifth of January, ten years ago, and my brother came ashore after 
being at sea all his life; he drove a taxi for five years and he decided to go back to 
the fishing. On the fifth of January, it was a very nice morning but there was a very 
bad forecast, but the skipper of the boat decided to go off and it came over a bad 
night. Coming ashore and two of them were swept over the side with a wave. My 
brother was, when he was 42 years old and an 18 year-old boy. And my nephew was 
on the boat with his dad and he lost it. He never got to them." (G-05) 
These tragedies bring the power of natural forces close to home. They are 
recalled to demonstrate that one cannot outdare the elements with impunity, that 
rather than trying to control nature, "real Shetlanders" ought to live with it. Such 
humility and respect are learned from experience. But it is a mediated experience of 
an already represented nature. It cannot be explained solely by reference to some 
objective "natural" demands'. Recklessness would be entirely inconsistent with the 
12If this were the case, one would expect similar diligence and respect for natural forces in 
other fishing communities where nearly identical natural conditions prevail. This is, indeed, the central 
tenet of the thesis of environmental or physical determinism. However, a number of researchers 
studying other North Atlantic fishing communities such as Newfoundland and Iceland have consistently 
reported that local fishermen engage in mindless displays of bravura, needlessly risking men's lives 
and boats (e.g. Byron, 1986; van den Hoonard, 1977; Tunstall, 1962; Warner, 1984). 
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local ethos wherein prudence, resourcefulness, responsibility, traditional wisdom and 
shrewdness are key values. It would be at odds with Shetlanders' representation of 
their way of life as "natural", harmonious, and respectful of the elements. It would 
also be incompatible with their organic representation of nature, which excludes the 
notion of mastery. Skippers embody this local ideal. Their status as "folk heroes" is 
only matched by that of crofters, as we shall see later. 
Perhaps, also, the reluctance of fishermen to expand on their knowledge has 
to do with some superstition'. The likeliest explanation of the fishermen's reserve, 
however, must be their simple inability to talk about what they are hardly aware of 
knowing. Indeed, in many ways, knowledges, behavioural tendencies and skills are 
stored in their body, which is finely tuned to the demands of the task. Co-ordination 
on the boat is crucial: everyone has a role and a place. But, more importantly, 
fishermen seem to adapt to being at sea by modifying spontaneously their muscular 
tone, by changing their sense of balance, and by accentuating certain movements. 
"J: With bad weather, it's a relief to get into port. [At sea], you can't relax and 
every window is battened down and you're rolling around. 
S: There's no rest. You're always rolling from side to side so you're always having 
to keep hold of something. 
J: Every muscle in your body is tensed although you don't realise it. Once you are 
on shore you feel like, when you are walking, you lift your legs too high since you 
have been thrown about. You find that, once you have come ashore after a bad day. 
[...] You've lost your balance. That's what it is. You feel yourself swaying suddenly 
when you come home. 
S: I don't feel that now, I used to feel that. I'm probably getting used to it. When 
I first went to sea and came ashore I started swaying! Ha! Ha! You'd think you were 
swaying. 
J: You think you are still on the boat if you come ashore after a very bad day. You 
still feel you are moving and the house is moving. But it's not, it's just that you've 
got a right big shake up. Your body has been thrown about and it's no gotten used 
to coming on the firm ground again." (G-05) 
13Schei & Moberg (1988) allude to the existence of a traditional "sea language". Apparently, 
the old fishermen of Shetland, as those of Faroe and western Norway, believed "that there were many 
words and names one must not mention while fishing in the Haaf. In Shetland this sea language was 
richer than anywhere else." (Schei & Moberg, 1988; p.90) It was thought that "the truth of things had 
to be kept hidden from the evil forces lurking in the deeps, otherwise not only the catches of fish but 
even the lives of the fishermen were in danger. The sea language was therefore quite unlike the 
language spoken ashore, and it could also vary from one boat crew to another" (idem; p.90; emphasis 
added). The authors refer to a paper by 0. Lundberg entitled "On the Shetland sea language as a 
source of old Norse literature" presented at the Viking Congress of Lerwick in 1950. I was unable to 
obtain a copy of the text. Whatever the extent of this practice, it does point to a qualitatively different 
way of life on boat and ashore: roles, rules, motion, even language, change from one environment to 
the other. This also indicates the importance of the crew as the context of socialisation. 
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Cohen (1978) also reports that many Whalsay men claim that they feel 
disoriented or otherwise uncomfortable when they spend any length of time out of 
sight of the sea'. In any case, a kind of interpenetration, or organic solidarity, 
seems to characterise the local fishermen's rapport to nature. The seas, for them, are 
a lifeworld. 
6.3.2. In-shore fishermen 
The same can be said of Shetland's in-shore fishermen (so far as I can judge 
from the single interview I conducted with a shellfish fishelinan and from the limited 
data I could glean). Perhaps even more than deep-sea fishermen, who can and do rely 
on modern technology, in-shore fishermen still work very much according to the 
traditional ways (with the additional use of a Visual Display Unit, which shows scans 
of the sea bed). They, too, claim to work with nature. The following quotations give 
some indication of the complexity of selecting fishing grounds, of the in-depth 
understanding of shellfish behaviour, underwater currents, seasonal changes and 
weather conditions which fishing for shellfish requires. 
"There's a lot of lobsters dat go frae dere to deep water, very deep water, in the 
wintertime. But the one thing dat scientists have never been able to find oot is exactly 
what the truth is aboot lobsters. [...] What I'm saying is dat, if it's the case dat all 
juvenile lobsters go deep doon in the cracks in the sea bed, close aroon the shore, 
cause I can't imagine them going into deep waters afore, I think they sat near the 
coast. I think they go into cracks, deep cracks and crevasses in the rocks and they're 
livin' dere till they're big enough to come oot into the open and fend for themselves, 
big enough so dat nothing else can kill them, they can fight off their predators, 
they're big enough to look after themselves. So if dat's the case, it could be a 
number o' years before you see juveniles dere. If dere's no pyaa [sign of life], if the 
sea bed is sterile after this, then anything dat comes frae dat area is not goin' to stay 
dere." (I-14) 
14Interestingly, almost two centuries ago, a Scottish doctor identified a "condition" which 
appeared to be found only amongst the Shetland Islanders. His "scientific" account reads as follows: 
"To such an extent is [the Shetlander's love of home] carried that, in the case of girls in service in the 
south, it often brings on a disease known to the Faculty as morbus islandious. There is no other 
symptom than a gradual dwindling away, and the patient herself is often unaware of the cause of her 
illness, the only remedy for which is immediate return to the dearly beloved Old Rock." (John R. 
Tudor, The Orkneys and Shetland, 1813; p.176; quoted in Schei & Moberg, 1988; p.73). Could it be 
that the intrinsic connection between "real Shetlanders" and their place which I have uncovered is some 
trace of a relationship which used to be more widespread, at a time when just about everyone truly 
endorsed the traditional "way of life"? 
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"In April, I start fishing wi' pots again, go for lobsters frae Sumburgh and working 
west, going west around the island. And I just slowly work me way right up to 
Speggie and I have a mourern anchor at Speggie so the boat stays dere in the 
summer. In May, June through July, I start working back again. If the weather, 
because the weather starts changing through July and August, it's not, it's no a good 
place to fish. The weather... you donna get out everyday so I start working me way 
back, come back to tics (?) side and then go up to Cunningsburgh which is up here. 
And I work in Cunningsburgh in August... 
I: How do you know if it's a good area or a bad area? 
Well, I've fished here all my life. I know tics (?) like the back of my hand. [...] 
Certain times of the year, here, I mean you donna get too much in April, May, June. 
But dat's when the shellfish get their new shell and dere seems to be good fishing in 
dis area. So I fish here, maybe, I'd say, the last two weeks of July, or the last week 
of July, August, September, through to October, I fish around Cunningsburgh and 
I work around here." (I-14) 
The segmentation of the sea shore into patches favours, in each individual 
person, a better, more intimate knowledge of the waters, of the cracks, crevasses and 
gyos (creeks with steep sides), of - the outsiders would say - the specific micro 
ecosystems found around the archipelago'. Dividing up the sea shores also reduces 
competition for already scarce resources amongst fishermen by avoiding the 
simultaneous presence of boats. In this sense, Nature is not the sole factor in 
determining the choice of fishing grounds: social, economic and ecological demands 
intersect. 
"I'm based in Levenwick, Sandwick and go right across to Sandness as well, and me 
fadder, he's fishing frae Cunningsburgh and up to Lerwick, so I donna go dere. 
I: Because your father is there? 
Well, because dere's no point in two boats fishing at the same place.[...] All you do 
when you fish somewhere, you're on top of somebody else, so the grass [gross 
earnings] must come doon. [...] Your earnings, their earnings must get less if you're 
fishing in their area. You see what I mean? So, there's a lot of shellfish boats in 
Shetland but everybody seems to keep to their own patch." (1-14) 
15In fact, this knowledge of the sea bed and of the shore is also carried in language, and more 
specifically in place-names. The name of the capital Lerwick, for instance, would combine the Norse 
elements leir-vik, which means a bay with a bottom of clay or mud Similarly, the site of the oil spill, 
Garths Ness, is a combination of the Nom word garth (also gerdi, gaard, cru or crub) which means 
an enclosed place or yard where sheep or cattle are kept, and of the English word ness (promontory 
or headland). Both the topographic features of the place and its social/natural/economic use are 
contained in the place-name. Considerable research has been conducted on Norse place-names in 
Shetland for almost one hundred and fifty years now. It shows that Norse place-names give quite 
matter-of-fact descriptions of the sea bed, scenery, fields, shoreline and other topographical features. 
The old language would have elements to express the most minute variations. Schei and Moberg (1988; 
drawing mainly on untranslated works by the Scandinavian linguist P.A. Munch (1853)) report, for 
instance, that there would have been some 20 words to describe hills of slightly different shapes and 
heights. They also state that coastal features, in particular, would have been described with great 
minutiae through place-names, presumably because, as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis suggests, they were 
so central to survival on the islands. Naming is a means of identification: only a deep knowledge of 
the landscape and of the seas around Shetland could generate this identification system. Today, 
language serves to keep this knowledge alive. 
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Again, as for deep-sea fishermen, knowledge is acquired from experience, 
over years spent observing others (usually one's father) at work, trying out new "little 
bits and places", studying changes in the volume, sizes and quality of catches. It is 
a knowledge which is rarely articulated in words and which must be gained on one's 
own, especially since fellow in-shore fishermen will not share their craft or divulge 
their best fishing grounds. 
"Every year, I work the same routine, fishin' in the same area, at the same time of 
the year. [...] I mean I know tis area probably as good as anybody knows it. I started 
fishin' in tis area since I left school. I started fishin' wi' me fader and I've known 
these grounds... I've been fishin' here for the last twenty years [...] Basically, for 
lobsters and velvet crabs, if you're working inshore, you have a good idea of the 
depth of water and where to go to but I mean some places it's different from oders. 
Some places it's better. It's just a case o'... you've got to go and fish there and find 
it out. When somebody comes doon here, I mean I probably wouldnae tell dem just 
the exact truth. I wouldnae. You have your secrets and you... Each fisherman has 
the things dat they don't tell. 
I: Can I share your secrets? I'm not going to fish here, don't worry! 
No, it's just, dat's just different places and wee bits and rocky bottoms and gyos dat 
you just, you donnae tell anybody. [...] You find bits or areas dat you've maybe 
never fished there afore, so you try oot some parts and sometimes you come up well. 
And you just donnae tell things like dat." (I-14) 
For now, I would like to establish that in-shore fishing truly is a "way of life" . 
It dictates every aspect of daily life, brings a negligible income, and rests upon a 
thorough knowledge of the seas and the sea bed around Shetland - a knowledge which 
is acquired through experience and passed from father to son, mainly through 
observation. One indicator of the depth of this knowledge is the extent to which the 
smallest creek, crevasse, or bay is intimately known and even allocated a name which 
describes its main features. Again, this seems to point to the kind of organic 
representation of nature described by Moscovici (1968/1977). However, it is 
impossible to draw further conclusions from a single interview, especially since the 
data are otherwise scarce regarding the practices, the knowledge, or even the opinions 
of these fishermen. I believe this is because they earn very little compared to deep-sea 
fishermen and because, consequently, they are inadequately represented by the 
Shetland Fishermen's Association (which in itself indicates that Shetland has 
undergone profound transformations). The interests of in-shore fishermen were hardly 
discussed in The Shetland Times, or even in The Shetland Fishing News in the 
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aftermath of the oil spill, although they were unquestionably the most severely 
affected occupational group. 
6.3.3. Crofters 
Finally, Shetland's "indigenous population" also comprises crofters. In many 
ways, it is impossible to talk about crofters as though they constituted a distinct 
category. In the past, Shetlanders' everyday life consisted precisely of some 
interweaving of deep-sea and in-shore fishing with farming, cattle rearing and 
knitting. Crofting truly was a "way of life". Hence the status of crofters and of 
crofting in Shetland society today. They are testimony to the resilience of Shetlanders 
and to their independence as islanders. They are reminders of the particular quality 
of social life which prevailed on the islands when everyone indeed knew everyone 
else and laboured together. They epitomise an era when a range of skills and 
knowledges were embodied in a single person. They link the community to a time 
when every facet of life was dictated by the seasonal cycle, rather than by the clock. 
"If you are thinking that being a crofter or a farmer is an eight to five job, it is not. 
I think you just have to accept that and try and work with the weather." (G-01) 
"[Crofting] is a seven day a week job, sometimes eighteen hours a day. 
I: Eighteen hours a day? 
Sometimes yes. Certain times of the year, yes. When things do not go right and you 
get bad weather. [...] It affects the work. If you get long days of rain we can't get 
on the land to do the work. That's one of the biggest drawbacks here, that the season 
is so short, the growing season. And if it's late in the Voar, in the springtime, then 
it's late right up through the year." (I-02) 
"Oh! Believe me, we struggle in Shetland. We struggle with the elements, with the 
weather. You have seen this last week. You cannot go about and feed sheep. My dad 
used to say it is the wind that had killed him all his life. It was double-Dutch but he 
did put a point through! [...] It is a place where you really can't relax; as long as you 
have work to do you mustn't relax. We used to have only hay and peats for the fire, 
and that was your whole summer taken up with either curing hay or getting your 
peats. No way would you ever consider having a day off or a half-day off until all 
that work was done. Then you relax and go on do what you felt like. That's in my 
younger days, and much more in my parents' young days. They never knew what 
like it was to relax.[...] They certainly were strained up, but it was their way of life 
and they accepted it. [...] Crofters are not frightened for hard work." (I-13) 
Crofting was, and remains, closely adjusted to the seemingly unchanging 
rhythm of the seasons - of Shetland's own seasons, that is. Drawing upon a variety 
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of sources (Cohen, 1986; Knox, 1985; Smith, 1984; the local newspapers and 
magazines), it is possible to reconstruct the annual cycle of crofting. The Voar (end 
of March, first week of April) is spent delving, ploughing, fertilising arable land with 
dung and seaweed, and planting the staple crops: tatties, neeps, carrots, onions and 
beets. Crops are sown early in the plantie cru (a small drystone-walled enclosure for 
growing vegetables and protecting them from bad weather, as a remedy against bad 
harvests), and are then transplanted near the croft house. In May come the lambing 
and the cutting of peat from the local scattald (rough grazing land used as common 
pasture by various owners in proportion to their arable land). Curing the peat involves 
a sequence of operations which begins with removing the turf overlaying the peat 
bank with a ripper or peat spade. The peats are then cut with a thuskar (an operation 
called castin' the peat), turned on their ends (raisin' the peat), and left to dry in small 
stacks in the field for the whole summer Finally in the Hairst (late summer, early 
autumn), the peats are taken home and stacked by the house for use as fuel during the 
long winter months. 
From the end of the Voar onwards, most of the work on the croft is carried 
out by women and children: they are in charge of tending livestock and growing 
crops. This division of labour is inherited from a time when men would leave their 
homes in May to fish in the Haaf for the whole summer. Women and children take 
the sheep away from the scattald, drive them down to the cru (an enclosure, often on 
a small inlet, where the sheep are kept), where wool is rooed from the sheep (plucked 
by hand, as opposed to shorn) to be carded and spun, ready for knitting throughout 
the winter. 
"I do just all the farm chores on the croft. I lend my hand to everything like curing 
the peat, driving the sheep across. We have vegetables and turnips in the field... I 
don't know what like they will be [as a result of the oil spill]. I have not been to look 
at them. We have nips, taaties, carrots, cabbage and kale. I take care of feeding the 
cows and cleaning them out, helping with calving time, helping at lambing time, 
feeding calves and lambs. They always say that new born calves and lambs always 
benefit from a woman's touch. We have more motherly instincts and we are made 
with maybe more patience. It all needs a motherly touch at times." (I-13) 
By mid-autumn come the slaughter of young cattle and the curing of meat, as 
well as the beginning of the cottage industry activity, which is pursued right through 
the winter months. Now that fishing is practised by well-equipped, professional 
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fishermen, it takes place in the winter as well (although severe weather conditions 
often keep the men ashore, as we have seen). 
That agricultural and other croft-related practices should be paced by the 
natural calendar does not suffice to explain why crofting has changed so little over 
the past hundred years'. To begin with, "croft" and "crofter" are legal statuses 
defined by the Crofters' Act of 1886'. The system of tenure of smallholdings as 
they exist today are a direct outcome of the Crofters' Act. Although the practice of 
small-scale agriculture existed in Shetland since Scandinavian times, crofting as such 
"is not the product of native processes nor, having been fixed by law, have the 
crofting practices altered greatly in response to social change and economic conditions 
in the last hundred years." (Byron, 1986; p.62). 
In order to appreciate the significance of crofting and to grasp the dynamics 
of change and permanence, it is useful to distinguish between crofting as a set of 
agricultural practices, and crofting as a "way of life" linked to subsistence economy. 
The former have changed very little; the latter has virtually disappeared. Although 
there are more than 2,200 holdings today in Shetland, only some 1,500 people make 
a living out of crofting (Schei & Moberg, 1988). This is in part because some 
families run more than a single croft, but mainly because their main source of income 
is gained elsewhere (especially from the oil industry or fishing). According to Schei 
& Moberg (1988), 53% of crofters are in fact "hobby" crofters, as they are 
16Indeed, it is consistently reported that agricultural activities have not changed significantly 
over the past five hundred years (Byron, 1986; Knox, 1985; Smith, 1984). Knox (1985) states that, 
at the time of writing, "spade husbandry was still the primary method of cultivation" (Knox, 1985; 
p.11). 
17In 1883, as a direct result of the growing number of evictions by lairds of tenants in the 
highlands and islands of Scotland, the Napier Commission was set up to investigate the plight of what 
were to become "crofters". "Testimonies of numerous Shetlanders were heard, and complaints varied 
from district to district. Major grievances voiced during the hearings included the general increase in 
rents over the last thirty years regardless of improvements made to the crofts by the tenants; the lack 
of leases and the constant threat of eviction; poor housing conditions; the removal of the scattald from 
the tenants and the charge placed on some tenants for stock kept on any remaining scattald land." 
(Knox, 1985; p. 176). The report of the Commission led to the passing of the Crofters' Act, three 
years later. The Act gave security of tenure, the right to heir their croft to their successor, and fair rent 
to the tenants. It defined the "crofter" as "a tenant of a holding from year to year, who habitually 
resides on his holding, the rent of which does not exceed £30 in money and which is situated in a 
crofting parish." A "crofting parish", in turn, was defined as "a parish in which there are at the 
commencement of this Act or have been, within eight years prior thereto, holdings consisting of arable 
land held with a right of pasturage in common with others and in which there are still crofters at the 
commencement of this Act." (Parliamentary Papers I, Crofters' Holding (Scot) Bill, 1884-1885, p. 
318; quoted in Knox, 1985; p.236). 
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sometimes referred to locally. A young oil worker describes the reality of this kind 
of crofting as follows: 
"My father has been into fishing since he left school and he has been fishing all his 
life [...] He's away from home maybe two weeks at a time and when he's home, he 
works about the house, gives a week to the croft and the sheep. It is just the land that 
is around the house, sort of thing, a good few acres. We grow our own potatoes and 
turnips and cabbages, that is feed stuff for the sheep, and corn and hay and all that 
sort of thing." (I-09) 
Thus, for most, crofting nowadays amounts to small-scale farming, the 
occasional curing of peat (for otherwise centrally heated houses), and the rearing of 
sheep. Cattle rearing, which requires more tending, has markedly declined (Schei & 
Moberg, 1988). The traditional cottage industry of knitting is now more a social and 
recreational activity rather than an economic necessity, and it is practised by women 
throughout Shetland. In a nutshell, crofting is no longer the way of life it used to be 
(Cohen, 1986, 1987). And yet, because it is fixed by law and, consequently, 
remained practically unchanged by new technology, crofting has become the most 
potent symbol of Shetland life. This, in turn, contributes to its permanence: 
Shetlanders do not want to modify their agricultural practices. 
So why do Shetlanders choose "a pretty strenuous hobby", "a kind of hard 
life", "a daily struggle with the elements"? Crofting is not an economically rational 
activity (Cohen, 1986; 1987; Schei & Moberg, 1988; Wills, 1990): the amount of 
time, energy and resources invested compared to the profits generated makes the very 
notion of "economy" inappropriate. 
"Crofting doesn't pay very well. It really is a way of life. It really is a way of life. 
You cannot think of the money." (I-13) 
"I would hate to think what the hourly rate would be. It would be so low. For the 
amount of work, the money you get at the end of the year, it really is [ridiculous]... 
But that is what I have always done." (I-02) 
But, and this is the crux of the argument, this kind of instrumental rationality 
is alien to the mental and cultural universe of the traditional crofter. Crofting, as a 
way of life, projects one into the past, into a pre-modern era when people and places 
were known intimately, when economic life was based on barter trade, rather than 
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monetary exchanges 18 . The croft objectifies "the old ways", the labour of earlier 
generations of kin, family traditions, collective memories. Cohen (1986) perfectly 
sums up the symbolic significance of the croft. He writes: 
"The croft, then, condenses the past through the landscape itself, and 
through its association with the natural calendar; with community; with 
an earlier mode of subsistence and the ideal of self-sufficiency. It 
evokes the astonishing breadth of skill, the ingenuity, the stamina 
necessary for survival in "da aald days". It may even be that it 
suggests an orientation to values somehow more substantial, more 
genuine, than those of the materialistic, debt-burdened, tax benefit-
maximising present [....] In this respect it is the very irrationality of 
crofting in economic terms which provides its attraction. [...People 
croft] not because it is uneconomic, but because it is non-economic: it 
belongs to quite a different realm of discourse. [...] To croft is to make 
a statement of commitment to the community and to the life it 
represents." (Cohen, 1986; p.109, italics in original) 
The legal definition of crofting has favoured its stability over time. This, in 
turn, has played a role in making crofting the most powerful symbol of Shetland life 
and of Shetlanders' identity. According to Cohen (1986), it is therefore because 
crofting is, in some important ways, non-economic and pre-modern that, in spite of 
the psychological (and physical) strain of "carrying on in the old ways" in a 
modernising world, some Shetlanders still do it. I shall let one of them, this pillar of 
traditional Shetlandic life, describe the meaning of crofting. 
"A croft, as far as I'm concerned, it's not boundaries. It's like a country. You fight, 
you would fight for your country, you would die for your country. People have done 
that all down the ages. So you fight for your heritage, which is the family croft. I 
am purely a steward here for a short time. This belongs to the family and it was 
passed down to me being the male and it will follow my line. But if I had a family 
that I didn't think was going to carry on in the old ways, I would think twice about 
going outside my family line. I was chosen in me generation because my old man 
knew that I would continue I think it puts a lot of strain on your mind. That puts a 
lot of strain." (I-03) 
18Smith (1984) describes how, until the late 19` 11 century, "a very large proportion of the 
material needs of the community were served without the need to enter trade" (Smith; 1984; p.2). 
Barter was the main form of economic exchange. Since the cession of Shetland to Scotland, local 
fishermen were bound by law to give some of their catch to Scottish landowners, who would fix the 
value of fish. Refusal to comply could result in eviction, and often did. Later, fishermen were also 
bound to sell their fish to merchants in return for the supply of shop goods. Ironically, this exploitative 
relationship was at the core of the traditional "way of life" which Shetlanders now enthuse about. Smith 
claims that the shift towards a trade structure based on the impersonal, abstract principles of market 
forces (heralded by the Truck Commission of 1872) was by far the most important factor in the 
dissolution of the way of life. 
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The notion of "stewardship" seems particularly important in shaping the 
crofters' relation to nature. Legally, landowners have the privilege of owning the 
land, but have no say over it and generate a negligible income from it. Crofters, on 
the other hand, do not own the land but have complete control over it. Nature is not 
their property; it is the source of a livelihood, and it ought to be kept "unchanged" 
for future generations. This world-view contributes to creating not only particular 
knowledges about nature, but also a different state of nature. 
6.4. Organic nature in Shetland 
Knox (1985), in The Making of the Shetland Landscape, shows that what is 
conceived as quintessentially "natural" in Shetland today - the grassy headland, the 
treeless hills, the abundance of wildlife - is in fact to a large extent the outcome of 
remarkably stable human practices. Shetland, at the end of the Celtic occupation, was 
covered with trees. It is the introduction of sheep to the islands which dramatically 
changed the Shetland landscape, as young tree shoots were devoured before they 
could grow. Nowadays, trees are only found in significant numbers in Weisdale, 
where they were planted between 1908 and 1921. Knox's research traces changes in 
relation to land occupation and land use since the 18 th century. It shows that the 
Shetland landscape as it exists today is but the "result of the changes already wrought 
by man in his physical habitat" (Knox, 1985; p.180). For instance, because of the 
division of arable land into small crofts, it was, and still is, impracticable to use any 
other method of cultivation than the spade: 90% of the arable land is cultivated in this 
way Similarly, the division of the land into scattalds (which still make up more than 
80% of the land) meant that such areas were not going to be cultivated, but simply 
left for pasturage. The practice of grazing in common on the scattald, in turn, meant 
that there could never be selective breeding, with the result that animals in Shetland 
were of very poor quality (Knox, 1985; p.24). 
"I have a small herd of Shetland cattle, the native Shetland cattle. Now I have to say 
that the Shetland cow, she is not a beef cow. She is the cow that we used in the old 
days. She was a house cow. She produced milk of a very poor quality for the family 
[.. 1 The old cow was raised in four hundred different ways and she was living on 
nil. She was living on nothing but still producing for that family. Most of us used to 
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have two on the croft. But they also had an ability to milk all year round. So they 
have qualities that most breeds don't have. [...] They are really durable little cattle, 
beautiful, simple, durable little cattle. They have character, tremendous brain. Oh 
yes, they have a good character!" (I-06)' 9 . 
But the making of Shetland's "nature" does not concern solely its landscape 
and domesticated animals. It is closely related to the changing use made of the nearby 
seas. From the mid-18 th century to the passing of the Crofters' Act, the Scottish 
landowners in Shetland were enmeshed in fishing, fish curing and trade. They saw 
the economic value of land primarily in respect of its proximity to fishing grounds. 
This obviously led to the neglect of agriculture. But their commercial mindset also 
brought about significant changes in the quantities of ling to be found in the Haaf, 
and of saithe and cod closer to the shore (see Smith (1984) for a detailed historical 
analysis). The relative importance of fishing and agriculture in Shetland life, and the 
particular form both took, were therefore not dictated by Nature alone, as it were, but 
by the changing interests of the Scottish lairds. These objectified interests became 
constitutive of the Shetland landscape and the surrounding seas. This crofter is 
roughly right when he says that: 
"...95% of Shetland is still the way it was hundreds of years ago. These are still 
virgin hills. There is only about 5% of Shetland suitable for the plough. Today there 
might be slightly more than that. And if anything the Shetlander has improved the 
land; I re-seeded in my land for grazing. But he has not been greedy with the island. 
This island is very much the way it was hundreds of years ago, that's why we have 
this abundance of wildlife." (I-03) 20 
19Notwithstanding the comical attributions about the character and the brain of these cows, an 
important point is being made. In spite (or because) of the most rudimentary technical means, 
Shetlanders have evolved their own breeds of cattle, sheep and ponies (see Schei & Moberg (1988) for 
the origins and changes in these breeds). In part, the growth of these animals is restricted by severe 
climatic conditions. In part, however, it is the limited access they have to good grazing grounds (used 
for cultivation around the crofts), the fact that they were raised "on nil" on the scattalds, which 
accounts for their small stature and poor quality. Moreover, it is estimated that the Shetland cattle 
would have become extinct by the 1930s had some Shetlanders not grouped to form the Herd Book 
Society in 1910. Today, there are about one hundred purebred Shetland cattle, of which less than half 
are kept in Shetland. Rearing them is now subsidised by the Shetland Islands Council. Again, then, 
human beings are deeply involved in the construction of nature. 
20It should be added, however, that the re-seeding and the improvement of the land is itself 
the product of a relatively new plan for agriculture put forward by the Shetland Islands Council after 
the end of the construction phase at Sullom Voe. The decline in oil-related jobs fostered the revival 
of traditional practices. Funds (either as grants or low interest loans) are made available for crofters 
to re-seed their land and to encourage the keeping of native breeds. This is yet another instance of the 
changes in Shetlanders' relationship to their own culture, nature and way of life brought about by the 
oil industry. 
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"Nature" - given, ahistorical, untouched by human labour - has no reality in 
Shetland. There, as elsewhere, it is to a large extent the product of human activity. 
If it has changed so slowly, and if the changes seem to concern mainly the 
"landscape", it is because, until very recently, Shetlanders' knowledges and modes 
of intervention did not profoundly alter the structure of matter, but mainly its form. 
The historically changing correspondence between social representations of nature, 
on the one hand, and the system of reproduction (institutions, techniques, etc.) which 
sustains them over time, defines, for "real Shetlanders", their state of nature. It links 
their biological and social being to the physical world. 
6.5. "We are nature" 
The stability of the culture and of the landscape is coupled with a particular 
sense of identity'. This sense of identity is derived from long and sustained 
processes of "physical world socialization" (Proshansky, 1978; Proshansky et al, 
1983) in the particular social, cultural and material environment found in Shetland'. 
The most striking aspect of "real Shetlanders"' identity is the extent to which it is 
rooted, through meaningful everyday practices ; in a particular place and becomes 
fused with the latter. Indeed, these Shetlanders' bodily movements and skills are 
perfectly attuned to the demands of the local environment (whether on the high seas, 
inshore or ashore); the old folk are remarkably sensitive to atmospheric, climatic or 
2 1By "sense of identity", I mean not only a social identity which would be derived from social 
comparison, in the course of inter-personal and inter-group processes, and motivated by the need for 
a positive self-concept (although, as we shall see, this is also involved in the making of social and 
personal identity in Shetland); nor do I mean the social allocation of particular qualities and traits to 
Individuals in order to maximise the distribution of uniqueness and variety amongst the islanders, and 
to foster collaboration and co-operation which Cohen (1978) observed in Whalsay (although, again, 
such processes are also important in shaping one's identity). I am concerned more specifically with 
identity as an existential reality, with the identity that emerges as a result of participating in a 
traditional way of life, of living in a particular place, and of holding onto an organic representation of 
nature. 
22This is very close to what Proshansky (1978) calls a "place identity". This is defined as 
"those dimensions of self that define the individual's personal identity in relation to the physical 
environment by means of a complex pattern of conscious and unconscious ideas, beliefs, preferences, 
feelings, values, goals, and behavioural tendencies and skills relevant to this environment." 
(Proshansky, 1978; p.155) Proshansky is interested in the socialisation process which takes place in 
urban settings and which participates in the development of a specifically urban place-identity. "The 
assumption being made", he writes, "is that the physical characteristics and requirements of life in the 
urban setting socialize the individual to move, think, feel, play social roles, and solve problems in 
relation to all physical settings in ways that are uniquely urban" (Proshansky, 1978; p.161). I am 
concerned with the identity which results from the socialisation to a particular, already-constructed, 
rural landscape in Shetland. 
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other "natural" changes 23 ; fishermen and crofters constantly make subtle qualitative 
judgements in relation to bays, voes, fish migration, cattle, sheep, the soil, etc. In 
many ways, these skills and knowledges escape their full awareness. They may be 
part of real Shetlanders' behavioural and cognitive repertoire, and they may structure 
their identity, but they remain difficult to articulate: the greater part of these cognitive 
and behavioural structures indeed defies verbalisation. Typically, asking a crofter to 
describe his or her everyday practices provokes a shrugging of the shoulders, a smile 
and the following: "I would have to take you to the fields, really" (I-01); "I would 
have to show you. We just do it the way we always did" (I-06); or "I cannot put it 
into words" (I-13). 
Of course, the "physical world socialization of the self" is also, at one and the 
same time, a social and cultural world socialisation. Perhaps more than anywhere else 
in Britain, the physical world signifies in Shetland: material and symbolic realities and 
practices merge. Elements of the landscape, such as walls, crofts, dykes, inlets, hills 
and lochs, are often known by the names of those who built them, dwelt on them or 
fished in them. The sense of rootedness is therefore accentuated by the wealth of 
meanings, beliefs, collective memories which are inscribed in the landscape, which 
are read by traditional Shetlanders, and which link each one of them not only to their 
own private history, but also to that of the entire local community I learned to 
appreciate the meanings of the landscape for local Shetlanders during a walk over 
Garths Ness with a crofter. She pointed to some derelict stone walls and fences in the 
distance which, she claimed, were built from the houses of her ancestors, more than 
a hundred years ago. Indeed, in 1874, many families from the small crofting and 
fishing communities of Corston, Garth, Quam and Neeflans on the Quendale estate 
in Dunrossness were expelled from their properties by lairds who thought it more 
profitable to use the land for raising sheep than for growing vegetables. Having 
evicted the residents, they then used the stones of the empty houses to delimit their 
23For instance, most Shetlanders in rural areas seem perfectly able to tell you the precise 
direction of the wind (e.g. South-Westerly turning Westerly) and to indicate its velocity (e.g. gale-force 
12). Perhaps more surprisingly, during my fieldwork they recalled with outstanding precision the 
weather conditions which prevailed at particular times of the day, over the previous two to three 
weeks. The particular circumstances of the oil spill - and more precisely the fact that the rescue 
operations, the spraying of dispersants, the clean-up work, etc., could not be undertaken under severe 
conditions - most certainly contributed to sharpening people's awareness of these conditions. 
Nevertheless, no urbanite has so acute a sensitivity to, and knowledge of, such ecological factors. 
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enclosures. Where I could only see some scattered stones, this Shetlander could 
retrieve her own history, that of her ancestors, and the collective struggles of the 
community. The material environment was imbued with meanings which could be 
almost directly apprehended, the fences constituting permanent reminders of past and 
present oppression, symbolising and celebrating the resilience of the Shetland folk. 
After all, she was there, able to recall how generations of kin had survived the lairds' 
ruthless regime. As Cohen (1987) writes: 
"The past is ever-present, in yarns about characters of old, in the 
minutiae of place names; in the historical association of families with 
their crofts and parts of the isles. Walls, dykes, rocks, geos (deep 
narrow inlets in the shoreline), crus (sheepfolds), crubs (circular stone 
enclosures within which seedlings were nurtured) may all be known by 
personal and family names dating back perhaps three hundred 
years.[...] In this and in the extensive knowledge of genealogy and 
kinship history there is a pervasive sense of rootedness, of belonging, 
as if people were as immovably and inherently part of the island as the 
very features of its landscape." (Cohen, 1987, p.3) 
It should be added that houses, walls and other features of the landscape are 
highly visible for there are no trees to conceal them. The physical world is a gigantic 
mnemonic system: it constitutes a vast repository of past social and personal 
practices, values, experiences. Authoritative knowledge of the landscape makes one 
an expert on the community itself. 
Thus, "real Shetlanders" learn how to know themselves through an already-
constructed and already-symbolising local nature: it is through the latter that they 
acquire a full sense of who they are, of their history, of their position in the 
community. Nature, knowledge and identity form a cluster wherein each term shapes, 
and can only be understood in terms of, the other two. Experiences of "nature" are 
not a priori meaningful: they must be defined as such by the group in order to end 
up as cognitions and to become part of one's identity. Not every aspect of the local 
landscape and seascape is significant: there is nothing inherent in Nature which would 
automatically trigger cognitive or symbolic activity (as I discussed earlier in relation 
to cognitive mapping research). Nature is infinitely polysemic. The meanings it 
potentially contains are neither unambiguous, nor universally shared. The weight of 
tradition and history, together with the need to sustain a particular (individual and 
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social) identity, preside over the selection, interpretation, assimilation and use of 
these meanings. 
What is unusual about "real Shetlanders" is that they still apprehend 
themselves as being organically related to nature. In spite of the overwhelming power 
of modern institutions in general, and of science in particular, they hold on (in part 
at least) to a pre-modern (sometimes apparently pre-Darwinian and even 
"creationist"), non-dualistic representation of nature. 
"The whole of creation is nature and humans are nature. They better remember that 
they are nature and nothing better." (I-14) 
"I never watched birds. I never had to. The birds are here. I'm here." (I-03) 
"We are nature. We live with nature, we respect nature, we don't think about it 
because that is what we are." (I-13) 
Everything appears as though Nature is not an "object" outside of oneself or 
of the group. We are nature. "Real Shetlanders" have a sense that, if they are to live 
off natural resources, they ought to live with Nature. They organise their lives in 
harmony with the natural calendar and the regular cycle of the seasons. "It is a sense 
of respect which best characterises their attitude... [Shetlanders] cope with natural 
conditions which they know intimately and study endlessly; they do not attempt to 
trounce them" (Cohen, 1986; p.30). Indeed, although Shetlanders constantly study 
their local nature, they never analyse, atomise, or dissect it into elements. It is 
striking that crofters, farmers or (deep-sea and in-shore) fishermen never give the 
impression of thinking of themselves as masters of nature. 
"I have been a crofter all my life and brought up with people who either went to the 
sea or they were, in many cases, deep sea men... But if you work on the land all 
your life... You see, the North American Indian and Aborigine, they literally 
worshiped the land; they knew without looking after Mother Nature, they couldn't 
survive. You have tribes that worship the sun perhaps. Again, they had the 
knowledge that without the sun they couldn't survive. But certainly the Aborigine and 
North American Indian was people that love that land and I think that the Shetlander 
he has this tremendous close contact with the land and with the sea because that is 
what nature is here." (I-03) 
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"The environment is something that Shetlanders understand. We are the environment, 
we are nature'. We are involved in nature. The reason there is so much wildlife 
in Shetland is because the Shetlander was prepared to respect it and live with nature 
rather than, as an example, the south east of England which is a wildlife desert 
because of the greedy rich white man again. [...] The same white man which is now 
in Shetland in the name of conservation, I'm afraid he doesn't understand 
conservation. Conservation and nature you have to live with it, you have to be part 
of it, we are all in there." (I-03) 
"R: We're used to get tough weather here in the winter, and because you get your 
livelihood from the land and the sea... But if you destroy that, then you have 
destroyed our environment but also our lives, so we have to get over it quickly. 
That's my, that's my views. 
M: If you look after the land and the sea, you look after yourself, that's what it starts 
with. And we know that, the sea is part of you, it's all part of you. 
R: It's like land. If you farm land too hard to get all out of it right now, you'll ruin 
it for the future. 
M: See, we're not like people that's brought up in cities." (G-03) 
These last quotations clarify yet another aspect of the constant articulation 
between organic representations of nature, local identity and the traditional "way of 
life" (with its own mode of knowledge of, and mode of relation to, nature), that is, 
the function of this cluster in resisting change and the values brought to Shetland by 
"city people" and the "greedy rich White man" who live in the South of England. 
Invoking the naturalness of the local way of life, and defining one's identity in 
relation to both the way of life and the landscape,amounts to establishing the 
superiority of Shetlanders. Paradoxically, this labour is rendered easier by the modern 
environmental movement which - having made the essential connection between 
"natural" and "better" - provides fresh moral justification to "real Shetlanders" . From 
their perspective, they are no longer "backwards"; on the contrary, their "way of life" 
is now entirely vindicated, even (or especially) by English urbanites themselves. 
The following table summarises the key elements involved in the construction 
of organic representations of nature. It shows how the past and the present, the 
24The close juxtaposition and the transition from "the environment" to "nature" is significant. 
Although this crofter initially talks about the environment - since this excerpt follows a lengthy 
discussion of the "environmental impact" of the oil spill as it was referred to and debated in The 
Shetland Times - he soon reverts to the local, traditional way of describing the physical world as 
"nature". This spontaneous switch gives us access to his representational universe. The inherent 
contradiction in the sentence "we are the environment" is inescapable and makes it necessary to change, 
in the same breath, to "we are nature". Indeed, the environment excludes self as it surrounds it. The 
representation of nature as an environment assumes and privileges an ontology of detachment which 
places self and human society outside what is residually construed as the physical world. "Nature", on 
the other hand, is represented as encompassing both self and world: the incompatibility between the 
two forces the linguistic switch. 
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individual and the collective, the material and the symbolic are deeply intertwined in 
these representations. It also shows how their content is socially conditioned to serve 
particular functions, most notably the defence of the community's identity. 
Table 6.1: Organic representations of nature in Shetland 
SELF SOCIETY NATURE 
Personal history Collective history Names 
* kinship * domination of/ * from people to 
* ancestors opposition to lairds place: 
* neighbours * Norwegian origins * crofts, walls, 
* childhood 
memories 
* resistance to 
"Sooth-Moothers" 
crus, geos, crubs, 
hills, inlets, voes, 
* private 
experiences 
(oil workers, 
outsiders, SIC, etc) 
etc. 
* allocation of 
patronyms and 
place-names 
* from place to 
people: 
* "Sooth-Mooth" 
* persistence of 
patronyms 
Personal qualities Local ideology Natural symbols 
* "real * "real Shetlanders" * Shetland "way of 
Shetlander" * "way of life" life" sustained by 
* honesty * egalitarianism farmers, crofters, 
* independence * independence as fishermen 
* resilience, 
fortitude, 
doggedness 
islanders 
* respect for Nature 
* knowledge of 
* "The Old Rock" 
* purity 
* abundance of 
* discipline community wildlife 
* humility * knowledge of 
* resourcefulness landscape 
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6.6. Conclusion 
Historically, the traditional "way of life" in Shetland was based on the small-
scale exploitation of the resources of the land and the seas through crofting, deep-sea 
and in-shore fishing, and knitting. The Shetland "way of life" was characterised by 
an unusually high degree of inter-penetration between these activities. Until a century 
ago, it still operated outside of the logic of market forces, with economic exchanges 
being based on barter. Moreover, everyday life was structured by the rhythm of the 
seasons, rather than by the clock. And crofters and fishermen were intrinsically linked 
to the product of their labour, as well as to their community through kinship, 
neighbourhoods or fishing crews. Taken together, such attributes correspond to what 
Moscovici called the organic state of nature. The remarkable stability and simplicity 
of this natural division of labour over time is attributable to a combination of factors, 
notably the emphasis on reproductive (rather than inventive) activity, the fact that the 
status of crofters was fixed by law, the symbolic appeal of traditions, the ethos of 
self-sufficiency, and the remoteness of the archipelago, which limited exchanges with 
the outside world and protected the indigenous culture. Higher education has yet to 
become available in Shetland. 
Geographic isolation and economic, cultural and social stability, have many 
consequences. Firstly, it means that the local organic state of nature itself has changed 
very little. This is most obvious in relation to patterns of land occupation and 
cultivation. Shetland's nature is, as elsewhere, a cultivated, socialised and historical 
nature, but one which, because of its relative permanence and stability, appears to 
consciousness as though it had eluded any process of construction. This illusion is all 
the more potent when Shetland's nature is compared to the other natures (such as 
cities) which humankind has also created. Greater contact with modern culture, and 
with the mechanistic and cybernetic representations of nature which it carries, have 
reinforced Shetlanders' conviction that their nature and way of life are more 
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natural25 . The modes of intervention in nature typical of "real Shetlanders" concern 
essentially the form which raw substances will assume, the movements of the fish, 
the productivity of the soil untouched by mechanical devices or chemical fertilisation; 
they do not purposefully alter the structural or systemic properties of matter. 
Secondly, the slow pace of change means that the indigenous population, and 
even specific local communities or particular fishing crews (wir folk), have evolved 
complex nature-related cognitions, norms, values, and practices. Crofters and 
fishermen have an intimate knowledge of water currents, tides, fish and animal 
behaviour, seasonal cycles, wind direction and forces, etc. Fishermen themselves 
move differently when ashore and on a boat, and some claim to feel dizzy when out 
of sight of the sea. There is also a slightly different language spoken in these two 
different milieux. Crofters also have an acute sensory knowledge of their land: they 
crumble soil in their hands, smell and even taste it in order to judge its acidity. Most 
of that knowledge is tacit and acquired through years of apprenticeship, quietly 
observing more experienced Shetland folk. This learning process perpetuates not only 
technical know-how, but also norms concerning the importance of traditions 
themselves, the proper behaviour expected of work mates, coping strategies, ways of 
articulating egalitarianism and independence with deference to authority and 
solidarity, etc. Participating in the traditional "way of life" confers on individuals a 
sense of belonging, a position in their community, a personal and social identity. 
Thirdly, the fact that the local nature has changed so little also means that it 
is symbolically loaded. The socialisation process of traditional Shetlanders involves 
learning how to read the landscape, for it contains fragments of the history of the 
entire community. Walls, stones, dykes, voes and hills signify. They carry in them 
the labours of earlier generations of kins They symbolise the strength, resilience, 
permanence and the superiority of the very "way of life" which has produced them 
(but which is believed to be a direct outcome of some immutable Nature). They 
25There now exists a quasi-universal assumption that what is ostensibly man-made is also 
artificial or unnatural (for instance, pollution, cloned sheep, atomic bombs) and often somehow bad, 
whereas what is less visibly man-made (such as open fields, scattalds, farmed salmon, or new breeds 
of cattle created through sexual reproduction) is deemed natural and, almost by virtue of that, 
somehow good. More research is needed to understand where, how and why the boundaries between 
"nature" and "culture" are established in the scientifically-informed common sense of contemporary 
Western societies. 
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provide each new individual with a sense of time and a sense of place, so that people 
become almost literally rooted in the land worked by their ancestors. They also 
provide the resources to resist further changes (especially those brought about by the 
oil industry), since the latter are exogenous in origins and, through symbolic 
association with a reconstructed version of the lairds' regime, tend to be perceived 
as wholly destructive. We therefore uncover an organic representation of nature 
which is structurally bound up with a particular sense of identity, of history and of 
community. 
However, recent social and cultural changes mean that this representation no 
longer shapes the ontology of all Shetlanders. For most, it is used as a resource to 
provide an anchor in an idealised, but threatened, "way of life". Hence the 
distinction, within Shetland society itself, between "born and bred Shetlanders" and 
"real Shetlanders". The former often comprise the more progressive wing of Shetland 
society; for them, the "way of life" is a symbol progressively emptied of any reality 
but nevertheless used to sustain a fiction of homogeneity. The latter, on the other 
hand, truly live by, and renew, the organic representation of nature upon which the 
traditional "way of life" used to rest. This representation is constitutive of their self, 
of their community, and of their local nature. In different ways, therefore, the organic 
representation of nature serves an essentially conservative purpose: that of resisting 
change. 
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7.0. MECHANISTIC AND CYBERNETIC REPRESENTATIONS OF NATURE: THE 
IMPACT OF LATE MODERNITY IN SHETLAND 
In this chapter, I shall explore the representations of nature held both by "born 
and bred Shetlanders" and by so-called "Sooth-Moothers" . The analysis, of necessity, 
will take us beyond the bounds of the Shetland Isles where the social representations 
were apprehended empirically and where they are objectified. This is because, just 
as organic representations were structurally bound up with the traditional Shetland 
"way of life", mechanistic/cybernetic representations cannot be understood outside of 
the conditions of late modernity which they have partly created, which they reflect 
and which they contribute to changing. Indeed, we shall see that identities, rationality, 
representations and social structure are still deeply intertwined, albeit in completely 
different ways. 
In the discussion below, I shall bracket off analytically the data that pertain 
directly to the oil spill. These will be treated in the following chapter. The aim is to 
identify how, to what extent, and with what consequences, Shetlandlers' "way of life" 
and environment have been shaped by growing trade with outsiders under the 
"normal" circumstances of modern life. This will help us to understand many of the 
social and psychic dynamics which prevailed in the aftermath of the Braer oil spill. 
7.1. The impact of late modernity in Shetland 
A brief account of the most salient dimensions of high, or late, modernity is 
necessary to understand the dynamics of social life in Shetland'. I shall draw 
extensively on Giddens' (1990, 1991) discussion of high modernity - bearing in mind 
that the latter is not simply the backdrop of otherwise unchanging personal feelings, 
social relationships, and social representations, but that it is both the context and the 
product of the latter. If late modernity is characterised by a tension between the 
global and the local, and if "real Shetlanders", with their organic representations of 
nature, embody the local pole in this dialectical relationship, it is important to analyse 
I I refer to the contemporary period as late modernity, rather than post-modernity. This is 
coherent with the works of Giddens (1990, 1991) and Beck (1992), who both describe our times as 
ones wherein the consequences of modernity have been exacerbated, radicalised and universalised, 
rather than replaced by a fundamentally new social, cultural and epistemological order. 
how the globalising tendencies of modernity also permeate Shetland society through 
and through. This other pole, embodied by "Sooth-Moothers" (foreigners) and 
symbolised by the oil industry, is equally constitutive of Shetlandic life. It is 
associated, as we shall see later, with quite different, mechanistic-cybernetic social 
representations of nature. 
7.1.1. The contours of high modernity 
Modern life, according to Giddens (1990, 1991), is characterised by a 
structural reorganisation of time and space. In traditional settings, time and space 
were connected through the mediation of place. Modernity, however, brings about, 
and rests upon, a disjunction of traditional modes of time-reckoning and of local 
spatial markers. The fundamental change is that time and space are now reintegrated 
and co-ordinated, but without the mediation of a particular place. This means that 
social relations tend to become disembedded, free from the hold of specific locales 
and from temporal constraints, and that they are often now mediated rather than face-
to-face. Particular disembedding mechanisms function to "lift out" social relations 
from their local contexts and to project them into global social systems. Money is one 
of the most important and pervasive mechanisms which unite people over time and 
across space. Written languages, especially since the invention of the printing press 
and of the electronic media, also play their role: they enable people to communicate 
across generations and cultures in ways which were unthinkable in purely oral 
cultures. Expert knowledge and technology also transcend the local conditions of their 
production; they have validity outside of the social relationships and institutional 
settings from which they emerge. They shape virtually every aspect of life (see also 
Gellner (1992) on the historic role of rationality and rationalism in the constitution 
of modernity). The combination of money, expert knowledge and technology, in turn, 
transforms fundamental dimensions of life into "objects" . 
The reorganisation of time and space, together with the effects of 
disembedding, profoundly alter the nature of both social and private life. Traditions 
are constantly being called into question; most aspects of personal life, of social 
activity and of material relations to nature are susceptible to chronic revision in the 
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light of new expert knowledge. Doubt, the corner stone of a modern rationality which 
aspired to erase it, now becomes its inescapable product, permeating everyday life as 
well as scientific consciousness. Giddens calls this constant awareness of the 
temporary and fragile character of the present, due to the institutionalised use of 
knowledge as a constitutive element in the organisation and transformation of social 
life, reflexivity. These three sets of elements - the separation of time and space, 
disembedding mechanisms, and institutional reflexivity - account for the dynamic 
character of modern social life, for the pace, scope, and depth of change, as well as 
for its inevitability. 
7.1.2. "Local modernity" in Shetland 
Indeed, no society is left untouched by these processes: each, by drawing upon 
its own history, culture and traditions, can only shape how they will be lived and 
rendered meaningful in the local context. Individual "local modernities" everywhere 
embody the dialectics of the global and the local, of the modern and the traditional. 
We have witnessed in the previous chapter some attempts by Shetlanders to root their 
identities within the local milieu, to locate themselves in the broader frameworks of 
community and kinship, to cultivate a sense of community pride, and to sustain 
traditional modes of knowledge. We have also seen that these attempts can only ever 
partially succeed because, perversely, they themselves reinforce the very reflexivity 
and uncertainty which prompted them in the first place. Shetland society, today, is 
thus immersed in worldwide abstract systems. Money, scientific and technical 
knowledge, the media, national and international political and legal frameworks, 
increased mobility, etc., all concur in re-structuring local practices by integrating 
them into wider, and qualitatively different, systems. 
These changes have implications for every aspect of political, economic, social 
and personal life. The place of birth no longer constitutes the parameter of experience 
and the source of identity; traditions can no longer be renewed unproblematically in 
a rapidly changing society because they lose their relevance; private life and social 
relationships are becoming "internally referential" (Giddens, 1991), susceptible to 
planning and decision-making. Increased mobility, coupled with greater freedom from 
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external criteria, mean that the threat of out-migration is continually present. 
Materialistic and individualistic aspirations must be countered. Local attachments must 
be consolidated. Identities must be reinvented. How Shetland's traditional "way of 
life" interacts with modern imperatives to shape new social/self-identities is the object 
of this section. 
7.2. Traditional and modern processes of identity construction in Shetland 
Modernity breaks down small communities and traditions. Yet, small 
communities also have considerable symbolic resources which they can mobilise to 
inform the process of change, to give it meaning and, to some extent, to resist it. 
Disenfranchisement and loss intertwine with empowerment and revival to create new 
social and cultural systems which blend the new with the old. This applies to the 
dynamics of identity as well as to the more strictly societal dimensions of social life. 
In order to address the issue of identity in contemporary Shetland, it is crucial 
to distinguish between social identity and self-identity (both are treated here as ideal-
types). These do not correspond to the two ends of a continuum: social identity and 
self-identity are qualitatively distinct, if intrinsically related, social psychological 
phenomena. They cannot be reduced to a single dimension because, I would argue, 
they emerge from, and are constitutive of, different forms of social organisation. 
Social identity, in the present context, refers to the set of traits which are 
granted to an individual by virtue of his or her participation in traditional social 
structures (such as neighbourhoods, crofting townships, fishing crews, or kinship), 
and which are accepted subjectively as integral to one's self. In this sense, each 
person's identity is derived from the requirements of collective life (such as the 
2Cohen 1978; 1982; 1982b; 1986) has provided subtle and detailed accounts of the means by 
which Whalsay folk manage to articulate the apparently divergent requirements of continuously 
reasserting the homogeneity and integrity of the community, whilst simultaneously celebrating the 
idiosyncrasies and marks of distinctiveness of each individual. His ethnographic reports show that this 
is achieved by maximizing the distribution of uniqueness and variety amongst the islanders. Each 
islander is granted by the community some commendable trait - almost regardless of the actual qualities 
of the person. Thus, in a village, one will find a skilful fisherman, an inventive joiner, a resourceful 
crofter, a colourful "raconteur", etc. This restrictiveness in the allocation of personal qualities keeps 
"variety within acceptable and expectable limits and thus preserves the essential homogeneity of the 
community" (Cohen, 1978; p.452). It also guarantees some form of cooperation and collaboration: 
controlled social and personal differentiation, via the collective distribution of attributes, renders 
solidarity necessary. 
194 
creation of a collective Shetlandic identity to counter homogenising modern 
tendencies). The processes of social identity construction reveal the operation of 
coercive external criteria - social duties, moral obligations, kinship rules - which the 
community as a whole deems to be necessary to its survival. In other words, 
traditional collective life creates, contrives and constrains the bases on which 
members of the local community engage with each other and with the rest of the 
world. The community, in traditional cultures, is truly the context and the source of 
social identity. Cohen (1978) writes (incidentally supporting my interpretative claims 
about the link between identities and organic representations of nature): 
"Whalsaymen are of their sea and their crofts. From these associations 
are drawn evaluative identities which are allocated with regard to a 
man's structural connections with the community and to the specific 
circumstances of the interactions in which the identity is allocated and 
subsequently reaffirmed. Thus, identities in Whalsay have idiomatic 
boundaries which preserve the essential cultural homogeneity of the 
community. " (Cohen, 1978; p.462) 3 
Unlike social identity, which is allocated and derived from traditional social 
systems, self-identity is continuously achieved and is bound up with the ever changing 
conditions of high modernity. It is a "reflexive project" (Giddens, 1991). Lineage, 
kinship, township of origin or of residence, lose their hold on individuals while "the 
only significant connecting thread is the life trajectory as such" (idem; p.80). In the 
face of disjointed experiences, individuals must reconstruct the continuity of their own 
existence and find their place in the world. Developing and sustaining a narrative of 
one's biographical choices becomes central to the maintenance of self-identity. 
Integrated modern selves give "internally referential" accounts and justifications. Here 
is how non-Shetlanders living on the islands introduced themselves: work, immediate 
3It must be borne in mind that Cohen conducted his fieldwork in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
mainly on the island of Whalsay which, even by Shetland standards, is thought to be a very tight-knit, 
self-enclosed and self-reliant community. The passage of time, on the one hand, and the change of 
location from a small island to Mainland, on the other, both contribute to explain the differences 
between the relative importance of social-identity and self-identity in the construction of individuality 
in Shetland. It may well be that the processes described by Cohen in the almost autarkic fishing and 
crofting community are very similar to those which used to prevail throughout the archipelago but 
which are now endangered by recent societal changes. 
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family, personal circumstances, an active quest for a better quality of life, are central 
to their biographical narratives and self-identity. 
"I: Why did you come here? 
My husband came up for an interview and was offered a job and we decided to 
move. 
I: What kind of job? 
Planning officer for the SIC, sort of conservation planner, working at listed buildings, 
tree preservation, old buildings and environmental issues." (I-16) 
"We lived in a quite depressed area of western Scotland. I had a job but my husband 
had finished university and did not have any employment, and we had visited 
Shetland before, and a job came up for me that I could go for on the small island of 
Whalsay, on the east side. He decided he would rather go unemployed in Shetland 
than where we lived and also, you know, the children, we would rather bring them 
up here. So, I went for the job and I got it. He sometimes works as a free-lance 
journalist and ecologist. He does a bit of writing for The Shetland Times every week; 
he has a wildlife column [ ] There is more freedom as well. In a sense, I think 
children have to be watched in Scotland whereas here, you feel that they can be left 
around the house and it's fine. That was just part of it, you know? Of course, John 
and I appreciated the wildlife. That was a big reason for coming." (I-05) 
"We came here in 1961 when my husband was appointed sheriff. He asked to 
become a sheriff and then he saw that Shetland was needing a sheriff. [...] He'd been 
here during the war on holiday and, really, he'd just taken to the place. He came to 
Orkney and Shetland and really he thought they were just quite special places and 
when the opportunity came to come here, he took it. I must say that I was a little bit 
upset. 
I: I was going to ask you. What about you? Did you want to come here? 
Not a bit! We both lived in Edinburgh at the time. I had given up full time medical 
work but I was still doing part time work. And I had been at school in Edinburgh, 
I had been to university and really quite enjoyed the life there. So really it was a big 
change to come here. I would say it took me three years to get used to it, which was 
rather long I think but after that, I never looked back. 
I: You would never want to leave this place now? 
Well, I wouldn't say never because you can never know what circumstances are going 
to affect your life, but given how the family is placed and everything at the moment, 
we would like to stay here." (I-11) 
"I do energy efficiency work and environmental management work and more general 
stuff, project development, that kind of thing. That's why I came to Shetland." (I-12) 
Projects, plans, desires and decisions dominate these biographical narratives. 
Compare them with those of most "born and bred Shetlanders" and of "real 
Shetlanders" (section 6.2.2). Place-identity disappears altogether. Notions of family 
history and ancestry, so central to the lives and identity of traditional Shetlanders, are 
completely absent from the narratives provided by modern non-Shetlanders. 
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"Although this is my home now, it's not been my home for, not historically been my 
home. I'm also aware of other places. I'm aware of living in other cities, and so on. 
I come from Manchester, but I lived in Africa for a while. What is constant is the 
feeling of never being at home." (I- 12) 
"We have interests, we have family hundreds of miles away. We have a different view 
of the world. I don't know. Maybe I think we believe that the Westminster 
government is interested, but they don't believe things like that. We have interests 
elsewhere, and very important interests. As I said, my first thought [when my 
husband told me there had been a disaster] was that someone was ill back home. My 
first thought was away from them, whereas a Shetlander will always live in a much 
smaller sort of area of interest. We are not absolutely sure if we are going to stay 
here for the rest of our lives but I think that most Shetlanders won't say that. We 
don't know how long we are going to stay here but for them this is not really a 
question." (I-05) 
Kinship is hardly mentioned either in people's accounts: only marital 
relationships engaged in through individual choice are invoked to explain one's 
decision to migrate to Shetland. But it is the very compulsion to construct a 
biographical narrative which is of central interest: non-Shetlanders never call upon 
traditions, "daa old ways", in order to justify their actions, in the way "real 
Shetlanders" do. They give accounts, and use the latter to structure their sense of self. 
These are crucially important new social psychological phenomena: they both derive 
from, and are constitutive of, high modernity. 
These novel phenomena are not found exclusively among non-Shetlanders. 
Local people (especially the youth) are also subjected to the disembedding effects of 
money, the mass media, expert knowledge, global industry, science, etc. One oil 
worker explained that he had lost his Shetlandic accent and could not speak the dialect 
because he had lived almost two years in Newcastle, spent seven years in the navy, 
in contact with people of different nationalities, and was now working at Sullom Voe 
with yet other foreigners. 
"It doesn't bother me [not to speak Shetlandic]", he said. "I know there is a lot of 
people that don't like to lose their identity but the world is the world..." (I-08). 
His biography was structured around personal decisions - to leave, to return, 
to travel, to work in the oil industry - and was marked by attempts to resist 
marginalisation in the community Another young oil worker was making plans to 
travel abroad for a year at the time of the interview. He described himself as a "born 
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and bred Shetlander" but, also, as a "citizen of the world". Asked what he thought 
about the oil industry in Shetland, he answered: 
"A lot of people will say it has been a bad thing because it has changed the life, it 
has changed Shetland's lifestyle. Before the oil came up, it was the fishing and 
nothing. Crofting. It was nothing. That was the main thing really. But with Sullom 
Voe a lot of new people came up, a lot of folk from the South and there is plenty of 
money around, at the moment anyway. It's a good thing I would say. But then again, 
maybe some old folk would disagree because it has upset their lifestyle in a way. But 
it's a good thing." (I-07) 
A "born and bred Shetlander" and salmon farmer expressed similar ideas in 
a group discussion: 
"I: Did the community feeling you describe change after Sullom Voe? 
(Silence in the group) 
K: Not really, no. There was a big song and dance aboot it at the time because we 
had quite an influx of workers. There was a general drift of workers up to Shetland, 
which is no a bad thing because there's new blood, there's new faces. It's a bit of an 
injection into the islands. That's not a bad thing at all." (G-01) 
The voice of "the old folk" is still strikingly present in all these discourses; 
but if local youngsters and the progressist factions of Shetlandic society face the 
disapproval of the "real Shetlanders", they nevertheless pursue their own individual 
choices. They are young and relatively rich; they see their world from the outside, 
as it were, and are determined to ride the tide of modernity. Their sense of identity 
and their more global outlook largely shape their representations of nature/the 
environment. 
7.2.1. The allocation of a social identity to foreigners: The social construction of 
"Sooth-Moothers" 
How do Shetlanders cope with all the foreigners in their midst? How do 
traditional and modern dynamics of (social and self) identity function in an ever more 
pluralistic context? How are non-Shetlanders categorised and treated by the islanders? 
Can they resist being marginalised on their own island? What are the consequences 
of such processes for everyone's identity? 
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Foreigners, by definition, belong to none of the traditional frameworks of 
social organisation. Yet, even they cannot escape the power of local traditions, of 
memory, and of organic representations of nature when these cultural resources are 
all summoned at one and the same time to defend a threatened collective identity. 
Indeed, although non-Shetlanders cannot be associated with a particular place (the 
majority come from England and the Scottish mainland, but the demographic 
landscape of Lerwick changes with the arrival of every ship or with the home-coming 
of off-shore oil workers), and although their narratives are much too complex to be 
explained by some common factor, they, too, are allocated a social identity by 
Shetlanders. The latter put traditional mechanisms to work, and use familiar anchors 
and symbols, in order to allocate social identities to people who would normally defy 
traditional identity markings. 
We saw earlier that the Shetland islands themselves symbolise the entire "way 
of life", and that they are used to sustain and to naturalise the traditional ethos. We 
also explored how the islands act as a repository of the local history and culture, 
which are inscribed in the landscape and read by "real Shetlanders". Further, we 
observed that Shetlanders are intimately associated with a place and that this 
association is highly normative and evaluative, rather than merely descriptive. Now, 
the same cultural resources are combined and drawn upon to attribute social identities 
(through place-identities) to foreigners. This is how it operates: Historically, people 
who came to Shetland from anywhere else generally sailed through the South mouth 
of Lerwick harbour. For centuries, this bay constituted the main access to Shetland; 
it allowed foreigners to penetrate into the islands. Otherwise, the Shetland islands 
were almost impregnable, being isolated by at least one hundred and eighty miles of 
treacherous waters from their nearest neighbours and having a coastline of abrupt 
cliffs. Thus, the "Sooth Mooth" of Lerwick was one of Shetland's most vulnerable 
points. It has come to symbolise the boundary, the point of tension between the inside 
and the outside. Shetlanders have used precisely this weakness in the geography of 
the islands to defend their own identity. They have projected onto the incomers or 
foreigners, henceforth known as the "Sooth-Moothers", all the attributes that run 
counter to the collective definition of "being a Shetlander" . Cohen (1987) summarises 
the natives' views on Sooth-Moothers as follows: 
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"Sooth folk are [to the Shetlander] a breed more to be pitied than 
envied; they are handless - incapable of self-sufficiency; wasteful, in 
that they do not make use of whatever resources are available to them; 
loud-mouthed, in that they are forever voicing their opinions; and 
deluded, in that they firmly believe their opinions to be correct. Their 
lives are frantic and unordered, lacking the essential regulation of the 
natural calendar which imposes an undeviating routine on the 
fisherman and crofter. They are, literally, irresponsible, in that they 
have abdicated their own obligations for decision and self-regulation 
by becoming dependent on policemen and priests and politicians. An 
encounter with, or discussion of, a "Sooth man" thus frequently finds 
Shetlanders reaffirming the ideal typical conception of the Shetlander's 
identity. " (Cohen, 1987, p.466, italics in original) 
The topographic feature of the South mouth is now enshrined in language, 
thereby extending to foreigners the indigenous means of allocating identity. However, 
whereas the social identity of the traditional groups of "born and bred Shetlanders" 
and "real Shetlanders" is coupled with almost wholly positive and somewhat 
romanticised values, Sooth-Moothers are nearly always perceived negatively. Their 
name itself crystallises Shetlanders' fear of being invaded. In this fashion, Shetlanders 
succeed, to some extent at least, in countering modern trends: their traditional 
approach subordinates individuality to collective identity and relegates those who 
threaten the homogeneity of the traditional group to the margins of the acknowledged 
social sphere. This strategic allocation of social identity disempowers the new-comers 
by undermining the appeal they may otherwise have. At the same time, it reasserts 
local values. Sooth-Moothers - members of the SIC, oil workers, experts, immigrants, 
and everyone else - may now be part of the social fabric, but they will remain, 
forever, outsiders. The locals have evolved complex strategies for undermining and 
discounting altogether their claims. Shetlanders will be delighted to tell you how 
Sooth-Moothers "like the sound of their own voice", are "all talk", "know it all", 
want to "rule the roost when they're still wet from the crossing", "think they can boss 
you around no end", etc. Control and superiority are perhaps the two most common 
features in the description of Sooth-Moothers. A crofter gave a humorous account of 
the social dynamics which, in his view, typically prevail when a newcomer arrives. 
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"This is the problem the Sooth-Moother has. He comes here: "What a wonderful 
place!" This is the first statement: "What a wonderful place!" And the minute he gets 
here, he has to change it! He must impose himself on the first committee that he can 
find, and if there is not a committee that suits him, he forms a committee! So he 
takes, he makes decisions on local issues. He has only been here ten minutes, mind 
you! That is the nature of the Brits. They must take it from school, I don't know... 
There is so many idiotic people... They usually learn. By eighteen months to two 
years, we manage to break them in. There are actually unwritten laws here, and 
rules. [...] But I am totally tired of trying to break in an Englishman. We are used 
to working with horses and training dogs, but the Englishman does try my patience!" 
(I-03) 
It may seem surprising that traditional Shetlanders, who have evolved complex 
and sophisticated means of differentiating amongst various social groups within their 
own community, should nevertheless amalgamate complete foreigners (who have no 
direct contact whatever with Shetland) and non-Shetlanders who live in Shetland 
(sometimes for decades) under the single name or category of Sooth-Moother. 
Perhaps this apparent lack of differentiation must be understood as being itself 
structurally related to the conditions of late modernity? Sooth-Moothers living in 
Shetland merely happen to reside there; they could quite easily have chosen to live 
anywhere else. There is therefore truly much more in common between Sooth-
Moothers residing in Shetland and residents of London or Boston, for instance, than 
there would be between Sooth-Moothers and traditional Shetlanders. In this sense, 
modernity not only fragments, it also unites, and the name given to all foreigners by 
Shetlanders accurately reflects these globalising and unifying tendencies. 
7.2.2. Resisting social categorisation 
Obviously, Shetlanders are not alone involved in the definition and 
construction of social categories; such processes are negotiated. Sooth-Moothers and 
local "modernisers" alike are acutely aware both of their own position in Shetland's 
social fabric, and of the general undermining of their contribution to Shetlandic life. 
But they benefit from some very powerful tools with which to restore a positive sense 
of identity - the very tools, in fact, which make them such a threat to traditional 
Shetlanders: a fundamental belief in the universal validity (and therefore legitimacy 
and superiority) of their own knowledge and rationality; the recognition of external 
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political, economic, scientific and legal institutions; and relative wealth in comparison 
to most traditional Shetlanders4 . In the eyes of Sooth folk and of local modernisers, 
the "real Shetlanders" are also perceived as insular, slow, stubborn, narrow-minded 
and somewhat naïve. They are friendly, not materialistic, relaxed, but ultimately 
"backwards" and, from the perspective of Sooth-Moothers, very reluctant to admit 
strangers into their conservative small world. 
"I think that people who know you just treat you as a person. I think people who 
don't know you and are defensive about Sooth-Moothers anyway, their first 
impression will be that you are a Sooth-Moother and... I think that we are treated 
differently even after this amount of time, after ten years and having three of the 
children here. The children are treated differently. They don't feel as Shetlanders. It 
creates barriers in a sense. [...] I mean it's not because of any disapproval or any 
distancing really by them. It's just because it's a very very difficult community to 
become part of. I think we had a funny lifestyle as well because John was at home 
with the kids and I was working, you know? Not on Whalsay! You don't do that 
here! [...] He didn't have any contact with other adults really because the women felt 
very strange about having him around and [...] the men are away fishing all week. 
[...] When you come from the Mainland, it seems a bit backwards, well, traditional." 
(I-05) 
"It always is difficult [to settle in a new community] and I mean I always say I will 
never be a Shetlander. I'm always an outsider and I mean you are classified as Sooth-
Moothers up here. You know I will always be a Sooth-Moother. But, I think people 
are a lot friendlier and a lot more relaxed and open than many in the North of 
England..." (I-16). 
Perhaps more subtly, traditional Shetlanders tend to be represented as passive 
and fatalistic, two potent marks of otherness. Passivity and fatalism go hand in hand 
as they amount to a repudiation of a controlling orientation to the future in favour of 
an attitude which allows events to unfold as they will (Giddens, 1991). In this sense, 
fatalism is no less than the refusal of modernity, in its fundamental dimensions of 
control, prediction and intervention. It reflects a worldview according to which the 
4The power differential between modern and scientific rationality, on the one hand, and local 
knowledges and expertise, on the other, is acknowledged by all. During the fieldwork it was clear that, 
if real Shetlanders tried to narrow this gap by invoking the experience and wisdom of the local folk, 
they were often quite surprised that I should want to talk to them at all. Indeed, they would generally 
direct me to the local authorities and various environmental agencies. This points to some awareness 
by lay Shetlanders that there exist different types of knowledge and that some are endowed with 
authority and legitimacy (the kind of knowledge Shetlanders assumed I was trying to obtain), whilst 
others are not (the rich knowledges they indeed possessed but denied having because they thought I 
would not be interested in their "common sense"). The association of certain public figures and 
organisations with legitimated knowledge in the minds of locals does not mean that real Shetlanders 
accepted their authority and the validity of their claims. Far from it. It simply indicates a recognition 
that the knowledge which they produce and diffuse is the sort which is generally sought after by non-
Shetlanders like myself. 
202 
order of things is neither pliable nor open to management, and it is therefore 
associated with passivity. 
Finally, traditional Shetlanders are often thought of as unfit to fully master 
scientific knowledge (and, therefore, to assess properly the consequences of the oil 
spill), being engulfed as they are by the concrete. 
"I think a lot of people don't realise the sheer disaster. They don't realise how much 
damage has been done because the physical evidence is not really there. They are 
looking for beaches with two or three inches of thick crude oil on it with seals trying 
to swim their way through it, but if you look at it, it's nowhere near that. But it's just 
as serious. It's the long-term effect that people don't realise." (I-12) 
"I think the main problem will be the lack of interest now that there is no oil washed 
up on the beaches. I think people will tend to forget about it really quite quickly [...] 
because it doesn't seem to be a problem because it is not visual [...] I think people 
will end up arguing about silly things and not really care about the real environmental 
problem [...] It would have been far better for us if [The Shetland Times] had said: 
"Well the visible signs of the oil have evaporated but there will be still a lot of oil 
sinking down through the sea and there is a lot of damage done to the seabed and the 
fish and the birds and... rather than just losing interest because you can't see it when 
you fly over it" . "(I-16) 5 
The disqualification of local knowledge and expertise by the modernising elite 
- both in Shetland and abroad - is another means of sustaining their own identity. 
Gradually, it does indeed contribute to de-skilling the local population or, at the very 
least, to delegitimising their traditional skills and replacing them with other abilities. 
7.3. The emergence of new "natural categories" in contemporary Shetland 
Such processes are closely intertwined with the emergence, within Shetland 
society, of new "natural categories". The narratives quoted in section 7.2. above 
indirectly introduced us to the lives of seven Sooth-Moothers and of two local oil 
workers. It is not accidental that all but one of them should be highly educated, and 
that most should have some form of expertise not available locally - three 
ecologists/conservationists, a retired chief medical doctor, a journalist, a school 
5It is of courseperfectly correct to state that the sensory knowledge possessed by "real 
Shetlanders" does not suffice to understand "environmental problems" as they are now defined. In fact, 
theories, measurements, experiments, and instruments of all sorts are necessary even to define a 
situation as problematic or as hazardous at all. Without them, most "environmental problems", such 
as "the hole" in the ozone layer or the greenhouse effect, would certainly exist, but they would not 
enter people's awareness. 
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teacher. If Moscovici's account of the genesis of the two most recent states of nature 
- mechanistic and cybernetic - is correct, one would indeed expect members of the 
natural categories represented by the engineer and the scientist (and, more generally, 
anyone involved in the management and monitoring of social and natural activities, 
such as journalists and ecologists) to be central figures in contemporary Western 
societies, not least because expert knowledge is disembedded, detached from any 
particular locale and, therefore, readily exportable. As an expert in energy 
conservation said: 
"I still am an outsider. I still am a Sooth-Moother. I think 	always be because I 
do work which goes outside the island. Certainly the first year and a half, maybe 
more than half my time was spent outside the island, and almost all my time was 
spent dealing with people not on the island. As a result, I don't get to know, I don't 
become as much a part of the community as local people do. But that's the advantage 
of my company. I have to be able to provide services and information and expertise 
that isn't available elsewhere locally." (I-12) 
This man's work is quintessentially late modern, made possible by the 
reorganisation of time and space, by various disembedding mechanisms, and by the 
diffusion of cybernetic representations of nature. His work depends upon, and 
contributes to, institutionalised reflexivity about the most critical of human products: 
"the environment". In this sense, it is not surprising that an explicit concern for "the 
environment", or some proclaimed love of "nature", should also have been integral 
to many people's decision to live in Shetland (or to return to their islands). Such 
feelings are themselves products of late modernity, which fosters a reflexive 
appreciation of nature based largely on a fear of its destruction. The spread of the 
built environment elsewhere has transformed Shetland itself into a rural idyll, the 
epitome of the "countryside" and the "wild". 
"You get a lot of people moving to Shetland who are like escaping from the rest of 
the country." (I-12) 
"Of course, John and I appreciated the wildlife. That was a big reason for coming." 
(I-05) 
The fact that so many "townies" should come to Shetland in pursuit of the 
"wilderness experience" does not leave Shetlanders' own appreciation of their place 
unchanged: they learn to see it through the eyes of outsiders. In the following pages, 
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I will discuss how three groups of people - salmon farmers, oil workers and those 
involved in the tourist industry - embody and foster the modern way of life in 
Shetland, just as deep-sea and inshore fishermen, crofters and farmers were key 
figures in the traditional way of life. These groups have been selected because 
Shetland's economy and way of life, nowadays, rest largely on their natural practices 
(Census, 1991). The latter are more consistent with mechanistic and cybernetic 
representations of nature than with organic ones. 
7.3.1. Salmon farmers 
Salmon farmers comprise a problematic group; "real Shetlanders" have trouble 
categorising them along traditional lines. An indication of their ambiguous position 
in the social fabric was given when a crofter began by excluding both fish farmers 
and oil workers as he described the "indigenous population", but, later in the 
interview, reviewed his original statement to include salmon farmers this time (still 
leaving out oil workers). The ambiguity expressed in this man's discourse reveals, I 
believe, some actual ambiguity in the status, sense of identity and rationality of 
salmon farmers in Shetland. On the one hand, their work is a blend of two activities 
which have always been the backbone of the Shetlandic economy and way of life, 
farming and fishing; it is regulated to some extent by the natural calendar and by 
weather conditions, and it is practised predominantly by "born and bred Shetlanders" . 
Thus, it would seem to qualify as an indigenous form of labour normally associated 
with organic representations. Salmon farmers are keen to compare themselves with 
fishermen and crofters, and to stress the extent to which their work is still organised 
by the rigours of the weather and by the seasons. 
"K: I would say a lot of Shetlanders involved in working outside, fishermen and 
fishfarmers, crofters, it's really weary I suppose this time of the year... 
B: You see, all the work goes with the season. Things tend to really slow down in 
the winter. 
K: If a rope gets broken or the nets need replacing, then you take the first 
opportunity with the weather to do that and the main thing is to get the fish seen to, 
whether it is feeding or treatment or whatever. To check them out. That is the main 
thing [....] Most of the way the weather affects us in Shetland, most aspects of the 
work outside in Shetland is that it goes crazy come April time. You have got to work 
right through until the holidays maybe start, maybe in August or July. It just goes 
crazy. We are working twelve hours a day..." (G-01) 
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On the other hand, and despite the ease with which salmon farming can be 
anchored within more traditional activities, it is Shetland's newest industry. It was 
established in the mid-80s and it operates according to a strictly modern rationality. 
Fish farming reduces the randomness of fishing in the wild by caging fish, installing 
predator nets around the cages, controlling the growth of smolts and salmon through 
precisely timed feeding twice a day, monitoring the water temperature, treating the 
salmon against disease, and even avoiding stress for the fish as the farmers go 
through these operations. The aim is to generate a considerable and predictable 
income, especially in rural areas where full-time jobs are scarce. Fish farming is a 
job, not a "way of life". Planning and monitoring are central to this new industry 
whose spin-offs are equally vital to Shetland's modern economy. Processing plants, 
polystyrene box manufactures and smokehouses are now part of the landscape while, 
in Lerwick, local associations and firms are responsible for controlling the quality of 
fish and for marketing the new industry abroad. The following quotations exemplify 
the rationale guiding salmon farming. 
"I: How did you decide to go into salmon farming? 
Precisely? We have... The company that owns this company is a hatchery and also 
this company have a factory for making polystyrene salmon boxes, so the logical step 
would have been to have a salmon farm as well. So we bought into a salmon farm 
two years ago." (I-17) 
"L: You put [the salmon] in May and by fourteen months, fifteen months, you get 
a percentage of the fish maturing and ready to go and spawn. You get to pick them 
out, say thirty percent, and the rest grows on and you come to April or May in the 
next year, then you get the rest of them all matured by then. And then they have to 
be harvested because they start going off feed, they start to change the colour of their 
flesh and all these kinds of things. And you have got to take them out. Two years 
really is the maximum. 
K: I think the biggest barrier also for growing them for that amount of time, when 
you can't harvest them, is cash flow. And financially, the markets, you have to time 
it for when the markets haven't dropped. Like we were going to harvest at the end 
of January and we had to stop." (G-01) 
Strict, clearly defined, uniform and objective criteria are also applied by 
official organisations employing people with recognised qualifications - the Shetland 
Salmon Farmers' Association, for instance, is headed by a lawyer and two "well-
educated Sooth folk who are pretty much on the environmental bandwagon" - to 
control the quality of the fish caught, farmed or landed in Shetland. 
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"They're an independent body and they, they go regularly into factories and check 
fish going through. They check the fish once they've been packed. They'll open a 
few boxes and check if there's any problem. They'll open more up till they get it 
sorted out. The quality of fish is checked for, you know, fat content, quality, 
freshness, temperature, etc. The works! There's a whole, I mean, there's a thick 
manual of things to inspect." (G-01) 
How far from the sensory knowledge which "real Shetlanders" could hardly 
"put into words"! "Thick manuals" are the repository of objective knowledge. 
Shetlanders are propelled into the global market. Salmon farming expands the 
traditional horizon of thought well beyond the islands. This different rationality and 
more mechanistic representation of nature - associated with the control, exploitation 
and domination of "natural resources" - partly explains why salmon farmers, in spite 
of being "born and bred Shetlanders" in the vast majority of cases, are excluded from 
the group of "real Shetlanders" 6 . 
The following quotation illustrates how going out of the islands changes one's 
perspective on Shetland, on others, and on oneself. It is no accident that these well-
travelled fish farmers should be able to develop an argument which weaves together 
the traditionally strong sense of rootedness and a more modern, detached, 
instrumental and, in this case, economic rationality. 
"B: You get more of a sense of being a Shetlander when you're outside of Shetland. 
You recognise somebody, a Shetlander, in Aberdeen or in London and you have kind 
of a bond there. You'll go and speak to them even if you don't know them. You just 
get their accent and you'll go and speak to them. When you get to Shetland, then you 
find you're into smaller groups of people again. [...] 
L: You go on the Mainland and you're constantly looking for somebody you know. 
B: In London, if you go in the underground, you look around and you think: "I don't 
see anybody here!" Everybody's anonymous. 
I: So you have been abroad a lot. Why do you come back to Shetland? 
B: It's the strangest thing. The minute you're away from Shetland, then you start to 
appreciate it. The further away you go from Shetland, the more the good things you 
can say. Well maybe that's just nostalgia but... 
K: There's something very, very strong that attracts you back here. 
B: Mind you there's good economic reasons for staying here because with the low 
unemployment, the chances of you finding a job anywhere else are a lot smaller, 
more limited, than working in Shetland. That's just the basic reason for staying here 
but I think there's got to be more... 
K: It's home!" (G-01) 
It is significant, for instance, that salmon farmers should be almost totally absent from the 
issues of the magazine Shetland Life I analysed - both as authors (as far as I could appreciate) and as 
objects of articles about contemporary life on the islands. There was only one article (April 1993, no 
150) devoted to this growing industry. This is all the more surprising since the threat to marine life 
posed by the wreck directly affected salmon farmers. 
207 
The taken-for-grantedness of communal life, of people's knowledge of fellow 
islanders, of the beauty of the natural landscape, erodes as one ventures out. Adopting 
a broader, external perspective on one's life means that explanations must be sought 
for what used to be unquestioningly accepted. The work of reflexivity is undertaken. 
7.3.2. The tourist industry: "Shetland, the natural choice" 
Tourism is also central to Shetland's economy, way of life, and to the 
collective identity of all Shetlanders. Now that modern technology allows distances 
to be bridged more safely and quickly, the tourist industry flourishes in Shetland. 
Growing numbers flock to the islands each year to observe the local wildlife as, 
elsewhere, the countryside recedes and cities expand. Shetland constitutes a privileged 
place to which to escape from the hustle and bustle of urban life. The local Tourist 
Board proudly entitled one of its 1993 brochures "Shetland, the natural choice". The 
drawings and photographs conspired to create an illusion of some pure, a-historical, 
non-socialised nature: puffins nested in cliffs, gannets in flight, whales, deserted 
stretches of sunlit coastline, uninhabited hills, Shetland ponies and the like. This 
concealed the fact that every square inch of Shetland soil, as well as important 
patches of the surrounding seas and most of the indigenous and visiting wildlife, are 
in fact protected by various regional, national and international statutes and 
organisations (see section 7.4.1. below). This "natural" nature, which seems to exist 
outside of society, is totally at odds with the organic representations of nature held 
by "real Shetlanders"; yet, paradoxically, this is what people come to Shetland for. 
The discourses signalling the end of nature to which most urbanites are exposed - and 
the sense of vulnerability, impotence and responsibility which they generate - seem 
to prompt people to seek the reassuring experience of some seemingly intemporal 
"nature". The Tourist Board play on such feelings. Their brochures contribute to the 
further disembedding of nature from social life since, in order to be sold to outsiders, 
"nature" must lose its organic connection with local knowledges and practices. The 
very socialisation of threats to the material world which made Shetland appealing to 
foreign visitors in the first place are negated and ruled out altogether in the glossy 
images distributed by the Tourist Board. 
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In some important ways, the annual influx of so many visitors, together with 
the infrastructures required to accommodate them, change both Shetlanders' 
perception of their place and Shetland itself. Strangers share some of their own, 
different life experiences with their hosts who, in turn, provide them with an idealised 
version of the Shetland "way of life". The guests have their own perspective on the 
local social and material world, thereby increasing and modifying how, in their turn, 
the locals relate to it. 
"I: When I asked you what you like about Shetland, nobody mentioned that it 
was beautiful. Do you find it nice? 
L: You find it nice in the summer, yeah. 
B: I think you take things for granted in your own country. You don't, you never... 
I think tourists come and see more in a week and travel more and see more [....] 
K: Maybe something else we take for granted around here is the wildlife in 
Shetland." (G-01) 
"I: Do you still find this view beautiful? 
Yes... I do but I mean I think you are looking at it everyday and you just sort of... 
But yes, I do, because everybody says, all the guests, everybody says how beautiful 
it is. [...] Like I'm not a birdwatcher. I love birds but I'm not a birdwatcher like the 
people that come up here." (I-01) 
Of course, guests pay for Shetlanders' hospitality so that the latter buy bigger, 
more modern houses and reserve two and three rooms in the house for visitors. 
Traditional houses disappear and traditional hospitality acquires an air of economic 
rationality'. The overall consequence is that Shetlanders themselves become aware 
of the specificity of their own lifestyle as well as of its gradual demise Their way of 
life becomes attuned to the expectations of their temporary visitors. 
7The consequences of the Braer for the tourist industry were widely discussed in the aftermath 
of the spill: the interests of salmon farmers and those of the Tourist Board clashed. A salmon farmer 
said it in so many words: " People have been cancelling reservations for Up-Helly-Aa and for next 
summer. [...] It's in the readers' letters [in The Shetland Times] too. People have been writing in from 
other parts of Britain, other countries: "We're right behind you, we're with you, we've been sitting 
in front of the television crying and thinking that Shetland has been destroyed and..." And you're 
thinking well, we need to reassure them in some way or other. There's not enough emphasis being put 
on, you know, how much Shetland has not been affected. There's a thin line between... You've got 
to think, there's money going to be available some time down the line, for some people, and if you 
try to play down the whole thing too much, then you may sacrifice some of that compensation. The 
question is to strike it right. If you don't shout too loudly about the oil, I mean, then you've got your 
profit to think about." (G-01). 
Another Shetlander expressed similar anxieties at the public debate: "What are you going to 
do for the folks that have guest houses and Bed & Breakfast? Folks that are losing money because 
Shetland is being thought about as totally covered in oil by some folk down Sooth, folk that come up 
here to see that wildlife and that? What is going to happen to them? Are we going to get any 
compensation?" (public debate). 
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7.3.3. Oil workers 
One final "natural category" must be considered: oil workers. What is their 
"way of life" like? How do they think of themselves? What kind of representations 
of nature do they hold? Surprisingly, considering the importance of oil workers in 
contemporary Shetland, it is difficult to give a "positive" answer to these questions. 
A number of reasons may explain this difficulty. First, the data are scarce. I have 
conducted only three in-depth interviews with Shetlanders directly involved in the oil 
industry, and no group discussion was convened specifically with oil workers 
(although one member of Group 3 worked at Sullom Voe). Moreover, the sections 
of The Shetland Times I analysed - "The Tanker Braer Disaster", the front and 
editorial pages, and "Our Readers' Views" - neither voiced nor reflected the opinions 
of oil workers. This is no accident: oil workers were neither key actors during the oil 
spill, nor was their way of life directly affected by it, precisely because it is 
"denaturalised". Indeed, the scarcity of data in itself reveals just how divorced oil 
workers are both from traditional activities and from other segments of the local 
population. Second, although two of the three interviews were very rich indeed, they 
did not link the workers' everyday life to nature (in the way crofters or inshore 
fishermen did, for instance). Nature was discussed extensively, but only in relation 
to the Braer. However, since the crisis will be the object of the next chapter, there 
is little to be discussed here. Again, this has to do with the fact that nature is not 
integral to the way of life of oil workers. Moreover, it always appeared in 
problematised terms, as a threatened "environment". 
Thus, one is left having to infer, from the little interview data there are, how 
oil workers think of themselves, of others, and of nature. We soon discover that work 
in the oil industry is fundamentally different from other occupations; it contravenes 
important aspects of Shetland's culture. For instance, life is highly structured at 
Sullom Voe. There is a strict hierarchy which stands in stark contrast to the 
egalitarian ethos of traditional Shetlanders. 
"People working at Sullom, I mean you can put it into two categories: the workers 
and the management. The workers are basically Shetlanders or people that moved in 
here and will be staying here for the rest of their lives, and then you get the higher 
management that are all two-year people. [...] Shetlanders, right up through to what 
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we call chief supervisors, chief controllers are nearly all Shetlanders now. But 
everything above that, from superintendents above, are basically incomers, only 
short-term workers. " (I-08) 
The three Shetlanders I interviewed were indeed all "workers": a welder, a 
"wire line operator" and a supervisor. The two manual workers, whose position in 
the hierarchy was inferior, generally expressed more traditional views. In many ways, 
their work, their lifestyles and their opinions still reflected those of the wider 
community. They both lived with their parents on a croft, and one of them (whose 
father was a deep sea fisherman) owned a small fishing boat. The main difference 
between them and the more traditional Shetlanders was perhaps that both seemed to 
enjoy, unashamedly, the material benefits of the oil money. 
"As you can see yourself, there is everything you need. [Shetland] is a very wealthy 
island, just because of the oil. 
I: Because of the oil? 
Oh yes, no doubt about that. Yes. It has generated a lot of employment, a lot of 
businesses benefit from Sullom Voe and everybody who is working gets a lot of 
money so everything keeps turning over. And the Shetland Islands Council gets a lot 
of money from the terminal and they can spend it on improving roads and on general 
things for the whole community, helping the community 
I: So, on the whole, Sullom Voe has been a good thing for Shetland? 
Oh yes! [...] People travel, have cars and they can have a dram [drink] or two 
more! "(I-09) 
The Lerwick-based, well-travelled, accentless and very articulate supervisor 
was less conspicuously materialistic, but also noticeably more modern. His worldview 
and rationality were closer to those of the foreign managers. He thought the oil 
industry had "changed Shetland for the good". Further removed from "nature", sitting 
in the comfort of his office which he attends according to a fixed schedule, this man 
monitors: 
"I am a supervisor. We do all the paper work, all the isolations, all the 
communications related to maintenance work at Sullom Voe. I only work day shifts, 
usually about three days a week. We do on average sixteen days a month." (I-08) 
Little more can be said with such a paucity of data. The processes which make 
it possible for someone to conceive of "the environment" in global, natural scientific, 
mainly quantitative, amoral terms, whilst somehow maintaining a sense of rootedness 
in Shetland, will become clearer in the next chapter. 
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7.4. The objectification of mechanistic/cybernetic representations in 
Shetland 
In recent years, much social scientific attention has been devoted to exploring 
what appears to be the inherently contradictory character of contemporary conceptions 
of, and relations with, nature in Western societies (e.g. Eder, 1988/1996; Grove-
White, 1993; Ingold, 1993; Latour, 1991/1993; Thompson, 1991). The contradictions 
seem to involve the following beliefs: first, that an objective, immutable nature exists 
independently of human actions and that the natural sciences are the voice through 
which nature talks to us; and second, that, equipped with natural scientific knowledge 
and modes of investigation, modern Western societies can intervene within the realm 
of nature to protect it against deleterious human actions for the benefit of future 
generations. Indeed, the core element of the mixed mechanistic and cybernetic 
representations of nature is a belief in the environment as an extrinsic and self-
regulating object, an inert set of forces which must be harnessed to human ends but 
which, also, must be protected from essentially destructive human intervention. This 
corresponds closely to a "conservationist" approach to human/nature relationships.' 
7.4.1. Conservation, control and the construction of the "natural environment" 
Both the mechanistic and cybernetic representations of nature become fused 
through the notion of conservation. The study of the modern ideal of conservation, 
and of the social representations underlying it, cannot be confined exclusively to the 
realm of "ideas", "concepts" or "beliefs". Social representations become objectified, 
acquire a concrete reality of their own, and therefore construct, literally, new 
"natures" . In Shetland, the ideal of conservation is objectified on a massive scale 
8Conservationism (e.g. Eder, 1996; Thomas, 1983; Yearley, 1992) is based on the notion of 
a strict separation between the realm of nature (country and wilderness) and that of society (town and 
cultivation). It often uses symbols and imageries of nature derived from a belief in the perfection of the 
divine order, a perfection which must be preserved intact against the ravages of civilisation, and it aims 
to preserve or enhance existing habitats and species. Conservationism is therefore essentially 
conservative. It is coherent with Shetland's cultural order, which explains the primacy of this approach 
in our data over at least two alternative human-nature relationships also found in modern Western 
societies: the political ecology approach (Lowe & Rudig, 1986) and the fundamentalist or deep-ecology 
i approach (Sessions, 1987). It is probably fair to say that the overall "greening" of late modern societies 
has blurred the distinctions between these rival conceptions of human/nature relationships by integrating 
the radical programme of political ecology into the mainstream political and economic agenda. 
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through the creation of areas which are deemed precious either for their scientific or 
their aesthetic value. 
The Scottish Environment Statistics (HMSO, 1996) states that "the aim of the 
SNH is to secure the conservation and enhancement of the natural environment in a 
sustainable way, and to foster understanding and enjoyment of the countryside." 
(HMSO, 1996; p.128). To this aim, the SNH have the responsibility of advising the 
Secretary of State for Scotland and other public agencies about the creation of 
"National Scenic Areas" ("areas of outstanding landscape value"); "Country Parks" 
and "Regional Parks" ("large areas of the countryside devoted to recreation"); "Sites 
of Special Scientific Interest" (protected "for reason of their flora, fauna, geological 
or physiological interest"); "National Nature Reserves" and "Local Nature Reserves"; 
"Marine Consultation Areas" ("where consultation is required on developments 
affecting the marine environment"); and "Preferred Coastal Conservation Zones" 
("where there is a presumption against major development"). The SNH also work 
together with other government departments to ensure that the various government 
initiatives on the environment are carried out successfully. The Scottish Office 
Agriculture, Environment and Fisheries Department (SOAEFD), for instance, are 
jointly involved with the SNH in advising the Secretary of State over the creation of 
"Environmentally Sensitive Areas". 
This plethora of officially designated sites does not exhaust the rationalist 
resources of contemporary societies. In Scotland, a whole set of non-governmental 
organisations - including the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, the Wildlife 
Trust, the Wildfowl and Wetlands Trust, the Woodland Trust, etc. - are also involved 
in nature conservation. Moreover, the Secretary of State for Scotland must also 
comply with international regulations and conventions. National surveillance and 
protection are clearly insufficient in this late modern age where environmental risks 
transcend the boundaries of nation-states. Certain habitats, species, landscapes and 
91 intended to map the changes in designated conservation areas, numbers of protected sites 
and species as well as listed buildings in Shetland over the last four decades. However, I could not find 
official documents on such matters prior to the publication of The Scottish Environment Statistics, first 
issued in 1987 (on a biennial basis until 1995, when it became issued yearly). The recency of these 
official publications which monitor the policies and management of sites under Scottish Natural 
Heritage (SNH) control is itself indicative of the changes in societal concerns about so-called 
environmental issues. The data they present, in turn, constitute tools for further policy-making and 
environmental control. 
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areas of "universal cultural importance" must be safeguarded for humankind. The 
UNESCO World Heritage Convention, the European Community Wild Birds 
Directive and the Ramsar Convention are testimony to the international efforts which 
are devoted to the protection of the "global environment" . 
The whole of Shetland has acquired the precious - in the eyes of Sooth-
Moothers and progressist Shetlanders, but not necessarily of "real Shetlanders" -
official designation of Environmentally Sensitive Area. The latter stipulates that 
Shetland is an "area of ecological and scenic value within which farmers are 
encouraged to adopt appropriate farming practices to conserve the natural beauty and 
nature conservation interest of the land, and to protect any historic or archaeological 
features" (HMSO, 1996; p.130). Moreover, the greater part of the Shetland coastline 
(including Garths Ness, the site of the Braer spillage) is protected under the 
designation of Preferred Coastal Conservation Zone. There are also seven National 
Scenic Areas on the islands (most of which are on the West coast of Mainland and 
the Burra Isles, where the bulk of the oil was driven), four Marine Consultation 
Areas, seventy-six Sites of Special Scientific Interest, three National Nature Reserves, 
three Conservation Areas (one of which being classified as outstanding), and one 
hundred and fifty Listed Buildings, and a partridge in a pear tree! (HMSO, 1996). In 
a nutshell, the "natural environment" of Shetland is shaped by bureaucratic decisions, 
taken outside of the islands, by politicians briefed by natural scientists. Nature is 
artificially preserved via institutional control; it needs its own life support system. 
This is how mechanistic/cybernetic representations of nature are objectified and how, 
eventually, they become states of nature'. 
loMany commentators are also highly critical of the fact that the debate about environmental 
issues should be framed according to the terms and formulae of the natural sciences. According to Beck 
(1992), for instance, there exists a danger that "an environmental discussion conducted exclusively in 
chemical, biological and technological terms will inadvertently include human beings in the picture only 
as organic material. Thus, the discussion runs the risk of making the same mistake for which it has 
long and justly reproached the prevailing optimism with respect to industrial progress; it runs the risk 
of atrophying into a discussion of nature without people, without asking about questions of social and 
cultural significance" (Beck, 1992; p.24, italics in original). Beck also makes it plain that even the 
arguments which are most critical of technology and industry with respect to the environment have 
remained at heart technocratic and naturalistic. In much the same way, Latour (1993) and Wynne 
(1987), to cite but two sociologists in this field, are critical of the positivist model of the natural 
sciences which underpins environmental discourses and actions. In different ways, they both argue that, 
far from providing a fixed, objectively verifiable body of knowledge of nature's workings, science 
itself rests upon a web of conventions, practices and "negotiated indeterminacies" (Wynne, 1987). This 
set of assumptions about the workings of science is associated with what Latour (1993) calls "particular 
universalism", that is the idea that one culture - the Western one - defines the general framework of 
nature with respect to which other cultures are situated. 
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Each and every one of the designations above carries a string of restrictions, 
prescriptions, recommendations and prohibitions. Together, they engender a sense of 
powerlessness among "real Shetlanders", who become "de-responsibilised" and cut-off 
from their own local nature. Although official designations, together with the 
prescriptions they entail, resonate within some factions in Shetland society, they are 
totally alien and alienating to "real Shetlanders". Environmental pressure groups and 
governmental conservation agencies are described by one local resident as having 
destroyed the Shetland wildlife because, he claims, they are driven by monetary 
considerations. 
"Well what you have got a few years back was an invasion of so-called 
environmentalists, RSPB, NCC, it is now the SNH - you don't see many Scots 
although it is Scottish Natural Heritage! (laughter) - what the RSPB did in my opinion 
is that they sold Shetland wildlife to their subscribers, usually city people. You pay 
your pound to the RSPB or whatever and that gives you a God-given right to go 
wherever you want and on one occasion, one year, there weren't one bird at all 
fledged off that loch purely on to human interference. Absolutely no birds at all. And 
the following three years, again on to human interference, there was one, two and 
three and then all that happened in the name of conversation. They have absolutely 
eliminated wildlife in this area. 
I: Do you think it is attributable to them? To these conservationists? 
Well, there was nobody else there! I mean it wasn't our people, it was imported 
people. People coming up here and... [...] What I am saying is that the RSPB saw 
something in Shetland which waxed... I don't suppose they knew they could hurt it. 
There was so much wildlife and it was only there because Shetlanders allowed it there 
for hundreds and hundreds of years, but they found it was great and they could sell 
it. They could make a lot of money by it because people coming were delighted to see 
this. And I honestly do not believe they knew the damage they were doing. I started 
speaking to people and saying in a very friendly way:" Do you think you should go 
down there?" "Oh yes! I'm a member of the RSPB, a paid-up member. I can go 
where I want, so to speak, this gives me the right." (1-03 
The paradoxes of nature protection - and, more fundamentally, the inherent 
incompatibility between mechanistic and cybernetic social representations of nature -
are exposed. They appeared everywhere in the local newspapers' coverage of the 
conference "Managing the Marine Environment" which brought together in Shetland 
"delegates from all over the globe" (The Shetland Times (04/02/93, (13); 04/09/93 
(14)). Indeed, images of properties and control abounded in the articles devoted to the 
conference: "We have inherited the earth", we must "control the pollution of the 
sea", "draw up a full Agenda for Action", "deal with the sea on an international 
level", "protect sensitive areas", "hand on a clean environment to our children": these 
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were only some of the conservationist prescriptions, based on mixed mechanistic/ 
cybernetic representations of nature, which were advocated during this international 
meeting held in Shetland. The delegates invited to participate included few 
Shetlanders. Most contributors had either technical expertise about ship design and 
maritime law, or scientific (biological and chemical) expertise about "the 
environment" . Their views can be summed up by the following quotation (one was 
spoiled for choice, in these issues of The Shetland Times, to exemplify 
mechanistic/cybernetic representations) 
"Professor [X] of the department of zoology in the University of Aberdeen presented 
the conclusions of the pollution control workshop in the form of a list of 
recommendations for future action. His recommendations were divided into four 
groups which covered taking a holistic global view of what was an intricate problem, 
the importance of continuous monitoring of pollution effects on the environment, the 
vital role of enforcing existing waste disposal regulations, and the function of 
international bodies in co-operating to tackle what was a world-wide problem." (The 
Shetland Times, (04/22/93, (13); front page, italics added) 
In this context, the local environment acquires an external, fragile reality. 
Shetlanders feel that they are no longer masters in their own homes. Others have 
appropriated this place by naming, classifying, constituting specific areas through the 
objective, official vocabularies and interventions of nature protection. Shetland 
becomes but another dot on a map (or a globe), like any other, where nature-related 
behaviour is governed by abstract laws and regulations issued by international bodies. 
7.4.2. Symbols of the new order: Sullom Voe and the Clickhimin Centre 
Not only is the "natural environment" shaped by mechanistic/cybernetic 
representations of nature and the conservationist agenda which they sustain. The 
"built environment" (notwithstanding all the problems which this dichotomy implies) 
is also permeated through and through by them. Sullom Voe, Europe's largest oil 
terminal, with the impressive cluster of tanks and pipes and separation plants and 
laboratories which give it such a strange, futuristic beauty, is undoubtedly the 
embodiment of late modernity. The terminal has its own power-station, port-authority 
and jetties (which can take tankers over 300,000 tonnes). Preparing the site for such 
a massive project meant that voes and bays had either to be widened or shortened, 
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filled in with peat and rock taken from the nearby hillsides. The local landscape 
changed dramatically and the few rural communities of the area were relocated. 
In the years of construction, temporary camps were established in the vicinity 
of the terminal to house workers. The official policy was to isolate the newcomers 
as much as possible from the islanders to avoid friction by providing workers with 
on-the-spot shopping, recreation and entertainment facilities. New houses, new 
schools and new roads were built. In the morning and the evening, all year long, at 
regular times, a procession of buses would shuttle employees (there were roughly 
1,000 Shetlanders and 6,000 Sooth-Moothers working at Sullom Voe during the 
construction phase) back and forth between Lerwick and the terminal. The scheduled 
life at Sullom Voe, the comparatively high wages, the presence of foreign engineers, 
planners, administrators and scientists alongside manual workers, had little to do with 
the traditional way of life. Organic representations of nature could scarce survive such 
an onslaught. 
Another potent symbol of the wide-ranging social changes which took place 
in Shetland is the (in)famous Clickhimin Centre. This is a very recent sports and 
social activities complex, built right by the remains of a Norse castle of the same 
name in the heart of Lerwick. It is the quintessential, by-product of the oil industry. 
As such, it has always polarised public opinion. Around it seem to be articulated the 
profound divisions which cut across Shetlandic society. Those wishing to emphasize 
the benefits of oil money point to the top-notch facilities provided at the centre which 
Shetlanders could never afford before "the oil came up": an indoor swimming pool, 
an immense gymnasium, the latest body-building equipment, modern changing rooms, 
reception halls, and the like. Many Shetlanders and Sooth-Moothers are proud of the 
Centre which signifies to the world that they, too, are modern. It is a ready-made 
argument with which to dismiss allegations of backwardness. Indeed, the subjects who 
volunteered to be interviewed at the Centre were generally progressive and tended to 
hold predominantly mechanistic/cybernetic representations of nature. "Real 
Shetlanders", on the other hand, insisted that the local community would never have 
the means to maintain such expensive facilities once the oil money left and that 
Shetlanders, yet again, would be left to cope with the undesired Clickhimin Centre. 
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Beyond such a divergence in opinion lies something much deeper, but which 
is never articulated by Shetlanders themselves. I would argue that the Centre is indeed 
the product of a society whose everyday life is cut off from traditional "natural" 
activities. When life depended upon meshing skills with practical activities occurring 
within the context of local communities and in relation to the immediate physical 
environment, there was simply no need for physical exercise outside of such a 
context. Walking to the fields or to visit neighbours, digging, harvesting, swimming 
in the nearby lochs or the sea or driving sheep to the cru, surely kept one fit. The 
reproduction of these activities within the hygienic context of the swimming pool or 
the weights room where activities take place at the end of a working day at the office 
symbolises just how deeply transformed and modernised Shetland society now is. The 
Clickhimin Centre is a permanent reminder of the very processes of change which 
traditional Shetlanders would want to deny, but which, quite literally, stare them in 
the face. 
7.5. Conclusion 
Shetland today is deeply engaged in worldwide processes of modernisation 
which change the local culture and social life in fundamental respects. Shetlanders' 
identity, modes of knowledge and social representations of nature bear the mark of 
these recent changes. Such internal pluralism is consequential in terms of social 
relations and, therefore, of social and self-identities. This heterogeneity is also 
manifest in the co-existence of plural rationalities which both generate and become 
constitutive of various representations of nature. The particular rationality and rapport 
to materiality which unite "born and bred Shetlanders" and "Sooth-Moothers" -
whether or not they live in Shetland, and whether or not they are involved in tourism, 
environmental protection, the oil industry or salmon farming - are structurally related 
to the conditions of (late) modernity. They correspond both to the instrumental labour 
of the engineer and to the regulatory labour of the scientist which Moscovici 
associated with the mechanistic and the cybernetic states of nature respectively. The 
empirical analysis presented above shows that, far from having been simply replaced 
by cybernetic representations, mechanistic ones have survived at the very core of the 
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latter. Whereas organic representations were tied into the local and traditional world, 
mechanistic-cybernetic representations link everyone to a global and modern world. 
Mechanistic-cybernetic representations are equally constitutive of people's sense of 
self, of their society, and of their local nature but, paradoxically, they can only 
become so through the negation of the dependency of knowledge upon social life. 
Again, we have seen that social representations become objectified. Thus, the 
landscape signifies and crystallises Shetland's recent history. The Sullom Voe 
terminal and the Clickhimin Centre are two ostentatious expressions of Shetland's 
penetration into worldwide frameworks, as well as of the changes in lifestyles which 
these have brought about. To the "real Shetlander" , walls, stones, dykes and hills 
evoked the labours and resilience of earlier generations of kin. To the "born and bred 
Shetlander" and the "Sooth-Moother", the gigantic oil terminal, ultra-modern sports 
facilities in Lerwick, brand new houses and an extensive road network, all symbolise 
the power of modern life, of instrumental rationality, of money and expert 
knowledge. More subtly, the unspoilt natural beauty of the landscape also signifies 
that modern Shetlanders can successfully negotiate the transition into the modern era. 
They do so responsibly, whilst protecting areas, habitats and species. But such 
protection requires Shetlanders to abdicate their own obligations for decisions over 
"environmental issues" and self-regulation by becoming dependent on scientists, 
bureaucrats and politicians. Kafka's castle may be as far away as Edinburgh. 
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8.0. CONSTRUCTING THE BRAER OIL SPILL 
How is the Braer oil spill made sense of'? What happens when a community 
is faced with such a dramatic event? Which symbolic resources are summoned to 
facilitate Shetlanders' psychological labour? How do the islanders integrate the images 
of themselves, of their way of life, their place, their traditional knowledge with which 
the foreign media and Sooth-Moothers present them? Are identities, relationships to 
others, and social representations of nature changing in the process? In this chapter, 
I shall attempt to answer these questions by exploring how Shetlanders devised 
strategies to cope with unfamiliar events and objects by translating them into familiar 
terms; I shall attempt to frame the conjunction of the exceptional with the 
unexceptional. We shall see that the social representations of nature described in the 
previous chapters are intimately linked to the management of the crisis, just as the 
latter is, in turn, a manifestation of underlying representations. 
8.1. Making sense of the Braer: A social practice 
How is the oil spill to be made sense of? To answer this question is to 
reconstruct the efforts of a whole community to define the spill in ways which can 
sustain their existing representations of nature, allow some degree of control over the 
current situation, and maintain the local sense of identity. In-between local and foreign 
media reports, public debates, visual and olfactory experience, everyone was involved 
in constructing a common, viable version of the Braer through metaphors and silence, 
images and printed text, or any other identity and cultural symbols. 
The Braer was not the first ship to founder in the seas around Shetland. More 
lives have been lost at sea than can be recalled. What is novel and dramatic about this 
event is that it was defined as a major ecological disaster on national and international 
'There is a theoretical problem in presenting in a separate chapter the analysis of the data 
which relate directly to the community's reaction to the oil spill. Implicit here is an assumption that 
the data I have collected about Shetlanders' representations of nature are independent of the series of 
events which provide the context of the research. In other words, it is as if the representations which 
have emerged from the analysis would have been identical had the Braer oil spill not occurred. This 
is untenable. My intention is to show that the grounding of the Braer generated powerful reactions, 
called for logistic procedures, for a continual revision of Shetlanders' relations among themselves and 
with the rest of the world, mainly via the media. The social construction of the oil spill needs to be 
analysed separately because it links identities, knowledge, and social representations of nature more 
explicitly; it shows how these are put to work in a particular context. 
news networks and that media reports fed back into the community. The islands are 
so remote from London that they rarely feature in the BBC, ITN or Channel Four 
evening news; they seldom appear on the front pages of the national daily newspapers. 
Suddenly, within a matter of hours after the grounding, images on television screens, 
radio waves and printed news were entering Shetlanders' homes, forcing them not only 
to make sense of their own immediate reality, but also of journalists' construction of 
this reality. Indeed, most islanders first learnt about the oil spill through the media. 
Their perception of the magnitude of the crisis was largely shaped by television 
images. 
"I saw pictures on the television. The thing that really struck me was when they took 
the first bird out of the sea. I guess everyone saw the same picture, the small duck 
that was just covered in oil and all black except the round eyes, and I thought: 
"Jesus, that is only one of them and it has only just started! What the hell is it gonna 
be like in the end?" It really did make you feel sad, it made you feel sick. And there 
was nothing you could do then. All you could do was wait." (I-08) 
"W: It just struck everybody that it was going to be an ecological disaster... 
R: And, yeah, and all this oil was pouring out of the tanker, I mean we all thought 
wi' what you were hearin' and all dis journalists corrin' in, you just thought: "Oh, 
it's nothing but doom and gloom. It is a disaster." (G -02) 
"Overnight our reputation for clean, pollution free seas was destroyed as the media 
flashed grim pictures around the world..." (The Shetland Times, 01/15/93 (02); 
editorial) 
Both the media and lay people anchored the Braer in terms of another, most 
telegenic, oil spill: the Exxon Valdez. Thereafter, the Braer was to be a disaster. The 
images of oiled birds, dead sea mammals, and black, thick tides in Prince Williams 
Sound which besieged television screens and newspapers' front pages around the 
world during the Exxon Valdez crisis are now part of our common sense. Their 
meanings are now autonomised from the original context of their production. They 
signify pollution, destruction, fragility; they symbolise the power of corporate 
interests over individual rights; they oppose societal evils to natural beauty. They 
convey a sense that human actions often have catastrophic environmental 
consequences. Such images, therefore, are an unambiguous manifestation of 
mechanistic/cybernetic representations of nature, albeit of representations which stress 
almost exclusively the malign or perverse effects of human actions. The media 
(including The Shetland Times which referred 21 times to the Exxon Valdez in the first 
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month) drew upon these widely shared images and meanings in framing the Braer, 
thereby blurring the differences between the two places. 
"The Braer oil spill will certainly become another environmental catastrophe much 
like the Exxon Valdez, to date the most damaging oil spill in human history. [...] 
There has long been an intimate connection between Shetland and Prince Williams 
Sound. They are both remote, productive marine environments with spectacular 
coastlines, abundant marine life and a hearty people fully engaged in sea-life. They 
are both at the same latitude. And, in the mid-1970s, large crude oil terminals were 
built in each." (The Shetland Times, 01/15/93 (02), p. 17) 
In fact, the differences between the two oil spills and the physical 
environments they affected are more remarkable than the similarities. Prince Williams 
Sound is a quiet bay, sheltered from winds, where sub-zero temperatures are the 
norm; Garths Ness is an exposed site, constantly battered by ferocious gales and high 
waves, but it has a very mild climate. The attributes of the crude oil spilled in each 
case rather serve to show up the differences between the Exxon Valdez and the Braer 
spills. Neither can recency justify this choice of anchor (the Katina P, the Khark 5, 
the Aegean Sea and the ABT Summer are all more recent). Ideology and social 
representations alone, not science, warrant the comparison. Would the public's 
perception have been the same had this new oil spill been described as "equal in size 
to the Independentza spill", or as "marginally more than a third of the amount of 
crude spilled by the Amoco Cadiz'? Anchoring and objectification are not innocuous 
processes: they are coercive social facts. 
Although media representations were actively resisted by most local 
inhabitants, they nevertheless shaped the locals' reactions to the spill; they began to 
question their own experience, their knowledge, and the accounts of the Braer 
circulating around them. The media reports also had disastrous economic 
consequences. Supermarket chains cancelled orders for farmed salmon and tourists 
cancelled bookings as Shetland's clean, pure, natural image became as tainted as the 
salmon swimming in cages. 
2According to the Oil Spill Intelligence Report (Arlington, Mass: USA), of the top fourteen 
oil spills which occurred between 1978 and 1992, the Exxon Valdez was, together with the Juan E 
Lavalleja, the smallest. 
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"The major disaster, damage, as far as Shetland is concerned, is from the media. 
They have sent reports, especially on the salmon farmers. They said that all the 
salmon farms were going to be devastated and it was going to be the end of the 
salmon, sort of thing [...] They should have said at the end of the report that the 
majority of the salmon farms are fine and there is nothing to fear. But they just put 
doom and gloom on everything." (I-07) 
Thus, from the outset, the reactions to the oil spill were elaborated collectively 
- if sometimes in private - as people listened to their wirelesses, exchanged news over 
the phone, watched television reports, attended community meetings, and 
meticulously followed the coverage of "The Tanker Braer Disaster" in The Shetland 
Times. 
"R: The oil spill... well we heard it on the radio. 
M: Oh yeah, it was on the wireless in the morning. Tuesday morning. [...] It said 
dat there was a tanker and it was driftin' towards Shetland. Dat was aboot seven 
o'clock. And then every hour, even every half an hour, we'd get... [...] And 
everybody kent [knew] aboot it and there was like a lot of talk fae... Like the lass 
I work wi', her boyfriend, as soon as he heard, he went doon there and saw it and 
he reported back to her and everybody, a lot of Shetlanders kent a lot of Shetlanders 
so he would tell one o' his friends and they would talk among themselves and pass 
it on." (G-02) 
Over the weeks following the grounding, social life became at times 
unbearably oppressive: with the Braer on everyone's lips, with uncertain information 
and unsatisfactory interpretations circulating everywhere, there seemed to be neither 
time nor space to reflect or to escape the power of a reality that was being 
constructed. 
"I: Do people talk a lot about the spill? 
Yeah, yeah. I've had three weeks like that [the interview will have been interrupted 
three times by phone calls]. 
I: Phone calls all the time. 
Yeah. There's some days I'm... When the tanker came ashore then we had, we 
started havin' daily meetings in Lerwick at the Fishermen's Association and the 
Shellfish Committee wi' the executive committee of the Shellfish Association, and 
it was daily meetings, night meetings and many hours every day. And back home, 
the phone never stopped. It came to the stage that I just pulled the plug oot of the 
wall. 
I: You didn't want to hear about it any more? 
Yeah. I just... fed up. [...] At the moment, everybody just.. it just seems to be the... 
you canna get away fae it. And if you try to get away fae it, you might go 
somewhere, like I've seen folk doon at the boating club, and even there you'd be 
speakin' to somebody that would help you to get away fae the subject, and then 
you'd speak to somebody else and then the first thing dat they mention is... You 
canna get away. You just canna get away. It's there. It's everywhere. It's... It's the 
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conversation. You canna get away fae it. You canna. There's some days it's worse 
than odders." (I-14) 
If one needs to get away from the conversation, to escape from a coercive 
reality in the process of being defined, others prevent oblivion: they penetrate private 
homes and materialise as voices on the telephone and the radio, or as images on 
screens; they force everyone into acknowledging that the unthinkable has happened 
and must be dealt with. For all their difficulties though, the media and conversations 
about the Braer provide the resources to make sense of this dramatic event. They 
crystalise the often inchoate feelings experienced during the crisis. Others are 
constantly engaged in providing a content to the most intimate emotions and, in the 
case of "real Shetlanders", in legitimating a pain which they are reluctant to admit 
even to themselves. Making sense of the Braer is not only a cognitive activity; it is 
a complex social practice. 
8.1.1. Social representations and metaphors 
Which metaphors are used to make sense of and to construct this profoundly 
upsetting event? How do metaphors relate to Shetlanders' representations of nature, 
of themselves and of others? There is not the space here to fully articulate the 
complex relationships between social representations and metaphors. However, 
metaphorical concepts and practices are no doubt involved in the genesis of social 
representation3 . 
The issue will not be resolved here. What matters is: Firstly, that metaphors 
are somehow involved in the elaboration of social representations and, thus, in the 
3Indeed, if the "essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of things in terms 
of another" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; p.5), then one can see how metaphors are implicated in the 
elaboration of social representations through both objectification and anchoring. Wagner (in a personal 
communication) has argued that metaphors are intrinsically - and exclusively - linked to objectification 
in that they make abstract concepts concrete and almost tangible. Undoubtedly, a number of metaphors 
do function precisely to reify and to give substance to aspects of our experience. However, I would 
argue that metaphors provide the resources for the process of anchoring novelty. Are there not striking 
parallels between "classifying and naming an unfamiliar reality within already-existing, familiar 
frameworks", and "understanding and experiencing one kind of things in terms of another"? Although 
Lakoff & Johnson consider "personification", for instance, as an obvious type of "ontological 
metaphor" - a view which would support Wagner's argument - their definition of personification as 
comprehending "a wide array of experiences with nonhuman entities in terms of human motivations, 
characteristics, and activities" (1980; p.33) is more akin to the mechanism of anchoring than it is to 
that of objectification. 
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social construction of reality. In this sense, metaphors are not only poetic devices or 
simple comparisons between some two objects. If that were the case metaphors could 
only describe but not create realities. Secondly, metaphors do not belong exclusively 
to the realm of language but also structure thought and action. It is the same 
conceptual system which is used when we think, talk and act. This is consistent with 
the definition of social representations as "systems of ideas, images and practices". 
Thirdly, the choice of a given metaphor - which at once highlights and conceals some 
aspects of our experience - is not arbitrary and idiosyncratic but highly consistent 
with the total cultural system of which it is pare. Indeed, metaphorical understanding 
and experiencing is not entirely unconstrained: it expresses and constructs meaning 
in relation to someone and to a shared cultural context where it can be understood. 
Such an approach is necessary in order to make sense of the metaphors which 
Shetlanders have used to construct the Braer. It allows one to see the interrelatedness 
between the selected metaphor and the cultural system from which it stems and which 
it expresses. 
8.1.1.1. 	"It was like a death" 
The first two words ever printed on the Braer in the local press were "Deadly 
cargo". The metaphor of death had entered the symbolic life of the community and, 
with it, an intense feeling that the Shetland the locals had known had gone forever. 
The destruction was total and irreversible, the sense of helplessness overwhelming. 
The oil, the black tides, the polluted sea spray signify death and bring death to 
everything in their passage: not only to the "neesiks, selkies, dratsies, scories and all 
the bird and sea life [which] were killed horribly" (The Shetland Times, 01/29/93, 
(04); p. 19), but also to local communities - the district, the family - and the entire 
"way of life". 
4This does not deny the possibility that metaphors may have a basis in physical reality but, 
as Lakoff and Johnson put it, "it is hard to distinguish the physical from the cultural basis of a 
metaphor, since the choice of one physical basis from among many possible ones has to do with 
cultural coherence." (1980; p.19) 
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"It could be the death of a whole way of life. That's the worst possible picture." (I-
15) 
"It is too early to tell you the amount of damage it has done to the community. I 
know the effect, the initial effect it had. I have never known anything that hurt the 
community like this. Big guys in tears, and they couldn't explain why! But I was 
really glad when somebody said they felt like that because quite frankly I felt like 
that. Three people said it was like a death in the family." (I-03) 
"I would have said it is like a bereavement, it was like a death in the district. The 
oil spill it was like a death. And I was talking to somebody, it was a man, and he 
says: "I don't think, he says, well I know I have never felt so upset about anything 
even... I was worse than when my father died." There was for two days that he was 
totally mentally sick, he was. He agreed with me it was like a bereavement." (I-13) 
"I was sooth when "it" happened, and felt the waves of disbelief and anguish in the 
folk on urban streets, in rural lanes in darkest East Anglia. South to attend my 
father's funeral; this was like a double bereavement. It seemed that the Shetland we 
had known was gone forever." (The Shetland Times, 01/15/93, (2), p. 25) 
The initial reactions of the "real Shetlanders" quoted here had little to do with 
economic considerations - the amount of damage was unknown - and seemed to resist 
rational explanations. No one could explain why they felt the way they did, and some 
even described themselves as "mentally sick" . What transpires here is the intimacy 
of the rapport which unites Shetlanders to their nature. It is as though nature is part 
of the self, an extension and expression of one's being. 
"H: It's very sad. We went, it's a small beach, just north of Spiggie Beach, we call 
it our "Secret Beach" because only a handful of people knew about it and we all used 
to meet there in the summertime [...], and we went for a walk doon there, and it was 
just completely destroyed, it was black, it was, it really was sad to go there. It was 
such a beautiful little spot and it was just absolutely destroyed. 
R: You have to, you have to climb up a peerie cliff to get to this beach. We walked 
over the grass and we looked doon on it, and you got a really horrible sinking 
feeling. 
H: Yeah. We felt, to be honest, we felt gutted, I mean, empty. 
R: Yeah, that's what it is, we really felt gutted. I felt absolutely gutted. I mean I 
was... 
I: Gutted? 
R: It's an expression when... you feel emptied, everything has been taken away. Just 
drained, everything has just been taken away from you. 
H: You wouldn't have believed then that something, that there was so much 
destruction and it was so far, that far away from us, do you understand? 
R: [...] There were media crews with their camera filming, and the image of them 
when they walked away laughing... But you, you didn't feel like speaking to anybody 
or... It was a horrible feeling, you could just see it going up the river, the wee burn 
up in the loch. You... It's hard to believe that an event, a single event like that, that 
happens one day, can completely turn your world upside doon. [.. .]  
H: I mean, we are hopeful, we are hoping..." (G-03) 
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"We feel as if we've lost a part of it, a part of us, so it feels bad. We've lost part of 
our island. It's... you feel something has been taken away fae us and we're all sad... 
but you never maybe appreciated just how much you had before." (I-14) 
"It was like a part of me [that was gone]. All that we worked and struggled for 
wasn't just to be wiped out! And when they talked about needing to evacuate, Oh! 
it was... I think we shoved that piece out of our minds because Oh!, we wouldn't 
have been able to live with that." (I-13) 
The role of others in defining one's own emotions is conspicuous: "I was 
really glad that somebody said they felt like that because quite frankly I felt like 
that", "He agreed with me it was like a bereavement", "Yes, that's what it is, we 
really felt gutted", etc. Communication and social interaction provide the resources 
to define one's own emotions in relation to the Braer; they also lend substance to the 
Shetlanders' representations of nature. It is also evident in these quotations that the 
physical world is not clearly thought of in separate terms; it is interwoven with, and 
it structures, people's lives; it is read as a representation which contains the residues 
of collective and personal life. A threat to nature is interpreted as a threat to self. 
Before I discuss the relationships between nature, self and society, let me turn to 
another metaphor used in relation to the Braer. 
8.1.1.2. 	"It was like being raped" 
The metaphor of rape is equally powerful. It was used by two women, "real 
Shetlanders", in an interview and a group discussion. Again, rape is a threat to one's 
physical and psychological integrity. It refers to the devastating consequences of the 
oil spill both for the islands and for oneself. The fact that the islands themselves may 
be raped suggests that they are attributed a life of their own, that they are personified 
and perhaps even conceived of as feminine Perhaps more than death, which mainly 
elicits sadness, rape expresses and arouses anger. 
"I don't think I had even ever smelt oil but I still felt in some way that the whole 
place had been dirtied, defiled or something. I, I said to [my husband]: "I wonder 
if this is the way a woman who has been raped feels?" You know, you hear them 
speaking about feeling dirty for a long time afterwards and it was almost as if the 
islands had been raped or violated in some way to me. And... it is difficult to say." 
(I-13) 
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"S: Personally I think, you know, when I go down to Spiggie beach and that, you 
know, it's like, it's like somebody, some alien has been there and spoilt it, you 
know? I'm furious [....] I cannot really put it into words,. You know, it's left an 
awful, awful, awful feeling. I thought you could see it but I mean you can't see much 
there. Like the other day I was going out there and I couldn't really see much but I 
knew that it had been spoilt. 
T: It's like somebody has been and abused it. [...] 
S: And what I actually thought as I walked back it was like being raped, that's what 
I felt. I've never been raped but it was so strong my feelings that this had happened. 
I just felt totally devastated, I really did. [...] 
T: I think it's, I mean I felt pretty similar to her, not exactly that way but I did feel 
as if we had been violated. Now it could never be the same because of what had 
happened." (G-04) 
Rape connotes an intimate feeling of being dirty, defiled, polluted. It evokes 
some loss of purity, the very purity which Shetlanders so frequently use to describe 
their islands, their seas, their selves. Significantly, the subjects also insist on the 
sense of long-term or even permanent damage. The oil spill will have changed forever 
how Shetlanders think of nature, and of themselves in relation to nature. 
8.1.1.3. 	Rape and death: The cultural coherence of metaphors 
Metaphorical understanding has been defined as comprehending and 
experiencing one thing in terms of another. For this process to occur, one must 
already have represented the entities to be related as having analogous properties. So 
what allows Shetlanders to link symbolically nature, the body (self) and the "way of 
life" (or society) through the metaphors of death and rape? In her analysis of pollution 
and taboo, Mary Douglas (1966/1991) suggests that threats and dangers that are 
credited to social structures are reproduced in miniature on the human body; the body 
stands as a symbol for society. I would argue that, in Shetland, the chain of 
symbolism runs like this: the body stands as a symbol for nature which, in turn, 
stands as a symbol for society. This, however, circumvents the central problem of 
what constitutes the link between these symbols. 
This link is to be found in the sense of identity which all three elements 
sustain and construct. If the analysis of "real Shetlanders"' organic representations of 
nature suggested earlier is substantially correct, then it is because the material world 
is a prime definer of the community's collective identity that its destruction may be 
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understood and experienced as the death of a whole way of life or as a rape. Indeed, 
we have seen that participation in the traditional way of life was the single most 
important factor in defining some local inhabitants as "real Shetlanders" , that is in 
granting them a carefully constructed social and personal identity. We have also seen 
that this way of life implied a particular, organic, rapport to materiality: an intimate 
knowledge of the local environment, not simply qua physical environment, but also 
as a life-world, a repository of Shetlanders' history and identity. That the annihilation 
of nature should stand for that of Shetlanders' "way of life" becomes self-evident if 
one accepts that both elements are symbolically interchangeable with respect to their 
function in creating and maintaining the locals' identity. 
So how can threats to nature, which signify both the potential dissolution of 
social life and the destruction of one's identity, be metaphorically understood in terms 
of the destruction or loss of purity of the body through either death or rape? I would 
contend that it is only insofar as the body is the chief symbol of one's self and one's 
personal identity that its annihilation can signify that of both social life and nature. 
It is thus the notion of identity which links the three elements - the body, social life 
and nature - and which entitles Shetlanders to understand any one of these three 
elements in terms of either of the other two. What is at stake here is the crumbling 
away of the traditional way of life, the invasion of the Shetlanders' place by other 
people, other symbols, other forms of knowledge, and the necessary reflexivity which 
this entails as the sense of whom the "pure", "real Shetlander" really is becomes 
fuzzier. Death and rape refer to the loss of purity in culture, in nature, and in one's 
identity. 
This becomes clearer still when one considers whom Shetlanders blame (and 
yet, cannot blame) for the latest crisis 5 . The culprits appear under various guises: 
technology in general, and the oil industry in particular; the government with its inept 
legislation; the local council which is run by "Englishmen" and fails to protect 
Shetlanders' interests; the master and the crew of the Braer who did not know the 
Shetland waters, were ill-trained, motivated by greed, and flew under a flag of 
5The Braer oil spill exemplifies late modern "risks": no one actually chooses to run them, no one 
can therefore be held responsible for them, but they profoundly affect very large numbers of people 
(Beck, 1992). 
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convenience, etc. 
"The people of Shetland are blameless and all that happened is outwith their control, 
yet they are the people who will suffer in the end. I am disgusted that after seeing 
many television interviews and newspaper reports nobody seems to be held 
responsible for the disaster. Not the Government, the Scottish Office, the shipping 
line, the oil company, the chartering company, the crew or the captain." (The 
Shetland Times, 01/15/93, (02), p.20) 
Beneath such apparent diversity, there appears, like a watermark, a common 
theme: in different ways, from the outside as well as from within, in the past as well 
as during the current crisis, these "culprits" have either robbed Shetlanders of their 
identity, or they embody values which are strongly antithetical to the local "way of 
life". The oil spill becomes yet another instance of the destruction wrought by Sooth-
Moothers and of the powerlessness of Shetland and of Shetlanders, blameless victims, 
to resist it. (The relationships between Shetlanders and Sooth-Moothers during the 
crisis will be explored further in section 8.2.) 
8.1.2. Beyond words 
There is a pervasive sense that, as Shetlanders were trying to express their 
emotions, they were at a loss: words systematically failed to convey the wealth of 
feelings and meanings associated with nature in general and with the oil spill in 
particular. 
"I said to him that I have never known anything that hit this community the way this 
did. I cannot, I cannot find the words to tell you." 
I: In what ways? 
I can't put it into words." (I-03) 
"Naturalist and author Bobby Tulloch said it was difficult to put into words how he 
felt about the disaster." (The Shetland Times, 01/15/93, (2), p.13) 
Nature appears so much as a given to "real Shetlanders" that it can only be 
experienced as it is lived in and that it is, therefore, intrinsically refractory to being 
put into words. But there also seemed to be an inexpressible contradiction between 
the intensity and the depth of people's feelings, and their immediate sensory 
experience of the spill which, together with a political discourse which emphasised 
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"Nature's prompt recovery" and called for the assessment of one's monetary losses, 
appeared to negate the dramatic consequences of the disaster. It is perhaps just such 
a disjuncture in one's experience that provides the motivation for constructing 
metaphors. The latter would then be an aid to the general process of making the 
unfamiliar familiar, especially when words fail to encompass and to express the range 
of emotions felt. If there is any truth in the saying "an image is worth a thousand 
words", it may very well be that metaphors are used because their figurative 
dimension short-circuits the need to verbalise. They are at once cognitively 
economical and socially necessary in that they allow communication to continue when 
normal discourse can no longer serve that purpose. But the metaphors described 
above are also ways of resisting the instrumentalisation and the commodification of 
nature proposed by Sooth-Moothers, and of holding on to and of protecting 
Shetlanders' representations and sense of identity. Silence, here, serves the same 
purpose and expresses the same tension. 
Indeed, Shetlanders do not participate in public debates. The host of "Speaking 
Out" was astonished by the small number of participants from the South Mainland at 
the public debate. 
"Host: Well, let me ask the wider audience. First of all, can we find out from a show 
of hands, which will make great radio but I'll tell you what the result is, how many 
people are actually from what you would describe as the South Mainland here 
tonight? Not, not, not all that many, it has to be said... Let's, let's see from some 
of the folk down here why is that? Yes, the lady there in the jumper. Are people fed 
up talking about this or what?" (Public debate) 
Similarly, the conference on the report of the Donaldson Inquiry, so eagerly 
awaited, was held in an almost empty room. The title (which spans over two pages) 
of The Shetland Times' coverage of the conference reads: "The ideas came forward 
but the audience stayed away" (The Shetland Times, 05/21/93, (20); pp.6-7). 
Moreover, the rare attenders reluctantly voice their opinions. When they do, these are 
met with contempt, partly because such concerns are bound to be ill-articulated since, 
to a large extent, they belong to the realm of the inexpressible, and partly also 
because they simply cannot be dealt with and resolved by bureaucrats, politicians or 
scientists. The synopsis of the public debate "Speaking Out" (see Annexe 4) reveals 
that more than 30% of the total debate (which includes the pre-recorded introduction 
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and the live discussion) comprises interventions by the host, Leslie Riddoch6 . This 
contrasts with 23.3%, the sum of all the interventions made by "born and bred 
Shetlanders". This proportion is very low considering that the programme was 
intended as a forum for Shetlanders to express their concerns. Mechanistic and 
cybernetic considerations make up the bulk of the programme, with 14.7% and 
20.5 % of the debate comprising utterances from experts in the audience and 
representatives of the SIC respectively. 
Faced by a "spectacular" lack of intervention from the floor, Leslie Riddoch 
had, by her own admission, to become rude in order to incite Shetlanders to speak 
out. 
"Host: Right. What do people in the audience feel about the compensation? Is there 
worries that it is not going to be enough? [long silence] Spectacularly no response! 
I have to be rude here, why did some of you come tonight? I mean haven't you 
questions that you want to ask? I know I am being rude but I mean that is supposed 
to be the worst that has happened to your islands and I understand you want to wait 
to see if other people put a point - I mean you know, it is always that way - but do 
none of you really have big worries about this compensation issue?" (Public debate) 
"Something strange is happening. Suddenly some people in the Ness who have been 
outspoken about aspects of the Braer disaster are going quiet. Anybody who heard 
the embarrassingly feeble edition of the BBC Radio Scotland programme Speaking 
Out, broadcast on Tuesday, must have wondered why , so few Ness folk took part. 
The programme got so stilted at one point that Lesley Riddoch, the woman with the 
unenviable task of acting as its presenter, asked the audience in the Garrison Theatre: 
"Why are you here?" when questions and points on the issue seemed as thin on the 
ground as customers in the bar of the Kveldsro. This is pretty extraordinary when 
you consider the tremendous upset folk in the Ness and other badly affected areas 
have been through, but maybe many of them are still in too much of a state of shock 
for all that kind of thing." (The Shetland Times, 01/22/93, (03); p.8) 
So why are Shetlanders so quiet? The answer is complex. In many ways, 
Shetlanders' conspicuous silence owes to the nature of social life in Shetland. Indeed, 
it has been noted repeatedly (Byron, 1986; Cohen, 1982c; 1987; Goffman, 1953) that 
Shetlanders are reluctant to engage in political and militant action or to make public 
statements which would threaten the homogeneous image that is so central to the 
collective definition of "being a Shetlander". Volunteering oneself as the first to speak 
6This percentage is unusually high. I used the transcripts of six programmes from the morning 
television show Kilroy, kindly made available to me by Dr. Sonia Livingstone, as a point of 
comparison. Despite differences between radio and television programmes, this comparison gives us 
some indication of the lack of flow evident in "Speaking Out". Kilroy's own contribution to the debates 
makes up, on average, only 17% of the total programme. 
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flouts egalitarian convention. Indeed, the local ethos of public equalitarianism, 
"manifest in the rarity of any kind of assertiveness in public behaviour" (Cohen, 
1982c, p. 307), partly explains the astonishing reserve displayed at public meetings. 
In the particular cases at hand, Shetlanders' customary reserve may have been 
exacerbated because both "Speaking Out" and the conference on the Donaldson 
Inquiry were organised by outsiders - BBC Radio Scotland and the Government 
respectively. Outside intervention is perceived as impugning the integrity and validity 
of local expertise and knowledge. 
Another, no less important, factor is that the people most affected by the spill 
were enjoined to relinquish their right to discuss the oil spill with Sooth-Moothers; 
their respective associations were responsible for handling the relationships with the 
media and experts. It came out, in two different groups contacted at the end of the 
public debate, that Shetlanders had been advised by the local authorities not to talk 
to me. The next lengthy quotation reveals the attempts at censorship, the tension and 
distrust which existed in the community following the oil spill, as well as the 
Shetlanders' need to express their views and feelings. It also indicates, yet again, how 
the local council is perceived as being run by Sooth-Moothers ("like Malcolm 
Green?", the Council's chief executive). More subtly, it points to the social networks, 
the rules of interaction and of communication, and the values which combine to grant 
one some degree of acceptability. 
"S: I think they [the SIC] should try and join together with the people, admit that 
they have got things wrong. Just really get down to the grassroots now. Just all really 
work together. Now they are just sitting up on platforms looking down at you 
[reference to seating arrangements at public meetings] as if you are, they don't make 
me feel an idiot, but that is what they are trying to do. 
I: Do you find it insulting to have a Sooth-Moother, somebody who is really an 
outsider who comes here... 
S: Like Malcolm Green you mean? 
I: Like me. Like me now being concerned about what you are going through? 
S: No, because you are a nice person. I mean it would depend on your attitude. If 
you were coming in talking to us like we were country yokels like a lot of South 
folks try to do, then I wouldn't. I mean I am very sensitive to people, I would just 
have never accepted that you come in to this place. [...] When you stood up in that 
meeting and said [why you were here], I thought, well, that took a bit of guts as well 
and I think that's important. It did. I mean what [the director of public health] said 
to you, Trevor, was, you know, he thought it was wrong of you [me] to do that. 
T: I wasn't going to say anything 
I: Really? [the director of public health] said that it was wrong for me to...? 
S: Don't say that I've told you that. 
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T: He said that that was the wrong way to go ahead doing your own investigation 
because you wouldn't get a true representation of... 
S: Well how true a representation could you get as coming into people's homes? 
T: I said: "Well if you are going into people's homes that are actually affected, then 
surely that's the best way!" [...] 
S: I'll probably tell him now that you've been. I know what you are doing. I'm not 
stupid enough to think, I mean of course it's for yourself as well. But I knew right 
away when you said that, I thought "Oh good!" because it means that folk can talk 
[.. .] 
T: I think he thought you were just looking for people to pull in. 
S: No, it couldn't have been that Trevor, because she gave them a choice. Everybody 
had a choice, they could say yes or no. And you were coming into our homes. So 
I was really surprised he said that, I really was. 
T: I don't really know what his idea was quite honestly. 
S: Because I feel, you see, you coming is a God-sent gift in a way because there is 
no way that I would talk to the social workers [...] They work for the SIC. I mean, 
I honestly wouldn't. And I'm sure Magnus [whom I also interviewed and who 
introduced me to this group], he would have told us and friends, but there is no way 
he would have told anyone coming in like that. [...] There's a lot of folks wanting 
to talk. But they [social workers] won't be getting the truth out of them because a lot 
of folks will be holding back. And another beauty about you is you're up from down 
South and you're going away again. So whatever we say to you or anything we say 
to you, it's not gonna go back into the community.[...] 
T: It's the same attitude: "Damage limitation. Don't let it get out. Don't tell anyone". 
He's cutting up every avenue. "You don't speak to anybody, you don't say anything, 
you don't express an opinion. We issue the authority line and that's it."" (G-04) 
Clearly, if "real Shetlanders" refuse to speak out, it is not because they are 
not worried. On the contrary, the questions are too numerous, the worries loom too 
large. They are, more importantly, of an entirely different nature from those 
expressed by the local authorities and the various experts they employed. Indeed, I 
contend that the main factor explaining the silence of traditional Shetlanders is a gap 
between the different social representations of nature which circulated in Shetland in 
the aftermath of the oil spill, coupled with the fact that organic representations, 
almost by definition, seem to resist verbalisation. The conflict between divergent 
representations, between scientific, economic and political preoccupations which call 
for instrumental solutions, and the existential loss for which there are no immediate 
answers, reduces "real Shetlanders" to silence. Offers of monetary compensation, the 
re-routeing of tankers, recommendations about ship design and maintenance, new 
legislations on the use of dispersants, endless monitoring - these are solutions which 
may satisfy onlookers, detached participants who want to limit the damage to the local 
economy and ensure that such disasters do not happen in the future to any other 
environment (or to the "global" environment). They neither restore a destroyed "way 
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of life", nor rid Shetlanders of a sense that their home, the legacy of their ancestors, 
their lifetime's work, their very selves, have been defiled. 
The debate over compensation perhaps best exemplifies just how this reduction 
and reframing of existential issues functions to negate Shetlanders' own realities and, 
thus, to silence them'. For the "real Shetlanders" who experienced the oil spill as a 
death or a rape, and felt that the disaster had destroyed a part of them, no financial 
benefits would ever truly compensate Shetlanders for so profound a loss. The 
destruction is incommensurable. This argument is frequent, especially amongst 
residents of the South Mainland. 
"Three people said it was like a death in the family It is difficult to quantify that, 
that is how they felt about it." (I-03) 
"I mean this oil has ruined, it's goin' to ruin the way o' life and there's no money 
dat can replace dat. There's no amount of money in dis world dat can replace your 
way o' life dat's taken away fae you." (I-14) 
However, the real significance of the debate over compensation is that it forces 
Shetlanders to consider nature as an external object, to which they must assign a 
monetary value. Nature, like money, must become a universal. Unless Shetlanders 
are capable of such a radical representational shift, from organic to 
mechanistic/cybernetic, their livelihood may indeed be severely jeopardised. 
"YESTERDAY morning the council announced details of a scheme designed to help 
the crofters and farmers in the Ness worst hit by the oil spill. Chief executive 
Malcolm Green said the council decided to issue a compensation scheme which will 
give farmers and crofters the chance to process their claims quickly. He said that this 
would allow them to carry on with their livelihood rather than worry about 
compensation. He said many farmers have already had their crops contaminated and 
condemned for human consumption. "If they are suffering and can identify their 
hardship then we will pay them": (The Shetland Times, 01/08/93, (01); p.7) 
7Few issues mobilised public opinion in the way the debate over compensation did. The 
centrality of this issue cannot be explained solely in terms of obvious economic considerations. The 
problem of compensation allows us to see how different and incompatible representations of nature are 
crystallised. The polarisation of opinion amongst different factions within Shetland society, and between 
Shetlanders and outsiders, points to the existence of different social representations of nature. Of the 
375 articles related to the Braer in The Shetland Times, 68 (18%) were devoted almost exclusively to 
issues revolving around compensation: who should provide it, the amounts available, the timing, the 
modalities of payment, the potential and actual beneficiaries, the impact on the community and, more 
fundamentally, the (lack of) appropriateness of monetary indemnity. The following words were 
included in the frequencies when they were used in the context of compensation: assistance, bridging 
fund, claims, compensation, IOPC (International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund), money and 
subsidies. The figure excludes articles which refer to other economic consequences (for instance, 
mentions of the damage to Shetland's image or the cancellation of orders for salmon by supermarket 
chains) or to the loss of amenity and the destruction of livelihoods. 
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Undoubtedly, Shetlanders are suffering. Teams of social workers are touring 
the isles listening to people and providing support. South Mainland residents endlessly 
talk about their sense of helplessness, loss, grief and anger. The Shetland Times often 
referred to "the psychological damage done to individuals", to "fears over mental 
health", to "the sense of loss that Shetlanders must feel", to "a rise in crime, divorce, 
and what psychologists call "post-traumatic-stress-disorder" " , to the "huge psycho-
emotional toll" which the disaster levies on the local residents, etc. And yet, for 
most, it is impossible to "identify their hardship" in quantifiable, and therefore 
procedurally acceptable, ways. 
To conclude, the Shetlanders' silence cannot be explained solely by reference 
to their organic representations of nature; complex and ramified social and cultural 
processes come into play. Nevertheless, I contend that they are the single most 
important factor in making sense of Shetlanders' reactions to the oil spill. This will 
be brought into sharper focus as we turn to the relationships between Shetlanders and 
Sooth-Moothers during the crisis. 
8.2. The Braer and Sooth-Moothers 
I have discussed earlier how Sooth-Moothers are generally perceived by the 
islanders. In the present section, I shall unpack this broad category more carefully 
and consider how Shetlanders dealt with the most prominent groups of Sooth-
Moothers to be involved in the crisis: the national and international press reporters, 
the master and the crew of the Braer, the academic and governmental experts 
monitoring the spread of the oil and the levels of pollution, and the environmental 
pressure groups, whose work also involved scientific assessment but which had a 
more explicit political agenda. 
8.2.1. The local, national and international media 
The mere physical presence of some 500 journalists accredited by the press 
office set up by the local council was, in itself, a disaster. Shetlanders had to see their 
place through the eyes of foreign reporters: the islands became just another disaster- 
236 
striken area, which journalists often compared to Prince Williams Sound, but also to 
Sarajevo and Cambodia, where civil war raged. The media were not content with 
reporting on the oil spill itself either; the institutional reflexivity characteristic of late 
modernity meant that BBC television crews were also sent to document the effects of 
the media themselves during ecological and social crises. More mundanely, roads 
were blocked, Lerwick and Sumburgh were overcrowded, residents felt harassed by 
requests for photographs, etc. The reporters' logistic needs were also a source of 
temptation for some Shetlanders who rented out rooms and cars, and offered their 
services at exorbitant prices, thereby threatening to corrupt "from within" the core 
values of abstemiousness, of free and mutual aid which are integral to Shetland's 
ethos. The relations between the islanders and media representatives revealed, and 
perhaps created, internal divisions within Shetland society. 
"There are a lot of journalists, people from the Mainland here [...] And you can 
make some extra money out of them! The prices they was paying for their rooms 
they were staying in!" (I-17) 
"There is a lot of people that I know of that made quite a lot of money out of the 
disaster through hiring vehicles and even hiring out drivers and things like that to 
drive the media people around. That is just someone trying to make a bit of money 
but for someone who had their whole livelihood destroyed because of the oil and see 
somebody else making a fortune out of the disaster, it's gonna cause trouble between 
people. Once it is all over, in a year or so when it's all settled down, you will still 
have people thinking: "That bastard! He's made a fortune out of this disaster but me 
I have lost a lot!" and that is where the trouble is going to come. The people in the 
community will probably suffer more than the actual environment itself in the long 
term. The environment will clean eventually. It may take ten years, maybe. But you 
will probably find division in the community." (I-08) 
The perception of the media reports and of the journalists themselves was 
divided: on the one hand, those for whom the Braer oil spill was experienced as a 
disaster generally described the foreign media as unobtrusive, accurate in their 
reports, and even helpful in that they raised issues that had hitherto not been 
considered by the locals. This "minority" opinion, however, was a self-conscious one. 
All Shetlanders were acutely aware of the predominantly negative view of the world's 
press; they spontaneously addressed and challenged the most common criticisms of 
the media as they exposed their own, marginal, view. 
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"I: What about the journalists that were here? 
I got along very well with them. I didnae think them too pushy at all. I tell you there 
was one or two who were too pushy. They were on a big holiday, they wanted to 
come to Shetland for four hours, get the story and get the hell out [...] But most of 
that people I think they were very good. In actual fact, they could tell us quite a lot, 
because some of these boys were, they had seen this sort of things before, they knew, 
they could tell us what to expect in the long term aspects of it. They could tell us 
more than our own people was prepared to. [...] They were really unobtrusive I 
thought. I really think they did very well." (I-03) 
"It has just been great how people [from England] have been affected and worried 
and annoyed and I think they were even more upset than us because they could not 
see for themselves. And when you can't see something first hand, your mind can 
conjure up much more horror things, if that is possible in this situation. 
I: Would that be because of the media? 
Yes, no doubt. But I always felt that the media didn't exaggerate this. [...] It's [an] 
unusual [opinion] but I think that what we were seeing was worse than the pictures 
that they were showing certainly. They were no worse than what it was. And another 
thing is that they couldn't show the smell. So I really felt that in this case they didn't 
exaggerate [...] The television and the papers, I didnae think that they were making 
it worse, I must say for sure." (I-13) 
On the other hand, those who either had vested interests in minimising the 
dramatic consequences of the spill (usually coupled with mechanistic/cybernetic 
representations), or who simply could not come to terms with the far-reaching and 
dramatic consequences of the oil spill for their way of life (usually coupled with 
organic representations), generally reviled the media. Allegations of lies, of fabricated 
images, humorous descriptions of how journalists had been exploited, analogies 
between media representatives and construction workers, tales of media intrusiveness 
all conspired to vilify and to discredit journalists and their work. 
"...there is one Shetlander that he works in the fish, he said on the TV that he 
thought that the four hundred odd journalists that had been here had done more 
damage than the oil will do. You know, spreading the news that the oil is everywhere 
and that it is a disaster. I am sure that people hearing this and not knowing any better 
just thought that the whole of Shetland was absolutely covered in oil. There was even 
stories down in Scotland that there was so many hundreds being evacuated and so 
many thousands waiting to go! That's what they were telling. I don't know but they 
must have read that in the papers or heard it on the news. I mean it's absolutely 
crazy! Just ridiculous to say such a thing. And somebody said about the people in 
Lerwick going with masks on, you know, twenty-five miles away, because they were 
frightened for their health and they were going with masks on, but it was nonsense! 
That was not true!" (I-01) 
"There was a report in one of the Australian papers that we were evacuating the 
whole south end of the island. Now things like that don't do anybody any good. They 
don't even do the paper any good. We had telephone calls: "When were we being 
evacuated? " " (I-10) 
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"W: Well, it's just an understood thing dat journalists, the majority o' them, they 
must get a story. It's their living. And if they can get big splash headlines it sells the 
papers. And they blow things oot o' proportions, really. 
R: I was doin' shopping on the Commercial Street and doon at the back o' the shop 
there at the sea front, there was a journalist interviewing this woman and he got her 
to put dis mask on her face and then he was taking photographs and speakin' aboot 
it. This would have been, I mean we never saw it in the paper but it quite probably 
would have been in a paper dat we were having to wear masks here in Lerwick 
which is twenty-five miles away. And this is absolute nonsense." (G-02) 
"No safe camps this time from the invasion of media and environmentalist 
"construction" worker equivalents..." (The Shetland Times, 01/15/93, (02); p. 25) 
The local attitude to both the media and environmentalists is perfectly summed 
up and prescribed in the last quotation from The Shetland Times: by coupling these 
groups with construction workers, the past is summoned to frame the present and to 
decree what to think, how to feel and how to behave in ways which resonate among 
Shetlanders. 
Yet, not everyone follows this prescription. As evidenced in the quotations 
above, those who are sympathetic to the media live in the area immediately affected 
by the spill; they are crofters, farmers and inshore fishermen. They are the "real 
Shetlanders" who hold organic representations of nature, whose livelihoods have been 
destroyed, and for whom the dramatic consequences of the oil spill cannot be 
overstated. In contrast, SIC councillors, salmon farmers, those involved in the tourist 
industry, Lerwick residents, and reporters from The Shetland Times massively 
criticise the national and international media. Their sources of income may be 
temporarily jeopardised (until compensation deals are struck), but they never invoke 
the destruction of their "way of life" to describe the effects of the spill. The latter is 
not experienced as an attack on self, only as damage to "the environment" and to the 
industries which it supports. 
Some themes concerning the foreign media, however, found unanimous 
support: they encompassed the familiar and conventional rhetoric of marginalisation, 
abandonment, and betrayal. 
"When the Government ministers who have allowed this to happen, and the media 
pack have long departed, Shetlanders will be left alone again to pick up the pieces 
as best they can. We do not despair because we have always been resilient. The 
anger will probably come later. But now there is only pain and a terrible aching 
sadness that it had to happen." (The Shetland Times, 01/08/93, (01); editorial) 
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"Where will the international media be when the oil clean-up is complete and the 
world markets must be won back?" (The Shetland Times, 01/15/93, (02); p.20) 
Accusations of betrayal and of desertion are the most powerful means of 
discrediting the media: they draw upon feelings of resentment and frustration towards 
the outside world with which Shetlanders are all too familiar. Often, the general 
theme of marginalisation takes the particular form of an alleged dismissal of the 
locals' views. Time and time again, people complained that media representatives had 
not listened to them and had turned exclusively to "experts" , as though the local 
inhabitants were "country yokels" who knew nothing about nature. 
"I think that is the problem. We are not allowed a voice, you see? We don't know 
anything!" (I-03) 
No one has interviewed a Shetlander on the television. It is all the so-called experts 
that have come in and the so-called experts that live here already, and there was this 
feeling: "Where are all the Shetlanders gone? Aren't there any Shetlanders around 
for people to speak to?" So that was another thing..." (I-05) 
"H: I think a lot of interviews that they did up here were, they all went to, they 
didn't go to very many ordinary people. Whereas if they had gone to ordinary 
people, they would have got a totally different story. If they did go to ordinary 
people, but they didn't quote what they said. 
R: One night, me and a friend actually went down to a hotel where journalists were 
staying to look for the reporters; we were that mad, we were so angry, we went to 
the hotel to look for the reporters to give them a true story of what it was." (G-03) 
In protesting against the denigration of local knowledge by the media, 
Shetlanders are also claiming its superiority; they are building a consensus out of 
otherwise heterogeneous views; they are constructing the Braer as yet another proof 
of their peripheral status in the eyes of Sooth folk; they are, finally, creating their 
history and renewing their identity as a resilient people, but one which is at the mercy 
of inept outside forces. 
What about The Shetland Times? In the wake of the crisis, the local newspaper 
shaped the way Shetlanders should relate to other media representatives and reports. 
Its coverage celebrated the "common sense and wisdom" by which Shetlanders would 
see through the inaccurate reporting of foreign media, thereby reaffirming the 
coherence and continuity of the social world. It actively contributed to the general 
process of vilification of the outsiders who came to Shetland during the crisis. The 
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Braer oil spill was used to demonstrate the recuperative strengths of the community: 
the resilience and solidarity of crofters, farmers and fish farmers, the competence 
displayed by the local authorities, the collaboration of all to returning to some normal 
functioning, despite the alleged concerted efforts of the media to create maximum 
disruption. 
"There have been days when nothing happened and nothing really changed, and as 
a result the media has been crowded into Sumburgh, trying to justify their existence 
by scraping around for man bites dog stories, or better still, trying to set 
conservationists at fish farmers' throats, or vice versa. On the whole they have not 
succeeded, because on the whole, folk and organisations here have been drawn 
together, have buckled down, and have tried to address the long term, in the 
knowledge that the SIC has done a magnificent job of addressing the immediate 
consequences." (The Shetland Times, 01/15/93, (02); p. 19) 
The coverage also emphasised the integrative function of the disaster. It 
hovered between "describing" how Shetlanders had always stood together in the past 
and still did so during the present crisis, and stating that Shetlanders should and 
would surmount this latest disaster. 
"Overnight our reputation for clean, pollution free seas was destroyed as the media 
flashed grim pictures around the world, and regaining a ruined reputation will take 
some time [...] But Shetlanders have really shown their true colours this week. Quite 
apart from the magnificent efforts of our MP, of practically every council worker, 
and all the volunteers who offered their services to comb the shores for dead and 
dying animals, in the most appalling conditions; crofters, farmers, fishermen and 
those involved in the tourist industry have fought back against the tide of black 
propaganda, using the media to demonstrate that our products remain quality 
products. We have become more united, perhaps because of the invasion of experts, 
officials and government ministers who flooded in to tell us how to run our affairs. 
We fought back." (The Shetland Times, 01/15/93, (02); editorial) 
The Shetland Times, representing the community and therefore sharing its 
moral attributes, was also to avoid exaggerated and foolish reports motivated by 
sensationalism. In a self-critical exercise, the newspaper found itself to be "accurate" 
and "responsible" in its reporting, unlike most "hysterical" foreign newspapers which 
were blowing things "out of all proportion". Level-headedness in the coverage was 
important not only for the sake of truthful reporting, but to avoid producing greater 
damage and, consequently, the loss of self-reliance. In a nutshell, The Shetland Times 
drew on a series of familiar idioms to construct the oil spill and to engineer the 
desired social response to it. Not surprisingly, The Shetland Times was 
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overwhelmingly praised by its readership. With the few exceptions of those who 
accused it of engaging in a "damage limitation exercise", the paper was commended 
for its "responsible attitude", for "sticking to the facts", for presenting them "as 
straight as they could", and for "avoiding the damage" so frequently condemned in 
the national and international media. By virtue of being local, The Shetland Times is 
also unquestionably truthful and trustworthy. 
"R: I would trust only the locals. [...] Well you see, the Shetlanders run The 
Shetland Times, they have their own journals, like they have in England. 
M: Dis is like I was saying earlier on, I mean, you trust Shetland folk more as you 
do wi' some Sooth person. And we would, I mean The Shetland Times would no 
write anythin' dat, like last week and dis week, dat's been like what's in the odder 
papers. I mean all dat's in The Shetland Times, everybody in Shetland will believe 
what's in The Shetland Times, unless it was completely exaggerated but... I mean I 
would believe everything dat's in The Shetland Times but I wouldnae believe 
everything dat would be in the Daily Record or whatever. 
W: Well that's a fact and it's been proved. The articles dat's been in the Sooth 
papers, like Maxwell, dat's one, dat there was stories dat they knew wasnae true." 
(G-02) 
"In The Shetland Times, I think the coverage has been excellent. [...] There has been 
no scaremongering. There has been factual reports. I have got a great deal of respect 
for what The Shetland Times has done." (I-10) 
"The local media were, our papers, they told the true facts. And they were angry in 
our papers and some of them said the same as I am saying. They were saying in their 
reports that the press was not helping Shetland in a lot of ways. They said in the 
local newspapers. "(I-07) 
My own content analysis undermines this appraisal. In fact, The Shetland 
Times' coverage of the Braer incident was highly inconsistent, misrepresented the 
views of local Shetlanders - whilst drawing upon familiar idioms and values - and, 
after the first issue, systematically downplayed the consequences of the spill'. The 
8The reasons for this state of affairs are numerous. Some stem from the nature of social life 
in Shetland. Indeed, the local papers had to represent the views and interests of the different factions 
of the community. These views and interests being themselves often irreconcilable, it is not surprising 
that reports about them should also be contradictory. Second, heterogeneous reporting is to be expected 
from any newspaper since the latter is produced by a collective. Third, much of the inconsistency in 
the reporting has to do with the fact that environmental debates are themselves structured by many 
different representations of nature, and different rationalities. Multiple sets of convictions about the 
nature of the world we live in co-exist in spite of being fundamentally at odds with each other. 
Moreover, organic representations of nature, for instance, are refractory to being expressed in words 
and are thus unlikely to be discussed explicitly in the press. Fourth, even within the realm of a 
particular, say cybernetic, representation, remarkably different assessments (both of environmental 
problems and of the solutions which are deemed appropriate or feasible) are possible. In fact, for many 
environmental problems, a single, true solution is demonstrably unknowable or incapable of existing 
(Thompson, 1991). Fifth, the sheer passage of time and, with it, the production of ever greater and 
more varied knowledge, Shetlanders' habituation to their plight, the frustration at the lack of progress, 
the mental exhaustion, the results of political negotiation, etc, were bound to generate inconsistencies. 
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evaluation of the coverage of the spill, therefore, has to do more with the identity of 
journalists either as Shetlanders or as Sooth-Moothers than with the actual content of 
the articles. 
8.2.2. The master and the crew 
Immediately after the initial shock of the grounding, the Shetlanders' attention 
turned to trying to identify the causes of the accident. Could it have been prevented? 
Everybody thought so. How? Opinions were divided. Commercial pressures, flaws 
in international law, flag state control, the lack of surveillance of, and guidance to, 
mariners, inadequate agreements over insurance and liability, were all discussed and, 
to a lesser or greater extent, blamed for the current crisis. However, "human error" 
was the issue which generated the most debate. Ostensibly, there is nothing surprising 
in the choice of this particular dimension of the accident and in the insistence with 
which Shetlanders debated it since it is generally accepted that four fifths of marine 
accidents are caused by human error (Department of Transport, 1994b). But I would 
suggest that the privileging of this issue indicates more than the mere reflection of 
some objective state of affairs. 
First and foremost, the discussions about the master and the crew are 
expressions of a people proud of a culture and expertise proven over the years but 
which are either ignored or derided by outsiders. This is explicit in the commonly 
shared view that, had there been local seafarers on board the tanker or in the incident 
room, the disaster could have been avoided. 
"Looking on the TV, they [the crew] obviously didnae know the currents. If there 
had been local knowledge, they'd have been able to say: "Well, you'll no go on dat 
island." They thought she was goin' to come in here to begin wi'. And then they 
thought she was goin' to hit Horse Isle. But wi' the way the current was running, the 
current took her right past [....] But there must have been some of the local men doon 
there dat knew dat she wouldnae hit the Horse Isle [....] It's a very dangerous piece 
o' water unless you know exactly what you're doin'. See if the tanker, if they'd 
been, the tanker... The old fishermen fae the Sumburgh area all said you never ever 
hit, you never ever go ashore at Horse Isle, your boat can never ever go ashore on 
the rocks of Horse Isle because the current comes dis way. It keeps you off the 
Horse Isle. And dat's what happened." (I - 14) 
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"There is a local fisherman, he has been a fisherman all his life, inshore fisherman, 
he watched the whole thing go on. They thought she was coming in on the Horse 
Holm, which is next to Sumburgh Head, she was quite close, and he said: "No, she 
won't come in there." Because he knew the tide, very strong tides sort of between 
the two seas. It runs north two hours more than it runs the other way, the west tide 
is the strong one. He said: "It won't be there." It is like a river in the sea, really 
strong river. He said: "When she is hitting the tide, the tide will take her off again." 
Actually, when she got in the tide, she stayed still for a little while and then she 
started to move away with the tide. You could really think she was under steam, she 
was running so fast. He said: "There is another problem. With the amount of wind 
forcing her onto the side of the tide", she was like hitting a wall you know, "if you 
manage to get her out of the tide, that will be a problem. If the tide is not strong 
enough to hold her", he said, "if she is going out of the tide, she will come on the 
west side of the Quendale Ness", which she did. And he gave the time she would 
come, and he was just within two or three minutes out. Now, don't you think he 
would have been some use in the incident room? [...] I am probably not supposed 
to say that but I think that if you had had Shetland men handling the situation it 
wouldn't have happened." (I-03) 
"I think they should have paid attention to the local people, the men that knew the 
tide. Our own inshore fishermen would have known better. They knew the place." 
(I-13) 
"Shetland fishermen are experienced seamen and have intimate knowledge of the seas 
and tides in the Roost. In the view of these mariners this is an accident which could 
have been avoided." (The Shetland Times, 01/15/93, (02); p.5) 
In The Shetland Times, the early reports exalted local knowledge and blamed 
the Greek master for the disaster. Insidiously, reporters questioned the crew's 
seamanship, implicitly contrasting the latter's lack of diligence and readiness to 
abandon ship with the ethos of local fishermen, where such attitudes and actions 
would be inconceivable. 
"Even the oldest rustbucket of a ship can be operated safely if there's a competent 
crew on board and a competent management ashore." (The Shetland Times 01/08/93, 
(01), editorial) 
"Asked who he blamed for the accident, [an SIC councillor] said: "I blame the crew 
for this disaster. I don't think they acted quickly enough"." (The Shetland Times 
01/08/93, (01); p.5) 
"Mr Lowe [helicopter operator for the Coastguard] said it was the master's decision 
to abandon ship but with the advice from Shetland Coastguard. Asked if the master 
was reluctant to leave his tanker, Mr Lowe said: "No"." [end of the article] (The 
Shetland Times 01/08/93, (01); p.5) 9 
9The subsequent coverage in The Shetland Times condemned the racist abuse suffered by the 
master and his crew which it had partly fuelled in the previous week, and distanced itself from any 
calumnious comment made in relation to these seafarers. 
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The almost exclusive focus on human error, and the insistence that Shetland 
seafarers should have been consulted in the incident room, both serve to reassert 
Shetlanders' identity by claiming the superiority of local knowledge. Such strategies 
appeal to the familiar values of seamanship and responsibility; they build upon 
accumulated resentment and frustration towards the centres of power. 
8.2.3. The "birdie people" 
The ambivalence of Shetlanders' feelings towards environmental pressure 
groups (epitomised by Greenpeace but including the RSPB, the WWF, the SNH, etc.) 
is summed up in the following quotation; three arguments and one explanation are 
linked by the conjunction "but", expressing contradictory ideas, relations of 
exclusion, and objections. 
"They [fellow Shetlanders] were quite happy with the things that Greenpeace, the 
tests that Greenpeace were doing. They were delighted that there was somebody up 
here doing it independently, but they do things that, one of them actually said to me: 
"If Greenpeace came on a dying seal or a dying man, they would go for the seal!" 
There is still a thread of humour running through it. And they said that one of the 
endangered species in Shetland now was the ethnic Shetland crofter and salmon 
farmer. This was one of the things that was an endangered species! But it is true they 
were delighted that Greenpeace came but then they said that some of the 
scaremongering, what they called the scaremongering that Greenpeace was doing, 
wasn't helping. But they were looking purely from their own point of view." (I-10) 
In a very short statement, this man first testifies to the community's gratitude 
for the "independent knowledge" provided by Greenpeace - a valuable contribution 
especially since the local authorities have been discredited over the misuse of 
dispersants, by declaring that there were no health risks, and by calling the crisis 
"officially over" . He then points to the discrepancy between the Shetlanders' 
immediate preoccupations and Greenpeace's aims: the former are concerned with their 
livelihoods ("a dying man"), the latter with the protection of ecosystems ("a dying 
seal"). Indeed, traditional Shetlanders deeply resent being subordinated to "external" 
authorities which appear to be more concerned with meeting environmental and urban 
recreational demands on the country than with the livelihoods of the indigenous 
population. In a humorous but significant attempt to bridge these two universes, 
Shetlanders state that they themselves are an endangered species: it is they who 
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deserve protection if their way of life is not to become extinct. 
Moreover, and for all their help, Greenpeace shake Shetlanders' conviction 
that they can get over this disaster "better than anybody else". By framing the oil spill 
in terms of its "environmental impact", they disempower the locals: the Shetlanders' 
resilience can do nothing to surmount what are defined as strictly ecological/ 
biological/chemical problems. Green groups frustrate the Shetlanders' psychological 
labour to minimise the consequences of the disaster. They are also oblivious to the 
local economic, social and symbolic dimensions of what they perceive as an objective, 
global issue to be tackled through scientific knowledge and technical surveillance of 
environmentally sensitive sites. And thus, the interviewee concludes by explaining 
that, if Shetlanders had some difficulty accepting Greenpeace's ideas, it is because 
"they were looking purely from their own point of view", that is, from the local 
perspective. 
In-between these contradictions, there indeed appears a struggle to defend the 
local point of view, to force the recognition of another, devalued, organic 
representation of nature within which livelihoods are intimately tied to nature, and to 
oppose the global, dominant, mechanistic/cybernetic representations which inform the 
discourse and practices of environmental pressure groups. For Shetlanders, the 
wildlife is an integral part of their milieu, something they cherish essentially because 
of its deep familiarity; it is at once intimately known and taken-for-granted. 
"I never watched birds. I never had to. The birds are here. I'm here." (I -03) 
Shetlanders take it as axiomatic that they can take animals for their livelihoods 
(this is reminiscent of the debate over whaling in which Icelanders have been 
opposing conservationists for years). They have killed fish and sheep for centuries; 
they have worked their land to ensure their survival and shaped it so that it now 
constitutes an expression of their collective history. They belong to Nature; Nature 
does not belong to them. From such a perspective, the green movement is but another 
"fashionable" expression of modernity, whilst environmentalists are seen as extremists 
who "scaremonger" the local population and create "havoc": 
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"The Shetlander cares for the environment. The Canadians and perhaps the 
Americans are very up on the environment at the moment, it is very fashionable to 
be environmentally friendly, and a few years ago it was feminism, and we support 
all that here too, but we would rather believe in a common understanding. And the 
environment is something that Shetlanders understand. We are the environment, we 
are nature. We are involved in nature. The reason there is so much wildlife in 
Shetland is because the Shetlander was prepared to respect it and live with nature..." 
(I-03) 
"I think what [Greenpeace] wanted to do was to get people mobilised into 
approaching the government and doing things nationally and the thing backfired on 
them because it caused local disagreement. And I think that what they didn't take into 
consideration was Shetland doesn't really feel part of the nation and local problems 
in Shetland have always been dealt with, or people feel that they should be dealt 
with, at the local level." (I-16) 
"[After the Braer], these environmental groups can just go off to some other disaster 
somewhere and create havoc." (The Shetland Times, 01/15/93 (02); p.1) 
At best, green groups are perceived as having some romantic fascination for 
the wildlife. Hence the pejorative name by which Shetlanders designate them: the 
"birdie people" . Greenpeace's almost exclusive preoccupation with "the environment" 
after the grounding of the Braer was totally at odds with Shetlanders' own concerns. 
"The only problem with Greenpeace is they were not concerned with people's 
livelihoods. They were more concerned with seals and birds. I don't have anything 
against Greenpeace but I would have thought that if they had been a bit more 
concerned about people's livelihoods rather than just a few dead birds, they would 
have been seen better. 
I: They weren't perceived too well here? 
I wouldn't have said that people of Shetlands are against them, but I would have said 
that most of the ones I have spoken to was more concerned... I would have said the 
birds and that was maybe the second thing on their minds. They were probably more 
concerned with people's livelihoods, fishing, you know, salmon farming, things like 
this. I would have said maybe the birds and the mammals, although fairly important, 
but maybe not the first thing on a lot of people's minds." (I- 17) 
Paradoxically perhaps, environmentalists are perceived as "non-holistic" by 
real Shetlanders holding organic social representations of nature; they criticise them 
for "cutting bits off", for "not understanding conservation" and, as "White men", for 
having "driven ethnic peoples to extinction". 
"We have had environmental bodies such as the RSPB, NCC which is now Scottish 
Natural Heritage, coming in and telling us, in the name of conservation... Now we 
can go back to the North American Indian, the Aborigine, in . fact the ethnic peoples 
of the world, which have been more or less driven to extinction. The same White 
man which is now in Shetland in the name of conservation, I'm afraid he doesn't 
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understand conservation. Conservation and nature you have to live with it, you have 
to be part of it, we are all in there. The environment is a total thing, not just 
something that you can cut bits off..." (I-03) 
This assessment is made possible by the conjunction of two factors: first, and 
in spite of a discourse which emphasises the inseparability and the necessary 
interdependency between human beings and the physical world, environmental 
pressure groups continue to conceive of the environment as an external object, as 
some earlier quotations indicate. And second, the green movement has grown out of 
a desenchantement with capitalist, industrial practices and modern philosophy. It is, 
essentially, an urban movement. And so, real Shetlanders are left to ponder the 
adequacy of a discourse propounded by people who, unlike them, have not 
successfully "managed" their own relationships with nature in an urban context. As 
"townies", what can they teach Shetlanders? 
"And townies from the South coining up here and telling us how to live our lives, 
when we have got on alright for hundreds of years without them... And I think that 
Greenpeace on a lot of occasions would have been perceived that way. Shetlanders 
are like that even with people who have been here for years like us. [...] I think 
there is a lot of Shetlanders who don't like people from outside [...] coming in and 
telling them how to live their lives. And this is said over and over again about the 
South people coming into Shetland, and very very many of the environmentalists and 
ecologists and so on are English. And that's even worse than being Scottish! 
(laughter)" (I-05) 
And yet, many Shetlanders are truly grateful for some of the work conducted 
by environmental groups. They avidly seek reassurance from (natural) scientific 
knowledge in order to reduce, somehow, the overwhelming uncertainty surrounding 
the consequences of the Braer. Like most of us, they expect science to provide 
answers, and they are prepared to rely, to some extent at least, on Greenpeace's 
expertise. 
"I want it monitored but I want the monitorin' to be a cross section, no just 
somebody. I want Greenpeace to be in on the monitoring; people that is going to tell 
you the truth. I mean maybe it'll come with a few scare stories but I want a cross 
section of monitoring. I donnae want somebody monitoring that is government based 
alone. Government people that come on TV and tell you there is nothing to worry 
about, I don't trust them. 
I: And who do you trust? 
Well I'm always a great believer there's no smoke without fire. Maybe the 
government guys will tell you there's nothing to worry about. Greenpeace, they 
maybe go a bit over board the other way and scare stories get too big. But I 
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always... If Greenpeace unearth something, then there is something to worry aboot. 
That's what I always think. Maybe not to the extent that they say but, put it this way, 
I would like to know the story in-between the two. The government experts on one 
side, and Greenpeace on the other." (I-15) 
In many ways, the crisis surrounding the oil spill exists because Shetlanders 
must create for themselves "the story in-between the two" (or three, or four), a 
process which is highly anxiogenic. As we turn to Shetlanders' perception of the other 
experts involved in the clean-up and monitoring of the spill, the local community's 
uneasy reaction to the results of scientific research in general - and to Greenpeace's 
work in particular - will become more explicit. And so will the divergence between 
their respective representations of nature/the environment. 
8.2.4. The "so-called experts" 
Alongside environmental groups, a plethora of scientists representing various 
governmental agencies, universities, research centres and private companies were also 
carrying out a battery of tests on fish, seawater, sand, arable soil, air, animals, 
human health, the oil itself, the dispersants used to break it up, and the interactions 
between any and all of these. It soon became clear that "plural rationalities" and 
"contradictory certainties" (Thompson, 1991) were jeopardising dialogues between 
experts, and that endemic distrust made the local populace very wary of constantly 
changing expert opinions and advice. Shetlanders wanted certainties and expected 
them to be defined in their own terms, there and then. They were forever dissatisfied. 
"And despite all the speculation from all the instant "experts", who have appeared 
from all corners of the earth, we do not know what further damage is yet to be 
done." (The Shetland Times, 01/08/93 (01); editorial) 
"Isn't it amazing when there is a disaster how so many people turn out to be new 
born experts and environmentalists? The experts who say there is no human risk 
either live well north in the island or are from the mainland and they will die of old 
age when the next generation now living at the "Sooth end" will be coughing their 
lives away in 20 years with cancer and bronchitis with no hope of compensation 
because they will be unable to prove that the air borne oil or fumes caused it." (The 
Shetland Times, 01/22/93, (03); p.15 ) 
"I really hate these experts that keep coming on the radio and TV and telling you 
there's nothing to worry about. They don't have a bloody clue whether there is 
anything to worry aboot or no." (I-15) 
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"This big boat came along, it happened to hit the shore, a little bit of light oil spilled 
out - oh! it's gone away. Where's it gone to? What happened to the actual bunker 
fuel on board? These are the answers we're not getting and until we do, you can 
present facts, figures, everything, wonderfully well. But at the end of the day the 
people sitting here have got to believe you." (The Shetland Times, 02/26/93, (08); 
P. 9) 
How are we to explain this dissatisfaction? To begin with, biologists, chemists 
and environmentalists could not provide answers which would even meet their own 
institutional and professional requirements: the prevailing weather conditions, the 
unknown characteristics of the oil and of the dispersants, the variety of habitats 
affected by the spill (and complex interactions between all these "variables"), all 
concurred to render impossible or, at best, to delay, a proper scientific assessment. 
"Shetlander: Hum... Can I just say that I don't think there is such a thing as an 
expert in these areas because there has never ever been an oil spill that has involved 
air pollution before, so how can they say that they are experts? 
Host: Well, that is a good enough question. Let's put it to anyone who cares to 
answer it. How can you be an expert when you've got such a unique set of 
circumstances? I mean, is it... have you done it as well as you can, or can you say 
that you have got the absolute experts in the world on hand? How do you react? 
Convener of SIC: Well, we have engaged people that we thought had the qualities 
that were needed. And we have had no reason to suspect they were not able to give 
us advice. It is entirely new and that is running through everybody's head. There has 
been no experience of this type of thing before. The oil, the spray of the oil landing 
on the crofts and the... We have engaged the advice of people that we hope can help, 
perhaps. If they can't, it will be revealed but at the moment we are trusting them at 
their job. "(public debate) 
"The disaster presented the majority of wildlife workers with a situation they had 
never faced before and Ms Briggs admitted she had not known what to expect. "The 
full impact is very difficult to assess at this stage," she said." (The Shetland Times, 
01/15/93 (02); p.13) 
"That's just a totally unique sort of oil spill because it's light crude and they don't 
know what the effects of this kind of stuff can be on the marine life and on the shore 
life and the land. They're taking all the soil samples doon to the Mainland, to 
Aberdeen to have them, to see what the effects of these chemicals and the oil is 
going to have on the plant life and the grass and different types of crops. It's just... 
we're the Guinea pigs, if you know what I mean?" (I-14) 
"This has never happened before, the professionals do not know the effect it is going 
to have and I think you can gather from that that the community is extremely 
worried. [...] We know that they don't know because that is new." (I-03) 
The widespread unease, distrust and fears are compounded by the fact that, 
even when the information is indeed known, it is not necessarily made available to 
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Shetlanders; legislation on commercial confidentiality, for instance, prevented the 
authorities from divulging the contents of the dispersants. Lay conspiracy theories 
began to circulate. Some Shetlanders decided to investigate for themselves the nature 
of the dispersants. They discovered that some of the chemicals they contained had 
neither been approved by the Government for use on rocky shores, nor had they been 
re-licenced. 
"H: I feel that right from the start, you've probably heard about all the spraying that 
they did to begin with, and the locals put a stop to it but it should never have been 
done in the first place. They also issued respiratory masks that were supposed to 
protect us and I have been told that the masks were absolutely useless. They were 
no use for this kind of chemicals.[...] 
M: Yes. I don't think... there is no point that they supply these masks late like that. 
The action they did... There would have been actually no action at all if there had 
not been a few people up here that kept our heads up. 
R: That's right! 
M: That's exactly what it is [...] All we want to know is the truth here and they 
didn't tell us the truth. They are suddenly telling you things to stop you from 
panicking which even they themselves didn't even know. 
R: They were telling us everything was all right but they had never done any tests 
so how can they ken whether everything was all right or not?[...] And they didn't 
even know what the dispersants they were using were. We challenged them. We 
knew what the dispersants were. 
I: How did you know? 
R: Because we went on our own to find out. We went and found drums of stuff. We 
went to the storage place in Lerwick and to some other place where they were storing 
them at the aerodrome. We go in through the security, we go up to get the name of 
the stuff, and then we went to Greenpeace with it because they know." (G-03) 
Initially, the local activists were labelled by fellow Shetlanders as "trouble-
makers" or "scaremongers" because of their association with, and reliance upon, 
Greenpeace; because they were, at least implicitly, challenging the "splendid job" 
done by the local authorities; and because they spoke to the foreign media. They were 
bringing unwelcome news. But soon, another appraisal emerged. The "trouble-
makers" became icons of Shetlanders' resilience and of the infallibility of local 
knowledge. They had refused to listen to "experts" and were proven right. 
" ... the so-called "troublemakers" have made a worthwhile contribution. Their 
questions and protests alerted the authorities to two very important but perhaps 
unwelcome things — firstly that the huge, well organised twice-daily effort to deal 
with the national and international media at Sumburgh Airport was not getting the 
message through to a lot of very worried local people; and secondly that the concerns 
of those people arising out of the disaster were not being addressed in a way they felt 
was convincing. When the first spraying of dispersants was badly handled by 
Government experts, who got the method of spraying altered? The "troublemakers". 
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And then there's the local doctor — who I hesitate to call a troublemaker, but maybe 
in this context it's an honourable title — who cautioned people in the Ness about 
possible dangers posed by exposure to crude oil after the grounding. He appeared on 
television and also expressed his fears at a public meeting, but his views were made 
light of by the local health authorities who appeared to be intent on soothing 
everybody into a state of complacency — presumably on the advice of Government 
experts. These, as we have already seen in the spraying botch-up, and in the giving 
of incorrect details as to which brands of dispersants they were using, are not 
infallible." (The Shetland Times, 01/22/93, (03); p.8) 
From Shetlanders' attitudes towards experts in general, and from their 
reactions to the "trouble-makers" in particular, much can be learned about the 
relationships between knowledge and identity, and about how these become 
intertwined with the dynamics of social life, especially in the case of marginalised and 
de-traditionalised communities. We saw earlier (section 8.2.2.) that Shetlanders 
relentlessly demanded the recognition of local knowledge: they claimed that they 
knew better; they wanted to be consulted and directly involved; they wanted their 
voice, the voice of experience, to be heard. 
"Maybe some day the "experts" with their book learning will listen to the people with 
experience." (The Shetland Times, 01/22/93, (03), p.15 ) 
Shetlanders found, in the battle for knowledge about the dispersants, the 
confirmation, as it were, that when the locals are listened to, they are proven right. 
In this sense, it is no accident that the activities of these few Shetlanders should have 
been the object of much media coverage and of praise in everyday conversations. Yet, 
local knowledge is progressively losing its legitimacy, as scientific knowledge and 
modern technology also penetrate, and profoundly modify, Shetland society. 
Shetland's very foundations, its traditions and knowledges, and the way of life which 
rests upon them, are undermined. Confidence in local knowledge erodes. Even the 
most traditional folks now seek reassurance from "experts" . Expert knowledge is 
received with a mixture of deference and scepticism, trust and fear. 
The reaction to expert knowledge was deeply enmeshed with the particular 
quality of social life in Shetland too. For one thing, the typical scientific idiom of 
certainty and control was culturally discordant with that of "real Shetlanders" , whose 
way of life demands constant flexibility and adaptation to changing circumstances, 
rather than prediction and control. The dominance of scientific discourses and 
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practices in the aftermath of the oil spill served to silence the Shetlanders who were 
indeed specialists within their own sphere, either as farmers or as fishermen. This 
institutional undermining of local knowledge, in turn, threatened the locals' social 
But some "internal" cultural censorship was also at play. The powerful ethos 
of egalitarianism, coupled with a profound disdain for "foolish" and "loud-mouthed" 
people, reduced to silence those who did possess traditional local knowledge and 
expertise, and who did master the local conditions. The stigma attached to what is too 
easily conceived as arrogant and boastful displays of knowledge - of which "real 
Shetlanders" in particular would be acutely aware - prevented those who otherwise 
showed real mastery from sharing it, lest they be derided by fellow Shetlanders. 
"We don't know what tomorrow will bring. We don't know what the so-called 
experts will tell us about it. 
I: "So-called"? 
Oh yes, yes. I would add "so-called", yes. I trust them very little. I have seen local 
guys that I have known all my life suddenly becoming experts. When you see that, you 
can add "so-called" 4-02) 
Local knowledge thus tends to become an important ideological and cultural 
resource but, at least when multiple rationalities , are found in the same context, it no 
longer constitutes a trusted tool to make sense of the real. In a globalising world, 
Shetlanders are left having to rely on the alien discourse of foreign environmentalists 
and scientists. This discourse is meant to be axiologically neutral; it is supposed to 
be based upon the rigorous assessment of discrete and clearly identifiable physical 
problems which are conceived as having an independent, objective existence in nature 
(for a critique, see for instance Beck, 1992; Latour, 1987; Latour & Woolgar, 1979; 
Thompson, 1991; Wynne, 1988; 1992). Indeed, environmentalists and scientists 
design contingency plans, monitoring techniques and tests which are, by their very 
nature, applicable to any environment which displays specific bio-chemical 
10These dynamics are remarkably similar to the ones discussed by McKechnie (1996) on the 
Isle of Man, and by Wynne (1992) among Cumbrian sheep farmers. McKechnie (1996) gave a detailed 
ethnographic account of how the Manxian population establishes boundaries between insiders and 
outsiders, referred to either as "Stopovers" or "Comeovers", and described how such identity categories 
impinged on the construction of expert knowledge in the local debates surrounding the emission of 
radioactive waste from the Sellafield nuclear plant. In the same vein, Wynne (1992) studied how hill 
sheep farmers fought to establish the legitimacy of their experiential knowledge when, in the wake of 
the Chernobyl nuclear fall-out, they had to confront government "experts" and environmentalists who 
dictated policies which sheep farmers knew to be unsustainable in their particular environment. 
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characteristics. They provide test results which refer exclusively to such 
characteristics. 
"The Shetland Times has obtained confidential Scottish Office figures with detailed 
results of testing that took place on salmon farms and in the open sea between 13th 
and 24th January. These show that the three highest toxic readings for hydrocarbons 
in open waters were a somewhat freakish 640.5 microgrammes per litre one nautical 
mile south of Sumburgh Head on 19th January, 125.5 microgrammes three-quarters 
of a mile west of Fitful Head (within the exclusion zone) on 14th January, and 70.9 
microgrammes one and a half nautical miles north west of Fitful Head..." (The 
Shetland Times, 02/12/93, (06); p.8) 
"Seawater samples collected on llth and 12th February showed levels in the southern 
part of the zone fell from 40-60 microgrammes per litre (ug/l) to 10-25 ug/l. In the 
north west voes concentrations fell from 20-30 ug/1 to 5-10 ug/l. Immediately to the 
west of the zone, levels remained just slightly above natural background levels, as 
they did both in and outside the eastern part of the zone." (The Shetland Times, 
02/26/93, (08); p.8) 
"PAH concentrations in fish inside the exclusion zone show the highest levels to have 
been 2.16 parts per million (ppm) in oil-tainted dabs up to two miles west of Fitful 
Head on 17th January and 1.81 ppm in tainted dabs three miles west of Blackstacks 
on the same day. Outside the first exclusion zone the highest reading is 2.69 ppm on 
17th January on untainted whiting six miles south west of Fora Ness. "(The Shetland 
Times, 02/26/93, (08); p.8) 
These results are incomprehensible to Shetlanders, not only because they lack 
the scientific knowledge necessary to understand the meaning of the figures, but 
because these are presented in isolation, that is, without a discussion of their 
repercussions for Shetlanders. They rest upon a representation of nature which 
excludes humankind as an internal and creative factor. If the problems targeted by 
natural scientists have important human ramifications, they nevertheless posit the 
people affected by the spill as though they were another "variable". Moreover, the 
endemic discontent stems from the fact that the scientific knowledge which informs 
mechanistic/cybernetic representations appears to negate the experiential, sensory 
knowledge possessed by real Shetlanders. 
The simultaneous clashes between experiential and formal knowledge, between 
local and global modes of apprehension, between "an active perceptual engagement 
with components of the dwelt-in world... [and] the detached, disinterested observation 
of a world apart" (Ingold, 1993; p.40), between organic and mechanistic/cybernetic 
representations, are constitutive of the crisis surrounding the Braer because they are 
at the very core of the dynamics of social life, and of identity maintenance and 
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change, in de-traditionalised communities. Different modes of knowing, of doing and 
of being meet and collide. People must position themselves, which inevitably entails 
choosing between contents and modes of knowledge when such choice is, in the 
widest sense of the word, deeply political. For Shetlanders, such positionings are 
made according both to prevailing and/or desired social relations, and to the social 
and cultural implications of knowledge claims. 
Two brief examples suffice to illustrate the clashes mentioned above. The first 
is found in The Shetland Times, in the section entitled "Our Readers' Views". It is 
a plea for the recognition of Shetland as a meaningful place, and for a change in the 
dominant discourse which considers the oil spill in terms of its bio-chemical effects 
on the environment in general. 
"I refer to the article in last week's Shetland Times concerning the Braer disaster in 
which a senior council marine member of staff was quoted as saying "a tanker load 
of oil is bugger all in the Atlantic Ocean." It may well have been bugger all, as he 
aptly describes it, had the tanker been in the middle of the Atlantic. Unfortunately 
Shetland just happened to be in the way. I'm sure the people of Quendale and 
surrounding areas will not be amused to hear this disaster described as bugger all." 
(The Shetland Times, 01/22/93, (03), p.15) 
The second example is taken from the public debate. A highly distressed 
Quendale resident claims she knows that the oil has not gone and that "it is not all 
right to go out" because she saw oil on the beach, because her husband came home 
"all red in the face". Her anxieties are met with scientific reassurances from experts -
via the Council - which go unheeded because they do not address relevant issues. 
"Shetlander: I have just never been happy since day one because we have never got 
the proper information across since day one. We are still very concerned about the 
health risks and I think that the people from the South Mainland are just fed up 
asking and asking and asking. Because we keep getting the same thing peddled across 
all the time and, you know, we were told a few days ago that the oil had gone and 
I walked down my local beach and saw that there it was again. I mean I know it is 
not gone. It can't be gone! And you know, is it safe for the kids to go to the beach, 
is it safe for our kids to drink the water? I mean we are told that everything is O.K. 
and that it is all over but we just don't believe that! 
Chief executive of SIC: Nobody said it is all over. 
Shetlander: Pardon? 
Chief executive of SIC: The media have perhaps said it is all over but... 
Shetlander: No. The media, I got the complete opposite from the media whenever 
I talked to them. They thought it had been played down far too far. And they were 
very concerned about our nature. 
Chief executive of SIC: The Council has not said it is all over. 
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Shetlander: And what I would like... I am very pleased to hear Greenpeace are 
taking independent studies and I would like a lot more of that because there is such 
a lot, I mean people are just not trusting and believing what they are hearing. 
Chief executive of SIC: Maybe you are not hearing what you want to hear! 
Shetlander: [shouting] Well, I certainly do not want to hear that my family or my 
friends and anybody else is at risk over this! And I do know a lot of people in the 
area that has not been well! My own family was out working, sprayed with that stuff 
that the planes sprayed all over them. I saw him coming home at night all red in the 
face and down his neck. So I do know what I am talking about! 
Chief executive of SIC: Yes, but the Council is taking advice on behalf of the 
community from the experts on these issues and there is no reason to disbelieve 
them. 
Shetlander: [shouting] Yes, well, I have heard a lot about, a lot other. A lot of the 
experts are, they don't tell what I am hearing from the Council, I am sorry. 
Chief executive of SIC: So, they should personally talk to us then, so we can assess 
them. 
Host: Well, can we try and clarify this a bit. I mean what precisely, if you could 
narrow it down to about three things, what would you like to know now? I should 
have given you a notice of that actually but give it a shot. 
Shetlander: Well, the health is one thing. I am very concerned about the health of 
young people. 
Host: Like specifically, is it all right to go out or... 
Shetlander: Well, I know it is not all right to go out. We kept the kids in for over 
a week. I am very worried about that. I am very worried about the long-term, five 
to ten years, effects on the people's health in that local area. I am not the only one. 
And we still get a lot of feedbacks from people that have been not well and 
concerned about... There is a lot of people not happy."(Public debate) 
The "proper information" demanded by Shetlanders will never, in the 
aftermath of the Braer, be heard and assimilated because nature, for the islanders, is 
not the same as the nature which is being investigated by experts. Shetlanders and 
experts live in quite different, but deeply interrelated, worlds. Whereas the former 
are concerned with their livelihoods, the land of their ancestors, their physical and 
mental health, that of their children, with the "loss of amenity" (a rather technical 
locution to communicate to others the pleasures of meditating on the shores of a loch, 
of taking the bairns for a walk on the hills, of fly fishing, etc.), the latter define the 
oil spill as a complex of scientific problems to be researched in themselves. 
Communication presupposes commonality and communality; without them, the gap 
between the representations of "real Shetlanders" and of Sooth-Moothers cannot be 
bridged. In Shetland, social groups, with their different positionings and the wealth 
of already existing meanings conferred upon these very positionings, could not 
communicate: they lacked both commonality and communality. 
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8.3. Conflicts and consensus: Is the Braer a disaster? 
It is in adjudicating over whether or not the Braer was a disaster that the 
representational and identity work was perhaps most obvious. The lack of any 
certainty, or rather the co-existence of contradictory certainties and plural 
rationalities, concerning the long-term consequences of the oil spill, made possible 
various assessments about the potential consequences of the Braer. Six different sets 
of arguments can be retrieved: an opposing pair - "a disaster", "not a disaster" - for 
each underlying representation - organic, mechanistic and cybernetic. It would be a 
mistake to consider these as matters of discourse or of social cognition only: 
interventions of all sorts objectified the positions based on various representations, 
thereby participating in the continual creation of nature. There was, of course, much 
cross-fertilisation between the various representations as arguments, opinions and 
information circulated; the resulting social, political and "natural" interventions often 
reflected such mixed input. Often, too, contradictory evaluations of the consequences 
of the Braer were juxtaposed in the discourses and practices of social (individual and 
collective) actors. Nevertheless, the boundaries of the representational field were rigid 
enough to allow a systematic presentation of the arguments put forward by the 
proponents of each of them. 
8.3.1. Organic representations: Destruction and resilience 
For some "real Shetlanders", the simultaneous destruction of the wilderness, 
of a landscape of personal and collective memories organically woven with the 
traditional "way of life", and the symbolic death of the subject whose identity is so 
profoundly rooted in both the landscape and the life of the community, conspired to 
create a sense of complete disaster. These symbolic associations were captured by the 
metaphors of death and rape used to describe the oil spill; they were also manifest in 
the refusal to frame the consequences of the Braer in economic terms, Analogies 
between the Braer and the oil construction phase also indicated that Shetlanders feared 
a massive social, rather than merely ecological, disaster. They feared the dissolution 
of the social fabric through the typically "Sooth" evils of greed, dishonesty and envy 
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which would bring about unsustainable social inequalities. 
A much quoted and discussed article by an Alaskan "expert", published in The 
Shetland Times, summarises Shetlanders' fears. 
" Put simply, the Shetland way of life will never be the same. With this much at 
stake, and this much international attention, community structures will reorganise. 
Relationships within and between communities on the island will change. And, on an 
individual level, the psychological effect of a technological disaster such as this is 
almost beyond comprehension. Those whose identity is closely tied to the sea 
generally find a ghostly emptiness within them when the sea, their identity, is so 
severely poisoned. Such was the case in Prince William Sound." (The Shetland Times, 
01/15/93, (2); p.17) 
Clearly, the Braer is not simply an environmental issue: it is, first and 
foremost, a social and existential crisis. This is rendered all the more visible by the 
occasional, but significant, references to the perennial threat of outmigration. In 
Lerwick, people expressed surprise and dismay at the fact that some residents in the 
Ness should have temporarily moved away from the area because "Shetland folk are 
not like dat". Local representatives were also keen to emphasise that "Shetland is still 
a good place to be", that "there is a future in Shetland" (The Shetland Times, 
01/08/93 (01); p.4). 
But organic representations of nature were often associated with diametrically 
opposed assessments concerning the impact of the Braer. The intrinsic connection 
between self, society and nature remained the same, but different cultural resources 
were drawn upon in evaluating the effects of the spill. For instance, the 
geomorphology of the islands was used to convey a sense of solidity and permanence 
upon the Shetlandic "way of life". The "Old Rock" symbolised Shetlanders' tenacity, 
strength, and "resilience". Most "real Shetlanders" were also left unmoved by the 
strictly ecological catastrophe forecast by environmentalists and experts: "a few dead 
birds" hardly constitute a disaster. Moreover, Shetlanders intimately believe that little 
can prevent Nature from taking its course; in The Shetland Times as well as in 
conversations, it was constantly emphasized that the sheer power of the elements 
would clean up the oil. "Nature will be left to take its own course as far as the 
cleaning of oil from Shetland beaches goes" (The Shetland Times, 02/12/93, (06); 
p.8).Thus, not spraying chemical dispersants, not putting up booms or burning the 
oil, for instance, were types of interventions consonant with the traditional ethos and 
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with local knowledge: "you do not try to outdare the elements" . 
We therefore find some ambivalence among "real Shetlanders" regarding the 
consequences of the oil spill. This ambivalence engendered apparently contradictory 
statements from the locals. It was often said, by the same person, and within the 
space of less than a minute, that nothing had ever hit the community like the oil spill, 
that it would split the community, that the pain, sadness and anger aroused by the 
Braer compared to being raped and to losing a loved one, that it was a disaster "too 
horrific for the imagination to grasp" , etc. Yet, in the same breath, the locals would 
also stress that they would recover, that it could not have happened in a better place, 
that everything would go back to normal, that the spill was merely an incident or an 
accident, but not a disaster. The more positive assessments were rooted in the belief 
that Shetlanders will always show their true colours, overcome problems and get the 
impossible done. They are as solid as their islands. 
To conclude, a number of "real Shetlanders" used the metaphors of death and 
rape to structure and communicate the painful emotions aroused by the oil spill. They 
linked its ecological impact to the dissolution of both social life and self. They 
criticised those who have earned, or may be tempted to gain, substantial 
compensation at the expense of "the next door neighbour" . They anchored the Braer 
in terms of two other "disasters": the oil construction phase in Shetland and the Exxon 
Valdez (which, in this case, was envisaged in terms of its long-term, devastating 
social and psychological consequences). They also blamed those who elected to leave 
their homes in the immediate aftermath of the spill, and attempted to counter a 
potential wave of outmigration. Together, these discourses unambiguously indicate 
that, for them, the Braer either already was a disaster, or threatened to become "the 
last nail in the coffin." Others stressed that both Shetlanders and Nature would be 
resilient enough to overcome this latest crisis, that the locals had shown their true 
colours and had become more united, that local knowledge was superior and would 
eventually triumph over that of Sooth-Moothers. All in all, Shetland was still a good 
place to be. Thus, "real Shetlanders" transformed the extraordinary event of the 
grounding of the Braer into an ordinary reproduction of the past, of their scorned and 
flouted identity in the eyes of others and, yet, of their resilience in the face of 
adversity. The past was invoked to limit the multiple potential meanings of the present 
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and, by displacing the problem, it allowed Shetlanders to confer old significations to 
a disturbing, novel event. These old significations, reworked in common, served to 
protect the Shetlanders' collective identity. 
8.3.2. Mechanistic representations: Resources, the market and control 
An altogether different set of arguments and interventions, predicated mainly 
upon mechanistic representations of nature, were also advanced and implemented in 
the wake of the oil spill. If the construction of the Braer in terms of organic 
representations transformed the spillage of 85,000 tonnes of light crude oil into a 
potential social and existential crisis, for those holding mechanistic representations, 
it became essentially an economic (and, more marginally, a political) crisis. First, the 
Braer was discussed with respect to its impact on "natural resources" . In this context, 
nature acquires an instrumental quality and becomes envisaged in terms of its 
potential in providing "resources" which can serve human needs. Second, and closely 
intertwined with the former, much attention was devoted to the consequences of the 
spill for the local economy. Again, nature appears in atomised, fragmented form, as 
though it were a source of interchangeable products extrinsic to human activity. 
Indeed, production and consumption are central aspects of relations to nature based 
on mechanistic representations. Nature becomes a commodity, with a particular 
exchange value attached to it, and which enables it to become detached from the total 
social universe of which it is both part and product; hence, the possibility of 
compensating Shetlanders for their loss. Third, mechanistic representations were also 
manifest in the urge to control and predict the consequences of the spill by 
summoning to Shetland disembedded natural scientific expertise. National regulations 
were demanded by the Chief Executive of the SIC, the Tourist Board and the local 
MP, as well as by salmon farmers and deep-sea fishermen, to re-route tankers away 
from Shetland. 
The Exxon Valdez was also used as an anchor to convey a sense of disaster. 
But this time, it was the damage to the local economy and the endless legal delays in 
granting compensation (as well as the insufficient amounts of money handed out) 
which had been experienced in Alaska to which people alluded. Evaluations of the oil 
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spill as either "a disaster" or simply "an accident" were based largely on some 
conjunction of the above three factors. Various uncertain and more or less meaningful 
results of laboratory tests conducted outside of the islands were invoked either to 
support the view that the Braer would be crippling or that Shetland would recover. 
Similarly, some claimed that compensation would arrive in due course and in 
sufficient amounts, whilst others feared it would not. Again, radically different 
assessments of the consequences of the Braer were possible on the basis of a 
predominantly mechanistic representation of nature. Incidentally, this provides 
important empirical support for one of the early claims made by social representation 
theorists (Moscovici, 1963), namely that social representations are more basic than 
attitudes. 
8.3.3. Cybernetic representations: Ecosystems and science 
Finally, cybernetic representations, according to which nature (the 
environment) is conceived as a global eco-system which exists outside society but 
which humankind must protect in order to ensure its own survival, led to other sets 
of arguments in the construction of the Braer either as a disaster or as a simple 
accident or incident. The Exxon Valdez was probably most often referred to in this 
context by those stressing the far-reaching and long-term damage wrought by the oil 
spill to the local fauna and flora. Much emphasis was also put on human 
responsibility for the current crisis, both locally and globally, immediately and more 
generally. For some, everyone (Shetlanders and Sooth-Moothers alike) was to blame 
for using oil (thereby making it necessary to transport oil and increasing the 
likelihood of a major catastrophe). They would stress the "unsustainable" character 
of such practices and call upon, with some degree of scepticism, international bodies 
to regulate the transport of hazardous substances. They would also draw attention to 
"worrying scientific results", and enjoin the authorities to take action to ensure that 
such a disaster could never be repeated elsewhere. 
But, on the basis of the same representation, others would make diametrically 
opposed claims. The differences between the ecosystems in Shetland and in Prince 
Williams Sound would be stated, and the environmental consequences of the Braer 
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would be minimised by adopting a global perspective and by assessing the impact of 
the latest spill in terms of world pollution and long-term damage to the Earth as a 
whole. Scientific research was also summoned to this aim. It served to reinforce the 
cybernetic view of the environment as a homeostatic system which would recover on 
its own. Thus, some would advocate a laissez-faire approach - since the environment 
has self-healing qualities- and leave the waves and the winds to do the clean-up; 
others would rather spray with dispersants to break up the oil into smaller particles 
which would then get dispersed more quickly and evenly, and spare the local wildlife 
by spreading across the Atlantic Ocean. One representation, different evaluations, and 
even contradictory prescriptions and interventions. 
The table below summarises the arguments which serve to construct the Braer 
oil spill either as a "disaster" or "not a disaster" . These arguments differ according 
to the particular social representations of nature of the people who formulate them. 
If there is some oscillation between the assessments of the consequences of the oil 
spill (either disastrous and enduring or relatively circumscribed and short-lived) 
within a given representational universe, the boundaries between representations are 
more rigid. 
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8.4. Conclusions 
A number of conclusions can be derived from this case study. The analysis 
revealed how central social representations of nature were in framing reactions to the 
oil spill, but also in providing a rationale for various "interventions" in its aftermath. 
The empirical focus was firmly placed on "real Shetlanders". We have seen that, 
through the filter of their organic representations, "real Shetlanders" experienced the 
oil spill as a fundamental attack on self and on the community - a rape, the death of 
a whole "way of life" - but that they could also escape the most dramatic consequences 
of the oil spill by drawing upon the common idioms of resilience and solidarity. For 
them, the oil spill was defined as yet another instance of foreign incursion into local 
affairs, with the catastrophic consequences which this normally entails, but against 
which the locals would unite and show their true colours. In other words, the analysis 
highlighted the fundamental importance of identity processes in maintaining boundaries 
between insiders and outsiders. These processes were no doubt exacerbated by the 
perceived and very real denigration of local knowledges by Sooth-Moothers, and by 
the "disaster" itself, which triggered a defensive attitude. However, the systematic use 
of certain symbolic resources (such as analogies with the oil workers or with "The Old 
Rock") for maintaining and protecting the locals' identity signals more enduring 
defensive and affirmative identity processes. 
The social heterogeneity described in the previous chapters both manifested 
itself during the crisis and contributed to its making: Sooth-Moothers and other de-
traditionalised Shetlanders (such as members of the local council, the Tourist Board, 
oil workers and most Lerwick residents) had an entirely different approach to the 
crisis, which left "real Shetlanders" profoundly dissatisfied and distraught. For Sooth-
Moothers, the issues raised by the oil spill seemed external to people, divorced from 
their existence; they had to be addressed systematically and rationally, through science 
and the law. Conflicting interests dominated the discourses between these various 
factions of Shetlandic society, who otherwise shared a common representation which 
integrated elements of both the mechanistic and cybernetic states of nature described 
by Moscovici. It is worth reiterating that the smooth and unproblematic passage from 
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one state of nature to the next conceptualised in the essay of the human history of 
nature finds no empirical support: today's representational field of nature is fraught 
with contradictions because it integrates dimensions of each of the three states. 
This partly explains why relationships between Shetlanders and Sooth-Moothers 
during the crisis were characterised by misunderstandings, tension, distrust and, at 
times, by an almost complete breakdown in communication and social interaction. This 
was evidenced by Shetlanders' reactions to: 1) the master of the tanker Braer and her 
crew, whose seamanship was called into question because they lacked local knowledge 
and did not display the traditional ethos of Shetland fishermen; 2) the "experts", who 
were discredited by the use of the qualifier "so-called" to preface any reference to 
them, even if they provided reassuring knowledge about the results of scientific 
monitoring; 3) the "birdie people", whose fascination with wildlife and exclusive focus 
on the ecological damage wrought by the oil and the dispersants angered the locals; and 
4) the dishonest and over-dramatic media constructions of the oil spill abroad, which 
were blamed for creating the crisis in the first place. The communication and 
interaction breakdown was also manifest in the remarkably low level of attendance at 
the public meetings which aimed to bring together the various protagonists involved in 
the crisis (such as the "Donaldson Inquiry" meeting or, indeed, the "Cost of the Braer 
for Shetland" debate), as well as in the silence of "real Shetlanders" . 
Cutting across all these, we uncovered deep and closely intertwined oppositions 
between scientific knowledge and local knowledges, between the global and the local, 
between control and adaptation, between Sooth-Moothers and "real Shetlanders", 
between modernity and tradition, between mechanistic/cybernetic representations and 
organic ones. The social construction of the Braer oil spill is the complex and 
multifaceted product of the interplay of these different modes of knowledge, modes of 
relations to nature, identities, and social representations. They are all bound up with 
the structural transformation of Shetlandic society. 
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9.0. Epilogue 
The aim of this thesis was to substantiate the project of the theory of social 
representations as an "anthropology of modern life" by exploring how different social 
groups represent and construct "natures". The analysis, based on fieldwork carried out 
in the context of the Braer oil spill in Shetland, I believe, contributes to this aim. It 
shows that natures are socially constructed through ideas, images and practices; it 
provides a description of the various representations of nature circulating in Shetland 
at the time, and of their joint involvement in the construction of the ecological/social 
crisis. The case study also enables me to confirm important aspects of the theory of 
social representations, to clarify others, and to raise new theoretical issues. 
In the pages that follow, I shall summarise my theoretical perspective on social 
representations of nature, as well as my findings on the structure and content of 
organic, mechanistic and cybernetic representations respectively, and discuss some of 
their theoretical, methodological and practical implications. This will entail a re-
examination of Moscovici's general theory of the socio-historical nature of nature and 
of his three-fold typology. This discussion also suggests some refinements to the 
theory of social representations. Much work is still needed to understand the complex 
relationships between social representations, identities and modes of knowledge. 
Greater theoretical and analytical effort should also be devoted to grasping the 
dynamics of permanence and change in real life, where representational fields are 
more often than not plural, fragmented and heterogenous. 
9.1. 	"Weak" and "strong" social constructionism and social representations of 
nature 
Social life, whether ordinary and routinised, or eventful and dramatic, is at one 
and the same time the product, the condition and the object of social representations. 
It is the very reality which social representations partly construct and which shapes 
them, to which they correspond and which they symbolise; it is the space where they 
are exchanged and negotiated, and which they simultaneously change and maintain. 
In this thesis, I have argued, and tried to demonstrate empirically, that the same is true 
of "nature", to the extent that it is also socially constructed, that it has a human 
history, that it is socialised by human activities, and that, paradoxically, it remains an 
external object which shapes our material and symbolic practices. 
To analyse how natures are expressed in symbols and how different 
representations of nature realise patterns of power, modes of knowledge, social 
relations, etc, I proposed distinguishing between "strong" and "weak" versions of 
social constructionism and adopting the former'. My own version of "strong" social 
constructionism can be summarised as follows. First, social representations are not 
only innocuous opinions and beliefs held by individuals. They are complex systems 
of images, ideas and practices which have ontological correlates. To represent is not 
only to re-present an object to consciousness or even to remodel it. It is also more 
than just the culturally and socially conditioned activity of a subject who would invest 
a passive, already-existing object with meaning. Rather, to represent is, in a very real 
sense, to transform social knowledge into reality. As people interact with existing 
material forces, they interpret, shape and change them in ways which reveal the 
'Dittmar (1992), Dickens (1996) and Tester (1991) also propose a distinction between "weak" 
and "strong" social constructionism in relation to "nature". However, they and I confer different 
significations upon these concepts and draw different conclusions from them. "Weak" constructionism, 
we agree, refers exclusively to epistemology. It states that various social groups understand and 
communicate about an otherwise stable natural world in ways which reflect their insertion in particular 
cultures. This perspective is often endorsed by philosophers and historians of science concerned with 
tracing our changing "concepts': or "ideas" of nature throughout history (e.g. Collingwood, 1945; 
Crombie, 1948; Haraway, 1989; 1991). "Strong" social constructionism, according to Dittmar (1992) 
and Tester (1991), by contrast, is the view that "nature" is only what human beings make of it. Nature 
itself does not exist; only discourses about it do. This perspective denies that there are features of the 
world which exist independent of discourses and cognitions. Extra-discursive phenomena are ruled out 
altogether (Tester, 1991). This seems plainly untenable. It is also squarely incompatible with the notion 
of "strong" social constructionism I propose. It would be an intellectual tour de force to deny, for 
instance, that gravity affects people universally and quite independently of the knowledge people may 
have, or of the discourses they may engage in, concerning materiality. 
Dickens (1996) claims that his version of "strong" social constructionism is not in the least 
incompatible with realism. For him, there is a "false dichotomy" between these philosophical views: "a 
realist can indeed handle both perspectives and view them as dialectically interdependent" (Dickens, 
1996; p.83). The dichotomy is allegedly resolved because realist natural sciences give us insights into 
the structures and processes of the world, whereas constructionist social sciences make us aware of the 
differences and particularities of time and place. In a paradoxical fashion, Dickens goes on to say that 
"we must [nevertheless] make a crucial distinction... between material processes and relations on the 
one hand, and our understanding of, and communications about, the processes on the other" (Dickens, 
1996; p.83). This perspective seems to institute (or at the very least confirm), rather than dissolve, the 
dichotomy. This statement betrays a materialist empiricism which views representations as secondary 
elaborations; it also points to an excessive reverence for the natural sciences and for the hegemonic 
representations of nature which they have developed. Such a view does not acknowledge that the 
"conceptual" or "ideal" part of reality is no less concrete than its material part (Godelier, 1984). Dickens 
fails to appreciate that physicists, chemists, biologists and ecologists operate on the basis of particular, 
and no doubt legitimised, representations of nature. These do not simply reflect an objective and 
unchanging Nature; they participate in the creation of new natures. As knowledge evolves, so do our 
possibilities to intervene in the world and to shape nature according to our interests. The fact that 
natural scientists are sporadically interested in the exotic representations of nature of other people, 
whilst they themselves keep uncovering the "true nature of Nature" in no way resolves the dichotomy. 
Dickens' perspective corresponds precisely to Latour's (1991/1993) notion of "particular universalism": 
according to this world view, one culture - ours - has a privileged access to Nature which sets it apart 
from the others. How this can be justified is never demonstrated. 
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operation of culturally-shaped assumptions about the world. In other words, as 
representations become objectified, they acquire a concrete existence and construct 
ever-new material systems, or "natures". Thus, and this is the second aspect of the 
argument, although natural phenomena do exist and indeed profoundly impact upon 
all forms of life, the essence of Nature as an immutable given is forever inaccessible 
to human beings 2. The main question is to uncover and explain the very diversity of 
the processes of objectification through which human beings construct themselves and 
their natures. This is a central task for social psychologists. 
This perspective, although highly compatible with a particular version of the 
theory of social representations, was mainly elaborated from sources derived from 
sociology (e.g. Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Latour, 1991/1993), anthropology (e.g. 
Descola, 1992, 1996; Douglas, 1970/1996; Godelier, 1984; Ingold, 1993) and the 
history of science/sociology of knowledge (e.g. Horigan, 1988; Moscovici, 1968/1977; 
1972/1994). There is simply no literature on the social representations of nature. There 
is of course, as we have seen, a plethora of studies on environmental cognitions, 
attitudes, values, behaviours, perception and the like; but they rarely question the 
notion of the Environment itself. How this novel object came into existence, how it 
2One may wonder why it is so difficult to conceive of natures as being socially constructed. 
Some have argued that we hold on to the boundaries between "nature" and "culture" because they justify 
and legitimise the institutional existence of the human sciences as autonomous disciplines (Horigan, 
1988). But the main objections, I believe, to redefining the boundaries seem to be that this new 
conceptualisation would reinforce the anthropocentrism so vehemently criticised by conservationists as 
well as environmental sociologists (Dunlap & Catton, 1994), and that it leads to complete relativism 
(Benton, 1993). Upon closer inspection, however, it turns out that neither argument is founded, or 
rather, that both deserve further qualification. The main problem with anthropocentrism seems to be that 
nature is conceived as a mere repository of resources to be used by human beings. This, in turn, could 
lead to so-called "unsustainable" economic practices and, ultimately, to the extermination of the human 
species. I would contend that the essential problem is not with anthropocentrism per se, but with the 
particular, mechanistic, social representation of nature upon which anthropocentrism of the form 
criticised by environmental sociologists is predicated. However, it would be difficult to state that the 
novel cybernetic representation of nature, or of the "environment", is not itself anthropocentric. Is the 
disappearance of a particular species problematic in itself? Nature - whatever that may be - would 
change, indeed, but then again it has always done so. The desire to protect particular species, and 
amongst them whales and dolphins before spiders and sand eels, is justified strictly from an 
anthropocentric perspective. Without human intervention, "nature" would equilibrate itself as new 
species would inhabit niches previously occupied by others. Nature conservation is a human problem, 
not a natural one. This is equally anthropocentric. 
Now, to emphasize the variety of social representations of nature does not amount to complete 
relativism. To acknowledge the reality of plural representations of nature and to point to the social 
transformations of "natures" in no way precludes the possibility of comparing them either in respect of 
their internal coherence, or of their efficacy in given circumstances (Douglas, 1987). It does question, 
however, the contemporary western assumption of a universalistic conception of Nature. The projection 
of such an assumption upon various social groups prevents an adequate understanding of local forms 
of ecological knowledge. Some anthropologists have come to this conclusion earlier than social 
psychologists because their fieldwork experience taught them that the nature/culture dichotomy was 
meaningless among the peoples they studied. My own research also prompted me to question this 
dichotomy because it could only account for some representations. 
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differs from, and relates to, older representations of nature, how it can co-exist with 
them and with what consequences for those who hold them, such issues have not been 
addressed by social psychologists. They have not paid much attention either to the 
relationships between cognition, affect and desire, and still less to the articulation of 
the above with broader social conditions, on the one hand, and with symbolic and 
material practices, on the other. I hope I have contributed to the development of a 
genuinely social constructionist social psychology better able to address these issues. 
9.2. Three social representations of nature in Shetland 
In my own research, I tried to apprehend the multiple facets of social 
representations by conducting the empirical research within the concrete social-natural 
totality where social representations are put to work. This was necessary to uncover 
the structural relationships which - as anthropologists studying exotic cultures know 
but social psychologists studying modern societies deny - always exist between social 
representations of nature, forms of social organisation, economic practices, political 
institutions and types of rationality. 
The Braer oil spill, in spite of its extraordinary character, constituted an ideal 
empirical situation in which to investigate how different social groups represent and 
construct natures. The oil spill itself defined the temporal and spatial scope of the 
analysis. It brought together in one place groups of people who do not normally 
interact face-to-face. The simultaneous presence of diverse representations of nature 
opened up the critical possibility of questioning the criteria involved in the 
determination of the issues to be investigated, the indubitability of the "facts" 
submitted to scientific analyses, the availability of unambiguous "hard data" (see 
Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Latour, 1987; Nothnagel, 1996, for a discussion of the social 
construction of Nature in scientific laboratories and discourses). One could observe, 
under dramatic circumstances, how realities are created, negotiated and changed. 
Lewin once commented that to understand a phenomenon one needs to study it in the 
process of change. This applies to social representations as well as to attitudes. By 
using a broad range of methods (individual interviews, group discussions, a content 
analysis of the local newspapers, and participant observation across a number of social 
269 
situations), I was able to retrieve the diverse representations of nature proposed by 
those involved, in different capacities, in the social construction of the Braer oil spill. 
The theory of social representations, coupled with Moscovici's (1968) typology of 
"states of nature", provided the necessary conceptual framework to analyse the content, 
the structure and the functions associated with different representations of nature, as 
well as the dynamics of their transformation. I could describe in a particular context, 
without privileging the modern or natural scientific vantage point, how different social 
groups represent and construct natures. Let me summarise my findings concerning 
organic, mechanistic and cybernetic social representations. 
9.2.1. Organic representations of nature 
Perhaps the main distinguishing feature of organic representations is that they 
are almost "pre-modern" (Latour, 1991/1993) in the sense that those who hold them 
do not impose rigid boundaries between Nature and Society. As we have seen, 
Shetlanders rarely talk about nature as an object. Nature is conceived and experienced 
as a lifeworld. They see themselves as creators of their nature ("The reason there is 
so much wildlife here is because the Shetlander was prepared to respect it, to live with 
nature.") rather than as simple users of resources. Real Shetlanders cannot conceive 
of modifying material forces without, at the same time, also transforming the social 
order, and vice versa. The two are intrinsically related. I have shown in the empirical 
analysis that, for real Shetlanders, personal biography, collective memory and the 
physical world are all intimately linked. Their close association was revealed, for 
instance, in how real Shetlanders introduce themselves: stating who one is inevitably 
entails providing a detailed description of one's family history, of one's rootedness in 
a particular place and social network. Walls, dikes, bays and hills are known by the 
names of those who built them, fished in them, or dwelt on them. The lines of 
demarcation between Nature and Society tend to become blurred, as rocks carried and 
carved by one's ancestor become imbued with meanings; as everyday activities are 
shaped through and through by the land, the seas and the winds; as ancestral 
knowledge is kept alive in bodily movements which no one can recall ever having 
learned and yet knows to be distinctly Shetlandic. One's private experiences and 
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biographical memories merge with, and are explained in terms of, the history and the 
culture of the community, for which the landscape constitutes a gigantic mnemonic 
device. 
The correspondence between society and nature also came to the fore in the 
association between being a real Shetlander and participating in the elusive way of life 
through crofting, fishing, knitting or curing peat. Only such natural-social practices 
were thought to be coherent with the traditional form of social organisation, the self-
proclaimed moral qualities of Shetlanders, and the material world: Society, Self and 
Nature tie in through them. In many ways, one is reminded of Levy-Briihl's 
(1949/1975) notion of participation: Shetlanders participate of their society and natural 
order as much as they are constituted by them. For "real Shetlanders", participation 
is what is given in the first place; it is a datum, not a post-hoc reconstruction of a 
clearly apprehended relationship between two and three distinct entities. 
The social construction of the crisis itself further revealed the structure and the 
content of organic representations. As often as not, the existence of such 
representations was revealed by their very absence from public discourse, by 
Shetlanders' self-proclaimed inability to "put into words" how they felt about the 
effects of the oil spill. The content of organic representations was revealed mainly 
through metaphors about the Braer (in particular those of death and rape, which linked 
the oil spill, the entire way of life, and personal identity), stories about the place 
(one's genealogy, narratives of the rule of the Scottish lairds) or via practices or 
accounts of practices ("I don't watch birds, I never had to. The birds are here; I'm 
here."). The refusal to seek compensation or to speak out in public, the inability to 
quantify one's loss, the resistance to the framing of the oil spill in terms of its 
"environmental" damage, the constant effort to reinstate the local perspective over 
against the global one propounded by experts, the criticism levelled at environmental 
groups for "cutting bits off', all attested to the specificity of organic representations. 
So did silence. Moreover, whether real Shetlanders characterised the oil spill as a 
"disaster" or as just another accident soon to be overcome, the arguments invoked on 
either side were identical in nature: they all rested on the correspondence between the 
social and the natural worlds. Thus, for some, Shetlanders were going to cope with 
this latest crisis, just as the Old Rock itself had withstood more devastating blows in 
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the past; Nature would be "resilient", just as Shetlanders themselves are. Conversely, 
for others, the destruction of nature, of the wilderness, of a landscape of memories 
would bring about a parallel destruction in the way of life of the local community, 
with its distinct culture, history and sense of identity. 
9.2.2. Mechanistic representations of nature 
Diametrically opposed to the organic representation of nature, we find the fully 
fledged "modern", mechanistic social representation. This representation is so familiar, 
so taken-for-granted that it is difficult to de-naturalise. Western scientific and lay 
epistemologies are predicated upon it. It permeates how we think of ourselves and of 
others (Descola, 1996). It is also the representation upon which many of the 
environmental and ecological psychological theories which I discussed at the outset 
are founded. Essentially, mechanistic representations assume and privilege an ontology 
of separation which places human societies outside of what is residually construed as 
Nature or the "physical world". If systematic correspondence and participation between 
nature and society characterised the organic representation, a complete dichotomy of 
the two terms, and the reification of both as distinct domains, are the most striking 
features of the mechanistic representation. What are in fact the joint, historical 
products of human activity become irremediably opposed, disconnected (Moscovici, 
1972/1994). According to this particular representation, Nature is never socialised; 
there is no room for reason or meaning within its orderly system. It is represented and 
constructed in such a way as to lend itself to instrumentalisation, domination and 
exploitation. Nature appears as a given, immutable, ahistorical world of substances and 
forces governed by principles extraneous both to chance and to human intervention, 
but which, nevertheless, impact on social life and serve human needs. It is a place of 
necessity where nothing happens without a cause and an explanation. The laws 
governing the natural world of things-in-themselves are to be revealed by Science. 
The crisis surrounding the Braer oil spill began in earnest with the anchoring, 
by the international media and, later, by lay people, of the latter in terms of the Exxon 
Valdez. Time, place, the specificity of the local context and culture were all excluded. 
Nature - universal, external, objective - was at stake. The selection of the Exxon 
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Valdez as a suitable anchor for the Braer was motivated by ideology, politics, 
economics and, importantly, by a combination of mechanistic and cybernetic social 
representations. Only a representation of nature as a universal object detached from 
local meanings and experiences, but towards which human beings are responsible, 
could allow for this process of anchoring. And yet, it all seemed so natural! The 
detached expertise of scientists from various universities was avidly sought after by 
most in the wake of the Braer. Members of the Shetland Islands Council, local 
reporters, salmon farmers, Lerwick residents - in fact, everyone but some rare real 
Shetlanders who insisted on the superiority of local knowledge - expected to learn 
from scientists the objective causes and consequences of the "natural" disaster. 
Scientists are trusted: they are impartial, have no interests other than revealing the 
truth about some objective, universal Nature. They are thought to be free from 
tradition, authority, local circumstances. A large number of articles began to appear 
in The Shetland Times about the characteristics of the spilled oil and of the chemicals 
used to disperse it, the damage caused to animal and vegetable life (fish, lambs, birds, 
grass, tatties, nipps, etc.), the safety of water supplies, and the results of various other 
scientific studies and assessment exercises conducted in laboratories abroad. 
In the empirical analysis, I have insisted on a symptomatic manifestation of the 
mechanistic representation: the issue of compensation. Arguably, it is over 
compensation that the clash between representations was most acute and revealing 3 . 
The very notion of compensation implies, in some fundamental way, the dissociation 
of Nature from the local meanings and identities which may otherwise be derived 
from it. It rests upon the assumption that Nature is nothing but a set of resources 
which can be quantified and that it has a strictly instrumental value. As such, it can 
be substituted by another instrument: money. Money itself has no connection with 
particular values; in order to be, money must be detached from everything. By 
attributing a monetary value to Nature, the latter can emerge as a true "universal", cut 
off from any particular way of life, identity, experiences. The unity between the 
3The very idea of attributing an economic value to nature is exogenous to both organic and 
cybernetic representations. For those who hold organic representations, nature cannot be valued in 
economic terms because it is intrinsically linked to their sense of self. And those who hold cybernetic 
representations oppose such quantification because Nature is not to be valued extrinsically; it has value 
in itself and for itself. 
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natural and the social world postulated by real Shetlanders, as well as the existential 
meanings attached to it, are excluded altogether. Of course Shetlanders wanted to get 
some money to survive the material consequences of the crisis, but they never thought 
money could compensate for their loss: an entire way of life. 
The arguments used to construct the oil spill either as a disaster or as an 
accident focused essentially on natural resources, on the amount and timing of money 
available for compensation, on legal issues, on the long-term effects of the oil spill on 
the reputation of Shetland produce, and on the health consequences. One person could 
emphasize the destruction of natural resources; another Nature's prompt recovery. 
Some could assert that the oil spill constituted a serious health hazard; others could 
retort, with supporting facts and figures, that the results of health tests were reassuring. 
In the face of such complex events as oil spills, the accuracy of scientific claims and 
counter-claims is very often simply undecidable. Indeterminacy and uncertainty are 
endemic. The scope for redefining and integrating ever more scientific evidence is 
almost infinite. 
9.2.3. Cybernetic representations of nature 
Cybernetic representations of nature also emerged in the scientific domain, at 
the turn of this century, where they challenged the hegemonic status of mechanistic 
representations. The proliferation of hybrids paradoxically favoured by the dualist 
modern episteme (Latour, 1991/1993) forced upon some scientists the realisation that 
human beings were indeed agents in the creation of nature (Moscovici, 1972/1994). 
But it is only in the sixties that these novel representations began to permeate the 
consensual universe, especially through environmentalist or conservationist 
movements. This sudden diffusion may have been the indirect result of technological 
advances: seeing the Earth from outer space rendered convincing the idea that we 
lived on a fragile and unique globe. At any rate, a whole new set of realities were 
created before our eyes: eco-systems and rare or even extinct species, global warming, 
the ozone layer, pollution, deforestation, etc. These new constructs were meant to 
articulate the necessary interdependency between natural and social processes. In many 
ways, this was a new departure. In others, it was a mere retrieval, continuation and 
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development of the dominant mechanistic representations. 
The present case study showed that cybernetic representations only partially 
succeeded in changing pre-existing conceptualisations of nature. The analysis revealed 
that the social actors who held them - especially environmentalists, but also lay 
Shetlanders (oil workers, local volunteers involved in the clean-up, etc.) and some 
Sooth-Moothers (journalists, volunteers from the British mainland, etc.) - opposed the 
instrumentalisation of nature characteristic of mechanistic representations. They 
focused on the interplay of political, economic, ideological and scientific factors both 
as causes of, and solutions to, the Braer disaster. They pointed to such "hybrids" 
(Latour, 1991/1993) as the hole in the ozone layer, pollution, the potential genetic 
mutations engendered by the introduction of unknown chemical substances, the 
destruction of eco-systems, and other such realities objectified by their very 
representations. They also, importantly, consistently used the substantive Environment, 
rather than Nature, in an attempt to emphasize the simultaneous construction of 
natures-societies, to retrieve a sense of historicity in nature and social life alike. 
And yet, they also fetishised Nature as some transcendental object in its own 
right, to be protected against industrialism and predatory capitalism, and to be 
rationally controlled by responsible, "sustainable" economic practices. Far from 
questioning the foundations of Western cosmology, environmentalists tended to 
perpetuate the ontological dualism typical of modern societies and of their 
corresponding mechanistic representations. The duality persists and the ideal of 
mastery survives, but the roles attributed to human beings change: from one of 
domination and exploitation of natural resources, to one of protection of the eco-
systems. For instance, in the wake of the Braer, a whole conference, entitled 
"Managing the Marine Environment", was set up. Similarly, The Shetland Times 
published a series of articles on the need to protect the Earth - which we would have 
inherited "untouched" by our ancestors and should pass on as such to our children. 
The creation of a sanctuary for seals and otters in Hillswick (manned mainly by 
Sooth-Moother volunteers, interestingly), and the organisation of birds rescue 
operations by the RSPB, were also typical expressions of cybernetic representations. 
These actions reveal a concern for the protection of the Environment for its own sake. 
In a different way, the opposition to the spraying of dispersants by "green" groups 
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indicate a representation of nature as a system endowed with self-regulatory 
mechanisms, a system which can regenerate itself without explicit human intervention. 
In spite of these novel dimensions, the project of environmentalism derived 
from cybernetic representations seems unable to escape the conditions of modernity 
in order to propose a radical re-conceptualisation of natures-societies. I would argue 
that this, in large part, is due to the association of environmentalism with the natural 
sciences and their epistemology. Even the notoriously anti-establishment organisation 
Greenpeace has appointed an academic scientist as its director and relies heavily on 
its high-tech "mobile laboratory" in order to monitor "environmental problems". The 
latter are regarded as physical problems, arising from specific forms of human 
intervention in natural systems. Their character and boundaries are given by Nature, 
their authenticity guaranteed by natural scientific investigation. Cybernetic 
representations have been anchored in mechanistic ones, sharing their reification of 
both Nature and Society as antithetical ontological domains. They have nevertheless 
emerged as a distinct representation mainly through their emphasis on the systemic 
properties of matter, their attribution of some inherent value to Nature and their re-
definition of the role of human beings in relation to it. 
How were cybernetic representations used in order to construct the Braer oil 
spill either as an accident or as a disaster? One could alternate between considering 
the oil spill in terms of its local impact, in which case it seemed quite disastrous, or 
considering it in the global context of world pollution, in which case it appeared quite 
insignificant. One could focus on the relatively small toll levied by the spill on the 
local wildlife, or emphasize the inherent value of life, stressing how a single dead 
bird or otter is a tragedy when it is unnecessarily caused by human foolishness. 
Furthermore, one could manipulate the temporal register: in the short-term, the 
destruction of the local eco-systems seemed rather dramatic; in the longer-term, the 
Environment would re-equilibrate itself and thus the damage would be minimal. By 
calling upon ambiguous and constantly revised scientific evidence, one could construct 
the oil spill as just about anything, from a total catastrophe to a barely noticeable blip. 
Ideological, political and economic commitments ensured, however, that the former 
option would be diffused by environmentalists. It was also clear that green groups 
would privilege certain life forms over others. Hence the discomfort expressed by 
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cybernetic representations 
some real Shetlanders at the fascination for wildlife manifested by the "birdie people". 
Organic, mechanistic and cybernetic social representations of nature, as they 
emerged from the empirical analysis in Shetland (rather than as they appeared in 
Moscovici's abstract account), can be represented graphically as follows: 
Figure 9.1. Organic, mechanistic and cybernetic representations of nature in 
Shetland 
organic representations 	 mechanistic representations 
As the diagram shows, the theoretical perspective according to which human 
beings are actively involved in the simultaneous construction of both nature and 
society corresponds neither to the phenomenological experience of Shetlanders nor to 
that of Sooth-Moothers. The analysis reveals what is probably one of the most 
powerful instances of objectification as a modality of consciousness: human beings, 
who in fact jointly create their states of nature and themselves, have a propensity to 
forget their own authorship. They produce realities - systems which articulate the 
relationships between Nature and Society - which paradoxically deny their role as 
producers of these realities (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). This is particularly baffling 
in the case of mechanistic and cybernetic representations. On the one hand, they 
institute a radical divide between Society and Nature; on the other, they lead to the 
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proliferation of entities which belong exclusively to neither of the dichotomised realms 
which these representations create. By contrast, real Shetlanders, who are otherwise 
acutely concerned with the relationships between the natural and social orders, in fact 
modify their "state of nature" at a much slower pace and in a much less dramatic 
fashion than other social groups. 
What are the theoretical implications of these findings? Moscovici's typology 
of the three "states of nature" proved immensely useful, once re-formulated in terms 
of the theory of social representations. It allowed me to re-consider the literature on 
environmental and ecological psychology as being itself a product of particular 
representations of nature. It also provided a framework to capture the different 
representations of nature which were circulating in Shetland in the aftermath of the 
Braer oil spill. Moscovici's account of the socio-genetic processes which bring about 
and shape each representation of nature also provided depth to my research by tracing 
the origins, in Western history, of some of the representations I identified in Shetland. 
Yet, as the analysis progressed, it became clear that both the theory on the 
human history of nature and the typology needed to be refined. First, states of nature, 
or social representations of nature, do not supersede each other in any simple sense. 
The assumption of linearity in Moscovici's work must be challenged: heterogeneous 
representations of nature can and do coexist - in rival or complementary ways - in 
contemporary societies. We do not live in an exclusively cybernetic nature. Indeed, 
I have argued that the crisis in Shetland stemmed partly from a contest between 
various social representations of nature. Second, the empirical differences between 
mechanistic and cybernetic representations were sometimes minute. The overlap 
between them was perhaps their most notable feature. Thus, whatever the radical 
novelty of cybernetic representations that Moscovici identified, this remains mainly 
in potentia. Other social scientists (e.g. Descola, 1992; Ingold, 1993; Palsson, 1996) 
have also found the dualism inherent in modern, mechanistic representations of nature 
to characterise the discourse of environmentalists, in spite of the latters' explicit 
rejection of this very dualism. Third, the present study investigated the content of 
organic representations of nature. This could not be achieved in general terms; by 
definition, these representations are local and particular, rather than global and 
universal. Their genesis, structure and content are linked to Shetland's geographic and 
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climatic conditions, to the indigenous way of life and traditions, to the modes of 
knowledge which prevail on the islands, to the forms of communications which link 
them to the outside world, etc. Only detailed ethnographic work could uncover the 
content of organic representations and demonstrate their intimate connection with the 
local culture, history, mode of knowledge,• sense of identity and natural practices. 
These complex relationships were left untheorised by Moscovici. 
The issues singled out above also have implications for the theory of social 
representations. They raise new questions. Why do older representations survive 
nowadays? What happens when diverse representations are found together? How do 
social subjects position themselves in a heterogeneous representational field? What are 
the consequences of this plurality for the social representations themselves, for those 
who hold them, for social life in general, and for the object to which they refer and 
which they construct? What are the relationships between social representations, 
modes of knowledge and identities? These questions have emerged from the analysis. 
They will be addressed briefly below, but more research is needed to answer them 
satisfactorily. 
9.3. Heterogeneous representational fields and the dynamics of social life 
Social representations correspond to the particular institutions and forms of 
social organisations of the cultures in which they are rooted. But what happens when 
different representations are found together, co-existing for a while in a discrete social 
situation, thereby constituting a heterogeneous representational field? In most 
theoretical and empirical studies on social representations, when a plurality of 
representations are indeed identified, researchers tend to satisfy themselves either with 
making an inter-group comparison, or with establishing a mere typology (notable 
exceptions include Jodelet, 1989/1991; Jovchelovitch, 1995; Moscovici, 1961/1976). 
One is left with a sense that each representation exists almost independently of the 
others; the cross-fertilisation, the dynamic relationships between them seem lost, and 
so are the struggles of individuals and groups to position themselves in, and to make 
sense of, a complex and rapidly changing reality. Yet, empirical situations prevent 
such easy simplifications. Certainly, in Shetland, social representations created in 
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markedly different contexts, by different social groups and with different objectives 
began to circulate, to extend beyond the boundaries of the societies in which they had 
first emerged, and to permeate the lives of groups to which, at first, they seemed most 
alien. In the wake of the oil spill, organic, mechanistic and cybernetic representations 
could not exist independently of each other: no one could ignore the simultaneous 
presence of these diverse representations. Individuals and groups had to position 
themselves in a highly contested representational field. Moreover, all representations 
were not equally endowed with authority and legitimacy: some enjoyed the support 
of powerful institutions - Science, the Law, the Market - which transcended the 
immediate social context; others were rooted exclusively in the social fabric of the 
local community and were efficacious strictly within the confines of the latter. 
The three representations described above rarely existed in a "pure" form. 
Hyphenated representations (organic-mechanistic, mechanistic-cybernetic, organic-
cybernetic) were the norm rather than the exception, as communications and 
interactions among various groups were dense and intense. Listening to polyphonic 
discourses, faced by polysemic natures, social actors had to become "cognitively 
polyphasic" 4 . There is nothing surprising in the syncretic character of this social and 
cognitive practice. After all, social representations are a practical form of knowledge. 
However, the anchoring of particular aspects of social representations was not a 
random process. It was highly structured and, I would tentatively suggest, seemed to 
be governed by two principles. On the one hand, the practical imperatives facing the 
community ensured that different representations (or aspects of representations) were 
mobilised to achieve the specific ends to which they are best suited. In other words, 
representations were activated in terms of their functional potential, which seems to 
support the hypothesis of cognitive polyphasia. On the other hand, an intrinsic 
connection between representations, identities, modes of knowledge and modes of 
relations constrained the possible combinations of elements from different 
representations. Let me explore these hypotheses after having reiterated, through some 
4Moscovici (1961/1976) once hypothesized that in modern societies, in order to resolve ever 
more complex natural and social problems, people would have not only to learn new languages but also 
to develop varied mental apparatuses. He thought that a particular mode of knowledge might be more 
apt to meet the demands of propaganda, another those of economic decisions, a third those of science, 
and so on. Moscovici speculated that the "dynamic co-existence... of distinct modalities of knowledge, 
corresponding to defined relationships between human beings and their surroundings, [would] engender 
a state of cognitive polyphasia" (Moscovici, 1961/1976; p.186; italics in original, personal translation). 
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empirical examples, how aspects of apparently incommensurable representations were 
integrated and modified, thereby blurring the boundaries between the three types of 
representations. 
9.3.1. Hybrid representations 
The oil boom of the seventies, the influx of oil workers, the generalised use 
of money as a medium of exchange, the imposition of internationally-agreed fishing 
quotas, the large-scale changes in fishing technology, the creation of "environmentally 
sensitive areas" in Shetland by British conservationist agencies (which bring thousands 
of nature holiday makers annually), together with every household' s daily exposure 
to national and international information, all contributed to ensuring that Shetlanders 
would, in the space of a few generations, become "modern" and, somehow, also 
partake in the environmental movement. Although traditional Shetlanders still resist 
notions of domination, conquest, mastery or protection with respect to nature, they 
now share elements of other representations of nature. Even real Shetlanders now 
begin to evaluate the social honour of skippers by the value of the catch they land 
rather than by its size. The older fishermen's extensive knowledge of the ecosystem 
within which they operate, which is traditionally the product of arduous collective 
apprenticeship and of years of practical enskilment at sea, is now juxtaposed with -
and will probably be replaced by - hi-tech devices providing instant information. 
Crofting itself is sometimes engaged in for the governmental subsidies to which it 
entitles Shetlanders. Salmon farmers spend their working lives attempting to 
domesticate nature and to exploit its resources through rational management. More and 
more Shetlanders develop a reflexive awareness of their Environment and of the need 
to protect it. 
The widespread use of the substantive Environment is a prime example of the 
diffusion of cybernetic representations; it is indicative of the diffusion of what began 
as an essentially urban, reflexive, detached perspective on a problematised Nature 
within a society to which it would seem alien. During the crisis, even real Shetlanders 
discussed the problem of pollution. Not only the black tides their eyes could see, the 
oily grass their hands could feel or the nauseating fumes their nostrils could sniff, but 
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also the intangible pollution of the sea bed and the air which environmentalists have 
rendered just as visible and palpable to all. Ironically, scientists, environmentalists and 
the media have so triumphed over the years at objectifying "pollution" that, when 
some of them tried to convince Shetlanders that they incurred no risk in going out, 
working the fields, or drinking water, they were incredulous. Shetlanders knew all 
about pollution and, in another twist, they could now summon back their senses to 
prove that it truly existed! Whilst scientists were busy measuring the density of oil 
particles in the water column, Shetlanders already knew that the pollution was severe. 
One does not get watery eyes, itchy skin, breathing difficulties and redness in the face 
for no reason after all! 
In a different way, the spontaneous creation of the movement Save our 
Shetland also illustrates how elements of cybernetic representations were integrated 
within organic ones. Saving Shetland, the meaningful place, could not be achieved 
locally. Born and bred Shetlanders literally had to step outside their known world, 
often for the very first time, and go to Westminster to present the Prime Minister with 
a petition. The movement aimed at the implementation of oil tanker exclusion zones 
around Shetland's "vulnerable" areas, of a "global strategy for their safe management", 
and of a full public inquiry into the disaster. The objectives of the petition could 
hardly have been different because of the necessity of engaging with outsiders. 
Shetlanders had to establish a dialogue and to engage with alien representations, if not 
to make them their own. Significantly though, the organisers insisted that the inquiry 
draw on local knowledge as well as scientific expertise. Significantly too, the launch 
of the petition was attended mainly by journalists and television crews: Shetlanders 
stayed away (as they had during the public debate set up by BBC Radio Scotland, and 
as they would for the diffusion of the report of the Donaldson Inquiry). 
The desired re-conceptualisation of both Nature and Society, as well as of the 
relationships between them, which is at the root of the environmental movement, 
seemed to trickle down and to get appropriated, at least in part, by most. The attempts 
to restore the human, moral and relational dimensions which characterise organic 
representations and are negated by mechanistic ones, resonated among some factions 
of the indigenous population and slowly transformed existing representations. Yet, in 
this process of appropriation, the radical promise of cybernetic representations could 
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not be kept; they themselves became anchored within the more dominant, modern, 
mechanistic representations. To gain legitimacy, those who hold cybernetic 
representations draw upon institutions which belong to the very social order which 
they initially attempted to overthrow. Thus, the diffusion and propagation of 
cybernetic representations, mainly through environmentalism, may have succeeded to 
some extent in changing older representations of nature, but these processes changed 
their very essence, too, and partly rid the notion of Environment of its radical 
potential. 
The inter-penetration of social representations, however, is clearly 
asymmetrical. Organic representations are rarely integrated into newer ones. Real 
Shetlanders have limited means of asserting their representation of nature; the local 
perspective is valid exclusively in the context of its production and use. It is not 
supported by disembedded, powerful institutions. In the aftermath of the Braer oil 
spill, perhaps the only instance where organic representations have been recognised -
if not appropriated - by someone belonging to a different symbolic universe is when 
an Alaskan expert described how he had learned to appreciate the meaning of the sea 
for fishermen in Prince Williams Sound following the Exxon Valdez. In ways that 
have yet to be researched systematically, social representations are permeated by 
power relations: they express and reveal the struggles of social groups to create a 
dominant reality. The reality status of Nature as a given, fixed, once-and-for-all object 
which characterises mechanistic representations has had, and continues to have, great 
socio-historical potency. It is now challenged by cybernetic representations which, in 
their turn, impose new realities upon a collective humanity. A new nature is being 
created. 
9.3.2 Social representations, identities, knowledge and modes of relation 
I have described three social representations of nature in Shetland. I have also 
given empirical examples of hybrid representations which betray the anchoring 
processes which occurred in the context of the Braer oil spill. It became evident that 
there were, in practice, many more similarities between mechanistic and cybernetic 
representations than a review of the literature would lead one to expect. These 
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similarities and differences, and the possible anchoring of certain aspects of a 
representation within another, are far from random. These are structured contents and 
processes which, I contend, are related at once to people's sense of identity, to their 
modes of knowledge and to certain modes of relations which are associated with each 
representation. 
Real Shetlanders, for instance, differ sharply from others in how they think of 
themselves in relation to nature. They apprehend themselves as part of their nature and 
of their society. Their shared history and culture are objectified in a landscape which 
they alone know how to read. Their movements and senses are attuned to a nature in 
which they partake, whose cycles shape their everyday activities, and over which they 
will not claim mastery. The sense of identity of traditional Shetlanders is in large part 
derived from a landscape upon which it has already been projected, and within which 
it is already inscribed by the labours of earlier generations. 
But, if nature can act as a vast mnemonic device for real Shetlanders, it is also 
because they know it differently. Indeed, for those traditional Shetlanders who hold 
organic representations of nature, knowledge is to be attained through involvement and 
participation in one's world. It is a matter of sensory attunement, of active perceptual 
engagement with one's surroundings, of familiarity with the history of the community. 
Knowledge is achieved slowly, through experience, as one looks at others working, 
listens to their stories, tries to emulate their techniques and movements. Because it is 
fundamentally dependent upon "custom and example", as Descartes would say, this 
mode of knowledge - and the organic representations of nature to which it gives rise -
sustains the identity of real Shetlanders. This experiential, sensory, traditional 
knowledge, Shetlanders themselves call "local knowledge" (see also Geertz (1983) on 
local knowledge). Indeed, it is both produced and validated locally. It is tied to a 
place, an identity, a culture. The rules of inquiry ensure the confirmation of previous 
representations and identities. Attempts at debunking the prescribed knowledge are not 
open to all; only real Shetlanders, by virtue of their status in the community, can act 
as privileged producers and validators of local knowledge. They alone can invalidate 
it since this would entail a redefinition of collective values. Local knowledge also 
protects the entire community because it is an essential part of social control and of 
group identity, and because, by definition, it is not available to Sooth-Moothers. 
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Having recourse to another mode of knowledge immediately betrays a person's status 
as an outsider, thereby reinforcing the boundaries between real Shetlanders and Sooth-
Moothers and securing the local sense of identity. 
Finally, because they are tied to a place, a people, a mode of knowledge, 
organic representations also foster a very specific mode of relation with respect to 
nature. By mode of relation I mean schemes of praxis through which social 
representations become objectified and acquire a concrete reality. In the most 
traditional factions of Shetland society, this mode of relation is one of identification 
and participation: the interrelation with nature is so intensive and thorough that real 
Shetlanders cannot look at it from the outside. They are inside nature, as it were. This 
mode of relation involves the rejection of any radical distinction between Nature and 
Society, between science and practical knowledge. 
A fundamentally different sense of identity and mode of knowledge underlies 
both mechanistic and cybernetic representations. Those who hold them apprehend 
themselves as being positioned well outside both Nature (or the Environment) and 
Society. They apprehend themselves as truly universal subjects, freed from local 
knowledge and tradition, and endowed instead with intemporal reason. They look at 
the alleged sameness or unity of a world which they can either exploit, in the case of 
mechanistic representations, or protect, in the case of cybernetic representations. 
Exploitation and protection are two very different modes of relating to Nature but both 
rest upon the possibility of mastering it through rational, detached, instrumental 
knowledge. Indeed, intrinsically linked to these representations is a mode of 
knowledge which claims to be objective, value-free, open to the scrutiny of all - that 
is of all who share the same representation. It is the knowledge of "experts with their 
book learning" which Shetlanders contrast with the superior local knowledge of "the 
people with experience". 
This is where, subtly, identities tie in with modes of knowledge. Indeed, such 
a sense of identity - detached, free-floating, decontextualised - is rendered possible by 
the rationalism upon which modern societies are predicated. The relationship between 
"rational" knowledge and modern identity was already contained and perfectly 
expressed by Descartes' famous "Cogito ergo sum". The Cartesian Ego used Reason 
to constitute itself. There is a structural correspondence between modes of knowledge, 
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identity and social conditions. Thus, although this is systematically disguised, 
instrumental rationality and scientific knowledge are, too, fundamentally dependent 
upon "custom and example". Only the customs, examples, traditions, practices and 
"natural symbols" (Douglas, 1970/1996) have changed. It is the tour de force of the 
moderns that they should have made the separation between a world of things-in-
themselves out there and an all-powerful rational subject endowed with pure, 
"abstracted" knowledge look so natural. Nature is represented as if it were unattached 
to any particular culture, as if it were untied to the specific mode of knowing which 
in fact engendered it. Because experts operate at a level of considerable abstraction 
which rules out the intuitive and breaks away from the familiar, both they themselves 
and others assume that their theories are (or will eventually be) universally valid, 
ahistorical and asocial. This wishful illusion is tremendously powerful. 
Table 9.1. 	Structural relationships between social representations, identities, 
modes of knowledge, and modes of relations in Shetland 
Representation Identity Mode of 
knowledge 
Mode of 
relations 
Organic 
Representation 
real 
Shetlander 
local knowledge: 
experiential 
intuitive 
concrete 
traditional 
sensory 
adaptation 
identification 
participation 
Mechanistic 
Representation 
universal instrumental 
rationality: 
modern 
abstract 
disembedded 
disengaged 
mastery 
exploitation 
Cybernetic 
Representation 
universal instrumental 
rationality: 
modern 
abstract 
disembedded 
disengaged 
mastery 
protection 
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This table highlights the structural relationship between what people know (the 
content of social representations), who knows (the subjects' identity), how people 
know (the mode of knowledge possessed), and how particular representations become 
objectified (through modes of relations). As the case study has shown, these aspects 
of representational activity must be understood simultaneously. Their inextricable 
connection favours the stability of social representations and allows social subjects to 
resist, to some extent, alternative representations. 
9.3.3. The multiple functions of social representations and cognitive polyphasia 
If a given social representation is intrinsically linked to a sense of identity, a 
mode of knowledge and a mode of relations, how can people sustain hybrid 
representations? How can they, at the same time, think in different ways and 
apprehend themselves through different senses of identity? If, moreover, each social 
representation is fundamentally dependent upon a particular state of social life, to 
which it corresponds and which it partly creates, how can older representations survive 
in today's society or new representations permeate different societies? 
The survival of older social representations alongside, or even within, novel 
ones must be explained by the functions they serve. I do not mean to underestimate 
the richness and complexity of social representations as proper objects of analysis in 
their own right by explaining them away through some reductionist functionalism. 
However, it seems that, as long as social representations can be functional for at least 
some subjects in some contexts, they will be maintained as real. The diverse functions 
of social representations must be understood in terms of the dialectical relationships 
between social representations as continuously produced objective realities, and social 
representation as apprehension of those realities5 . 
In Shetland, I have found, that for those whose way of life is still linked with 
the land and the seas, who witness the transformation of their society and seek to 
resist it, holding on to an organic representation of nature is a means of sustaining 
5In other words, as social representations accomplish their functions, they themselves become 
transformed in the process, along with the realities to which they refer. The social actors who hold them 
do not remain unchanged either. To adopt a functionalist perspective, in this sense, could not be further 
removed from endorsing a homeostatic view of social systems. 
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their identity. By contrast, for those whose livelihood depends on the exploitation of 
natural resources for commercial purposes, who must rationalise production and 
foresee consumption, who need to establish trade links with the outside world, or to 
manage Shetland's economic and political life within the broader context of British 
and international institutions, a mechanistic representation of nature is more functional. 
Finally, for those concerned with the "environmental" sustainability of current 
economic practices, with the protection of eco-systems, with such global issues as 
world pollution or the widening of the "hole" in the ozone layer, a cybernetic 
representation of nature constitutes a better guide for action, and enables a better 
mastery of the very issues which are privileged by this representation. Depending on 
the circumstances, a different representation, or different elements of a representation, 
may be activated. Of course, these functions may be served, first and foremost, 
because each social representation of nature, and the corresponding state of nature 
which it partially represents, already defines them as being of paramount importance. 
Therefore, it is because environmentalists tend to share a cybernetic representation of 
nature that they emphasize only certain abstract properties of material systems and 
insist on the need to protect local eco-systems. Similarly, it is because Nature is 
already represented as a set of forces and resources to be dominated and exploited by 
men that salmon farmers and local politicians tend to hold a mechanistic 
representation of nature. And it is because real Shetlanders are agreed upon the social 
meanings and collective memories which they read in materiality that they mobilise 
the latter at times of crisis to sustain their identities. This is a matter of dialectics, not 
of tautology. 
Different social representations can co-exist also because the various spheres 
of life are not all equally permeated by instrumental rationality. The sphere of 
economic production, for instance, is highly rationalised and systematised, but not that 
of consumption. Political life seems to oscillate between traditional, charismatic and 
bureaucratic authority and rationality. Cultural life, more generally, is heterogeneous 
and can hardly be said to be subjected to the canons of instrumental rationality. Thus, 
because economic, political and cultural life are themselves fraught with contradictions 
and liable to incompatible demands, they must also sustain different social 
representations (and therefore, different modes of knowledge, different senses of 
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identity and different modes of relations) which enable social actors to master the 
multiple dimensions of their world. 
This perspective brings us back to Moscovici's hypothesis of "cognitive 
polyphasia". My research substantiates this hypothesis. However, the modes of 
knowledge used and invoked do not seem to be nearly as diverse as Moscovici 
(1961/1976) had envisaged. There is no one-to-one correspondence either between a 
social representation and a mode of knowledge, or between a practical imperative (be 
it communicational, economic, scientific or religious) and a mode of knowledge. 
Indeed, two distinct social representations can be rooted in the same mode of 
knowledge. Such was the case for mechanistic and cybernetic representations of nature 
which, despite the claims of environmentalists, both relied on the same kind of 
rationality. Only two distinct modes of knowledge were identified: "local", 
experiential, traditional and sensory versus instrumental, rational, objective, detached 
and universal. The limits upon the potential diversity of modes of knowledge, I have 
suggested, are related to the sense of identity associated with each mode of 
knowledge. 
9.4. Permanence and change: some reflections on the consequences of the 
Braer for Shetlanders 
As I bring this thesis to a close, it seems important to reflect on the potential 
consequences of the Bruer for Shetlanders. In particular, I should like to discuss the 
dynamics of permanence and change, or of "de-traditionalisation". What follows are 
only thoughts and speculations which raise more questions than they offer answers. 
More definitive statements about the actual consequences of the crisis would require 
going back to the archipelago (something which I hope to do in the near future). 
In some important ways, and for centuries, Shetlanders have occupied the 
concrete space of the margins. Geographical peripherality has functioned to 
marginalise Shetland, allowing a distinct culture to flourish there. Although this 
culture has been slowly eroding, Shetland is still a community where homogeneity is 
sought, if not always realised; people think of themselves as fundamentally different 
from non-Shetlanders; everyone "ken" just about everyone else; traditions are 
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remembered. This physical and symbolic location in the world has always opened up 
the possibility of resisting, and even at times of subverting, foreign representations. 
Recall the example of the tea towel, where hegemonic geographical facts were 
distorted to locate Shetland at the centre of the (framed) world. This potential was 
dependent upon the strength of local representations which were not expressed just in 
words but in modes of being and in ways of living. 
What happens when such a community faces an oil spill which projects it onto 
the screen of every household? What happens when such a community sees itself 
through the eyes of the other? Does it still recognise itself? The tanker Braer did not 
only bring oil. It also brought home the realisation that the mythical, homogeneous 
image of themselves Shetlanders so desperately wanted to believe in and live by, was 
more fragmented than was easy to acknowledge. Shetlanders had to come to terms 
with this fact about themselves. At the same time, they had to try to reconcile the very 
real differences which existed in their representations, identities, modes of knowledge 
and modes of relating to nature between themselves and Sooth-Moothers. Furthermore, 
they also had to resist whatever similarities there were between them so as to protect 
their identity and way of life. These almost incompatible demands had to be met in 
the midst of an ecological crisis, with its own complex logistical, economic, political, 
legal, scientific and social problems. 
The Braer made it plain that, this time, Sooth-Moothers could not be blamed 
entirely for creating the social unrest: some fishermen, those pillars of the Shetland 
way of life, were challenging the fundamental rules of social life by demanding 
financial compensation. Local folk were exploiting foreign journalists. The 
population's elected representatives were representing other interests. Many were 
claiming, against their own experience, that the oil spill was "not a disaster". The 
threat to the community, the split which, for so long, was feared and resisted, was 
visible. In the flow of social representations, of divergent opinions and advice, 
Shetlanders had to choose whom to trust. They often elected outside agencies (such 
as Greenpeace representatives or scientists from Alaskan or Aberdonian universities) 
as their privileged source of information instead of the representatives of the Shetland 
Islands Council or the local doctors. This choice was profoundly against the ethos of 
self-sufficiency: suddenly Shetlanders could no longer rely exclusively upon 
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themselves because endemic distrust was corrupting community relations, because 
organic representations could not be communicated easily, and because these local 
representations were ill-suited to address more global and often technical issues. There 
was no scientific expertise at hand, on the islands. 
Which strategies did Shetlanders adopt to resist the imposition of dominant 
meanings and to restore a sense of agency? First and foremost, they resorted to what 
can be described as "strategic essentialism". They put forward a consensual image of 
the "real Shetlander" derived from myths, traditions, and reconstructed history. I do 
not mean to suggest that Shetlanders do not generally think of themselves as having 
particular moral qualities; only that the critical context of the Braer led to a closure 
of the potential meanings associated with being a Shetlander. This image, or identity, 
became narrowly organised around a series of binary oppositions: born and bred 
Shetlanders are "resilient", "honest", generous, "resourceful" and "reserved"; Sooth-
Moothers are weak, immoral, selfish, "handless", and "loud-mouthed" 6 . 
The long-term consequence of this strategic essentialism - which in the short-
term may be necessary to protect the community - is that it leads to the exclusion of 
significant numbers from the collective definition of "being a Shetlander". We have 
witnessed how, when an individual or a group (such as oil workers or SIC councillors) 
`The construction of such a sense of identity can only be understood in terms of the islanders' 
particular history and culture, as well as in terms of the functions which it serves. "Resilience", for 
instance, is a core element because resistance to outside powers - whether those of the lairds, of the 
current Government or of the oil industry - was, and still is, deemed essential for the survival of the 
community. "Resourcefulness" is also a central feature because physical isolation and life under harsh 
climatic conditions render self-sufficiency and inventiveness necessary to cope with very limited 
resources. "Reserve", or the lack of assertiveness in public behaviour, also stems from the pragmatic 
imperative of avoiding conflict in a tight-knit community which could not easily withstand open dissent 
for any length of time. Similarly, "honesty" has specific semantic ramifications in Shetland: it has to 
do more with the sharing of the group's ethos of egalitarianism, and with the observance of the latter 
in practice, than with some abstract moral principle. Being "honest", therefore, can be expressed by 
working hard for a meagre salary, by providing free help to family and friends with everyday chores 
on the croft, or by making no gain at the expense of the next door neighbour. In this sense, the group 
uses its history and projects its ethos in the construction of its identity. 
Clearly, although the construction of identities engages, in some fundamental ways, the affects 
and the cognitive efforts of individual subjects, it is no private business. It draws upon cultural forms 
and social norms, and uses alterity to define selfhood. Social identity and social categorisation theories 
may contribute to explaining the processes of categorisation which are undoubtedly involved here, but 
they simply cannot account for either the specific contents of what is represented as essentially 
"Shetland" or essentially "Sooth-Mooth" or for the social processes which, over time, result in the 
creation of such groups. Indeed, for Tajfel and his colleagues, the specific content of identities is 
irrelevant. Under experimental conditions, subjects are arbitrarily allocated to groups - the Klees and 
the Kandinskys, for instance. On that random basis, they come to favour their in-group in order to 
sustain their need for positive self-identity, which remains a black box. Outside the laboratory, however, 
people are usually not simply assigned to social groups; they create them. This entails defining the 
attributes of each group. Social identity and social categorisation theorists also fail to address what 
happens at an explicitly societal (rather than inter-personal) level since they focus on individual needs 
and motivations as a means of explaining inter-personal and intergroup dynamics. For this, we must 
invoke the theory of social representations. 
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failed to maintain the integrity of the group, and thus threatened to weaken the 
boundaries between real Shetlanders and Sooth-Moothers, it was the whole community 
which was summoned to restore the boundary by excluding them. As Jodelet noticed 
in Ainay-le-Chateau, when a community is threatened from within, "the deviant suffers 
the same fate as the impure stranger. He is relegated to the margins of the 
acknowledged social sphere. This ability to displace the partition within the group 
preserves its order" (Jodelet, 1989/1991; p.277). 
Already, as has been amply demonstrated, the partition has been displaced 
often. Indeed, Shetland today is not solely, and unreflexively, peopled with 
Shetlanders. There are "real Shetlanders", born and bred Shetlanders, ordinary 
Shetland folk, some rare Sooth-Moothers who are more or less accepted, and other 
excluded Sooth-Moothers (with English people being further removed still than Scots). 
These fine distinctions are the marks of past struggles, of previous contacts with 
otherness. With every significant or prolonged exposure to the outside world, the 
process of displacement of the boundaries (of narrowing of the in-group) and of their 
"rigidification" is repeated. With the consequence that, over time, the group of 
traditional, "real Shetlanders" becomes ever smaller and ever more reflexive about 
their specificity. The "taken-for-grantedness" characteristic of traditional societies 
slowly erodes as the fight to prevent the local ethos from disappearing altogether and 
the battle to restore a sense of pride, of historical and cultural continuity, become part 
of everyday life. As they are now, the fine distinctions between social groups point 
to an acute awareness of, and resistance to, some alterity within. 
Thus, in the short-term, the consequences of the oil spill paradoxically may be 
somewhat positive. The uneven exchange which took place during the crisis has 
strengthened some Shetlanders because they have reasserted their identity and 
proclaimed loud and clear the superiority of local knowledge. But, as the boundaries 
become much more rigid between real Shetlanders and others, the former group also 
shrinks in importance and losses legitimacy. It sees itself as an ethnic group on the 
verge of extinction, as Shetlanders themselves would joke bitterly about. Indeed, 
perhaps the most important consequence of events like the Braer is that, caught in an 
asymmetrical flux of representations, local communities, with their owndistinct 
traditions and ways of being and of living, themselves become "endangered species". 
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ANNEXE 1 
Extent of pollution on Wednesday 6 January 1993 
Source: 	The Braer Incident. Shetland Islands, January 1993., 
Marine Pollution Control Unit, Department of Transport, 
HMSO, 1994. 
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ANNEXE, 
Table 1: 	Qualitative Synopsis of The Shetland Times. Headlines of front page and 
editorials 
Date (issue) Front page (F)/"The Old Rock" (editorial) (E) 
01/08/93, (1)  - "DEADLY CARGO. Worst fears realised as tanker spills" (F) 
- "Weather is key to evacuation" (F) 
- "Unheeded warnings" (E) 
01/15/93, (2)  - "Cruel sea cleans it up" (F) 
- "New claims over tanker master's role" (F) 
- "Hard to quell health fears" (F) 
- "A mood of optimism" (E) 
01/22/93, (3)  - "Storm chaos as records shatter" (F) 
- "Rights of passage" (E) 
01/29/93, (4)  - "Labour's Scottish spokesman hits a "blanket of silence". Secrecy 
on test results comes under attack" (F) 
- "Self-defeating secrecy" (E) 
02/05/93, (5)  - "Salmon farmers face total ruin" (F) 
- no editorial 
02/12/93, (6)  - "Salmon slaughter due within weeks" (F) 
- "Ministers snob SIC conference" (F) 
- "Heavy vetting" (E) 
02/19/93, (7)  - "Caithness might come after all" (F) 
- "Descending into farce" (E) 
- "Little local difficulty" (E) 
02/26/93, (8)  - "Accusations fly high in compensation row" (F) 
- "No surprise" (E) 
03/05/93, (9)  - "Compensation deal agreed" (F) 
- no editorial 
03/12/93, (10) - "Mystery oil came from Braer" (F) 
- no editorial on the Braer 
03/19/93, (11) - "Cool treatment angers petition delegation" (F) 
- "No surprises" (E) 
03/26/93, (12) - no front page report on the Braer 
- no editorial on the Braer 
04/02/93, (13) - "Global audience plans action for the future" (F) 
- "Not cutting any ice" (E) 
04/09/93, (14) - "Boost for farmers as smolts arrive" (F) 
- "Prince is all set to return" (F) 
- "A letter to Santa" (E) 
04/16/93, (15) - no front page report on the Braer 
- no editorial on the Braer 
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Table 1: 	Qualitative Synopsis of The Shetland Times. Headlines of front page and 
editorials (continued) 
Date (issue) Front page (F)/ "The Old Rock" (editorial) (E) 
04/23/93, (16) - "Inquiry hears scheme criticised" (F) 
- no editorial 
04/30/93, (17) - "Sheep should be kept off land" (F) 
- no editorial 
05/07/93, (18) - no front page report on the Braer 
- no editorial 
05/14/93, (19) - no front page report on the Braer 
- no editorial on the Braer 
05/21/93, (20) - "Labour throws down radar gauntlet" (F) 
- "Grazing land released" (F) 
- "Paying for pollution" (E) 
- "So who cares?" (E) 
05/28/93, (21) - "Huge loss hits salmon companies after spill" (F) 
- no editorial on the Braer 
06/04/93, (22) - "Donaldson rejects calls for radar in the interim" (F) 
- "Second round of health tests" (F) 
- no editorial on the Braer 
06/11/93, (23) - "Compensation breakthrough. Victory for seafood associations" 
(F) 
- "Braer firm faces action" (F) 
- "We need to know more" (E) 
06/18/93, (24) - no front page report on the Braer 
- no editorial 
06/25/93, (25) - "Clean-up plan was inadequate" (F) 
- "Still no comment" (F) 
- no editorial on the Braer 
07/02/93, (26) - no front page report on the Braer 
- "Good news after bad" (E) 
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Table 2: 	Qualitative Synopsis of The Shetland Times. "The tanker Braer disaster" 
Date (issue) "The tanker Braer disaster" (page number) 
01/08/93, (1)  - "Countdown to major oil spill" (2) 
- "As we watched we felt pathetic" (2-3; continued from front 
page) 
- "Last ditch bid to save ship from the rocks" (3) 
- "Questions on anchors" (3) 
- "Stay away" warning" (3) 
- "Costs quiz for the PM" (3) 
- "Scale of problems widens day by day as oil spreads" (4) 
- "Convener praises emergency team" (4) 
- "Crew members tell of escape in 65 mph winds" (4) 
- "Greek master claims help came too late" (5) 
- "Plea for tanker ban in channel" (5) 
- "Contingency plans swiftly in operation" (5) 
- "Supply boat captain frustrated by events" (5) 
- "Cancelled orders rumour denied" (6) 
- "Ewing demands action on tankers" (6) 
- "Oil in Loch of Spiggie bird reserve" (6) 
- "Braer US-owned" (6) 
- "Full effects on wildlife not yet clear" (7) 
- "Council launches scheme to compensate Ness crofters" (7) 
- "Litigation lawyers urge "don't rush" (8) 
- "Ministers visit scene" (8) 
- "Rules of road" (8) 
- "Firm faces ruin following storms" (8) 
- "Air attack on oil" (8) 
- "Tourism fears" (8) 
- "Sanctuary ready" (8) 
01/15/93, (2)  - "Ten days on and now is the time to look ahead" (2) 
- "SIC to move to Ness to show their support" (2) 
- "Pilot says he made the right decision" (2; continued from front 
page) 
- "Warning that bunker oil may still pose threat" (3; continued 
from front page) 
- "Informal protest" (3) 
- "Interest in telling the truth" (3; continued from front page) 
- "Fish chiefs move to keep industry's image clean" (4) 
- "Anger turns on store as Marks and Spencer call a halt" (4) 
- "Fish tested and used to feed the national media" (5) 
- "Tourism campaign launched to "keep Shetland on the map"' (5) 
- "Fishermen astonished at ddecision to abandon early" (5) 
- "Master praised by coastguard" (6) 
- "Coastguard releases time table of the disaster" (6) 
- "Position doubt" (6) 
- "Ship's failure raises more questions than answers" (7) 
- "Speculation dangerous says ferry captain" (7) 
- ""Warnings unheeded"" (7) 
- "Labour's prevention plan" (8) 
- "Calls for radar watch round coast" (8) 
- "Tanker off Skye claim!" (8) 
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Table 2: 	Qualitative Synopsis of The Shetland Times. "The tanker Braer disaster" 
(continued) 
Date (issue) "The tanker Braer disaster" (page number) 
01/15/93, (02) 
(...continued) 
- "Concerts planned" (8) 
- "Council gives congratulations" (8) 
- "About turn in wake of Braer accident" (8) 
- "Concerns over ships seen off Fair Isle" (8) 
- "Inquiry into wider issues announced in Commons" (9) 
- "Wallace backs union call" (9) 
- "MacGregor makes visit to "appaling tragedy" (9) 
- "MP warned Government of dangers" (9) 
- "Advert in "extreme bad taste" (9) 
- "SIC chief moves to quell fear on spray" (10) 
- "Dispersant use is questioned" (10) 
- "How to use masks" (10) 
- "Spray contents remain secret" (11) 
- "Health tests take place in the Ness" (11) 
- "Royal visit to wrecked ship" (12) 
- "Farmers and crofters get "sympathetic response". 
Agriculture gets organized to look towards the long term" (12) 
- "Wildlife death toll continues to rise as oil comes ashore" (13) 
- "Expert arrives from States" (13) 
- "Co-op donates washing-up liquid to sanctuary" (13) 
- "Society launch appeal" (13) 
- "Isles as wild as ever" (13) 
- "Checks on water supply increased" (14) 
- "Society sends a sympathy message to Isles" (14) 
- "MP asks "was it a disaster?"" (14) 
- "Millions available for compensation claims" (14) 
- "Scientists to assess effects on plant life" (14) 
- "Threat to airport from media's style of parking" (14) 
- "Fish worry closes market" (14) 
- "Claims men visit" (15) 
- "Speak out on radio" (15) 
- "Councillors describe how community coped" (15) 
- "Will it affect the isles roofs?" (15) 
- "Dutch link renewed" (15) 
- ""Fertiliser will help"" (15) 
- "Spill prediction" (15) 
- "Bairns will be on radio" (15) 
- "Calamity shakes Norwegian oil community" (16) 
- "Weather hampers salvage attempts" (16) 
- "Previous incident recalled" (16) 
- "Young people voice concern" (16) 
- "Emergency chain of command" (16) 
- "Alaskan key to clean-up" (17) 
- "Fears fulled by speculation" (17) 
- "Advice on how to cope with feeding changes" (18) 
- "Extent of land pollution" (18) 
- "What to do if you have oil on your farmland" (18) 
- "HLCA forms out" (18) 
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Table 2: 	Qualitative Synopsis of The Shetland Times. "The tanker Braer disaster" 
(continued) 
Date (issue) "The tanker Braer disaster" (page number) 
01/15/93, (02) - "Crofters want things to be kept in proportion" (19) 
(...continued) - "British Sugar among first to offer help" (19) 
- "Sheep clear so far" (19) 
- "Director tours scene" (19) 
- "Stock monitoring will start soon" (19) 
- "Fodder available" (19) 
01/22/93, (03) - "Blood samples all clear so far" (6) 
- "Burra bears the brownish brunt" (6) 
- "Water test results may be published" (6) 
- "Vet takes a spin" (6) 
- "Time to unwind" (6) 
- "Avoid oily bruck says isles' top doctor" (7) 
- "Dispersant chemical fails toxicity tests" (7) 
- ""Dirty money" is in the post" (7) 
- "The hazards of neat acid" (7) 
- "Wallace writes to PM" (7) 
- "Greenpeace leaflet" (7) 
- "Call for inquiry to be held public in Shetland" (8) 
- "Alaskan city sends sympathy" (8) 
- "Oiled birds mystery" (8) 
- "Essex people and wildlife centre" (8) 
- "Salmon on MP's menu?" (8) 
- Concern was "sadly prophetic"" (8) 
- "Sounding off. An occasional commentary. Shetland Times 
chief reporter Rob Fogg considers some aspects of the 
aftermath of the tanker disaster" (8) 
- "Labour unhappy about dispersant secrecy" (8) 
- "Hundreds signing up" (9) 
- "Ship traffic system call gets backing of council" (9) 
- "Help from Edinburgh" (9) 
- "Labour warns on compensation" (9) 
- "Superb response - Tories" (9) 
- "Chamber issues guidance" (10) 
- "Many complexities in disaster compensation" (10) 
- "Group set up" (10) 
- "Officials to meet over monitoring" (10) 
- "Divers sample the sea" (11) 
- "Questions arise over the peculiar brown grass" (11) 
- "Consultants will assess the impact" (11) 
- "Council means to recover everything it had to spend" (11) 
- "Chainstore has to eat its words over salmon" (11) 
- "seaway closed to tankers" (12) 
- "Board hears of difficulty in bid to reassure people" (12) 
- "Don't spread fertiliser" (12) 
- "Fears over mental health" (12) 
- "Stored crops are safe" (12) 
- "Youngsters have their say" (12) 
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Table 2: 	Qualitative Synopsis of The Shetland Times. "The tanker Braer disaster" 
(continued) 
Date (issue) "The tanker Braer disaster" (page number) 
01/22/93, (03) 
(...continued) 
- "Overwhelming response to plan to save industry" (13) 
- "Coastguard did the right thing claims mmariner" (13) 
- "Hundreds offer to help" (13) 
- "Vagsoy concerned" (13) 
- "SNP calls for safeguards" (13) 
- "Results given to SFA in confidence. Exclusion zone tests are 
carried out" (14) 
- "Puffins under threat" (14) 
- "Call for more volunteers" (14) 
- "Mousa clean" (14) 
- "Advert ploys "annoying"" (14) 
01/29/93, (4)  - "Move may mean a revision of boats' claims" (6; continued 
from front page) 
- "Dispersant alert as drums spring leak" (6) 
- "Elm grant for fund" (6) 
- "Computer model may be simply a dotty prediction" (6) 
- "Lang sets up group" (6) 
- "SIC appoints legal firm" (6) 
- "Water in fuel tanks to blame, say owners. B&H explain power 
failure" (7) 
- "Bulk of inquiry to be held in London" (7) 
- "Master mariners query statement" (7) 
- "Few claim forms returned so far" (7) 
- "Petition success" (8) 
- "Wrong George" (8) 
- "Group formed" (8) 
- "Staff praised" (8) 
- "Anchor report" (8) 
- "Stay off beaches, signs warn" (8) 
- "Tanker completely broken up" (8) 
- ""Hold inquiry in public"" (8) 
- "EC calls for wide ranging review of sea regulations" (8) 
- "Two names as assessors in Donaldson inquiry" (8) 
- "PM warned of economy fear" (8) 
- "Co-ordinator now at work" (8) 
- "Plea for probe by sheriff" (8) 
02/05/93, (5)  - "Tissue tests show sheep are clean" (9) 
- "Salmon firm quits" (9) 
- "Accusations fly over cash" (9) 
- "Group appointed" (9) 
- "Health survey funding" (9) 
- "All salmon inside zone tainted" (9) 
- "Debate declined by tanker firm" (10) 
- "Damage "minimal" - tourist chief" (10) 
- "Animal feed scheme chamges tomorrow" (10) 
- "Solicitors warn of claims office "conflict of interest" (11) 
- "The black rain in Spain..." (11) 
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Table 2: 	Qualitative Synopsis of The Shetland Times. "The tanker Braer disaster" 
(continued) 
Date (issue) "The tanker Braer disaster" (page number) 
02/05/93, (05) 
(...continued) 
- "Disaster evidence for US Congress" (11) 
- "Results of tests in library" (11) 
- "Chairman visits lab" (11) 
- "Braer claims meeting" (11) 
- "One in five signs" (11) 
02/12/93, (6)  - "Fish farmers face cash crisis" (8) 
- "Action group formed at Ness meeting" (8) 
- "At last - the Scottish Office gives results" (8) 
- "Clean up of beaches will be left to nature" (8) 
- "IMO boss concerned at lack of progress on safety" (9) 
- "Squabble warning" (9) 
- "Petition will be taken to the Prime minister" (9) 
- "Children rally round for isles" (9) 
- " Waters out of bounds around Braer wreck" (9) 
- "Inquiry in isles plea" (9) 
- "Crofting committee now in operation" (9) 
- "Alaska spill hit health" (10) 
- "Heated exchanges on monitoring of the land" (10) 
- "SNP angered by snub" (10) 
- "Voluntary ban" (10) 
- "Contamination is denied" (10) 
02/19/93, (7)  - "Hay fever hits as big bales arrive" (6) 
- "New monitor unit is set up" (6) 
- "Mullay sends personal letters" (6) 
- "Agreement reached to continue watching sheep" (6) 
- "Blow to anglers" (6) 
- "Doubt over legal fees" (6) 
- "Warning sign is up at Ireland" (6) 
- "Meeting will hear health results" (6) 
- "Compensation delay a threat to livelihoods" (7) 
- "Growers may need letter" (7) 
- "Inquiry call" (7) 
- "Bigton meeting" (7) 
- "EC chief visits" (7) 
- "£1000 for wildlife" (7) 
- "Hay or pulp?" (7) 
- "Ecological steering group members named" (7) 
- ""Negligence" not to put radar" (7) 
- "Publishers to donate cash from book's sales" (7) 
02/26/93, (8)  - "Ecological group meet next week" (6) 
- "Payment problems for salmon farmers" (6) 
- "Submissions to inquiry" (6) 
- "Feed available for crofters" (6) 
- "Promise on results" (6) 
- "Donaldson inquiry to hear evidence on isles" (6) 
- "Scientists "let down" by Skuld" (7) 
- "Bid for fishing aid" (7) 
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Table 2: 	Qualitative Synopsis of The Shetland Times. "The tanker Braer disaster" 
(continued) 
Date (issue) "The tanker Braer disaster" (page number) 
02/26/93, (08) 
(... continued) 
- "Beaches not being analysed" (7) 
- "Report claims no cause for concern" (7) 
- "Contamination levels in exclusion zone fall" (8) 
- "No intention to dupe anybody" (8; continued from front page) 
- "Scientists probe oil's origin" (8) 
- "Agenda changed" (8) 
- "Land treatment confusion" (8) 
- "Revelation fuels campaign" (8) 
- "Fishing ban may be lifted" (9) 
- "Health study result "reassuring"" (9) 
03/05/93, (9)  - "Back to sea for Hillswick seals" (12) 
- "Italian eye on the isles" (12) 
- "Public to have a say on study" (12) 
- "Movement seeks regulation" (12) 
- "Dispersants objection" (12) 
- "Lloyd's pay out share of insurance" (13) 
- "Moves to allay health fears in the Ness" (13) 
- "Tanker masters could be reported" (13) 
- "Format agreed" (13) 
- "Labour ire over inquiry" (13) 
- "Hazard cargoes on agenda" (13) 
- "Political discussions" (13) 
- "Jarlshof samples taken for analysis" (14) 
- "Fishing still improving" (14) 
- "Divers in SNH survey" (14) 
- "Full backing for petition" (14) 
- "Moves to protect the coast" (14) 
- "Salmon to be fed to farmed mink" (14) 
- "Call for clear-up of beach storm debris" (14) 
03/12/93, (10) - "Traffic scheme urged" (14) 
- "Social workers do their bit" (14) 
- "More problems for salmon farms" (14) 
- "Friends of the Earth gives evidence" (14) 
- "Conference debate" (14) 
- "Political parties unite over Braer" (14) 
- "Trout samples given clean bill of health" (14) 
- ""Collect cheques" "(14) 
- "Seals freed" (14) 
- "Disappointment at Ness meeting" (15) 
- "Burra and Trondra will bide their time" (15) 
- "Sailor's chaplain expresses thanks" (15) 
- "Ecological funding" (15) 
- "Resolution" (15) 
03/19/93, (11) - "Exclusion zone future unclear" (10) 
- "Openness pledge" (10) 
- "Union evidence" (10) 
- "Meeting moved" (10) 
327 
Table 2: 	Qualitative Synopsis of The Shetland Times. "The tanker Braer disaster" 
(continued) 
Date (issue) "The tanker Braer disaster" (page number) 
03/26/93, (12) - "Salmon slaughter delayed" (8) 
- "More oil appears off Burra" (8) 
- "Cross-party forum make demands" (8) 
- "Compensation payments pass the £3.5m mark" (8) 
- "Route code welcomed" (8) 
- "Fisheries groups amalgamate" (8) 
- "Action plea by trust" (8) 
- "Shop appeal cheque presented" (8) 
04/02/93, (13) See Table 2.1. 
- "It's symbolic, don't you know" (15) 
- "Nature group's pollution plan" (15) 
- "Minister accused" (15) 
- "Interim report on seawater monitoring" (15) 
04/09/93, (14) See Table 2.1. 
04/16/93, (15) - "Tests yield cheer" (6) 
- "Compensation claim by community discussed" (6) 
- "Warning sigh to come down as all-clear given" (6) 
- "Inquiry to begin" (6) 
- "No zone change due as tests continue" (6) 
04/23/93, (16) - "As inquiry gets under way Labour fears a prejudiced view" (13) 
- "Birds casualties might be worse" (13) 
- "Close watch to be kept on oil" (13) 
- "Opposition expressed" (13) 
- "Bigton group awaits community council's meeting" (13) 
- "Land quality results have still not arrived" (13) 
- "Study well under way" (13) 
- "£5.26m handed out" (13) 
04/30/93, (17) - no report under "The tanker Braer disaster" heading 
05/07/93, (18) - no report under "The tanker Braer disaster" heading 
05/14/93, (19) - Meeting to hear MPs" (7) 
- "Effectiveness of double hulls querried" (7) 
- "Claims dismissed as "pure speculation"" (7) 
- "Cash used to fund new wildlife trust" (7) 
- "Donaldson Inquiry arrives next week" (7) 
- "Study to be carried out on otter population" (7) 
05/21/93, (20) See Table 2.2. 
The section on the tanker disaster ceased to exist after May, 14, 1993. Articles on the Braer 
were scattered across the newspaper. 
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Table 2.1: 	Qualitative Synopsis of The Shetland Times. Special section: "Managing the 
Marine Environment: Conference Reports" 
Date (issue) "Managing the Marine Environment: Conference Reports" 
(page number) 
04/02/93, (13) - "A "chance to help change things" (11) 
- "Caithness opens conference" (11) 
- "Shellfish worst affected" (12) 
- "Full effects of pollution on birds may never be known" (12) 
- "Elements saved situation" (12) 
- "Missing Braer oil may be in sediment" (12) 
- "Chemical companies condemned" (12) 
- "Minister tells audience action is being taken" (12; continued 
from page 11) 
- "Pollution of sea debated" (13) 
- "Seaborne litter problem" (13) 
- "Funding call" (13) 
- "Sutherland calls for radical action now" (13) 
- "IMO representative outlines their position" (13) 
- "Insurers will not pay on damage to the environment" (14) 
- "Transferable quotas explained" (14) 
- "Worst problems caused by myriad of small emissions" (14) 
04/09/93, (14) - "Agenda for Action draft is presented" (12) 
- "International views on fishing quotas compared" (13) 
- "A potential role for the EC inmarine protection" (14) 
- "Lessons learned from the Exxon Valdez spill" (14) 
- "Braer played down" (14) 
- "Harbour's safety role" (14) 
- "EPA concept defended" (15) 
- "An Alaskan view of sea pollution" (15) 
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Table 2.2: 	Qualitative Synopsis of The Shetland Times. Special section: "The Donaldson 
Inquiry" 
Date (issue) "The Donaldson Inquiry" (page number) 
05/21/93, (20) - "The ideas came forward but the audience stayed away" (6-7) 
- quotes highlighted in the text: 
- "We could as vulnerable next January as we were this 
January." (Jim Wallace, MP) 
- "We would like to know the answer about the Braer as 
much as the people of Shetland." (Lord Donaldson) 
- "Another Braer could totally finish off Shetland." (Isobel 
Mitchell) 
- "We beseech you to make an interim recommendation for 
a pilot radar scheme." (Peter Hamilton) 
- "You are asking for radar coverage without the means of 
identifying the ship." (Lord Donaldson) 
- "It's not just a knee-jerk xenophobic petition." (Isobel 
Mitchell) 
- "Shetland utterly depends on the sea for its livelihood. It 
is very vulnerable." (Lawrence Graham) 
- "Shetland plays a pivotal role in the Government's 
revenue, yet we are still unprotected." (Isobel Mitchell) 
- "There may be more than one way of killing a cat or a 
passing ship." (Lord Donaldson) 
- "The recommendations which we will make are 
recommendations which ought to be accepted by any 
reasonnable Government." (Lord Donaldson) 
- "Radar alone would not prevent every accident." (Lord 
Donaldson) 
- "We very much appreciate the feeling of urgency on the 
part of the Shetland Islanders." (Lord Donaldson) 
- "We need to safeguard our shores this winter." (Brian 
Smith) 
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Table 3: 	Quantitative Synopsis of The Shetland Times: Number of articles 
per section 
Date (issue) Number of articles on 
front page and editorials 
Number of articles on "The 
tanker Braer disaster" 
01/08/93, (01) 3 article(s) 26 article(s) 
01/15/93, (02) 4 73 
01/22/93, (03) 2 48 
01/29/93, (04) 2 23 
02/05/93, (05) 1 16 
02/12/93, (06) 3 16 
02/19/93, (07) 3 18 
02/26/93, (08) 2 18 
03/05/93, (09) 1 19 
03/12/93, (10) 1 14 
03/19/93, (11) 2 4 
03/26/93, (12) 0 8 
04/02/93, (13) 2 20 
04/09/93, (14) 3 8 
04/16/93, (15) 0 5 
04/23/93, (16) 1 8 
04/30/93, (17) 1 0 
05/07/93, (18) 0 0 
05/14/93, (19) 0 6 
05/21/93, (20) 4 1 
05/28/93, (21) 1 0 
06/04/93, (22) 2 0 
06/11/93, (23) 3 0 
06/18/93, (24) 0 0 
06/25/93, (25) 2 0 
07/02/93, (26) 1 0 
TOTAL 44 331 
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ANNEXE 4 
Table 6: Synopsis of the public debate "The Cost of the Braer for 
Shetland". Length of utterances (% of total debate) by 
participants 
Sections of 
Speaking Out 
Role of 
participants 
Identification of 
participants 
Length of 
utterances (% 
of debate) 
Introduction BBC host Leslie Riddoch 36 (5.2) 
BBC interviewer Hughan MacKelreiss  
Davy Nicholson 
10 (1.4) 
39 (5.7) Shetland farmer 
Live debate BBC host Leslie Riddoch 172 (25.0) 
Panel Chief executive of SIC 92 (13.4) 
Convener of SIC 30 (4.4) 
SIC Director of public 
health 
19 (2.7) 
Members of the 
audience  
SIC Director of marine 
operations 
10 (1.4) 
Experts SIC Director of 
environmental services 
17 (2.5) 
Norwegian Insurance 43 (6.3) 
Association 
Greenpeace spokesman 7 (1.0) 
Natural scientist 9 (1.3) 
(American) 
Natural scientist 15 (2.2) 
 	(British) 
Shetland Sooth-Moothers: (60) 
residents a) petition organiser 31 (4.5) 
(lay people) b) journalist 29 (4.2) 
Born and bred (120) 
Shetlanders: 43 (6.3) 
a) South Mainland 14 (2.0) 
residents 17 (2.5) 
b) two adolescents 9 (1.3) 
c) two SIC councillors 11 (1.6) 
d) two social workers 
e) Davy Nicholson 
26 (3.7) 
 	f) general 
(NFU) 
Others Unidentified 9 (1.3) 
336 
